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Foundations of Character and Personality

An Introduction to the Psychology of Social Adjustment

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PREFACE

THIS volume is a posthumous work. Doctor Betts completed the manuscript in its main features before his very sudden death. He had written all the chapters except the last one.

Since then the list of Problems at the end of each chapter has been prepared for all the chapters except the first one, which he wrote; references have been checked and supplemented; the last chapter has been written; and all the material has been carefully edited.

Throughout the work done since Doctor Betts left it, consistent and conscientious effort has been made to do what it was thought he would want done,—what he himself would have done as far as others can approximate this. The form of his own style has been preserved as far as possible. Faithfulness to him throughout has been the lodestar of everyone who has had anything to do with preparing the manuscript for the press.

Among the persons who have aided in making this publication possible are Doctor John E. Stout, who wrote the Introduction. He was Dean of the School of Education of Northwestern University from 1926 to 1934, and has been Professor of Religious Education at the same institution since 1920. Doctor Howard A. Lane prepared a number of Problems and gave valuable assistance in other details. He is Assistant Professor of Education at Northwestern University. Doctor George E. Hill wrote the last chapter and supplied the Problems for it. He is Assistant Professor of Education at the University of Pennsylvania.

I am deeply indebted to them for assistance without which this volume could not have been published, and also to Mrs. Betts for her constant encouragement.

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RAYMOND A. KENT, *Editor.*

INTRODUCTION

The present volume is the result of interest and productive scholarship for many years in the field of character education. More than twenty-five years ago Doctor Betts collaborated in a nation-wide movement in the formulation of codes of ethical conduct, and made valuable contributions to that enterprise. Previous to this, his text in elementary psychology, *The Mind and Its Education,* set forth clearly the psychological point of view in the treatment of personality and character. Next was his volume, *The Social Principles of Education,* where he approached the same problem from the social point of view.

Following his work at Cornell College in Education and Psychology, he devoted his major attention to religious education for a number of years at Boston University and Northwestern University. As a teacher and writer in this field his interest in the outcomes of education in terms of personality and character is again clearly manifested. Among his publications were, *How to Teach Religion, The Curriculum of Religious Education* and *Program of Religious Education.* What he was seeking were means and methods for the development of attitudes, ideals, interests and motives that would result in improved conduct, and finally in improved personality and character.

The present volume reflects clearly the results of the work of these years which he devoted to psychology in its relation to personality, to the field of general education with particular reference to social aims and objectives, and to the study and interpretation of religion in terms of its contribution to the same ends.

The volume, however, is more immediately the product of his work in recent years, which may be thought of as being more specifically in the field of character education. A little more than a decade ago the term character education came into rather general use, and a movement was initiated which sought to secure greater emphasis in education upon personality and character. Doctor Betts was one of the pioneers in this movement and entered upon the task of a scientific study of the problem involved. He carried on a number of inquiries for the collection of data and was instrumental in directing some experimental work in the field. Several studies were undertaken by his colleagues and others, under his stimulus and direction. Research studies were made in educational institutions for delinquent children and youths, and in the public schools. In one school an experiment carried on over a period of years, resulted in some fundamental changes in the curriculum and in the policies of the school.

In the meantime he developed courses in character education and conducted seminar work in the same field. In co-operation with graduate students, he collected material from several hundred schools throughout the country which were attempting to administer programs of character education. This material was studied in detail, and classified and evaluated in terms of such data as were available relating to actual achievement. As Director of Research in the School of Education at Northwestern University, he gave assistance to a number of graduate students who made special studies in this general field.

This long-time interest in educational outcomes in terms of personality and conduct, and devotion in various ways to the task of securing improvement in means and methods to this end, are clearly reflected in this volume. In more recent years the application of much of the result of research, the use of experimentation in collecting data, and a wide study of various practices in setting up and administering programs, find expression here; and finally the interpretation of all of this by a mind long disciplined by careful and painstaking thinking, is brought to fruition.

The various chapter titles indicate the general categories and sequences in treatment. The following are some of the more salient points of emphasis:

1. Character is conceived in terms of social values. In the view of Doctor Betts, character is always revealed and has significance only in the conduct of individuals, and is fundamental to any conceivable kind of social order. It functions both in fitting into and bringing about changes in environment. The dynamic of character determines desirable changes in environment and in initiating and bringing them to pass.

2. Appropriate attention is given to "perverse personality" which results in marked misbehavior and serious maladjustment. The presence in society of the delinquent and the criminal is recognized, and remedial measures are suggested. The volume, however, is devoted primarily to a consideration of normal individuals, normalcy being measured only in terms of adjustment.

The physical as a basis for moral and ethical development is clearly recognized. Maladjustments have their source in weakness of personality due to neural disorders. Proper adjustments are brought about after proper diagnoses which reveal the causes of maladjustment, and the educative process is relied upon as the remedial agency.

3. The genetic approach to any fruitful consideration of emotional factors is stressed, and processes of development and maturation are emphasized. Improved conduct is to be secured through the educational method, and the agencies which shape social behavior receive somewhat detailed treatment. Motives receive an appropriately large share of attention, and a hier-

archy in their importance is established. Sex is given frank, scientific treatment and its significance in emotional life is recognized. Drives, dominance and curiosity are accorded rather full treatment, and learning is sharply differentiated as the effective means in the formation, development and functioning of motives.

Attitudes are regarded as an important source of motives, and their functional relation to conduct and adjustment is made explicit. Here, as in the treatment of motives, learning is the process by which they are acquired and developed, and this may be accomplished by means of organized instruction. Attitudes are built up through cumulative experience under appropriate environmental conditions.

The source of ideals is found in the immediate environment, hence the importance of education in providing an environment conducive to right ideals and to their appropriate functioning in conduct. Teaching ideals is made explicit, and detailed attention is given to a consideration of the steps in its procedure. Traits are regarded as particular forms of behavior, and trait actions as specific forms of conduct. The interrelation of all these affective qualities—motives, attitudes, ideals—is made clear, and their functional values are interpreted in terms of their integration in personality and character.

4. Beliefs and knowledge receive discriminative attention in relation to character and conduct. The basic fact here is the quest for certainty. A scale is provided for the classification of beliefs in accordance with the degree of certitude. At the lower end of the scale are found those beliefs which have little or no support in fact. Continuing upward in the scale, the degree of certainty increases until verification by objective evidence is possible. The importance and function of the educative process are here given detailed consideration as the only means of securing a rational basis of conduct.

5. Throughout the volume stress upon the importance of environmental factors is maintained, but not to the neglect of inner initiative and individual responsibility. The older concept of conscience and the newer point of view are clearly distinguished, and the retention of "conscience" as an indispensable factor in the development of personality and character is insisted upon. Self-criticism and self-compulsion are essential to any well-ordered life. Moral standards are in the last analysis personal and result only from growth, development and maturation of the individual. Environment furnishes only the material out of which such standards are created.

The social approach to moral and ethical standards is from the point of view of social codes as a factor in conduct. These are treated as to origin, development, change and functioning in behavior. Conflicting codes are recognized and explained, and the procedure by which evaluation, choice and application operate in making proper adjustment is made clear.

6. Personality and character are at all points in the discussion conceived in terms of habitual and consistent modes of conduct. "Right" and "wrong" get their meanings only from the consequences of conduct to others—the social implications, immediate or delayed. Conduct patterns are postulated and their qualitative aspects and significance are explained. Emphasis upon the integration of personality and character through education is implicit throughout, and is made explicit in the concluding chapters by indicating the procedure through which integration takes place.

In conclusion it seems appropriate to say that the writer had the high privilege of being closely associated with Doctor Betts for more than thirty years. As a student in his classes and as a colleague for many years, he has witnessed the growth of interest in character education and the development of the background for the present volume. In more recent years almost daily contact with the author has given the writer opportunity to become familiar with the researches being carried on, the meticulous care with which data were selected and evaluated, and the painstaking attention given to the preparation of material for publication. Among the notable contributions which Doctor Betts has made to educational literature, this final volume best portrays him as a great teacher, an eminent scholar, a distinguished writer, and it most fully reflects the incisiveness and honesty of his mind, the strength of his personality and the nobility of his character.

JOHN E. STOUT.

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CHAPTER I

MEANING OF CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

IT IS probably inevitable that man in his evolution should come to the understanding and mastery of himself last. Food, clothing, shelter, protection from enemies, were for long ages immediate necessities which admitted of no delay. So as a race we attacked first the problems of our physical environment, and have at last made the world a fairly satisfactory and comfortable place in which to live. In fact, except for death itself, an inescapable part of evolution, we are now reasonably on the way to the control of all the external obstacles to comfort which baffled our early forebears.

Our Chief Problems Those of Human Nature

We have made much less progress in meeting the problems that arise out of human nature. Of the forces which rule the behavior of men we know comparatively little. In spite of cycles of racial discipline, human conduct is yet largely irrational and often socially unfit. Instead of adjusting ourselves to one another as peoples, we stupidly fight wars. We blindly commit murders. We craftily take one another's property by robbery, commercial dishonesty, industrial unfairness, various forms of graft. Through unfavorable social environment, failure of understanding, lack of self-control, bad methods, we often unintentionally handicap our children, leading them into wrong behavior, making out of them unsocial personalities, faulty characters. We are unkind to one another, causing much unnecessary unhappiness. As individuals we frequently follow after wrong values, wasting opportunity and defeating the best outcomes of life. Through wrong use of our powers and failure in proper adjustment to the multiform situations that arise out of highly organized social living, we ourselves, lords of creation, masters of the material side of civilization, create the most difficult problems to be faced in the modern world.

If our civilization fails it will not be from the effects of famines, pestilences or any shortage of natural resources, for these things we can manage. It will be, rather, from lack of social adjustment among men, a failure properly to conceive the ends and conditions of living. If individuals fail to secure from life its supreme goods it will not be from want of material resources or the equipment of culture and attainment necessary to set free their powers. It will be from a distorted view of goals, lack of understanding of the self and its relations to others, failure of intelligent self-direction. If, in general, we refuse to return to the common pool of social goods as much as we take from it in sustenance, opportunity and happiness, it will not be because we lack intelligence, education, applied skills; but because we are short on character, and being thus short do not choose to make fair return for what we have received.

It was not so much a faulty economic organization as it was basic weaknesses in character that brought on the great depression of the 1930's, wrecking our financial system and pauperizing millions of our people. It is lack of character that continuously squanders the taxes and bankrupts the cities, that misappropriates relief funds, that organizes selfish minorities to prey on the federal treasury. It is lack of character that permits crime to become a major business throughout the nation, and that allows unscrupulous politics and business to corrupt the police and the courts. We may reform our banking system, curb speculation, modify the form of government, modify judicial procedure, make all the changes we please in social *organizations;* but unless these changes, however wise, are supported by a fundamental integrity of national character, fairness and good will, no lasting good will result.

Derelictions that have to do with our relations to one another are the negative aspect of an otherwise remarkable civilization, the weak link in a highly intelligent social order. Such weaknesses can be cured only by discovering and directing the forces which shape character and personality. To do this is an infinitely more pressing necessity at the present time than any problem confronting us in physical science, in technology or in finance. It is vastly more important than the exact form of government we maintain, or than the perfecting of our industrial organization, or than the stabilizing of our financial system. This is true because the values of such desirable things as these last, can be made effective only as they minister to a society in which human nature is better adjusted socially than at present.

In the following pages we discuss some of the factors that have to do with character and personality. First of all therefore we should consider the meaning of these terms. At the outset we must admit that the words character and personality are not strictly standardized in scientific usage. This is due mainly to the fact that modern scholars have only recently turned their attention to this field, and to the further fact of the complexity of meaning contained in each of the terms. "Agreement, clarity and constancy of meaning," as William McDougall reminds us, "can come only gradually, as we progress towards clear understanding of the complexities of human nature."[1]

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[1] See *Character and Personality,* Vol. I, p. 3.

Meaning of Character

The words character and personality are used interchangeably by many persons. In strict scientific usage, however, there is room for a fairly sharp distinction based primarily on scope or inclusiveness of meaning. Increasingly in American, and rather generally in English though not in German usage, character is narrower in meaning than personality; the character of a man is a particular part of his total personality.

According to Doctor Breasted the earliest recorded use of the word character was by King Ptohotep in Egypt twenty-seven centuries B.C.: "Precious to a man is the virtue of his son, and good character is a thing remembered."[2]

In everyday speech character is a word used with many different shades of meaning. We say a man *lacks character,* not meaning of course that he is without this aspect of personality, but that he is undependable, or deficient in some other desirable quality. Another person is said to be a *man of character,* thereby summing up in a single phrase an unspecified list of good traits. An old epigram has it that *character is what you are,* a statement lacking in clarity and at best expressing only a half-truth, for character is also what you do.

According to Charters, character consists of the "most fundamental traits of personality,"[3] namely the moral. Prince, like Charters, thinks of character in terms of traits when he says it is "the sum total of the predominating dispositions or tendencies commonly called traits."[4] To both of these writers traits are *characteristic responses* to given situations—in effect, *habits in action.* In his *Human Nature and Conduct,* which so strongly emphasizes the habit factor in behavior, Dewey calls character the "inter-penetration of habits"[5]—organized systems of habits. The same thought is expressed by Symonds in physiological terms when he defines character as "the sum total of stimulus-response bonds." He adds that character is, "in the broad sense, all of conduct," thereby ignoring the distinction we have made above between character and personality.

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[2] J. H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience,* p. 396.

[3] W. W. Charters, *The Teaching of Ideals,* p. 41.

[4] M. Prince, *The Unconscious,* p. 532.

Taking the long view of character as a constancy in the quality of life, Munsterberg refers to character as "the power to keep the selected motive constant throughout life"—a definition which seems to leave out of account the fact that motives change, and that a "selected" motive of this year may next year be set aside because of new knowledge or changed point of view. Emphasizing the stabilizing aspect of character, Thomson calls it "the basis of predictable conduct."[6] Kilpatrick, evidently seeking a practical rather than a rigidly scientific definition, says that character is simply "the organized aggregation of our working habits."

Close analysis of such definitions reveals two distinct emphases running through them. One stresses the *tendency* to (or readiness for) action of a particular type; and the other the *action* itself (expression of the tendency). Perhaps the chief cause of seeming difference in meaning given the term character in the definitions, comes from the use of but one of these two points of view when both are required to make the definition complete. It is an axiom in logic and exposition that most full and satisfactory definitions tell: (1) what the thing defined *is* as an object, existence or structure; and (2) what its action, use or function is. An automobile defined structurally is so much of steel, wood, glass and what-not organized as engine, gears, wheels, brakes and various gadgets. Defined functionally an automobile is action, speed, transportation. Looked at structurally and using terminology suited to our discussion, the automobile is a set of tendencies to action; its structure (if we are acquainted with machines) enables us to *predict its performance.* Looked at from the functional viewpoint the automobile is but this mechanism, these tendencies, expressing themselves in characteristic automobile behavior—so much speed, acceleration, smoothness of action, sureness of braking and so on.

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[5] John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 38.

[6] M. K. Thomson, *Springs of Human Action,* p. 63.

Applying this method to our problem, we may define character: either (1) *structurally,* as an organized set of tendencies; or (2) *functionally,* as habit, action, behavior, conduct, expressed in daily living. On the one hand (functionally) character consists of one's typical behavior in given situations; on the other hand (structurally) it consists of the organized habits, attitudes, predispositions to certain types of action in such situations. When we say that character is what you *are* we are referring to its structural or predictable aspect. When we say that character is one's general system of conduct we are referring to its functional aspect. When Thomson says, "Character is the basis of predictable conduct," he is of course defining it structurally only; so also when Dewey and Tufts say, "Character is whatever lies behind the act in the way of deliberation and desire."[7] When Charters defines character and personality in terms of *traits,* he is emphasizing the action or behavior side, for he defines a trait as "a type reaction."

We may grant, of course, that there is no way in which the background of stored tendency to certain types of action can be known except through its expression in behavior. There is no way to know the quality of another's desires, inclinations, habits except by what he says and does; and even then he may deceive us on particular occasions. Nevertheless there does come to exist in every person a certain *basis of predictability* as to conduct. We expect one person (with certain allowance for the exceptional) to be a gentleman in his behavior, honest in his dealings, just because he characteristically acts in these ways. We rightly assume that a tendency has been left behind by such former behavior. We expect another person to lose his temper, to show lack of self-control, to take advantage of others when opportunity offers, just because we know he usually behaves so; and we learn to assume *a resulting tendency* to such future conduct. There *is* therefore a structural something which may be called character, just as there is a flow of typical responses to life situations which also may be called character.

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[7] John Dewey and J. A. Tufts, *Ethics,* p. 203.

Meaning of Personality

Most writers, as we have said, look upon personality as more inclusive than character. Charters, for example, defines personality as the integrated total of *all* our traits, and character as a certain section of those traits. Resorting to figure, Symonds says, "Personality is the portrait or landscape of the organism working together in all its various phases."[8] To Allport personality is "the individual's characteristic reactions to social stimuli and the quality of his adaptation to the social features of his environment."[9] Roback defines personality as "the sum total of all our cognitive, affective, conative and even physical tendencies."[10] He adds that sum total does not mean a simple addition but an integration.

Emphasizing the all-inclusive nature of personality, McDougall analyzes it into "five distinguishable but inseparable factors; namely, *intellect, character, temperament, disposition,* and *temper.*"[11] Each of these factors, he explains, is highly complex and variable. All of them working together in a more or less integrated harmony comprise the personality.

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[8] P. M. Symonds, *Nature of Conduct,* p. 286.

[9] F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology,* p. 101.

[10] A. A. Roback, *Psychology of Character,* p. 159.

[11] William McDougall, *Character and Personality,* Vol. 1, No. 1, September, 1932, p. 15.

Personality, like character, may be defined either *structurally,* as a summation or integration of all the highly individualized factors that condition action; or, *functionally,* as the active expression of these factors in conduct. In either case personality stands for the uniqueness of the individual. This uniqueness extends in two directions: (1) each individual is totally different in the impression he makes on others, no two persons in the world being alike even in their fingerprints; (2) each individual apprehends or is aware of a self at the center of his being which is separate and distinct from all others, and is in an entirely unique sense wholly his own. And, in spite of all mechanistic theories of life, this self or personality is for practical purposes commonly accepted on the basis of awareness and experience as a true entity or integration whose reality can no more be questioned than consciousness or existence itself. Whether this apprehended personality is wholly the resultant of experience—the integrated effect of all the thoughts, acts, contacts of our lives—or whether it has a self-existent core, we shall not need for our present purpose to undertake to decide. The ultimate nature and source of this self is a question which has long disturbed psychologists, philosophers and religionists alike, and which is still far from being settled.

The fact that concerns us here is that what we recognize as personality (including character) in one another is demonstrably a product of growth and development in every individual. While infants do differ one from another, their individuality or uniqueness is at first much less marked than it comes to be later in childhood, in youth and in adulthood. This is only to say that our characteristics which impress themselves on others and by which we come to be known as persons must have time to grow, and that they require stimuli to condition their development. Likewise the other aspect of the same thing, the *self* that we come subjectively to know, requires time for development before it can be apprehended. Many persons can remember the very occasion when the existence of this inner self first dawned on them. One young woman tells that on a day when a girl of a dozen years, as she was going about her work in the home, it suddenly occurred to her that, *"I am I. I am distinct and different from every other person!"* A youth testifies that he first apprehended the self in him while he was trying, as a boy, to throw a curved ball which would not curve. The thought came to him, "Here am I and here is this thing that opposes me and will not do what I wish. *I* here, *it* there. Who is this *I?* What is *me?"*

Psychology, the offspring of philosophy, began with the soul. The quip has it that in becoming a science psychology has lost its soul, and that in adopting the mechanistic view of behavior it is now losing its mind. Until psychology has entirely "lost its mind" it cannot get rid of the recognition of self, the awareness of personality, the sense of something real and actual that stands for the *I* and the *me* of our speech. Nor can either psychology or education get away from the fact that this unique personality in some way springs out of experience; that is, out of all the individual's reactions to his environment, both the informal part that he meets casually and the organized part that is provided by the schools for his education. Personality is not born ready made, it grows; it is not a gift of the gods, but is wrought out in the activities of the day's living. Character is not an accident, chance; it is caused.

That personality grows with experience and that it takes on the quality of the acts going to make up that experience, are matters of common observation. Not infrequently has it been found by teachers and clinicians that a "problem child"—sullen, rebellious, unsocial in the home—shows distinctly opposite traits under conditions provided at school or in the club. The two segments of experience represented by the home and the outside have become integrated into two quite different selves. So also the man who is a gloomy tyrant in his home may be a jolly good fellow in his office or club, conveying an impression in the two situations of almost totally different personalities. Here again two markedly different types of reaction, continued over a considerable period of time, have resulted in personalities so different from each other as to seem contradictory. It has often been the defense of the heartless gangster and conscienceless outlaw that he was a kind and gentle father and a model husband. In some degree the principle that is operating to produce such instances is operating on us all, for who fails now and then so to act that he is excused as "not being quite himself today"?

Cases of abnormally "split personalities" probably obey the same law that acts to produce discrepancies such as we have mentioned. In both instances there seems to be a failure of proper integration of the elements of personality into a synthetic whole.

In what we may call normal variations in personality, certain desires, predispositions, habits, fuse into a drive which temporarily controls behavior. Let the situation change and another synthesis of motives takes charge, and the reactions are of a very different type. In the latter case the controlling factor in the change of personality seems to be mainly the external situation: the home situation brings into action its particular quality of self, the office situation its particular quality; the gang situation calls up sternness, dominance, relentlessness, vindictiveness, while the gangster's home situation evokes the gentle, complaisant personality.

Explanation for the abnormally divided or alternating personality must be left for the specialist. Based on available evidence it would seem that the action is in general the same, except that the cause for the personality shift is to be found primarily in certain disarranged neural conditions, with less of the responsibility on the external situation. Let one set of tendencies, predispositions or habits gain ascendancy and dominate to a marked degree and we have a personality that is out of proper balance. For these lopsided personalities the abnormal psychologists have names, such as *Schizoid* (queer), *cycloid* (moody), *neurotic* (frustrated), *anti-social* (perverse), *hypophrenic* (stupid), and others.

Within any single type of normal personality the individual self is fairly constant. This is to say that any characteristic system of behavior in given situations tends to run true to form. If the mother who is usually calm, restrained and gentle in her treatment of her children, one day in a fit of "nerves" becomes sharp, petulant and exacting the children will look at her in astonishment; the mother whom they had known and come to take for granted has disappeared and another and unknown person has taken her place. Likewise an habitually troublesome child who suddenly becomes "good" is sometimes looked upon with suspicion, past experience teaching us that this new person is planning to seek some favor as a reward. In short, we come to expect one person in a given situation to act in this way, and another to act in that way. Their behaviors are characteristic of them, the forms of expression by which they are known. So much is this the case that we say of certain conduct, "Just like him," or "You wouldn't have known her today; she acted like another person." The self by which we are known to others, the self that gives us our own sense of selfhood, is a *habit-self*. And if we have, in effect, several selves, then it means that we have several systems of habit-reactions fitting into the various broad situations of our social environment; something is wrong with the integration of the self.

Relation of Character to Personality

Let us see now whether we can answer somewhat more directly how we are to use the terms character and personality in our discussion. This much we have clear, that personality is the more fundamental and inclusive term and that character is the most important aspect of personality. Stated in functional terms, personality will be understood to include *all* the traits which together constitute the impression we make on others. There is no way of defining character as sharply as this, but in general we will understand it to mean, as Charters says, the "most fundamental" (socially important) of the traits of personality. Just what the most fundamental traits are none can say with exactness and proved authority. We shall probably not be far out of the way, however, if we think of character as being involved *at points where moral issues arise;* that is, in situations where *right* and *wrong* are concerned.

That right and wrong are not final terms any more than "moral" is a fixed value, we must of course concede. Concepts of the moral not only change with the progress of social evolution, but they differ among groups and between individuals at any social stage. This is not fatal to our definition, however, for there is still a considerable range of conduct which by almost unanimous agreement is called moral, or good; and another range called immoral, or bad. All forms of theft and dishonesty, most forms of lying, cruelty and injustice, taking from the accumulated social store without giving in return, the unprovoked taking of human life, failure to fulfill responsibility or obligation—these are forms of conduct that have few defenders in any society; they are not moral. Since they are concerned with important human interest, they represent fundamental traits of personality, therefore they are elements of character. Whether one has a pleasant manner, takes proper care of one's person, says good morning to the members of one's family, keeps cheerful, has a sense of humor, may seem important enough to those closely associated with one; but such traits as these are obviously not as "fundamental" as those of the preceding list. This is true for the simple reason that they do not touch social welfare so deeply. They are not "right" or "wrong" in the same basic sense that holds for theft, murder, dishonesty. If, however, we should extend our list of traits far enough we would quite certainly come to a point where we could not say whether to classify certain traits as sufficiently "fundamental" to make them questions of character or not. Nor would a classification that might hold for one situation necessarily hold for all situations: to tell a lie in one case might properly be defended and in another case condemned. We therefore reach the conclusion that no absolute line can be drawn between character and personality.

In the main the present treatment will concern itself with problems of character—that is, with the more fundamental qualities of personality that are of deep concern to society. When we use the term character strictly we shall refer to moral qualities. The limitation proposed for our discussion is not so restrictive as might first appear, for the principles concerned with the development of character will in general hold for the wider aspects of personality as well.

Traits and Their Function

Without definition we have been using the word trait in our discussion. We have looked upon traits as the elemental stuff of which character and personality consist. As this, trait may be defined from either the *structural* or the *functional* point of view. For trait in the functional sense Charters suggests that we employ the term *trait-action*. From the functional point of view, trait or trait-action may be defined as a *characteristic response to a given type of situation.* From the structural point of view a trait is *the tendency, due to habit, attitude or other prepotent factors, toward certain types of action.*

Some writers, evidently disagreeing on the one hand with the mistaken attempt of many to teach such virtues as honesty, truthfulness, courtesy as abstractions, and, on the other hand, recognizing that there is no such thing as an "honest" or a "truthful" response for all possible situations, have opposed using the term trait. Symonds, for example, asserts that trait "is sure to go the way of the 'faculties.'" The word trait, however, properly understood, stands for an important and clearly definable factor in character and personality. Freed from the older, false connotations that cling to it, it will render good service in our present discussion.

Since we shall use the term freely, let our point of view be somewhat more explicitly stated. Traits emerge only from the acts which express them. These acts (trait-actions) leave a residuum of habit or predisposition to similar acts, thereby through repetition in varying but related situations establishing a trait in the structural sense. Unless one habitually acts honestly, tactfully, dependably in a wide range of situations, one can by no possibility come to possess such traits as honesty, tact, dependability. Traits (in the sense of predispositions or tendencies) spring only from repeated trait-actions. But given the trait-actions voluntarily performed and accompanied by a reasonable degree of satisfaction, then the traits (not as abstractions but as pre-potent tendencies) are sure to follow. A trait never simply emerges out of nowhere into character. It cannot be contributed, directly at least, by heredity. It comes only through practice of the quality (trait) concerned. Put differently and more briefly, *a trait is a habit or closely knit habit-system of sufficient stability and importance to receive a* *name,* such as dependability, sincerity, or the opposite. Traits can never be completely generalized, for persons who are honest or dependable in one situation may be dishonest or undependable in another. Yet for well integrated personalities, traits do come to possess sufficient coherence and reliability so that behavior reactions are reasonably predictable.

The words behavior, conduct and character are inseparably related. In discussing character and personality we have used, besides the word conduct, such terms as behavior, act, action, response. These words, as we have employed them, need no formal definition. Yet in exact usage they do have a difference in connotation or sequence which it may be worth while to note.

When, in biology, we seek to express the simplest or most basic concept possible we speak of stimulus and *response;* or we refer to a *reaction* to a stimulus. For the next stage in complexity, intelligence or purpose, the word *act* is used. A related series of acts we call *behavior*. Behavior systematized or integrated is *conduct*. And conduct which has become characteristic to typical situations is *character* in its functional aspect. From simple to complex we may therefore make such a series as this: *reaction—act—behavior—conduct—character* (or *personality*).

For purposes of comparison and further clarification the following quotations bearing on character and personality are given:

"The personality of a man is revealed by the sum total of his specific responses to particular situations. When out of the sum total of these responses those which have relation to the accepted conventions and code of morals are especially considered, the term character is used." Chapman and Counts, *Principles of Education,* p. 123.

"*Extrovert* personality: is one in which there is a minimum of conflict or reflection upon the propriety and significance of the overt behavior, of self-criticism and introspection. (Those who act first and then reflect.)

"*Introvert* personality: the one who analyzes carefully before developing or carrying out an action. He questions his own conduct very thoroughly to see if he is about to act correctly, and often times defers action until the correct time." L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology,* pp. 255, 256.

"Two factors enter into physiognomy as an indication of character: (1) tonus level, and (2) habits of the features and permanent wrinkles formed at right angles to the direction of contraction of frequently used muscles. A slight perpetual frown frequently indicates the irascible temperament, while 'crow's feet' show about the lids of the jovial fat man." F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology,* p. 220.

"Our aim is such an integration or organization of habits in character that the full character shines out in each act, speaks through each act." W. H. Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method,* p. 321.

"Character is that body of active tendencies and interests in the individual which makes him open, ready, warm to certain aims, and callous, cold, blind to others; and which accordingly habitually tends to make him acutely aware of and favorable to certain sorts of consequences, and ignorant of or hostile to other consequences." John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics,* p. 255.

"Every decision made, every conflict resolved, is a step in the further organization of the individual. It may be a step in the good direction or in a bad direction, but it is a step in organizing the individual's reaction-tendencies into what we call character." R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology,* p. 529.

"I define personality as the sum of activities that can be discovered by actual observation of behavior over a long enough time to give reliable information. In other words, personality is but the end product of our habit systems." J. B. Watson, *Behaviorism,* p. 220.

"Character is a confirmed habit of moral choice." G. A. Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals,* p. 58.

Dr. John Dewey says that character is a name for "the total interaction of habits with one another." *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 39.

Personality "means the individual as a whole, his height and weight and loves and hates and blood-pressure and reflexes; his smiles and hopes and bowed legs and enlarged tonsils. It means all that anyone is and all that he is trying to become." K. A. Menninger, *The Human Mind,* p. 21.

PROBLEMS

1. Everyone has the experience of not "fitting in" with certain personalities. Do you know persons who: make you "cross-grained," ready to oppose, contradict; over-awe you, put you at your worst; make you feel gloomy, depressed or cynical; bore you?
2. What qualities (traits) in an individual are likely to produce the responses mentioned in No. 1?
3. Select from among all persons whom you know the one who seems to you the most attractive as a personality. Can you describe or list the qualities which seem to you responsible for the appeal made by this personality?
4. Do you think it likely that the total effect of a personality may be due quite as much to the *way the qualities combine* in the make-up of the self, as to the individual traits? Can one *do* anything about the way his own traits combine with one another?
5. Carry out the general intent of No. 3, applying it to the most unattractive or disagreeable person you know.
6. Subjective evidence of the "predictability" of character (or of the "spread" of traits to a range of situations) can be had by each person for himself alone as follows: Consider such a trait as *honesty*. Suppose you find in thinking of your behavior in various situations that you have acted honestly. *Does this extend to all situations in which honesty is involved?* Do you act dishonestly in certain situations? Follow the same method for other traits, such as, tolerance, fairness, sympathy, dependability, truthfulness.

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Chapter II

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT AND MASTERY

Using the point of view set forth in the preceding chapter we may look upon personality, for practical working purposes, as the *total impression or effect* we make upon others. This impression registers, or the effect is produced, largely in situations occurring in social living which call for acts of adjustment on the part of the individual. At the human level adjustment does not mean simple slavish subservience and subjection of the individual to the group. Room must be left for the play of individuality and initiative, for self-expression, even on occasions for dominance and mastery. The meaning of this distinction may best be approached by starting with a more general view of the problem.

Adjustment Required by Conflicting Orders

Two distinct though related orders run throughout the entire range of life at all its levels. The *one* order is that of the *reacting individual,* the single unit of the species, which comes bearing from nature the equipment of its kind for responding to stimuli suited to it needs. The *other* order is that of the *environment*. This is the matrix in which the individual develops, which provides the situations requiring response, and which limits and controls while it energizes life.

Every human individual as he begins life is faced with two necessities, *adjustment* and *mastery;* he must fit into his environment in order to live, and he must change certain aspects of it if he is to progress. Adjustment comes first as a necessity, for without adjustment mastery is impossible. Because the environmental order is so much greater and more compelling than the individual order, only when the individual has met the requirements of the main pattern of his environment is he able to change the smaller patterns. One must obey the larger laws of gravity, friction, energy before one can make a locomotive. Gandhi must conform to Hindu life and customs in their larger outlines before he can change the caste system. Any person who would change any single tradition or practice of his group, must first be in conformity with the great body of its traditions and practices.

The principle of adjustment is illustrated constantly in a thousand ways all about us—and within us as well. The pores and the sweat glands of the skin delicately adjust to each change of the surrounding temperature. Endocrine glands respond to the individual's awareness of danger by pouring hormones into the blood stream and preparing the body for action. Plants and animals not only take on protective coloring as required by their environment, but some change their color promptly when the situation demands. Species of life which are too slow in making adjustments to new conditions brought on by changes of climate or other adverse factors, lose out in the struggle for existence and become extinct.

Illustrations of the principle of mastery are no less plentiful in widely diverse realms of life. The coral organism build their reefs. Plants and animals add humus to the soil and increase its fertility. The lowly earthworm breaks the tough clay and prepares it for producing food crops. Beavers build dams and cause lakes to form. With the lower forms of life the changes wrought in the environmental order are controlled by no purposed end, nor do the changes always work to the advantage of the organisms that produce them. The coral polyps build reefs only with their lifeless skeletons. The fungus in destroying its host endangers its own existence. Even the amazing beaver seems to be obeying a blind instinct rather than following teleological ends.

But man works on his environment with intelligent foresight and purpose. He changes his physical environment in a thousand ways, carrying it upward with him as he advances in civilization. The dull clay and iron he shapes into buildings of great beauty and usefulness. He tunnels mountains, bridges the oceans with ships, annihilates time and distance with his inventions. His social environment man consciously changes also. He creates institutions, modifying them as need arises. He develops codes of conduct and alters them as conditions require. Through education he shapes the thought, attitudes and skills of each new generation. He transforms and civilizes his group by making changes in customs and laws, by suppressing the anti-social and unfit, and in many other ways.

At Human Level Adjustment Predominantly Social

For every individual from amœba to man the environment matrix is first of all physical. The single-celled animal floating in the pond lives alone; likewise the young child's earliest responses are to physical rather than to social stimuli. But at the human level the environment quickly becomes predominantly social. Every physical object takes on a social meaning. A table is to civilized man more than a convenient square of boards from which to eat. It is a symbol of prized relationships, of good fellowship and the interchange of thought and experience. Trinkets that have little or no intrinsic value become priceless for the sentiment that attaches to them. A house is transformed into a home by virtue of the human bonds which it shelters and serves.

In making adjustments to his physical environment and in shaping this environment to his own needs and comfort, man has been highly successful. He compels the earth to supply bountifully his food. He devises shelter and clothing. He constructs machines that do his work and serve his pleasure. He defends himself against the enemies of disease. But in the social realm he is much less successful. He still wages fruitless wars. Greed and injustice stand in the way of satisfaction and fullness of life. Fear, suspicion and jealousy create much unhappiness. Countless millions of people suffer and die because men have not learned to live together. Proud of our adjustment and mastery in our physical environment, we have barely begun on the problems of adjustment and mastery in our social relations. Says Professor Breasted, "Man became the first weapon making creature a million years ago, perhaps earlier, but it is less than 5,000 years since men began to feel the power of conscience to such a degree that it became a social force."[1] And so obsessed are we with the mastery and control of our physical environment that we yet pay the highest honor to the inventor, the manufacturer, the builder of material things, rather than to those who work for the improvement of the social order.

After this glance at the meaning of adjustment and mastery in their broader aspects, let us turn more concretely to their relation to the individual. Consider the child at birth: a reactor equipped with the mechanisms, inherited tendencies and whatever else goes to make up the human individual; yet devoid of experience and learning. Ready to receive him is a more or less rigid order into which he must fit. Instinct prompts him to eat when hungry, but the modern régime feeds babies by the clock and he must perforce adjust. Early vocal gurgles and chance articulations must grow into the exact forms of a difficult language. Greedy gobbling of food must give way to mannerly methods of eating as prescribed by his group. Impulses to many acts must be checked and behavior made to conform to standards set by others. A hundred social conventions must be learned and reasonably followed on pain of social reprisals. Adjustment is required at very turn. Little wonder that conflict arises at points of strain between the order of the self and that of the not-self. That there are not more conflicts and failures than there are, is convincing proof of the great plasticity of the human individual and of his capacity to learn.

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[1] J. H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience.*

From another point of view this ready compliance of the individual with social demands is natural enough. At the beginning the young child is physically, mentally and socially helpless in the hands of adults. Rebellion and refusal to conform may succeed up to a point, but on the whole the adult order wins; the young cannot work purposed changes in their social environment. Almost as tightly bound also is the individual adult. For the social codes and requirements imposed upon him are very compelling.

For example, the captain must go down with his ship, for he cannot survive and face the condemnation of established tradition. Only in recent years has it been possible for a man to refuse to fight a duel without losing social caste. When the *Lusitania* strikes an iceberg and is sinking the men obey a compulsion that is stronger even than the impulse to live, and the women and children are put in the boats while the men drown. Fire springs up in an Iroquois Theater starting a panic that causes a reversion to type; men with their minds stripped of rational inhibitions rush out, trampling scores of helpless persons to death—and later find themselves unable to meet the eyes of friends, fearing to see revealed there their condemnation and scorn for failure to observe the code that the strong must protect the weak in situations of physical danger. Even the gangster at war with the established social order is bound by the code of his class. Though he has been gunned and filled with slugs by his rivals he must not "sing" when under arrest, lest he be an outcast even in his own gang. In short, whatever the point of conflict, the social whole is greater than any single unit of its parts, and the individual is always under a compulsion hard to resist.

Expressing this fact we have the epigram about square pegs fitting into round holes—individuals who are unable or unwilling to adjust to the social practice. In primitive society the square peg who fails to fit into the round hole of tribal custom or taboo, is driven out and his life is made forfeit. Socrates was a square peg when he dared contradict the accepted opinions of his day and was forced to drink the fatal hemlock. All down through the ages square pegs in the form of heretics have been tortured and burned because they differed from the thought forms of their generation. Galileo, in order to save his life, was forced to recant the subversive view that the earth and not the sun moved. To come closer home, how well does the square peg called a pacifist fit in the round hole of a war-minded nation? How long does a college freshman last who violates a sacred tradition by refusing to wear a green cap or yell for his team at a game? And when fashion, whether in clothes, amusements or morals, cracks the whip, ninety-nine persons out of a hundred fall promptly into line regardless of individual tastes or preferences. The square peg is usually (though not always) on the defensive, uncomfortable, filled with apprehension, or smarting under the scorn and punishment of the group. Public opinion is more terrible than an army with banners. More necessary to the normal man even than physical satisfactions, is the approval of those of his fellows, few or many, whose esteem he most covets.

Source of Demand for Conformity

This tyrannic insistence by the group that the individual shall conform to established pattern, often seems cruel and unnecessary. Especially is this true where refusal to follow prescribed social norms brings no bad results and may even point the way to desirable change. Yet there is a wisdom deeper than reason and logic in the instinctive demand of the group for conformity to custom and usage. Civilization, organized society, is possible only with a degree of like-mindedness among individuals, and with a growing nucleus of accumulated social culture and custom. Institutions can develop only among people who within reasonable bounds think, feel and act alike. Organized society depends on bonds strong enough to overcome the divisive influences always present in human affairs.

That this compulsive constraint exercised by the group over the individual through its customs, traditions, laws, public opinion, is often narrowly tyrannical and unsocial, is readily agreed. Especially is this true when the group is rigidly static and set against all change, or when it is caught in the hysteria of fear, propaganda or crazes of any kind. Yet normally, that is in the long run and with plenty of exceptions for particular cases, there is something to say for the forcing of conformity by the group. On the whole the customs, the traditions, the codes, the whole broad outline of behavior patterns brought together out of many generations of social living, have a quality of practical value not always present in the acts of a would-be reformer.

Put the matter somewhat more concretely. Let every person follow his unrestrained impulses about mating, with no regard for the prescribed conventions, and it is doubtful whether permanent families and homes would continue to exist. Let each child, as the extremist in progressive education recommends, "express his inner self" without reference to the rights or interests of the group, and we shall later have an individual with whom it is impossible to live. Let no one obey any statute or common law except as it suits his whim, and all personal security and justice would soon be at an end. In short, under uncontrolled individualism social organization of any kind is impossible. The individual who receives from the group not only stimulus and nurture necessary to his development, but in addition has the heritage of accumulated culture from the past, owes the group something of conformity in return. Not only this, but the satisfactory outcome of his own life depends in large degree upon his ability properly to adjust to the society in which he lives. Social living is impossible without group norms to serve as the general pattern for individual conduct.

Points at Which Adjustment Is Required

To make any complete examination of the points at which adjustment is required between the individual and the group, is impossible for the reason that practically *all* our acts are governed in some degree by social custom or demand. Whether we sleep, eat, work, dress, bathe, go calling, go courting, engage in business, marry or are buried, all are in accordance with social patterns developed long before we were born.

Although it is impossible to analyze all the situations in which we are compelled to make social adjustments, two factors enable us to accomplish our present purpose with a briefer survey:

(1) Not all situations which require adjustment are equally important. That is to say, it is not as essential that we should be guided by established social patterns at some points in our social contacts as it is that we shall be so guided at other points. To illustrate, it may be disagreeable in a boy to wipe his mouth

with the back of his hand instead of using his napkin, or to have the habit of picking at his nose. But these violations of good taste and the social niceties are less important than the use of lewd speech among other children, throwing stones at windows, or turning to thievery. The first of these types of behavior has to do with desirable graces of living, the second with the deeper question of basic morals.

(2) All the situations in which adjustment is required fall into a relatively small number of large categories. This classification and emphasis reduces to more workable proportions the task of studying the problems of social adjustment.

All the *social adjustments* required of the individual fall under four broad relationships as follows:

Of person to person
Of person to group
Of group to person
Of group to group

That is to say, each individual must adjust to other individuals—friends, relatives, fellow-workers; and to groups—his family, a club, the opposite sex. Groups, also, must work out the general group relation to individual members and to other groups: the family régime to its children, or to the father who must leave early for work; nation to nation, one club or gang to other similar groups.

All the *situations* in which social adjustment is required likewise fall under a relatively small number of categories, thus systematizing somewhat a consideration of adjustment problems. The categories answering to such social situations may again be divided into two basic groups: (a) *pre-determined groups,* or those representing situations into which the individual is born, or to which he is committed by social requirement without voluntary choice of his own; and (b) *self-chosen* *groups,* or those representing situations which the individual himself chooses to enter. Illustrating the first of these are the family and the national group; one does not have to choose or "join" these groups. Examples of the second group are the Scouts, a neighborhood gang; these groups the individual enters by act of his own.

The more important, at least, of the *pre-determined social groups* are:

(1) The family group. Here the points of adjustment are reciprocally between husband and wife; between parent and child; between the child and the parent; between children with one another; between each child and the family as a group, with its standards, habits, regulations; between the family group and the individual child, as favoring one who is sick, avoiding "scenes" with a child who is emotionally disturbed; and finally between the family group as a whole and other groups. At one time or another in a normal life every individual must work out adjustment in all these relations; and upon the success of such adjustments will depend much of the outcome of life and its satisfactions.

(2) The school group. The school is placed in the pre-determined category of situations because of its compulsory nature; normal individuals must go to school. The most important relations of this group are of teacher to pupil; of pupil to the total school group, and to smaller groups within the school, as clubs, teams and the like; of school or its clubs and teams to the pupil; of school and home reciprocally to each other; of taxpayer to school; of school to its constituency and to society. Because education is one of society's chief instruments for working social change and progress, and because the outcome of the individual is in so large measure bound up with education, proper adjustments in all the relations of the school are of first importance.

(3) The local community group. Except for the massed

population in large cities, the local community is an important factor in American life. Here arise such relationships as neighbor, friend, citizen, elector, official. The activities of the community, with its various local organizations, its playgrounds, amusement places, public parks and many other co-operative enterprises, provide one of the surest tests of social adjustment. The individual who does not fit into his community as a smoothly functioning contributor to its welfare, is an unsatisfactory and usually unhappy square peg in a round hole.

(4) Work or occupational groups. Civilization—not only physical comfort but culture and all the finer graces of living—rests on a foundation of labor. The relations involved in work include that of the individual to his employer; of employer to employee; of the individual to fellow workers; of worker to the worker group and their organizations, and various others. In our present economic order this relationship in its broader meaning also includes that of labor and capital, with their many tense situations of maladjustment.

(5) Political and civic groups. The words state, nation, government, stand for important relations. Government compels payment of taxes by the individual, drafts him into the army, forces him to attend school, directs his activities by means of officials and police, permits or refuses him the privilege of travel abroad, arrests and tries him in court, and in the end takes his life if it decides the punishment merited. On the other side of the ledger, government affords the individual protection, provides schools, mail service, hospitals, roadways, health service and many other benefits available to all. The relationship between the individual and the government is a test both of the quality of civilization and of personal character. That this relationship is not all that could be desired among us at present is evidenced by the low state of politics found in almost every division of government. Many social maladjustments exist in

relations of voter, public official, taxpayer, politician, organized minority, political boss, lobbyist and others. In our social order we are far from the ideal state and the ideal citizen.

(6) Racial groups. Deeply grounded in human nature is the conviction that one's own race is superior to all others. While we look down upon "inferior" races, they retaliate by calling us uncultured barbarians. The writer, visiting an Indian prison in Benares, unconsciously found himself pitying the prisoners—black, uneducated, members of a race subservient to white masters, in the toils of the law. Suddenly his perspective was corrected by a caution of his Anglo-Indian guide: "Please do not touch any of the food which is being prepared. To these men you are foreign and out-caste and your touch upon their millet cakes would cause the caste-proud Indian convict to go hungry rather than to eat them."

Proper adjustment to social groups requires that we recognize differences without the bias that ascribes superiority or inferiority to that which is merely different; that we give ready appreciation to the strong qualities found in those of blood alien to our own; that we refuse to judge human worth by the color of skin, the shape of head, the type of costume, or the geography of domicile.

(7) National groups. The principles just stated apply equally to adjustment to individuals and nations other than our own. Especially does this hold for America, where clear national strains are almost unknown. It holds likewise throughout the modern world, which recent science and technocracy have literally made into one people in their larger interests and their destiny. Not nationalism but internationalism is the new basis of social adjustment.

(8) Sex groups. Difference of sex is a factor that probably goes deeper and touches a wider range of situations than any other human quality or relationship. It is sex that founds the

family and that not infrequently disrupts it. In the relations based on sex are found some of the highest satisfactions and the most harrowing unhappiness known to experience. The sex motive accounts for much that is best in literature, art and music. It is responsible for a large proportion of crime and depravity. The working out of satisfactory adjustment to the opposite sex is one of the highest tests of the personality. This adjustment includes relationships of boy and girl, of man and woman, of lover and mate, of husband and wife. In some cases various illicit relationships are added to the list, with or without social approval, according to the standards and customs of the group.

The *self-chosen groups* to which the individual must adjust are many or few according to the degree of complexity in the social organization. A hundred years ago in the United States there were few organizations for the individual to "join" except the church; and at that time the church was far more compulsory than the school, as it is in effect compulsory today for Catholic children. Now, besides informal groups such as incidental clubs, gangs and back lot athletic groups, there are dozens of more or less formal organizations for the young and an even larger number for adults:

(1) The church group. According to statistical reports somewhat more than one-half of the population over thirteen years of age in the United States are members of churches. If religion is to be a vital factor for the individual and society this would seem to be an important field of adjustment.

(2) Character emphasis groups. Prominent among these for the young are the Scouts for boys and for girls; Camp Fire Girls; Four-H Clubs; Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., besides many other semi-religious organizations. All such organizations have their objectives, their activities and their requirements, which provide situations requiring adjustment by their members.

(3) Reform groups. A large proportion of adults hold membership in one or more organizations whose purpose is to reform social practices which they think should be changed. Some of these organizations prove more of a nuisance than a moralizing force; nevertheless reform often must be organized if it is to be effective. The well adjusted individual may at times therefore find himself working with a minority group which is seeking to effect a change in the practices of the majority.

(4) Occupational guilds and unions. Almost universally those of common interests and purposes draw together in organized groups. So we have guilds of workmen, labor unions, scientific societies, associations of teachers, medical associations and many others. The worker who joins no organization of his fellows is usually not considered socially well adjusted.

We shall not need to go further into the field of the voluntary organization which we "join" and which in the aggregate play an important part in society. Most children at one time or another belong to some "secret" group. Adults have their fraternal organizations, women their bridge clubs, literary clubs and a host of others. Students have fraternities and sororities, scholarship societies, athletic teams and what-not. Each of these provides situations in which adjustment is required. Their educative value—that is, their effect on personality and character—depends on whether the situations themselves have value and whether the resulting adjustments fit into a desirable life pattern.

Social Conformity and Individual Initiative

A person may be out of harmony with his group either (1) because of some weakness, inability or twist in his own personality, or (2) because for reasons he considers valid he chooses not to conform. If the conflict arises from the first cause the case is one of maladjustment; if from the latter cause, it is purposed non-adjustment. Reserving the first of these for the next chapter, let us look briefly at the second.

Much of the social adjustment required is accomplished without conscious purpose or any sense of compulsion. Naturally pliable, the child falls into patterns of action set by his group. Not all adjustment, however, works out this smoothly. The desire or purpose of the individual may clash with the purpose or desire of other individuals or groups. Conversely, the group, as in the case of the family, may have patterns of group action into which some member does not fit, and the family group may need to change its habits in justice to the individual. Wherever adjustment must take place in the presence of conflicting interests there is danger of tension and unsocial behavior. It is therefore necessary both for the individual and for the group to learn the need of compromise, and to cultivate a certain degree of give-and-take if satisfactory relations are to be maintained.

If social conformity were absolute, that is, if all individuals of a new generation were to follow exactly the customs, conventions and laws provided for them from the past, the result would be a wholly static social order and change and progress would be at an end. Human society would then approximate the society of bees and ants. Fortunately, exact social conformity is impossible for at least two reasons: one is the *native individuality or uniqueness of each person;* the other is the *spirit of initiative, independence, self-expression, revolt or creativeness* characteristic of humanity at its best. The first of these two factors means that we cannot exactly copy each other even if we should so desire, for the simple reason that we are all basically different in the elements that go to make up personality. The second of the factors means that we naturally rebel at too close a control over our acts and that we demand a reasonable range of independence and choice.

The explanation of individuality or uniqueness in social response is to be found both in one's native equipment and in the social stimuli that shape development. Not only is the physical organism of man the most complex machine in existence but no two of these machines approximate each other closely in the detail of their structure and organization. For example, it has been estimated that the population of the earth would have to be multiplied some forty times before the chances would be even that two sets of fingerprints from different individuals would resemble each other so closely as not to identify their owner. Apply this principle of complexity to the human organism as a whole and it is evident that the physical basis of individuality is inconceivably complicated. In the creating of machines the technologist does his best to standardize each part so that it will be interchangeable in any number of similar machines. In the creating of living individuals nature, as we have noted, seems to follow exactly the opposite plan. No two persons are ever alike, not in appearance alone, but even in the chemical constitution of the protoplasm, in the nerve structure and tensions, in the hormones that incite to activity, in the integration of a million elements into a functioning whole. Each individual is the first, last and only one of his exact model.

The effects of social stimuli in producing variation in individuals is no less marked than are the effects of native equipment. Emerson spoke literal truth when he said, "I am a part of all I have met." The self, person or individuality is the evolving product of the experiences from thousands of different situations, no two alike for any single individual, to say nothing of their not being alike for two different persons. Not only are any two children born the same day immeasurable distances apart as they start, but this distance increases as long as the reconstruction of their experiences takes place under the influence of social stimuli.

Not only, therefore, is exact conformity by the individual impossible, but there is a distinct place in the social order for non-conformity. The objector, or the person who refuses to follow in the grooves of custom, may often be disagreeable but on the whole he has his uses. It is a well recognized truth in biology that evolution depends on variation among individuals. Out of a hundred plants of a single variety no two are exactly alike, each varying somewhat from the norm of the species. One plant may possess a more sturdy or vigorous quality than the others of the group and so persist while the others perish. Again, one plant out of a thousand or a million may vary so sharply from the others that it constitutes a mutation—and a new species evolves. A mutant refuses to follow custom and becomes a reformer, a leader, a pioneer.

Analogies in the field of social relationships are not lacking. Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed were religious mutants, founders of new orders. Cromwell, George Washington, Sun Yat-sen refused to be bound by social orders they did not approve. They were out of accord with the social standards of their day, essentially rebels. All such pioneers make endless trouble for the conforming group and are disturbers of the established order; but to them and their kind we owe much of our social progress.

Even on the college campus leaders of revolt are sometimes needed. A century or two back our colleges borrowed from abroad and developed certain practices such as hazing, fagging, wearing of prescribed costumes, carrying out certain ceremonials, joining certain exclusive organizations. Because college generations are short these practices quickly grew into established custom, became tradition, and took on a quality of sacredness. Now generation after generation of students meekly follow the established order like so many sheep jumping the stile, each afraid to violate traditions which lack both sense and humor. They are waiting for nonconformist leaders to break them out of the groove of established custom. If it should be said that the same principle is active among college faculties and the boards that prescribe curricula for higher education, the accusation would be hard to contradict.

Whether it is worth while to be a nonconformist or whether the group profits by the activities of nonconforming individuals, depends on circumstances. To refuse to recognize the dictates of a harmless fashion or to rebel at minor conventions, as for example those governing practices at the table, are unconvincing for the reason that no important principle is involved in refusing to be governed by them. Where nothing of basic value is at stake there is no purpose in rebellion; there is no virtue in being merely "queer." One could never make a national hero out of oneself by refusing to eat with a fork even if there is ground for argument that a knife is a more effective instrument. If, however, a group of girls should refuse to wear shoes with skyscraper heels because of the effect on their posture and carriage, something could be said for their independence. If people who prefer conversation or music to bridge when in a social group would dare say so, the change effected might be worth the cost of the shock to the conventional host or hostess. If the determined persons who at one swing of fashion or another are up in arms because of the brevity of skirts or the scantiness of bathing costumes, would direct their efforts to factors which actually bear some relation to morals the good accomplished would probably be greater.

For any particular person who is planning his social adjustment or whose social adjustment is being planned by parents or teachers, the principle is therefore clear: Under ordinary circumstances the individual should whole-heartedly and with good will fit into the social patterns of his day. In doing this a certain amount of variation is to be permitted in most situations in order to meet the necessities of individuality. Where important moral principles seem to be violated or where the social good demands it, the individual whose age and experience will warrant it is justified in breaking with tradition and following for himself and advocating for others a line of practice that runs counter to social custom and convention. To do this successfully requires qualities of leadership. Such a course of action is certain to bring upon the innovator adverse public opinion and scorn, if not harrying and persecution. The intelligent person who plans a course of action that will run counter to public opinion should therefore count the cost before he begins, and consider his own powers of resistance.

PROBLEMS

1. Is your personality determined by the environment in which you find yourself? Describe situations which alter your personality.
2. List ten persons with whom you are well acquainted. What is the dominant method employed by each in seeking the approval of his associates?
3. In considering this chapter the class might find it profitable to appoint committees to examine carefully the scientific literature concerning differences in ability, and characteristics of racial groups and sex groups.
4. Unfortunately most of us can list persons whom we heartily dislike. After listing a half-dozen or so such persons, write down what you really know about them. To what extent are you acquainted with their difficulties in adjustment, their motives, their feelings?
5. Someone has observed that social reform has always been left to unstable personalities. Consider the great social leaders in human history. What can you learn concerning their social adjustments?

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CHAPTER III

MALADJUSTED PERSONALITIES

THOSE who read this chapter are probably all to be classed as normal persons. Yet it is likely that no one of us is wholly free from certain "twists" of personality that keep him from perfect balance and adjustment. As the old Quaker remarked to his wife, "Everyone is queer but thee and me, and sometimes I think thee is a bit queer." The word normal has no fixed meaning; between normal and abnormal there is no sharp dividing line.

Normal and Abnormal

Normality is to be measured only in terms of adjustment. When Dr. W. A. White says, "The best mind is that which is capable of the greatest latitude of adjustment,"[1] he is not talking about intelligence alone, but also about mental poise and the ability to meet successfully the situations of our environment. The "normal" person is the person who most of the time, or in most of the situations in which he finds himself, is able to make a satisfactory response. Against the normality of most of us must be charged one or more such quirks as these: troublesome apprehensions, fears or obsessions that have no real foundation, a tendency to lapses of control when anger or resentment drives to irrational behavior, morbid desires that reason and habit condemn, fits of depression, sense of frustration, feelings of inferiority, unwarranted suspicions and such like.

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[1] W. A. White, *Outlines of Psychiatry*, p. 17.

Life, the hourly flow of experience, is subject to a system of drives and counter-checks. Each urge or tendency is balanced by some compensating restraint. Just as every flexor muscle has its extensor, just as the nerve energy that drives the heart into action is balanced by another flow of energy that slows the heart beat, so is each more general drive to behavior balanced by a check or control. Fear is acted upon by reason and pride. Anger is met by habits of self-control and standards of social conduct. The sex impulse is restrained by social conventions and moral considerations. So also intelligence curbs prejudice and superstition. Good will and love of kind, temper injustice and cruelty.

As long as a proper balance is maintained between drives and checks so that our behavior fits reasonably into the code of social practice, we are "normal." Failing in this we are "abnormal." A person may be acceptably normal in most of his attitudes and acts, and abnormal at but one or few points. He may be well balanced and companionable, but possess some trait of noticeable weakness, some "soft spot," as the English call it. For example, an otherwise attractive girl may be subject to fits of "blues" which occasionally make her a burden to herself and her friends. A boy of fair parts may have a tendency to evade responsibility by blaming anything or anyone but himself for his failures.

If our abnormalities, or maladjustments, are minor in their effects and not too many in number, they are commonly overlooked; no one expects anyone else to be perfect. If our troublesome traits become too obvious or insistent, then we are "queer," "bores," "cranks," so that we jar on those about us, In that case others may endure us, snub us or avoid us. Let our maladjustments become so marked that they make us a real nuisance or an actual menace to others, and they are likely to put us in an asylum or prison. For we have then so far passed the bounds of normalcy that society will no longer put up with us.

Sources of Maladjustment in the Personality

"No mental fact is fortuitous; it has had its adequate mental explanation," says Doctor White. All defects of adjustment go back to some weak or maladjusted point in the personality. This weakness or maladjustment may have its origin in a fault in the neural system, when the resulting disorder is called a *neurosis;* or the defect may be primarily mental, arising from unfavorable social environment and training, in which case the unsuitable behavior is called a *psychosis.* Because it has been found practically impossible to separate the physical and the mental causes of maladjustment, the later tendency in this field is to speak of *psychoneuroses.*

Physical causes operating to produce psychoneuroses include: (1) *Toxins,* which may originate either within or without the body. Prolonged indigestion may register in grouchy, irritable behavior. The poisons of alcohol, cocaine, opium and such drugs cause unmistakable changes in the personality. (2) *Traumatisms,* such as severe concussions or direct blows to the head. For example, a workman of easy-going companionable nature became violent and quarrelsome after being struck on the head by a slowly swinging steel beam, and was restored to normal again by an operation which relieved pressure on the brain. (3) *Exhaustion,* as from long continued physical or mental strains or from illness. All sensible persons learn to make allowance for the heightened sensitiveness and irritability of the overworked and the sick. (4) *Bodily diseases* which interfere with normal functions, as of circulation, digestion or the action of certain glands. Victims of some form of heart disease are characteristically depressed, while those afflicted by pulmonary tuberculosis are usually hopeful and often subject to moods of excitement.

Mental causes of psychoneuroses are difficult to classify, due to the fact that any severe stress whatever may disturb normal adjustment. Fear, worry, disappointment, sorrow, troubles of any kind may throw the personality out of its proper balance and induce behavior quite at odds with the normal individual.

Freud would account for many personality maladjustments by *conflicts* which arise out of suppressed desires or impulses, particularly (though not exclusively) those that have their root in sex. Many of these conflicts date back to childhood and, according to Freud, most of them exist only in the unconscious, not rising to the threshold of awareness. The fact that they are thus submerged, however, does not in the least lessen their power to influence motives and behavior. These repressed wishes or instinctive tendencies, Freud tells us, produce a state of tension in the mind. At all times the repressed wishes, tendencies, desires, are seeking expression through overt acts; but all the time too the social standards of behavior, the individual's own standards of fit conduct, act as a bar to their expression.

This situation is thus explained by Menninger: "Suppression and repression represent the forces opposed to the pouring out of ideas and the expression of wishes. They are the forces opposed to instinctive tendencies. They act in accordance with the education and idealism and moral education which the individual has had."[2] The thing that is suppressed the personality as a whole does not approve. Occasionally when the inner "Censor" is caught unaware the repressed desire takes command and an act follows that runs counter to the general pattern of the personality. More especially, the Freudians think, does the censor relax its vigilance in sleep, the dreams then revealing much of the nature of the repressed tendencies.

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[2] K. A. Menninger, *The Human Mind,* p. 268.

Alfred Adler, like Freud, would seek the explanation of many maladjustments in forgotten experience, but in his theory the later types of unsuitable behavior are *compensations* or *corrections* of these earlier unfortunate experiences. For example, a sense of inferiority, which may have a real or a fancied foundation in fact, may lead a child to acts of arrogance, self-assertion, bluffing, dominance over others, undue aggressiveness. The tendency of many individuals to extravagance in living, to over-display, to spending beyond income, may not come altogether from the tendency to "keep up with the Joneses," but from early poverty and the deprivation of much desired possessions.

On the other hand, the person who is oppressed by a feeling of inferiority may not react by thus expressing opposite or antagonistic qualities. An oddity such as a crippled foot, deaf ears, or undersized stature, often leads to retirement and seclusiveness. Or such defects may direct the energies to exceptional efforts in lines in which achievement is possible. Beethoven's great success in music seems to have owed much to his deafness. In fighting his defect of speech Demosthenes became a great orator. Napoleon's early ambition to be a writer had to be thwarted before he turned to soldiering. In Adler's view the achievements of these men are to be explained in no small degree by compensatory strivings to correct feelings of inferiority due to their respective handicaps, even though they may not have been conscious of the sources of the drives acting upon them.

Instead of looking to the past, Jung finds the explanation of various peculiarities of personality in the way the individual *meets the present situation.* Due in part to innate constitution and in part to the effects of social experience, two broad types of personality (with all degrees of shadings between) may be distinguished: one, the *introvert,* the other, the *extravert.*

The introvert, in dealing with the conflicts that arise in the daily run of experience, "turns back upon and within himself." He is intensely subjective in his thought and emotions. He is shy and inhibited, does not adjust readily to new social situations. He shrinks when met by a crisis, is easily hurt, slow in making decisions, uncomfortable when in the focus of social attention, given to imagination rather than action, turns to introspection, is meticulous in the care of his person.

The extravert shows qualities which are quite the opposite. His interests are objective. He is much the creature of his environment. He "tries to do or to make just what his *milieu* momentarily needs and expects from him." He lives not in himself but in the objects, activities and persons around him. He may even neglect the subjective self and its needs until neurotic conditions force them on his attention.

Contrasting the two types, it is sometimes said that a chief characteristic of the introvert is his "flight from reality"; and of the extravert, his "flight into reality." Whether or not we may agree that people can thus be classified into types, there is no doubt that the tendencies described under "introvert" and "extravert" do exist; and that they account for many of the differences in adjustment to be observed in individuals.

To give a critical evaluation of the positions of Freud, Adler and Jung is beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say here that each position quite certainly represents certain facts of human nature, though possibly with over-emphasis in one direction to the exclusion of other equally important facts. Suppressed desires and wishes do have a part in determining later behavior. Inferiority complexes do influence personality.

Distinguishable personality types do represent tendencies which allow us to predict with some accuracy certain broad lines of behavior. However the forces of our nature may operate, the past is always at work in us to shape our present and future.

Minor Disorders of Personality

On the physical side the human organism is by far the most complex machine in existence. The most delicately constructed watch, printing press or airplane is crude in comparison with the neural mechanism. Every hour of the day in any normal person more synoptic connections are made and broken, more neural trunk lines opened and closed than in all the combined telephone systems of the world. Correspondingly, the mental processes that find expression in thought, emotion and action are as infinite in number and variety.

Inevitably, even in a machine so long in the making and so highly developed as the human body, things will sometimes go wrong. Inevitably too the mistakes in our training and the faults in our environment leave their mark on the growing personality. Some element of the nervous system fails to function properly, a gland is out of order, ideas or obsessions take hold upon the mind with magnified importance—any one of a hundred things may happen, and the personality is disturbed in its balance, adjustment is imperfect.

The better service stations for automobiles now are equipped with a "motor analyzer" that can be attached to point after point in your car and in the end tell you what is wrong with it. What a boon it would be—or would it?—if the same thing could be done for a disordered personality. For a personality that is out of adjustment is quite as much below its full standard of efficiency as is an engine with something wrong in its carburetor or ignition. There are many minor twists, quirks and distortions of personality that will never classify one with the abnormals, and yet which act on the total outcome of the life much as loose tappets or worn piston rings act on the efficiency of an engine.

No rigid classification can be made of these neuropsychotic disturbances until further advance has been made in their study. On this point Menninger remarks, "Classifications must never be taken too seriously—they ruin our thinking; but fear to use them has prevented much more thinking." With these cautions in mind we may proceed to the following maladjustments.

Fear

In the words of Burnham, "Fear is the extreme form of disintegration,"[3] It disrupts the ordinary flow of experience and unfits the individual to meet new situations with proper adjustments. In a state of strong fear the personality undergoes radical alterations, attention is scattered, rational thought sequence fails, marked physiological changes take place. Acts performed under the stimulus of fear are usually well below the individual's normal power of performance. For example, the young orator who faces his audience trembling and quaking does neither himself nor his subject justice. When at the beginning of an examination dread and misgiving displace confidence, students are not at their best. Fear-stricken persons, when the house is on fire, throw pictures and clocks out of the window and carry clothing and mattresses out in their arms. A false cry of fire in a crowded upper hall causes a stampede that kills a score. The driver of an automobile who loses his nerve on a mountain curve is better in the back seat.

Fear is a species of retreat, flight or escape in situations where the individual feels himself inadequate. The flight may take many forms, from overt physical acts of escape to such established traits of personality as timidity, shyness, seclusiveness, suspicion. In many cases alcoholism and drug addiction are species of flight from situations of dread or fear. Suicide is the extreme form of retreat. Nations acting under the drive of fear take refuge in increased armies and navies; wars may be caused quite as much by apprehension as by desire for aggression. Arrogance and bumptiousness in the individual are often to be explained by fear of competitors or rivals.

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[3] W. H. Burnham, *The Wholesome Personality,* p. 293.

Some fears arise out of knowledge, are therefore well grounded, and so form a useful factor in adjustment: fear of rattlesnakes in a region known to be infested, fear of rushing automobiles on an unprotected street, fear of broken electrical wires. Such fears are rational. The individual by making proper adjustments can meet the situations from which rational fears spring. Out of such fears come forethought, prudence, discretion, wariness, caution—all desirable qualities when properly applied.

The fears which are most troublesome and which are most detrimental to the personality are the ones that spring from imagination, from unfounded beliefs, or from actual situations which one cannot control. Children fear the imaginary monsters of the dark from which no precautions they can take make them feel safe. The heart of primitive man grew weak with fear when he believed a legendary animal was devouring the sun. Children are often made habitually unhappy through anxiety and worry over failure of promotion in school. Fear of losing one's job, of failing in business, of losing out in the struggle for recognition or position, casts its shadow over the lives of many persons, destroying happiness, injuring health, marring personality. Certainly we shall not be far astray if we agree with Burnham that *all fear is injurious*.

Remedies for Fear

None of us wholly escape from the tyranny of fear in some of its forms—apprehension, dread, diffidence, anxiety, trepidation, funk. No personality is altogether free from the disintegrations, the unhappiness and the weaknesses for which fear is responsible. To avoid or cure fear for ourselves and those whom we influence, should be a major objective.

The first step in preventing fear is of course to *avoid planting unnecessary fears* in the minds of the young. Threats of monsters that will get them or calamities that will come upon them, tales that deal with horrors real or imaginary, moving pictures that show hair-breadth escapes, radio programs that fill the mind with nerve-racking imagery, threatening and intimidating the child by a dominating personality that towers over him—all such sources of fear might, with greater wisdom and kindness on the part of adults, be saved the child.

Simple *knowledge and understanding* protects from many fears. A highly intelligent girl was with others rehearsing for a play. Suddenly she became pallid, began to tremble, fell to weeping: she had just noticed that her group contained thirteen members. Scientific knowledge, the habit of mind that seeks adequate causes for events, recognition of the fact that as we know our world it ceases to be frightening—such mental equipment goes far toward relieving us of the despotism of fear. All fortune-tellers, soothsayers, clairvoyants and others of their ilk are a menace to sound-mindedness and ought not to be encouraged.

Objective interests are in general a good prophylactic against fear. The idle, inactive person, if predisposed to fear, has too much time to imagine and brood. This holds true particularly for those who have a vivid imagination and are disposed to dwell upon their anxieties and apprehensions. As long as one is energetically active toward some purposed end, fear has little chance to claim the attention.

Fear disappears before the state of mind that enables one to "*face the music.*" March up boldly to the ghost and it becomes the shadow of a tree. Hamlet gave us the phrase, "to take arms against a sea of troubles, and *by opposing end them.*" If you are timid in the presence of a person you recognize as your superior, seek contacts with him. Make yourself beard the lion in his den. Compel yourself to meet the terrifying situation with action and it will lose much of its threat. Soldiers find waiting for the zero hours more trying than going over the top. Aviators who have been in an accident are sent into the air again soon that they may recover their nerve.—All of which is to say, *cultivate courage and self-mastery* when fear threatens.

The power of one emotion to combat another is not to be overlooked in combatting fear. Love cannot live in the presence of fear, nor can fear live in the presence of love. The cornered animal changes from fear to rage and puts up a brave fight. More than one small boy has lost fear of the bully by giving rein to his anger or desperation and thrashing the offender. Indignation and disgust are effective antidotes to certain fears.

One who would free himself of the maladjustments caused by fear does well to *discover the origin* of each troublesome fear. A college girl who suffered greatly from shyness and timidity was shown by her teacher of psychology how these traits arose, not from any lack of ability or attractiveness on her part, but out of the dominance over her of an older sister since childhood. Immediately there came about what amounted to a "declaration of independence" against sisterly oversight, self-assurance grew, excellent poise developed. Let the child of eight or ten who is afraid in the dark understand how his fear arose, not from anything in the dark which threatens, but from hearing frightening stories just before going to bed in the dark, and his fear is quite certain to be relieved. In fact, psychiatrists find that almost any fear, once it is analyzed and its source revealed, tends to disappear.

Obsessions

Obsessions may take either of two forms: that of some insistent *idea* which thrusts itself upon the mind and refuses to be banished; or an irresistible impulsion to some *act* which is needless and useless. Probably a majority of normal persons are troubled by obsessions at one time or another.

These "fixed ideas" and impulsions are of many kinds. One man is sure he will die at a predetermined time; another that he will die by drowning, so he carefully keeps away from the water. Many persons are afraid to be on high places because of the impulsion to jump off. A college girl reports that she is troubled by the idea of everything she does being in some way evil. Not a few of us have got out of bed to satisfy the troublesome idea that we had not locked the door or shut off the tap, although we were certain that we had.

The fact that one has certain obsessions need cause no great concern unless the ideas or compulsions themselves are troublesome. They may be annoying but they do not portend insanity. Doctor Menninger calls them mental "beggar-lice." Psychiatrists offer various explanations of their origin, but the field needs further study. Dr. Louis Berg says they "arise without reason and remain without right of logic."[4] All authorities agree that they spring from earlier experiences the products of which have in some way become separated from the ordinary patterns of thought and behavior. Obsessions should not be encouraged by centering attention upon them—they are nothing to be proud of, for they *are* weak spots in the personality. On the other hand it seems to do little good to make a business of fighting them; this may even accentuate them. It is worth while, however, to understand obsessions for what they are—if for no other reason than that we may refuse to give them too great a prominence in appraising the personality. Something can be done also toward their control by avoiding situations which tend to call up specially troublesome ideas, or which afford expression for undesirable compulsions.

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[4] *The Human Personality*, p. 207.

Phantasy

It seems quite certain that in the evolutionary process, emotion and thought were not ends in themselves. They arose as stimuli and guides to behavior. The normal outcome of any complex of ideas is a train of action.

Under the condition called phantasy or, more commonly, daydreaming, this law is disregarded. The daydreamer lives in a world of fanciful ideas instead of a world of reality and action. Through imagination he creates fictitious situations rather than deal with actual ones. He pictures for himself glamorous acts and achievements, instead of engaging in real ones. The successes he wins, the victories he attains, the plaudits he receives are but pleasant mental fictions, playthings of fancy.

Probably everyone indulges more or less in daydreams. Some children seem to live quite completely in a world of phantasy. But it is during adolescence that daydreaming appears to reach its height, possibly due to the stimulus of sex which now becomes active.

Several undesirable results may come from excessive daydreaming. First of all, our phantasies are an attempt to escape reality, which may have brought up pain or discomfort, or which we simply may not have found interesting and satisfying. Yet reality must be faced if we would live successfully. After an hour spent in brightly colored daydreams we are likely to find our commonplace surroundings dull and sordid, thus opening the way to chafing, querulousness, unhealthy discontent, unhappiness.

Daydreaming grown into a habit, definitely substitutes phantasy for action. The daydreaming boy can picture himself winning athletic victories, swaying audiences by his eloquence, directing great enterprises far beyond any likelihood of actual achievement. The girl can see herself a great musician, an admired social leader, successful beyond what she is likely to attain. The danger is that, taken up with these attractive pictures, one will neglect the immediate activities and efforts which lead toward the coveted goals. The old saw that "dreamers make the world" does not refer to dreaming that is not backed up by purpose and action.

Excessive daydreaming holds a very real danger to certain types of mind. The thoroughly normal person is aware that his phantasies are but make-believe. He is easily able to shake off his dreams and take up the thread of reality where he laid it down. But let an individual with none too well integrated a personality indulge freely in daydreams, and he may find the dissociation between his everyday life and his dream life become so complete that he withdraws from the real world and lives in a world of phantasy. There is no sharp line between immoderate daydreaming and dementia.

Regressions

"I am afraid Robert will never grow up," remarked a father concerning his adult son. The quality in Robert which led to this judgment was not any exuberant boyishness that had clung to him, but a tendency to become petulant and childish in situations which produced any conflict. Not uncommon is the criticism, "She acted like a baby," or "He behaved like a spoiled child." Such behavior traits definitely indicate regressions of personality.

Regression can only be understood by remembering that personality is a product of steady growth and development. Old stages are left behind, old types of behavior dropped as new ones take their place. The adolescent does not *cry* for candy, the high-school boy or girl does not tease or pout or go into temper tantrums to obtain a desired end. At least they do not do these things normally. But let the situation become too trying, the strain too great, and regression may occur. The ordinarily agreeable and well-poised personality may revert to childish ways.

In extreme regressions adults have even been known to go back to baby speech. Wild outbursts of emotion occur. Reasonableness is supplanted by absurd obstinacy. Good manners are forgotten and social conventions laid aside. Self-centeredness takes the place of altruism. The personality becomes that of the egoistic child.

Such regressions are usually but temporary and the individual soon returns to his normal self. But let the conflict be too severe and long sustained, and the regression may last long or even be permanent. For himself the normal individual should permit as few indulgences in regressions as may be; he should not "baby" himself. In dealing with other persons whom we should save from regressions at least three principles seem sound: (1) Avoid unnecessary situations which produce the conflicts responsible for regressive behavior. (2) See that regressive acts do not yield satisfaction. (3) Provide outlets for expression in situations which avoid the troublesome conflicts.

Compensatory Defense Reactions

Few individuals, as we have remarked, wholly escape a sense of inferiority in certain situations; with some this feeling seems to be a dominant note in the personality. The inferiority felt may be real, as when it results from some physical or mental handicap; it may be imaginary, wholly due to some unfortunate circumstance in the social environment. With Byron it arose from a club foot. It may come from a defect of speech, or carroty hair; from being bullied and suppressed by an older dominant person; from hearing a mother or teacher explain "George is not as bright as his sister"; or from any other source that puts the individual at a disadvantage when compared with others or with standards set for his own achievements. A feeling of inferiority and a perpetual sense of defeat come to many pupils because of subject-matter that is beyond their ability in difficulty or amount.

Springing from feelings of inferiority are compensating defense reactions of many kinds. At the one extreme of defense behavior are acts of timidity and withdrawal; at the other extreme, acts of exaggerated independence, arrogance, aggressiveness.

Heidbreder lists eight types of reactions to the normal sense of inferiority. These appear in italics in the following list:[5]

1. *Self-consciousness or self-preoccupation.* Characteristic accompaniments of this state are: blushing, embarrassment, a tendency for the tongue to trip or for hands and feet to become awkward.
2. *Self-criticism and self-dissatisfaction.* One compares oneself adversely with others in appearance, dress, ability, skills; worries over mistakes or shortcomings; is given to self-analysis.
3. *Touchiness and over-sensitiveness.* The person of this type is always having his feelings hurt, is on the lookout for slights and snubs, takes blame or praise with great seriousness, suffers deeply under defeat.
4. *General emotional and nervous instability.* A sense of inferiority introduces emotional tension into many situations, with its consequent

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[5] E. F. Heidbreder, "The Normal Inferiority Complex," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* Vol. XXII, No. 3, p. 248.

disturbing effect on nerve control. Characteristic moods are those of apathy, depression, the "blues."

5. *Persecutory trends of a more or less definite sort.* The person with *an inferiority complex* generally feels abused, unappreciated, at odds with the world.

6. *Unwillingness to put oneself to the test.* Lack of confidence in the outcome hinders effort, dulls ambition, breeds the habit of defeatism.

7. *Lack of ability in certain lines of overt behavior which demand a fair degree of self-assurance.* Confidence is necessary to poise and various other qualities essential to success in social or business relations.

8. *Perfectionist tendencies.* Feelings of inferiority may result in compensatory traits of over-insistence on perfection, extreme fussiness and precision.

Wherever possible the individual should be saved from a continuing sense of inferiority. To suffer occasional defeat is no doubt good for the souls of most of us; constantly to believe oneself inferior to others is a handicap few can stand without permanent injury to the personality. Let the timorous, shy child who doubts his own powers be directed to achievements in which he can excel. Then let judicious praise and appreciation stimulate self-respect and confidence. The older person, conscious of his tendency to worry over his shortcomings, can cultivate objectivity, refuse to dwell on his defects, have pardonable pride in his really worthy achievements, remember that others also have their weak spots.

Rationalization

Rationalization is the process by which one offers plausible but inadequate explanation for some questionable act or desire. It is the inventing of excuses for what needs justifying; the offering of defense for what is but doubtfully defensible.

Many persons, perhaps most of us, think that human behavior is commonly guided by reason—that we think a thing out and then obey our logical conclusions. More often than we realize such is not the case. We act by impulse, respond to some biased attitude, are compelled by some circumstance, follow a chance whim, are driven by some emotion, in a direction which logic and reason would not approve. Then comes the business of justifying our behavior either to ourself or to others. Rationalization comes to the rescue and defends an act of doubtful validity. To ask a person why he did a certain thing is as likely to induce a process of rationalization as it is to uncover the real source of motive.

Examples of rationalization are so common that they scarcely need to be cited. We fight a war and then find reasons to justify it. Latin is inherited in the modern school curriculum from days when it fulfilled a real function, and we invent "formal discipline" to justify it. We gyp the railway out of a fare because "the corporation beats the public anyway." The student cheats in his examination because "everybody does it." We excuse our sharp retort by, "He asked for it." We explain eating to over-repletion on the ground that it is Christmas. The tactless individual exonerates himself with, "I always was a blunt person." Many of our prejudices are rationalizations—justifications of our own desires, attitudes or acts.

The remedy for the rationalization tendency is basically the cultivation of *honest-mindedness,* a willingness to face situations as, at our best moments, we know them actually to be. Any person who catches himself in frequent making of excuses or hunting for justification, may well be on guard against the unlovely habit of rationalization.

The Tendency to Blame

Closely related to rationalization is the tendency to blame. If an untoward act has been performed which brings self-accusation, or merits the disapproval of others, excuse often is found in blaming somebody or something else rather than oneself. Especially does this tendency arise with over-sensitiveness or when the sense of the ego is active and the desire to protect the self from criticism is strong.

Thus an exaggerated proneness to blame indicates a desire to escape responsibility or to emphasize the self at the expense of the person or thing blamed. Great ingenuity is expended in locating blame for a war that has been fought. The teacher is blamed (and sometimes to blame!) when the examination goes wrong. When automobiles scrape fenders each driver blames the other; blame your neighbor before he blames you. When husband and wife do not agree it is almost inevitable that each, in his own thoughts if not in open accusation, blames the other. Parents blame the children for conditions of conflict in the home, children blame the parents for lack of understanding and sympathy.

Often it happens of course that those who are accused are rightly blamed. Judgments of blame may be entirely sound and valid. Yet the locating of blame is usually a profitless proceeding. Let the tendency to blame and find fault become ingrained as a trait and it detracts markedly from the graces and attractiveness of the personality. "Let him who never makes mistakes among you cast the first stone," is a safe principle. Faithfully followed it will save many grouches and much intolerance. And by helping to live with "positives" rather than with "negatives" it will add much to personal happiness and good will.

Suspicion

Suspicion is distrust, mistrust, doubt toward the object or person suspicioned. It has its rise in diffidence, apprehension, anxiety, dread. It leads to false assumptions, conjectures and surmises.

Like fear, in which it is rooted, suspicion may be contagious. Children who grow up in homes which constantly criticize the neighbors, the school, the church, are likely to develop suspicious attitudes toward these institutions and those connected with them. Suspicion may arise from unfortunate experiences. The person basely deceived by a trusted friend needs to watch that his confidence in human nature is not undermined. The jilted lover tends to become suspicious of the other sex. Banks and bankers, many of them unjustly, came under almost universal suspicion during the depression days of the 1930's.

The well-balanced person is not too innocently naïve, does not take a Pollyanna attitude toward the individuals and events about him; but neither is he always expecting the worst, unwilling to place trust or reliance in those with whom he has to deal, finding ulterior motives where none exists. A suspicion complex should be avoided as one would avoid poison.

The foregoing are not all of the maladjustments which are more or less commonly observable in normal individuals. Those who would pursue the subject further will find plenty of material in psychiatric books. Our purpose here is to note that such quirks exist in normal persons, and to learn to recognize some of the more important of these mental twists for what they are—minor defects that in some degree injure the quality of a personality. We are not to think of ourselves as exceptional or queer if we have our share of such flaws; on the other hand we are not to think that their possession gives us any claim to uniqueness or individuality. Above all we should not allow study of these "beggar-lice" of the personality to turn our thought too much in upon ourselves. We should note such weaknesses as we have been discussing, only to avoid them and to help others escape them. The healthy personality is predominantly objective in interest and thought.

PROBLEMS

1. Determine the origin of the word normal. What is its implication for defining the normal person?
2. In what ways would you distinguish between fear and caution?
3. Ask a number of individuals to list strong fears which affect their behaviors, and to attempt to account for the origins of those fears. Are fears characteristically well-founded in real danger?
4. During the depression following 1929 we witnessed the suicide of a large number of apparently wealthy men. What would you suspect as being the dominant fundamental motive which impelled these persons to destroy themselves?
5. Attempt to recall instances in your own experience, or in that of your associates, which might be characterized as regression. Does any central motive appear to cause regression?
6. It is believed by some persons that the fundamental drive in creative genius has always been a compensation for a feeling of inferiority or one of frustration. Through biography, or immediate acquaintance with genius, examine this hypothesis.
7. Perhaps you are considering buying a new car, moving into a new house, purchasing a new dress or suit. To what extent do you rationalize in thinking about the problem?
8. What method have you found for shaking yourself out of moods or doldrums in personality? Compare notes on this with classmates and friends. Is any consistent method employed?

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CHAPTER IV

THE PERVERSE PERSONALITY

PERVERSITY of conduct has been and is man's greatest problem in his long, slow climb upward. Why can not we be "good"? Was Seneca right when he said, "Most of the giddy rabble hate the evid deed they come to see"? Or Ruskin when he wrote, "No man ever really enjoyed doing evil since God made the world"? If so, what is the explanation of the vast amount of conflict existing between the two orders—society and the perverse individual?

Degrees of Seriousness and Amount of Misconduct

In ordinary human relations latitude is commonly allowed for certain failures of adjustment. These are accepted as exceptions to a reasonable average of suitable behavior. Children are not expected to "behave" all the time; "boys will be boys" now and then; the police assume that the model citizen will drive at thirty miles occasionally when the regulations say twenty. But there are personalities who are quite constantly at war with their social environment. They conflict with the standards and authority of the family. They are at odds with the school, and misfits in the community. Older grown, they are rebels against society at large. Such individuals are characteristically *perverse,* habitually going counter to the larger social group; *wayward,* refusing to play the game according to accepted rules; *anti-social,* fighting against the established order.

The waywardness of perverse personalities is of all degrees of seriousness. There are the *problem cases,* as we call them in the school and in the home—individuals who through their behavior characteristically make trouble for themselves and others. These persons may be of any age from childhood to senility. Their offensive behavior is not of the type that brings them within the range of the law, but it is a constant source of friction, a disintegrating influence upon their own lives and the lives of others.

Then there are the *delinquents,* who have been found in acts which bring them into the courts. They become wards of the state, sometimes being placed on parole, often sent to "Homes," "Schools" or other reformatory institutions. And there are the *criminals,* who are too old to be classed as delinquents (those under sixteen) and whose more serious perversities send them to jails and prisons.

How many problem cases there are in home, school and community, no one knows. Their number is undoubtedly very large; for many investigations have shown that most delinquents and criminals have passed through a problem case stage. And there are of course many problem cases, perverse, warped and wayward personalities out of adjustment with their environment, whose unsocial behavior never brings them into conflict with the law.

Dating back at least as far as the twelfth century, the degeneracy of youth and the increase of crime have been favorite topics of writers and speakers. Many recent statements assert that criminal misconduct, on the part of both the old and the young, is growing. This no one knows with certainty, for there are no records sufficiently complete to warrant conclusions based on comparable data. The more careful students refuse to speak of a "crime wave," but say that there probably has been a gradual increase in the more serious kinds of crime.

In any case the situation is serious enough to warrant grave concern. According to careful estimates the total number of juvenile offenders brought before the courts annually is fully two hundred thousand. Probably about the same number are under some form of restraint in the schools, homes and reformatories provided for them. A large proportion of these, as records show, are on their way to lives of crime.

At the beginning of the year 1931, according to the United States Bureau of the Census, 127,495 adult persons were in federal and state prisons and reformatories. The number confined in jails and workhouses, judged by proportions revealed by an earlier census, was somewhat greater than this, making a possible total of some 300,000 adult prisoners held as hostages by society.[1]

Accurate estimates of the economic cost of crime and delinquency are impossible. The public cost of the administration of criminal justice alone runs well over five hundred million dollars annually. Private expenditures for protection against crime are estimated at two hundred millions at least. And this is hardly more than a beginning, for there are yet to be considered the losses from actual thefts, from racketeering and extortion, from protective insurance costs, and from many other sources. Taking a conservative view it is probably safe to say that those perversities of human nature which fall within the province of the law, are constantly costing more than the federal government plus the public school system. For the losses in productive achievement, in wrecked lives, in happiness turned to pain, we have no measures.

Sources of Misconduct

What causes the perverse person—the problem child, the delinquent or the criminal—to act as he does? Seldom does anti-social behavior bring lasting satisfaction to the offending individual; more often it is followed by pain, suffering and discontent. Why is it done? Is wrong behavior a product of free choice by a person who could do differently if he would? Or is it the result of causes outside the control of the individual, which, taken in the aggregate, make any other conduct impossible? If responsibility is to be located, where does it lie, in the offending personality or in the conditions that produce it? This question is important because on its answer depends largely the prophylactic or remedial treatment which may be used in dealing with the perverse.

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[1] According to Max Stern, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*. Vol. XXIV, p. 935, 52.9 per cent of the 332,712 persons imprisoned in all institutions were in 1923 held in local jails and workhouses.

Over fifty years ago Lombroso made the first attempt to apply scientific method to the study of criminals, and gave us what has been known as Lombroso's *criminal type* theory.[2] After extensive observation and many anthropometric measures, he decided that criminality is innate and that it carries with it unmistakable physical signs, such as the low brow, the square jaw, projecting chin, unshapely ears and other marks; and that these marks indicate a reversion to a lower stage of evolutionary development. This easy solution appealed to popular imagination, and quickly fiction writers, cartoonists, detective stories pictured for us the "born criminal," the "villain" familiar on the stage, in the cartoons, in the films.

This theory stood until in 1913 Charles Goring made a study of three thousand English prisoners to test Lombroso's claims. The results effectually did away with the "criminal type" theory. There is no criminal type based on physical characteristics. Misconduct is not a reversion that carries the offender back to some lower evolutionary level. Goring found that his convicts represented the general physical characteristic of the adult population of their country, nothing more, nothing less, except that they were slightly smaller in stature. Goring's findings have been abundantly supported by later investigators. Problem cases, delinquents, criminals as they average are like the rest of us in appearance, cranial measurements, facial outline and all other physical qualities. Beetling brows, large teeth, prominent jaws, coarse skin are not evidences of criminal tendency. There is no "criminal type."

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[2] C. Lombroso, *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies*, p. xiv.

The explanation of abnormal perversity was next sought in some *defect of mentality*. The problem child in the school usually was found retarded and so was classed as of low intelligence. When intelligence testing came into vogue it seemed to show that delinquents and criminals were of distinctly low mental caliber. Terman was sure that mental deficiency played a "fearful rôle" in delinquency."[3] Goddard went even farther and called low-grade mentality "the greatest single cause of delinquency."[4] Later investigations based on better tests and much larger numbers disproved these strong claims. True it is that problem children and delinquents have I.Qs. somewhat lower than the population average. While the general population is supposed to show an average I.Q. of approximately 100, delinquents and criminals average around 90. Under present school and community conditions it is likely that low intelligence favors a tendency to misconduct. The dull child in the school falls behind in his class, is made the butt of gibes by his mates and of reproofs by his teacher. No wonder that he loses interest, grows resentful, becomes a rebel. In the gang the boy who is not bright is made the dupe of the others, sent to steal or perform some act of vandalism for which he falls into the hands of the police, while they, the instigators, escape. The same principle holds in more serious adult crimes. Often the "brains" of the gang uses in positions where the risk of getting caught is greatest, those of his followers whose intelligence is not sufficient to show them that they are being used.

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[3] L. M. Terman, *The Meaurement of Intelligence,* p. 9.

[4] H. H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence,* p. 73.

Naturally they are the ones who are caught. Low intelligence, we may conclude, is not in itself a direct cause of misconduct, but it often leads into compromising situations which would be avoided by brighter minds.

More recent reports give us still further information. In a study of seven hundred fifty-one boys of five different states made by Bowles and Bloodgood,[5] it was found at the time of commitment (1) that fifty per cent came from broken homes; (2) that at least three-fourths were retarded in school and sixty per cent had records of habitual truancy; (3) that stealing was the reason for commitment in two-thirds of the cases; and (4) that seventy-seven per cent had previous delinquency records.[6]

A study of one hundred forty-three delinquents and one hundred forty-three non-delinquents was made at the Yale Institute of Human Relations.[7]

"Comparison of the emotional experiences and emotional reactions of delinquents and controls show by far the greatest difference that we have been able to discover between the two groups."[8]

". . . No less than *91 per cent of the delinquents* gave clear evidence of being or having been very unhappy and discontented in their life circumstances or extremely disturbed because of emotion-provoking situations or experiences. In great contradiction we found similar evidences of inner stresses at most in only *13 per cent of the controls.*"[9]

The delinquents fell into three groups:[10] Twenty-six were abnormal personalities; fifty were comparatively normal personalities but with only bad social pathology; and sixty-seven were comparatively normal personalities and with comparatively good social environment.

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[5] *Institutional Treatment of Delinquent Boys,* Part 2, *A Study of 751 Boys,* U. S. Department of Labor, Children's Bureau Publication No. 230.

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 35 and 36.

[7] William F. Healy and Augusta F. Bonner, *New Lights on Delinquency and Its Treatment.*

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 122.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid p. 161-172.

The net effect of low intelligence, emotional instability and other neurotic tendencies is to produce what some scientists have called *moral imbeciles*. Some psychiatrists speak of individuals who are legally sane but morally incompetent. British law defines moral imbeciles as "persons who from an early age display some permanent mental defect, coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has little or no deterrent effect." Tredgold goes so far as to claim that abnormally defective moral sense may exist along with normal or superior intelligence.[11] This the distinguished authority, Dr. William Healy, flatly contradicts. Speaking of his work with delinquents, Doctor Healy says: "We have constantly been on the lookout for a moral imbecile, that is, a person not subnormal and otherwise intact in mental powers, who shows himself devoid of moral feeling. We have found not one."[12]

Healy's conclusions are upheld by the findings of other recent investigators. Modern psychology also supports this position on theoretical grounds. For psychology fails to discover in the individual anything answering to an innate moral sense, any inborn power to perceive right and wrong. Whatever lack of the "moral" one may have goes back to intelligence, ideas, attitudes, judgments, applied to particular situations.

It is likely that most misconduct must be charged primarily to the influences coming from the *social environment*. We may allow that defective mentality makes unsocial conduct easier; we may agree that certain organic disorders, especially such as affect the neural system or the endocrine glands, provide conditions favoring perversity of behavior; we may find in emotional instability a fruitful source of erratic conduct. Yet these are but *predisposing* factors. Their power is not absolute and determinative. They can be checked or encouraged by the social influences brought to bear on the individual. In fact we should probably be justified in saying that *no person,* could the social environment be suited to his individual characteristics, need develop into a problem case, a delinquent or a criminal. Proper environment can restrain and correct the conditions that lead to perversity. On the other hand, no matter how perfect the physical and the mental at the start, the most finely endowed individual can be changed into an anti-social personality if subjected early enough and persistently enough to improper environment.

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[11] A. F. Tredgold, *Mental Deficiency*, pp. 348, 349.

[12] William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, pp. 783, 784.

"Environment made criminals," says Berg, "who are far more numerous than organic criminals, usually have few or no physical disorders to account for their unlawful acts."[13] A child who is perfectly normal in physical equipment, may have his lot cast in a social situation which conditions behavior into anti-social directions. The better he orients himself to an environment of thievery and violence, the farther he is on the road to perversity as defined by the more highly socialized group.

This is shown on a broad scale by Shaw[14] in his study of delinquency areas in Chicago. Basing his investigation on court records, he computed by mile wide zones around the Loop the percentage of offenders in the total population represented by male delinquents, female delinquents and male criminals. Practically without exception for all three classes he found misconduct decreasing from the Loop outward. (The proportions of this decrease are shown in the diagram on page 9.) It is seen, for example, that while for boys the delinquency rate in the zone nearest the Loop is 15.3 out of

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[13] L. Berg, *The Human Personality,* p. 231.

[14] C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas,* pp. 92, 134 and 158.


GIRLS
0.8
0.7
1.0
1.1
1.4
2.0
3.3
3.8
3.8
BOYS
3.1
2.9
2.9
3.5
4.7
6.2
9.0
9.1
15.3
LOOP
Lake Michigan
5.2
3.37
2.46
1.90
1.10
0.81
0.63
0.52
0.43
0.43
ADULT MALES
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
ZONES

Percentage of 7,541 adult male offenders; of 8,141 male delinquents; and of 2,869 female delinquents by mile zones surrounding the Loop in Chicago. (Adapted from C. R. Shaw,[15] *Delinquency Areas*, University of Chicago Press, 1929.)

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[15] Shaw, *Delinquency Areas.*
Adult male offenders, p. 134.
Male delinquents, p. 92.
Female delinquents, p. 158.

every hundred boys ten to sixteen years of age, the rate falls to 2.9 seven and eight miles out (rising again to 3.7 at nine miles). For girls the delinquency rate drops from 3.8 per cent in zone 1, to 0.7 and .08 per cent at eight and nine miles out. For adult male criminals the rates are 5.2 per cent in the Loop and 0.43 per cent nine miles away.

Interpreting these facts, Shaw says: "School truancy, juvenile delinquency and adult crime, rather than being distributed uniformly throughout the city, are largely concentrated in certain areas. The highest rates are found in areas adjacent to the central business districts and the large industrial centers, while the lowest rates occur in the outlying residential communities. The areas in which the greatest concentrations and highest rates are found . . . are in a process of transition from residence to business and industry and are characterized by physical deterioration, decreasing population, and the disintegration of the conventional neighborhood culture and organization."[16]

This is all to say that in the zones of high delinquency rate there are fewer good homes, fewer playgrounds, fewer resources for innocent amusement and recreation. On the other hand, there is in the high rate zones more of vice, of gangs and hoodlums, of saloons and gambling, of hostility to law, and of various other influences least helpful to proper social adjustment.

The child who grows up in an unfavorable social environment may be well adjusted *to that environment*. There are parents who look leniently on stealing, just so one does not get caught; who rail at all "cops" and at the courts; who even force their children to go out and sneak milk bottles from back doors, "rustle" bags of coal from near-by dealers, bring in salable bits of junk from an adjacent yard. Such homes also often set examples of discord, drunkenness and abuse. Sympathy, consideration for others, all the graces of happy family life are lacking; the law of the jungle rules. There are not only homes but whole communities in which the prevailing tone and sentiment make heroes out of the gangster and the hoodlum, and in which any trickery that "beats the police" is rewarded by appreciation. From such a social environment problem cases, delinquents and criminals are the natural and, on the whole, the inevitable product.

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[16] C. R. Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

We may conclude, then, with Sullenger that "delinquency cannot be explained in terms of any one or few causative factors. It is a by-product of a vast number of minute social responses.[17]

Perverse conduct is due in the main to three major causes: (1) emotional stresses and disturbances; (2) physical activity as exhibited in restlessness and greater activity as shown in delinquents over non-delinquents; and (3) ideational life such as the child or youth may observe from movie attendance or the pressures of national ideology.[18]

Whatever its physical and mental foundations one thing is sure. Misconduct develops into an established habit only in situations which permit adjustment to wrong standards, or which permit maladjustment to situations themselves otherwise acceptable. In its last analysis perversity of behavior is but a system of habits gone wrong.

The Problem Case

Types of misconduct which characterize the problem case, vary with age and also with the relationship sustained to others. Behavior which is amusing in the child of three is looked upon askance at six, is definitely offensive at twelve, and wholly taboo at sixteen. The "showing off" which is often thoughtlessly encouraged in young children, is sharply banned a dozen years later. Tantrums of temper which are endured when staged by the very young, are unendurable in adults. So also children often act toward parents in a manner that would not be tolerated in the school, and parents treat children with a lack of consideration and respect which teachers would not show toward their pupils. And it not infrequently happens that husbands and wives take a tone toward each other in the home, which neither would use toward others outside.

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[17] Thomas E. Sullenger, *The Social Determinant in Juvenile Delinquency,* p. 7. An unpublished Doctor's thesis at the University of Missouri, 1929.

[18] See Olof Kinberg's *Basic Problems of Criminalology,* Copenhagen, 1935.

One important fact which is often overlooked is that parents and teachers are quite as likely to be "problems" to the child as the child is to parents and teachers. Always in situations where there is conflict there is a clash of will, of purpose, or of desire. In many cases the situation which produces the conflict is not wisely handled by those in charge of the child. The aggravating situation might have been saved by diverting the child's attention; the exciting causes might have been removed or lessened; the adult might have exerted the necessary control in such a way as to avoid conflict instead of inviting it. Adults in their treatment of children (or of each other!) are not always reasonable, free from the sharpness and anger that breed resentment, courteous, kind and well-mannered. They are not always consistent in their standards and demands, so that children come to know what to expect. In short, based on proportionate numbers, there are probably fully as many problem-case parents, and possibly problem-case teachers, as there are problem-case children under their control. Children quite likely average as well adjusted *as children,* as their adult mentors average *as parents and teachers.*

Problem cases on the adult level are so common that they hardly need illustration. Back of unhappy marital relations are practically always one, if not two, problem cases. It may be that the problem is one of sex. It may be one of lack of consideration of one person for the other, of small defects magnified until they become unendurable, of extravagance, of divergence of interests, of incompatibility of temper, or a hundred other causes of conflict. Then unless concessions and readjustments are made, the tension grows or endurance joins with indifference to keep the peace.

Nor is any community without its problem cases: the neighbor who plays the radio late at night; who offends with ill-kept premises; who is constantly watching for infringements of his "rights" by neighborhood children, dogs, and other such community necessities. There is also the picnic party which litters the park or the roadway, the man or woman who cuts in on protected streets without stopping the car, the deliveryman who traverses the lawn and makes a path through the hedge, the family which evades quarantine—and so on endlessly. All of us are problem cases at the points where others must constantly "make allowance" or restrain resentment for some characteristic habit of conduct which brings friction and annoyance into otherwise satisfactory human relations. Conversely, other persons are problem cases when their ways or purposes habitually conflict with our own. We may be right in our demands, or they may be right, or both may be at fault. But there is no doubt about the friction produced by the antisocial behavior.

To most parents and teachers the worst problem case is the one whose behavior produces the most friction or annoyance. With this the psychologist and the psychiatrist would not always agree. For example, timidity and shyness in children do not cause great trouble in the home or the school, so the timid, shy child is not a problem case to the parent or teacher. On the other hand, aggressive behavior on the part of children rudely disturbs the smooth-running home or school, so markedly assertive or disobedient conduct makes the child a problem case. Yet psychologists and psychiatrists, who are concerned with the growing personality rather than with the machinery of family or school life, look upon excessive shyness as more serious than excessive assertativeness.

Based on 5,463 reports by parents on faults observed in their children, the more important behavior difficulties were as follows, with frequency about equal for boys and girls:[19]

Fault	*No. Cases*
Stubborn	1943
Argues	1894
Slow dressing	1563
Thoughtless about duties	1492
Slow to obey	1390
Teases	1238
Impatient	1217
Hates to go to bed	1203
Carelessness	1184
Nervousness	1128

In interpreting these faults on the part of children, one needs to keep in mind that what is called stubbornness in the child, the parent may call firmness in himself. One should remember also that it requires two to argue; that co-operation is better than obedience; that impatience may but reflect a similar quality in the parent; that teasing often springs from imitation; that dislike of going to bed is not in itself a mark of depravity. Put differently, most of these forms of behavior arise out of situations which it is more than likely the parent had a hand in creating. Usually there are two sides to problem behavior.

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[19] E. K. Wickman, *Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes,* p. 14.

The difference in estimates placed on certain types of misconduct by teachers and by mental hygienists, is shown by Wickman. Having collected from teachers a list of fifty behavior problems of their pupils, he asked the teachers to *rank* these problems from most serious to least serious. Also he asked thirty clinicians actively engaged in the study and treatment of behavior in children to rank the same list.

Below are shown the ten items ranked highest in seriousness by teachers and the ten ranked highest by clinicians, with the rank assigned the same items by the other group.

Teachers Rank	*Clinicians Rank*	*Type of Misbehavior*
1	25	Heterosexual activity
2	13	Stealing
3	41	Masturbation
4	28	Obscene notes or talk
5	23	Untruthfulness
6	22	Truancy
7	37	Impertinence, defiance
8	6	Cruelty, bullying
9	24	Cheating
10	45	Destroying school materials
40	1	Unsocialness
37	2	Suspiciousness
22	3	Unhappy, depressed
29	4	Resentfulness
36	5	Fearfulness
8	6	Cruelty, bullying
23	7	Easily discouraged
28	8	Suggestible
45	9	Over critical of others
48	10	Sensitiveness

It is to be noted that on only one type of misconduct, *cruelty and bullying*, do teachers and psychologists agree in the highest ten in seriousness. Teachers include three kinds of sex misbehavior in their upper ten, psychologists none. The characteristic ranked worst by psychologists (unsocialness) is ranked fortieth by teachers, while school offenses, such as *truancy, impertinence, destroying school materials,* which are given high rank by teachers are taken less seriously by psychologists. On the whole it would seem that teachers are most concerned over acts that make immediate trouble in the running of the school, psychologists over acts that promise most lasting injury to the personality.

A somewhat different result came from one hundred and fifteen Kenosha, Wisconsin, teachers who were asked to list the behavior problems observed among their pupils:[20]

Rank	*Problem*	*Frequency of Mention*
1	Conceit	97
2	Deceitfulness (Cheating, slyness)	95
3	Shyness	78
4	Disrespect (impudence)	75
5	Laziness (indifference)	71
6	Disorderly Conduct	58
7	Lack of Co-operation	57
8	Nervousness (restlessness)	46
9	Rudeness	44
10	Truancy	41
11	Pouting (sulkiness)	40
12	Inattention	40
13	Lying	39
14	Obstinacy (stubbornness)	38
15	Bullying (annoying others)	37
16	Tardiness	34
17	Stealing	34
18	Thoughtlessness (carelessness in work)	28

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[20] J. W. Shank, *Deviates in Behavior in the Public School,* p. 17. An unpublished thesis in the Northwestern University library, 1934.

19	Temper Tantrums	27
20	Uncleanness (of body, clothes)	26
21	Destroying Property (vandalism)	19
22	Lewdness in Acts	18
23	Selfishness (covetousness)	17
24	Lewdness in Speech	10
25	Wastefulness	9
26	Swearing (profanity)	8
27	Cowardice	6
28	Tattling	6
29	Poor Sportsmanship	5
30	Improvident (chronic borrowing)	4

These teachers, while placing conceit at the head of their list, rank shyness, lack of co-operation, chronic restlessness as more serious than truancy, rudeness, obstinacy or even stealing.

The Young Delinquent

Most delinquents are recruited from the problem-case group, just as most criminals have served an apprenticeship in the delinquent group.

The set-up in seriousness of misconduct is seen at a glance as one compares the following list of offenses, for which six hundred and thirteen boys were committed to the St. Charles (Illinois) School for Boys, with the preceding lists of problem-case offenses reported by parents and teachers:[21]

Offense	*Number*	*Per Cent*
Burglary	168	27.4
Auto Larceny	138	22.5
Theft	113	16.4
Robbery	45	7.3

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[21] H. A. Lane, *Social and Educational Background of Young Delinquent Boys,* p. 52. 1934. Unpublished doctor's thesis in Northwestern University library.

Holdup	40	6.5
Truancy	39	6.5
Runaway	35	5.7
Violence—Arson	19	3.1
Sex Offense	10	1.6
Shooting	6	1.0

The average age of the boys committing these crimes was slightly above fourteen years, the age range being from eight to nineteen years. A comparable group who passed through the juvenile court of Boston averaged somewhat younger, just under thirteen and a half years. These two groups are not far from typical for the country at large. When it is remembered that the offense which brings commitment is seldom the first, it is evident that serious crimes are being committed by boys hardly out of childhood.

As age increases, the list of offenses broadens and the seriousness is intensified. Fairly typical of the older group of criminal youth are the inmates of the Pontiac, Illinois, Reformatory who were studied by Hill.[22] The average age of the one thousand five hundred boys committing the offenses of the following list, was a little more than nineteen years:

Offense	*Number*	*Per Cent*
Robbery	304	20.3
Larceny	256	17.1
Larceny of Auto	228	15.2
Burglary and Larceny	189	12.6
Petit Larceny	155	10.3
Burglary	100	6.6
Grand Larceny	55	3.6
Forgery	43	2.9

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[22] G. E. Hill, *Factors Associated with Delinquency among Young Male Offenders*. 1934. An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Northwestern University library.

Rape	40	2.6
Assault to Rob	28	1.9
Attempted Robbery	18	1.2
Assault to Murder	15	1.0
Concealing Stolen Property	12	.8
Arson	10	.7
Attempted Rape	7	.5
Malicious Mischief	6	.4
Sodomy	4	.3
Contributing to Delinquency	3	.2
Confidence Game	3	.2
Extortion	2	.1
Manslaughter	1	.1
Miscellaneous	21	1.4
Total	1500	100.0

Analysis of this list reveals the great source of motivation for crime—the wish for wealth. Out of the twenty-two offenses bringing commitment, the highest eight had to do with securing ownership of coveted property. Fully ninety-three per cent of these crimes had their origin in the acquisitive motive. *Desire to own* without earning is back of an astonishingly large proportion of the misdeeds which torment organized society and bring disaster to individual lives.

Girl offenders present a problem quite different from that of boys. Their psychology, their stature and their place in society does not tend to make them engage in crimes against property or in acts of violence against persons. Typical of the misconduct among young girl delinquents are the offenses of the following list which represents the three hundred and eighty girls in the Illinois Training School for Girls.[23]

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[23] Marguerite Paschall and Louise C. Crawford, *Factors Contributing to Delinquency among Girls: A Preliminary Report,* 1934. Unpublished. Northwestern University library.

Offense for Which Committed	*Percentage of White Girls*	*Percentage of Negro Girls*
Sex	43	47
Incorrigible	22	23
Stealing	7	10
Truancy	7	9
General Delinquency	6	2
Bad Company	3	1
Dependent	3	3
Intemperate	2	2
Lack of Supervision	2	1
Other (Less than 2 per cent each)	5	2
	100	100

The fact that nearly half of the girls were committed for sex offenses for which in the main their men companions were not brought to account, indicates that such a list is "stacked" somewhat against the girls. When to sex misconduct is added general incorrigibility, two-thirds of all the offenses resulting in commitment in this group are accounted for.

Taking this group as roughly representative, we have the following picture of girl delinquencies: Nearly half are in the reformatory because of sex offenses for which their companions escape punishment. Incorrigibility, or *persistent rebellion against* the social or the family code, accounts for almost another one-fourth. About one out of four has been in court before the trouble that brought the present commitment. About half of the homes are dependent partly or wholly on charity. Well over half come from homes broken by separation or death. Approximately one-fourth are suffering from gonorrhea or syphilis. The average girl has an I. Q. a little below 80, is half-way through the seventh grade in school, is retarded somewhat more than one year.

The Adult Criminal

Adult criminals are in the main recidivists—young delinquents grown older in wrongdoing, finding their way repeatedly into reformatory or penal institutions. Leadership of neighborhood bands is good training for later managing of gangs of hoodlums, racketeers, extortionists, kidnapers. Membership in predatory groups of boys is excellent schooling for the activities required in organized crime. Comparatively few recruits are enticed from lives of rectitude and made into criminals after the age of eighteen or twenty years. To be an efficient lawbreaker requires education and experience in wrongdoing. Acts of violence, including murder, committed by older persons under stress of anger, jealousy or passion, often do not represent any deeply grounded perverse tendency.

Speaking broadly in general terms and only with rough approximation to the truth, we may say that most criminality begins in early childhood as perversity of conduct shown in the home, the school, the community. Fortunately, only a small proportion of problem children become criminals, but most criminals have been problem children. The problem child on his way to a criminal career usually passes through the stage of youthful deliquency. His misdeeds become persistent and serious and he is made the ward of the juvenile court. Offense follows offense, the range of misconduct widens, the code becomes markedly anti-social, war is declared on the law, the problem case and the delinquent becomes the established criminal, the bane of society.

A phase of the problem not to be left out of account is the no-man's-land of unsocial but legal behavior that lies between ethical conduct and criminality. Here we find the corrupt individual and the corporation who keep within the legal statute, but violate the laws of common honesty, justice and fair dealing. It is in this territory that crooked politics and crooked business flourish, while steering clear of courts and prisons. It is likely that in the aggregate, society suffers quite as much from this type of misconduct as from that which is overtly criminal. Nor is it easy to see where those who steal from others by evasion and trickery are any more admirable in character than those who rob at the point of the gun.

Prevention and Cure of Perverse Conduct

Many books have been written on the theme of this section and many organizations set up to answer the problem, which seems as far as ever from solution. Our space permits only the somewhat dogmatic statement of a few important conclusions.

There is no single cause at work which produces perverse conduct. It usually arises out of a complex of influences which are never the same for two individuals. In one case organic conditions, or some physical defect may be a factor. Psychoneurotic conditions certainly play a part in many instances. Says Burt: "It is in the poor, overcrowded unsanitary households, where families are huge . . . where the parents are largely dependent on charity and relief for their own maintenance, that juvenile delinquency is most rife. . . . It is the moral atmosphere of the home and its neighborhood that is significant."[24]

Speaking of seven hundred and twenty-six boys in the St. Charles (Illinois) School for Boys, H. A. Lane says: "The home conditions of the delinquents are lamentable. Less than one-half live with both parents. Fewer than one-third live in respectable homes. The fathers are employed in low-grade occupations; more than one-half of the mothers are employed outside the home, usually in menial service. Most of the boys have been employed, generally on the street or in the alley. Scarcely any of the delinquency boys come from home conditions which could be considered wholesome for child development."[25]

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[24] C. L. Burt, *The Young Delinquent*, pp. 75, 178.

The school is probably seldom a cause of delinquency, though there are those who believe that prevailing systems of examinations, note-taking, reading reports and the like, encourage cheating and dishonesty. Also may be questioned the effect of instruction which encourages or allows bluffing, evasion, slick practice, rather than compelling intellectual and moral honesty.

Whether the school is doing all it might in correcting problem-behavior may well be questioned. It is quite certain that if the work of the school could be suited to the capacities and interests of the low I.-Q. pupils who constitute most of the problem cases, much misbehavior and rebellion would be saved. Teachers also do not always treat the problem child with sympathy and understanding. School physicians are not always available to assist in correcting physical defects which are affecting conduct. Nor are psychologists provided to assist in diagnosing the more serious cases and planning remedial measures for their recovery. Wherever possible these specialists should be a regular part of the school's personnel.

Above all it should be recognized that prevention is much better than cure in dealing with perversity. The relative hopelessness of correcting delinquency by available methods, once it has become grounded, is shown by a study of one thousand boys who passed through the Juvenile Court of Boston between the years 1917 and 1922.[26] Judge Cabot referred each of these boys to two expert psychiatrists, Doctor Healy and Doctor Bronner, who studied the boys and made recommendation as to the disposition of each case. The judge then put the boys on probation, placed them out with a family, or sent them to a reform school. Five years after the prescribed treatment was completed the Gleucks located nine hundred and twenty-three of the thousand. Of these eighty-eight and two-tenths per cent had continued their delinquency. Seven out of ten had been arrested an average of three and six-tenths times each. Two out of three had been sentenced for serious crimes. Evidently these boys were continuing on the downward road. In fact this tendency was observable in the Boston group at a still earlier age, for ninety-five per cent of them were known to have marked behavior difficulties in home or school before their first appearance in court. Putting the facts all together from the Gleuck study, Cabot draws this conclusion:

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[25] H. A. Lane, *The Social and Educational Background of Young Delinquent Boys*. p. 148. 1934. An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Northwestern University library.

[26] S. and E. T. Gleuck, *One Thousand Juvenile Offenders*.

> "A juvenile-court judge facing a delinquent boy who has good paternal discipline at home, no history of misconduct in school, no school retardation, no delinquency up to his sixteenth year, and less than one year of delinquency before coming to the juvenile court, can know that the chances for reform are relatively good."[27] (But still well under fifty per cent.)

If less favorable conditions prevail, the chances for reform are relatively poor (over ninety per cent of failure) by any methods now at our command.

PROBLEMS

1. Recall the "bad" children among your classmates in the elementary school. What kind of persons are they now?
2. What percentage of the population of your state is in prison? If these are normally distributed among the state's total population, how many citizens of a city of ten thousand would be in prison in your state? How many of them would be boys and girls under eighteen years of age?

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[27] R. C. Cabot, *"1,000 Delinquent Boys," The Survey,* Vol. LXX, No. 2. February, 1934.

3. Examine the pictures of fugitives posted in your local post office. Do they appear to represent a particular physical type?
4. List several explanations for the finding that institutionalized delinquents are below normal in intelligence.
5. If you live in a reasonably small city, make a spot map of the addresses of persons brought into police court. Do your findings correspond with those of Mr. Shaw?
6. Organize a study of individuals from your community who have been released from institutions for the correction of delinquent behavior. To what extent have these released individuals made good adjustments?
7. What seems to you to be the essential step in a community program for the eradication of juvenile delinquency?

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CHAPTER V

PHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY

MODERN science rightly refuses to concern itself with the old problem of the distinction between body and mind, and speaks only of *life*. In fact most scientists decline to ascribe to life itself any unique quality which does not belong to all other manifestations of energy.[1] Nevertheless, for practical working purposes it is convenient to recognize *physical* and *mental*. An ulcerated tooth, while its repercussions may affect the total system of its victim's attitudes, emotions, volitions and thought processes, still must be treated as a physical fact (even, in advanced surgery, to the insertion of a tiny maggot into the cavity to eat the dead tissue and germs). The approach to the cure is not mental. Similarly, a fear obsession, though it may shatteringly modify the whole bodily metabolism, is to be removed not by treating the nerves but by attacking the mental cause.

The Organic Basis of Personality

Personality, which is a totality and not a mere sum of parts, involves on the physical side the whole organism. It has its roots not only in the neural system but in the glands and the muscles, and in the entire metabolic tension and activity of the body.

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[1] Compare H. H. Newman in *The Nature of the World and of Man*, pp. 163-176, "What Is Life."

Surgical history contains the records of many cases where behavior, attitude or outlook on life has been changed by an operation to relieve pressure on some part of the brain. The removal of a piece of bone can change a vicious, quarrelsome, combative victim of a blow on the head to a normal, kindly individual. A tumor on the brain may cause a radical change from a fine personality to the very opposite, and the surgeon's knife may bring the person back to his former state of selfhood. In cases where water collects on the brain such traits as irritability, depression, and the lowering of self-control are ordinarily looked for as results. When the surgeon has inserted a drain in the lumbar region and the pressure is relieved, the personality traits are restored to normal.

Many times has it happened that the removal of adenoids and diseased tonsils has transformed children radically in their interests, their social attitudes, their general conduct. Long continued illness of any kind usually changes the kind, courteous, forbearing person, temporarily at least, into an arbitrary, fault-finding tyrant for whom allowance must constantly be made because of his illness.

An indigestible supper and consequent troubled sleep tortured with nightmares tends to leave an individual depressed, irritable and out of sorts with the world and one's best friends the morning after. The young child whose food does not agree with him is in a constant state of discomfort which usually expresses itself in wailing, whining, fits of anger and general petulance. The babe who suffers from the heat, uncomfortable clothing or lack of attention, is unhappy and expresses his mood in resentful cries, rages and other forms of protest at his command. Almost every adult has had the experience of a time of heavy strain from work, worry or trouble so affecting his organism that nerves have got on edge and his personality has at least temporarily been quite changed. One boy asked by his despairing teacher why he behaved so badly in school, answered that "he was so darned hungry all the time that he just felt like being mean." Professor Haggard speaks of "the fatigue and irritation that generally develop soon after the fasting level of blood sugar is reached."[2]

In all these cases what the psychologist calls mood is involved. A single isolated case of indigestion resulting in a bad mood for a few hours will probably not register a noticeable effect upon personality or character. But let the aggravating physiological cause continue for days or weeks or months, with the concomitant unsocial behavior, and soon we have on our hands a more or less permanent set of undesirable trait actions which go by such names as irritability, ill-temper, crustiness, rudeness, fault-finding and the like. Let these be built into habit systems and they have become an active part of the personality which affects other people.

That various emotions have a decided effect on the physiological processes of digestion, elimination and other organic functions, is well-known and has been proved by much careful experimentation. Fear, sorrow, depression and such like "negative" emotions retard the vegetative processes, and this condition in turn tends to produce dark or depressed moods which still further interfere with organic action. High emotion of the "positive" sort, such as extreme joy or any excitement, may also affect certain organic functions, as digestion, adversely. Yet on the whole, moods of happiness, satisfaction and serenity are favorable to normal metabolism. Unhappiness, discomfort or depression of any sort if long continued, tends toward a deranged physiological action, and this is often reflected in moods which lead to undesirable behavior and so to habit systems which are unfavorable to personality.

Every mother should know that a young child who constantly frets, cries or shows fits of temper, is developing traits whose marks are certain to register more or less permanently in personality. She should know also that children who fret, cry and show fits of temper ordinarily do this, at the beginning at least, because of certain physiological conditions which produce discomfort. Children who persistently suffer from aching teeth, discharging ears, diseased nasal passages, bad tonsils, eczemas, malnutrition and the like, are inevitably under a handicap in trait building. That is to say, their personalities are suffering. Children in school who from lack of proper glasses are subjected to continued eye-strain and the consequent nervous tension and headaches, are sure to feel the results in conditions which again will find expression in personality.

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[2] H. W. Haggard, *Time,* July 2, 1934, p. 38.

Disease toxins prey on personality through their effect on physiological functions. Many happy, responsive children are transformed, for a time, at least, into irritable, complaining, violent tempered misanthropes by the poisons from a siege of scarlet fever or measles. Myerson, illustrating this point, tells of a "sociable, amiable lad of two" who became ill with diphtheria. "All his basic moods became altered and all his wholesome reactions to life disappeared. He was cross and contrary, he had no interest in people or in things."[3] Not until time "had repaired the more subtle damage to his organism did he become the hardy little adventurer in life that he had been before his illness."

To children much more than to adults is there danger of lasting effects on the personality from traits set up during a protracted period of illness. The adult, whose behavior patterns have become reasonably stable, is likely to revert to his earlier characteristics when the sickness passes. The child, whose behavior patterns are still relatively unformed, often sets up trends that become permanent. Especially is this true unless the child receives sympathetic and understanding treatment during and following his convalescence calculated to weaken the bonds of any undesirable traits which have carried over.

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[3] A. Myerson, *The Foundations of Personality*, p. 19.

Toxins from syphilis cause pathological changes in the brain which are paralleled by marked changes in character and personality. The kind and gentle person becomes exacting, cruel, even brutal. Persons formerly properly controlled in the matter of sex become profligate and perverts. Ideals deteriorate; ambition and purpose weaken; the character goes down and the leader becomes a derelict. When, however, as now and then happens, a case in its earlier stages is successfully treated, say by Salvarsan, a seeming miracle of reconstruction takes place in personality as the tortured organism recovers. Old interests, attitudes and traits return. A benign new personality takes the place of the old shattered one. Restored physiological functions have carried with them the renewal of the personality.

The relation of physiological functions to character and personality is well seen also in the effects of certain stimulants and narcotics. Alcohol at certain stages will with some persons increase social responsiveness and good fellowship. Others it will make surly, quarrelsome, cruel. Persistent alcoholism characteristically results in a deterioration of self-control, loss of self-respect, weakening of integrity, failure of the finer sensibilities and appreciations. Opium, cocaine, heroin and all the terrible family of habit-forming narcotics rob their victims of natural strength and charm of personality, leaving in the end but weak and pitiful caricatures of the victims upon whom they have preyed. These results are brought about by the devastating effects of such drugs on the nerve centers and various organic functions subject to their influence.

Influence of Endocrine Glands on Personality

Hardly less important than Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood (1628) has been the discovery of the important functions of the ductless glands. In the opening up of this field the years 1855-1856 were especially significant. For simultaneously in these years Bernard in Paris, Addison in England, Brown-Sequard in America were entering upon experiments that were to have far-reaching effects in creating a new science. Others quickly followed their lead.

It is only during the past decade or two, however, that the practical possibilities of this field have appealed widely to scientists and laymen alike. No program of a medical meeting is complete today without an important section on endocrinology. Physician specialists devote their whole time to the ductless glands, and indeed some are recently centering their chief work on one particular gland. No psychologist or psychiatrist is considered equipped for his task without a knowledge of endocrinology. So important has the literature of the field grown that a leading American work now requires four volumes,[4] while the chief German publication runs to twenty volumes.[5] Monographs, articles and reports of researches are without number.

Speaking of the general importance of the ductless glands Dorsey says, "Arrest of development or over-stimulation of the endocrines brings about change which may be harmful or of benefit to the body. Giants, fat women, cretins, men and women under-sexed and over-sexed imply variation in the structure and functioning of these glands."[6]

Says Myerson, "Without going into details of the functions of the endocrine glands one may say that they are 'the managers of the human body.' Every individual from the time he is born until he dies is under the influence of these many different kinds of elements—some of them having to do with the development of the bones and teeth, some with the body and nervous system, some with the development of the mind and character."[7]

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[4] W. Engelbach, *Endocrine Medicine.*

[5] M. Hirsch, *Handbuch der Inneren Sekretion.*

[6] G. A. Dorsey, *Why We Behave Like Human Beings,* p. 240.

Berman, speaking of the influence of the internal secretions upon the emotional and intellectual processes says: "A volume would not suffice for their adequate consideration. Reflexes, instincts, habits, tendencies and emotions are involved in their machinery. The development and normal functioning of the intellectual and emotional functions are controlled by them. Brain without enough of them in solution in the blood sleeps or remains dormant like the butterfly in the chrysalis. The cretin who has not enough thyroid is an imbecile because of his deficiency. Supply him with thyroid from outside sources, feed him animal thyroid, be it of the sheep, the pig or the goat and behold a miracle! He is restored to the level of at least a relatively normal intelligence."[8] This writer (though few agree with so extreme a view) asserts that personality may be so influenced by a preponderance of activity from this or that ductless gland that we may speak of "adrenal personalities," "pituitary personalities," "gonado-centric personalities."

The chemical products of the ductless glands are called *hormones*. Each hormone has its own particular and highly specialized function. Some of the hormones are so far known only by the effects they produce, much as we know electricity by what it does. Others have been analyzed, their chemical elements identified, and the hormone manufactured in the laboratory. This enables medicine to supply a missing or depleted hormone to patients whose glands are not in working order. The following commercially produced hormones from the glands of animals are now in common use:

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[7] A. Myerson, *The Foundations of Personality*, p. 12.

[8] L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 200.

Thyroxin, from the thyroids of sheep, pigs, goats
Adrenalin, from the adrenals of sheep and cows
Insulin, from the pancreas of cows
Pituitrin, from the pituitaries from cows

The Endocrine System

Physiologists divide all glands into two classes, *duct* glands and *ductless* glands. But whether duct or ductless, the business of a gland is to manufacture from the blood a substance possessing a particular chemical property. Duct glands, as their name implies, are equipped with the tubes which convey their product to its destination. The tubes of the lachrynal glands pour tears into the eye, those of the salivary glands carry saliva into the mouth, the ureters convey urine from the kidneys to the bladder. Ductless, or endocrine, glands discharge their secretion directly into the blood stream, by which it is carried throughout the body to be used by the tissues which require it.

The more important endocrine glands form eight groups as follows:

Located in the neck and chest:

1. the *thyroid*
2. the *thymus*
3. the *parathyroids*

Located in the brain:

4. the *pituitary*
5. The *pineal*

Located in the abdomen:

6. the *adrenals*
7. the *pancreas*
8. the *gonads*

Of these the pancreas and the gonads act also as duct glands.

In order to understand the functioning of the endocrines it is first of all necessary to remember that they form an interacting *system.* No single gland seems to operate independently of the others. The hormones of one gland balance, complement or supplement the hormones from other glands. Failure of function of one gland may affect the functioning of the entire system. Thus interlocking they act as an intricate combination of checks and drives upon one another. On this point Schwesinger says: "The ductless glandular system is a cooperative agency, and works as a system rather than as so many independent entities each on its own. Consequently it often happens that a weakness or malfunctioning in one gland is compensated for by an over-activity in another gland."[9] In spite of this close-knit interaction, however, it is nevertheless true that each of the several glands which are best understood (such as thyroid, pituitary, adrenals) possesses its own distinctive function.

The Thyroid

Located at the front of the throat at the lower edge of the pharynx is the thyroid. It is a brownish-purple mass with two wings or lobes connected by a narrow bridge, which can be felt by the finger tip slipping upward when one swallows. In adults the thyroid normally weighs about one ounce.

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[9] Gladys C. Schwesinger, *Heredity and Environment,* p. 369.

The swellings of the neck called goiter are but enlarged thyroids. This disease has been known for many centuries and in all parts of the world. It attacks not only man but many species of animal, as sheep, horses, pigs, dogs. Though the ultimate cause of goiter is still unknown, the immediate cause is believed by medical authorities to be a deficiency of iodine in food and water. Large scale addition of a small amount of iodine to drinking water has been found to reduce the disease almost to the vanishing point in populations markedly subject to its attack. In the United States the chief age for the appearance of goiter is from about eleven to seventeen years. Goiter occurs some six times more frequently in girls than in boys.

In the lower vertebrates the thyroid is closely connected with the organs of sex. Though at the human level this anatomical connection has been lost, the intimate relation of the thyroid to sex is shown by a swelling of the gland with menstruation, pregnancy and sexual excitement.

Basically this gland controls body metabolism through its effect on oxidation. It therefore has to do with the amount of energy produced, and so governs the speed of living. Given too little of the thyroid hormones, the child's development is retarded, the brain and other organs fail to ripen and assume their normal functions. Given too much of the hormone, development is accelerated, shortening the period of infancy, inducing sexual precocity.

Not less strikingly does the chemistry of the thyroid secretion register in the rate of physical and mental activity which characterize the individual in the situations of daily living. Thyroid deficiency is accompanied by physical and mental sluggishness, inattention, lack of normal interests, slowness of response, loss of mental power, physical impotency. The personality is like the engine with fouled spark plugs or leaking pistons. Just the opposite effects are shown from hyperactivity of the thyroid: A nervous restlessness drives the individual to over-activity, high emotional tension, ready loquacity, a driving impulse to be up and doing, unwillingness to pause for proper rest and sleep, a craving for excitement.

The fact of *cretinism* and of *myxedema* emphasizes in a most tragic way the relation of the thyroid to general personality. A cretin is a child imbecile whose imbecility is due to defect or absence of the thyroid gland. The brain, nerves and all other organs may be normal, but the shortage of perhaps one-hundredth of a grain of thyroxin daily produces a human monstrosity. The mind remains stagnant, the skin is rough and coarse in texture, the hair dry and lusterless, the movements are awkward and uncontrolled, the temperature is subnormal. The child lives in a dull and sleepy torpor, hardly rousing sufficiently to take food. The face is wrinkled, waxy, repulsive. Growth is in irregular proportions, the head being massive, the trunk too large for the spindly extremities.

That this condition is caused by lack of the thyroid hormone is abundantly proved by the application, if taken in time, of the proper amount of thyroxin. Medical records now contain the history of many cases in which this treatment has made the helpless imbecile over into a normal individual of average intelligence.

Myxedema is the adolescent or adult parallel of cretinism, and also is caused by thyroid deficiency. Helen G. at sixteen was a high-school girl of unusual charm and high intelligence, well developed physically and of distinctly feminine type. Then began a rather sudden change. Her skin became dry and rough, her hair brittle, her features coarse, her eyelids puffed. Her face lost its vivacious expression and became stolid, her characteristic feminine charm disappeared and she took on a masculine quality, even to the beginnings of a slight beard. Her dismayed parents took Helen to a specialist who diagnosed her case as thyroid deficiency with the basal metabolism nearly thirty per cent below normal. Feeding of thyroxin was at once begun, the cause of defective action in the gland diagnosed and treatment applied. In less than a year the girl was fully recovered, her personality had gone back to its original type, her appearance and manner approached their former charm.

Most commonly, thyroid shortage with its consequent myxedema comes on after full adulthood has been reached. Women are more subject to it than men. Persons who in middle age begin to take on fat rapidly, show a waxy and puffy face, become slow and stupid, are likely to have defective thyroids. If such is the case the trouble can usually be removed and the personality brought back to its earlier type by proper feeding of the thyroid hormone.

An over-active thyroid is little more to be desired than one which refuses to turn out a sufficient amount of the hormone. Yet hyperthyroidism is frequently found at all ages and in every known country. It is a condition marked by high nervous tension, mental excitement and unrest, irritability. The heartbeat is accelerated, the muscles tremble and become uncertain, the bodily temperature increases by one or two degrees. In more serious cases the eyes become bulging and prominent.

Over-active thyroids which refuse to respond to medical treatment are operated upon and a part of the gland cut away. The operation is one that requires a nice precision, for if too large a portion of the offending gland is removed the remnant may not supply enough of the secretion, and the patient may then need to be fed thyroxin for the rest of his life.

In our description of thyroid deficiency and of thyroid overactivity we have purposely taken extreme cases, such as produce on the one hand the child cretin and the adult myxedema case; and on the other hand the abnormally tense, active, rapid-living person. In between these two extremes there are of course all degrees of thyroid activity, much of it falling within the range of perfect normality, with this important energizer performing its proper function. But also there are beyond question many individuals in which a lazy thyroid, which may never come to the attention of a physician, accounts on the physical side for certain peculiarities of appearance of types we have noted; and accounts on the mental side for a slowness, slackness and lack of nerve due not to any brain defect but to shortage of the hormone which is needed to release the native powers of body and mind. Equally certain is it that mildly over-active thyroids often are responsible for the live-wire magnetic personalities who wear us (and themselves!) out while they charm us with their vivacity.

The Pituitary

It is probable that Berg goes somewhat beyond the strict warrant of science, yet he is not without supporters when he speaks of the pituitary as, "one of the most important glands determining the destiny of mankind," and says: "When we understand its rôle more fully we may be able to prevent or to cure defects or bases for adult personality deficiencies which we are now powerless to combat."[10]

In a little bony cavity of the skull at the base of the brain lies this grayish-yellow gland, which is the size and shape of a kidney bean. It has two parts, anterior and posterior, connected by a bridge of tissue. These parts, though anatomically connected, have quite different origins and produce hormones of quite distinct functions.

The pituitary is essential to life, its removal or dysfunction first causing a deep lethargy, which is followed within a few days by death. In its function the pituitary is closely related to the thyroid. For while the thyroid governs the supply of energy for living, the pituitary controls the application of this energy to the organs and tissues which use it. If the pituitary fails properly to produce its secretion, energy is not properly applied, endurance fails, fatigue comes easily.

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[10] L. Berg, *The Human Personality*, p. 68.

Dwarfs and giants, formerly looked upon as an "act of God," are now known to be products of deranged function in the anterior pituitary. Failure to supply in childhood a sufficient amount of its secretion, *tethelin,* results in a checking or stoppage of growth at half normal height. An over-supply of this hormone produces the giant, who sometimes attains a height of eight or nine feet. Striking also is the fact that the causes which throw normal growth out of balance act at the same time on the brain. Dwarfs and giants are generally of low intelligence. Besides this handicap they are at a decided disadvantage in social adjustment. They are looked upon as "queer," "freaks," "different." Except as spectacles in circuses and sideshows they are out of place and made to feel so. It is inevitable therefore that they should become awkward, self-conscious, diffident, dull. A quip ascribed to Bacon has it that, "A very tall man is like a dwelling house—the attic lacks furniture."

Dwarfism and gigantism have their sources in causes which originate in childhood or before birth. Let the anterior pituitary become over-active in adult life and the excess brings on the condition called *acromegaly.* In acromegaly there is usually no further growth of general stature, but the skull expands, and the bones of the face broaden so that the cheeks and forehead become prominent. The hands and the feet also increase in size and their tissues become thick. Sometimes the ears grow large. These facts lead us to guess that the massive brows, heavy jaws, generous hands and feet often supposed to mark a peculiarly virile man may be but the product of a too-industrious pituitary which has thrown certain of his features somewhat out of balance.

Just what the total effect of the normally functioning pituitary may be on the personality, cannot be said with any degree of certainty at the present time. Yet some important facts are known. The pituitary is closely bound up with sex development and function. Deficiency in its secretion prevents sexual development and activity. An active pituitary favors growth of stature and tends to provide forms of generous build and vigor. In the general concert of the endocrines, the pituitary is closely allied to the thyroid and the gonads and is necessary to their proper functioning. Berman, whose conclusions are taken with a grain of salt by other specialists, sets out the following marks of a *strong and healthy pituitary:*

> "Large and bony frame. Eyes wide apart. Broad face. Teeth broad, large, unspaced. Square, protruding chin and jaws. Large feet and hands. Early hair growth on body. Thick skin, large sex organs. Aggressive, precocious, calculating, self-contained."

The effects of an *inferior pituitary* Berman believes to be revealed in these characteristics:

> "Small, sometimes delicate skeleton. Rather adipose, weak muscles. Upper jaw prognathous. Dry, flabby skin. Small hands and feet. Abnormal desire for sweets. Sub-normal temperature, blood pressure and pulse. Poor control of lower vegetative functions. Mentally sluggish, dull, apathetic, backward. Loses self-control quickly, cries easily, discouraged promptly, psychic stamina insufficient."[11]

Taking known facts into account, it seems clear that Berman is on fairly safe ground in the physical characters, but lacks full scientific proof for the mental qualities he describes.

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[11] L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality,* p. 247.

The Parathyroids

Little exact knowledge exists concerning the way the parathyroids function, but it is certain that without them life quickly ceases. Their number is not rigidly fixed, having been found to vary from two or three to as high as six, four being typical. In size and shape they resemble grains of wheat somewhat flattened. They are reddish-yellow in color, and are commonly located in notches in the thyroid. This last relationship seems to be entirely accidental, as the thyroid and the parathyroids differ fundamentally in nature and activity.

Removal or dysfunction of the parathyroids is quickly followed by nervous and muscular disorders. Any sudden shock or stimulus causes the victim to start violently and may even throw him into a spasm. With parathyroid deficiency the voluntary movements become uncontrolled, the heart beats violently, respiration is quickened, extreme physical depression is felt.

These facts lead inevitably to the conclusion that many cases of extreme "nervousness" as seen in children, inability to sit still, tendency of the muscles to twitch and quiver, may come from lack of parathyroid hormones. This diagnosis is strongly supported by the frequent instances in medicine in which feeding the ailing person parathyroid extract, brings quick and complete recovery of the normal personality. Besides their neuro-muscular relationship, the parathyroids are believed by some investigators to exert an important control over the processes of growth.

The Pineal

Long before the Christian era began, the ancients had discovered the pineal gland hidden away in the brain back of the eyes. The reddish-gray cone-shaped body is about one-third of an inch long and half as thick at its base. For many years, helped along by the philosopher Descartes, this organ was thought to be the "seat of the soul," whence the vital spirit of life was diffused through the organism.

Scientists of today are themselves none too sure concerning the function of the pineal gland. A few even doubt whether it actually gives out a secretion. The cautious Berkeley, however, concludes as follows:

> "As a *provisional conclusion* I shall affirm that the pineal gland is a gland of internal secretion; that in childhood and adolescence its secretion promotes mental, bodily and sexual precocity; that it is not essential to life at any age, but that it probably has some metabolic function throughout life."[12]

Imperfect as our knowledge of the pineal gland is, studies of its effects have gone far enough so that careful physicians are feeding pineal extract from calves to backward children to promote their development. Some experimentalists assert that the pineal acts to hinder too rapid sexual development in children. Normally the pineal atrophies after the age of thirty, its function seemingly having been performed.

The Thymus

In dealing with the thymus also we are on none too certain ground. It is, however, reasonably sure that the thymus acts as a brake on the development of certain other glands, particularly those of sex. Berg says: "If the thymus is removed the sex glands will mature early and the phenomena of puberty and adolescence will be premature. Thus sexual precocity—

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[12] W. N. Berkely, *Principles and Practice of Endocrine Medicine,* p. 320.

sexual activity under ten years of age—may be explained by the early degeneration of this gland."[13]

If this conclusion holds true we may have in thymus deficiency the explanation of the too early ripening of some children, with the consequent cutting short of the period of childhood necessary to balanced development. On the other hand an over-active thymus might account for the slowness of certain others in attaining puberty and developing normal attitudes toward sex. On the same hypothesis we might go further and find in the continuing activity of the thymus following adolescence a cause of sexual coldness found in some adults. And on the same theory it might be assumed that a thymus that fails properly to "brake" would be a factor in the over-sexuality of those of the opposite type. But in arriving at such conclusions as these it must be recognized that they rest on hypotheses not yet proved to be fact.

Nevertheless it is safe to say that the thymus is a "gland of childhood." It is relatively largest at birth, it has a short span of activity, it normally ceases its activity before the end of the growth period. While it remains active, the secondary characteristics of sex do not appear. On the other hand, if the gland remains active past its normal period of ceasing to function, the adult manifests certain characteristics of childhood. Those in whom the thymus atrophies too early, display precocity in their development.

The Pancreas

Life, thought, activity are all as dependent on the continuous burning of body fuel as is the movement of the motor car on its gasoline. Sugar is the chief body fuel that keeps life on the go. And the regulator of the sugar supply of the body is the hormone *insulin* provided by groups of secreting organs known as *the islands of Langerhans* (from their discoverer). These structures are a part of the pancreas, a gland of darkish-red color which lies back of the stomach. The pancreas also acts as a duct gland, pouring a digestive fluid directly into the alimentary canal.

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[13] *Loc. cit.*, p. 69.

When for any reason the supply of insulin runs low, sugar escapes from its great storehouse, the liver, and is filtered from the blood by the kidneys, the body thus throwing away its finest fuel. The condition brought about by this over-supply of sugar in the blood and the urine is called *diabetes*.

In moderately severe diabetes the normal sense of well-being is seriously disturbed, the person becomes excessively hungry and thirsty, mental sluggishness is felt, and marked changes may take place in the personality. So serious is a shortage of insulin with its consequent loss of body-sugar that until little more than a decade ago diabetes was considered a rather hopeless and generally fatal disease. Then came two inquiring experimenters at Toronto University, Dr. Frederick Banting and Dr. C. H. Best, who succeeded in extracting insulin from the pancreas of animals and by administering it to diabetics, holding their disease in permanent check. There are living today literally thousands of persons who owe both life and normal personality to their constant dosage of insulin, plus a carefully regulated diet.

This fact was forcefully brought to the realization of the writer when as a guest he sat at dinner where the daughter of the host, a charming girl of seventeen, had by her plate a set of scales on which was carefully weighed each portion of the food she was served. Regularly also Janette had her dosage of insulin. Should the supply of insulin fail for forty-eight hours this lovely, accomplished girl would probably pass into a coma from which there would be no waking. So important are the islands of Langerhans and the hormone they provide.

The Adrenals

The adrenals have been called the "glands of combat," because a hormone they pour into the blood has the power to increase the tone of muscles, raise the blood pressure, convert glycogen into sugar for body fuel, and otherwise prepare the body for action. Twenty years ago Professor Cannon, after many painstaking experiments asserted that the adrenal hormones, *adrenalin,* is nature's provision for the crises met by living animals; her method for providing them with superpower for use in emergencies. Says Dorsey, "With adrenalin cowards may fight for their lives, brave men may surpass themselves, and all of us can run as we never ran before; or shed tears of sorrow over the loss of friends."[14]

Perched on top of the kidneys are the adrenals, two in number, yellowish in color, of the size and shape of large beans. Each gland consists of two parts, the cortex, or shell, and the medulla, or core. These parts, which lower in the evolutionary scale were two separate organs, perform quite different functions. The cortex is closely related to the development of sex and its function. Over-secretion of *cortin,* the hormone of the cortex, acts to make the male less masculine and the female less feminine. Excess of this secretion also hastens sexual maturity, sometime causing menstruation to start at six or seven, and inducing comparable sex activity in boys of the same age. Besides its relation to sex, the adrenal cortex deeply affects many vital processes of the body. Its removal is followed by severe prostration, apathy, difficult breathing, finally paralysis which ends in death.

Adrenalin, the product of the medulla part of the gland, was the first of the endocrine secretions to be isolated and analyzed. That nature is a wonderful chemist seems clear when we know that the formula for adrenalin is: $C_6H_3 (OH)_2 COCH_2C1 + NH_2CH_3 \rightarrow C_6H_3(OH)_2. COCH_3. NHCH_3.HCL$.

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[14] G. A. Dorsey, *Why We Behave Like Human Beings,* p. 212.

This is a powerful drug, so powerful that in arterial blood its proportion is about one part to a billion parts of blood. If Cannon's theory[15] holds, the great function of adrenalin is, as we have said, to prepare us to act under stress. How shall we carry ourselves in emergencies which require action? Shall we be helpless, hesitant, paralyzed? Or shall be boldly "take arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing end them"? Some go so far as to say that the amount of adrenal secretion in the blood makes the difference between the hero and the coward; and that the victories of the world go to those who carry the most adrenalin.

For the present we cannot go this far and remain on safe scientific ground. Yet the further research proceeds, the more important do the adrenal glands appear to be in determining both the physical and the mental aspect of personality.

The Gonads

Probably no factor in organic evolution, certainly no factor in social evolution, is more important than sex. Looked upon by early Christianity as a source of evil and a cause for shame, all matters related to sex are approached with a certain furtiveness and embarrassment by the prudish even today. But nature is wise, and never allows interest in sex to weaken or die.

Sex profoundly influences human behavior in every area of experience. Its cleavage runs through all the activities of work and recreation. Its differences affect the economic order in all its ramifications. Sex is recognized in law, education, religion. Its motive is felt in literature, art and the graces of the social convention, which are more binding than law. Sex founds the home and the family, that basic unit of the social order, the source of the highest satisfactions and the deepest sorrows and tragedies known in life. Not least important, sex gives to personality its unique quality and most potent charm.

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[15] W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage.*

Sex differences and the appeal of each sex for the other depends on glands, the testes in the male, the ovaries in the female. *Gonads* is the general term for the glands for either sex. The gonads are true duct glands in that they discharge secretions through ducts; but these secretions, unlike those from other duct glands, are not used by the body that produces them. Their purpose is to serve the needs of reproduction. To this end the testes supply *spermatozoa,* the ovaries *ova,* the union of which makes the beginning of new life.

Besides performing this function of reproduction, both testes and ovaries secrete a hormone which is discharged directly into the blood. It is these hormones which are primarily responsible for the secondary characteristics of sex; that is for the distinctly masculine qualities of men and the feminine qualities of women. In order best to understand the action of these hormones, one needs to keep in mind that each sex carries a latent or recessive tendency toward the sex characteristics of the other. Not only does each sex bear certain vestigial marks belonging to the other, but male and female secondary characters co-exist in practically all individuals. It would be difficult to find a person wholly masculine or wholly feminine. And it is the gonadal hormone that chiefly determines the degree to which individuals of each sex express in their personalities the qualities of their own sex, excluding those of the other.

Many proofs of this fact are matters of common knowledge. Witness the ox and the gelding whose essential "maleness" was lost with their gonads. The eunuchs formerly so much in favor in Oriental courts, were but imitation men with their beardless faces, mincing walk and high pitched feminine voices. Loss of function of the ovaries is followed in women by the appearance of a beard and other masculine characteristics. Laboratory experiments on animals prove that transplanting the gonads of either sex to individuals of the opposite sex, causes the qualities of the transplanted sex to appear in its host.

The gonads are not, like most of the other endocrines, necessary to the continuance of life. Taking all facts into account, however, it is clear that they are of supreme importance in the influence they exert over the personality. Their hormones are necessary to the qualities that attract others of either sex, and so function in the working out of human relationships and adjustments. They give to men their bearing of assurance and command, and to women their distinctive charm and poise. Without the gonadal secretion neither sex develops physically according to type.

Concern is expressed by some that modern life will weaken or destroy the secondary characteristics of sex, making the active, efficient, businesslike girl and woman less feminine; making the motor-riding, office imprisoned, carefully manicured man less masculine. There is little danger, however, of these basic differences between the sexes which have been developing for millions of years, being lost through the influence of such externals. As Havelock Ellis remarks: "A man is a man to his very thumbs and a woman is a woman down to her little toes." Structural and functional differences exist in the sexes, which have required geological epochs to produce. The key to these differences is largely in the keeping of the hormones of the gonads. Let these be kept healthy and normal, and womanly women and manly men are in no danger of losing their distinguishing traits.

Teamwork

One who would comprehend the physical basis of personality must, as was remarked earlier in the chapter, first of all seek to understand the marvelous teamwork that goes on in the body. In discussing the various organs, particularly as we have in this chapter discussed the endocrine glands, this specific function or that is set out. For example, we tell how the gonads act upon the characteristics peculiar to sex; but we also know, or think we know, that the thyroid, the pituitary and probably the thymus, are likewise related to the development of sex. We learn how a dysfunction of the pituitary changes the growth of the bony skeleton, thus changing bodily proportions; but the removal of the gonads in early life also is known to result in increased stature. We speak of one gland being a "brake" upon other glands, thereby influencing profoundly the entire metabolic and growth process.

All of which is true enough, but in the aggregate it is equally true that the entire physical organism—including the ductless glands—is a marvelously complex interlocking system, with part working upon (or working through) part in ways which science does not yet fully understand. Therefore when we think of any particular organ possessing a given function or carrying out a specified activity, we must remember that the *whole* organism is acting when any single part acts. When we speak of certain glands as regulating the body or the personality, we must recognize that glands are not the only regulators. For example, the chief regulator of respiration are the billions of cells of the body, by means of the carbon dioxide which every living cell gives off. We think of ideas as related to the activity of the brain cortex, but we must not forget that a thyroid deficiency leaves the child with a perfect brain, still an imbecile.

Personality has a physical foundation, yes. But that foundation consists of the *whole* organism; yet not the organism considered as separate parts, but as an inseparable unit. The endocrine glands are marvelous in their influence over life, certainly. But so is the much-abused stomach, so is the liver, so are the muscles, so is each individual cell as it acts with countless millions of other cells throughout the body. And personality, in so far as it consists of and acts through the physical, is the product of the total unanalyzed life-process going on within us.

PROBLEMS

1. Consult physicians and recent medical and psychological journals to learn of recent work on the functions of the endocrine glands.
2. Recount in your own personal experience emergencies to which you reacted adequately and then became quite overwrought emotionally. Compare your experiences with members of your group. Do you see any demonstration of the power of the endocrine glands in these experiences?
3. Recently a young man came to the author reporting that he was tremendously in love with his older brother's young wife. His feelings were aroused only in her presence. At such times he felt a consuming urge to destroy the brother and run away with the sister-in-law. Can you offer any possible explanation for the origin of this urge? (Let us assume that the young wife is a rather ordinary person.) What seems to you to be the correct solution for this young man's problem?

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Chapter VI

SELECTIVE RESPONSE IN SOCIAL SITUATIONS

Modern science recognizes the fact that it can become normative in human affairs only as it gets back to causes of the phonomena it describes. To be able simply to portray the course taken by a case of yellow fever, effects no cures. It is necessary to discover the cause of the disease as residing in a particular mosquito, before the threat can be conquered. We have volumes of descripton of cancer, but we do not know its cause so we have no cure.

Equally does this principle hold in the field of human conduct. We may *describe* undesirable behavior. We may keep case records full of the details of perverse behavior. But not until we know the causes back of such conduct can we give intelligent direction for its prevention or cure. We may describe and analyze the acts of a well-adjusted person, but not until we know the sources of motivation can we lead those we would direct, to similar types of character. Differently stated, all behavior goes back to definite causes and laws, whether such behavior consists of a single act or a sustained system of conduct. For the response made in every situation, there is an adequate explanation to be found in the relation existing between the stimuli and the motives which are involved.

Behavior Adequately Caused

For example, go into the infant ward of a maternity hospital where a dozen babies lie in a row. Touch this one on the cheek and immediately it turns its head and makes sucking movements. Apply the same stimulus to the next in order and no such response follows. Try the experiment on each child in turn; some respond, some do not. The explanation here is very simple. The children who make the nursing response are hungry; a motive is at work. Those who refuse to respond, or whose response is something other than nursing, have recently been fed or they are in discomfort which blocks out any sensation of hunger that may be present. The response made in each case is adequately caused.

The forces operating to determine behavior are often in conflict, and the response then obeys the strongest motive or combination of motives. To illustrate: In the laboratory in a large cage separated into two compartments are a male and a female rat, each in its own enclosure. Near the dividing partition in each compartment is an electrical grid so placed that either rat in order to approach the other is obliged to cross the grid and take a mild but unpleasant shock. Today neither rat may cross the grid; tomorrow either or both may repeatedly make the advance in spite of the discomfort. Again the explanation is fairly simple: Unless some stronger compensating motive appears, aversion to punishment of the grid is sufficient to keep the rats away from the partition. Today the cycle of the female is not at the stage to produce a sex urge toward a mate, so caution toward the grid rules. Recent satiation has also made the male indifferent, so he keeps on the far side of the cage. Tomorrow the urge may be active in one or both, and when present is strong enough to overcome the aversion to the electrical shock; the grid is then freely crossed in order to approach the mate. In each situation the preponderance of motive rules the behavior.

More difficult to unravel because almost infinitely more complex, are the causes which on one occasion make a child respond amiably to direction or restraint, and on another occasion throw him into a tantrum of temper or state of rebellion. It is likely that in the first instance the normal mood of the child prevails, recent experience having been satisfactory, nothing having occurred to upset the emotions. In the second instance there may have been a succession of recent disturbing experiences, indigestion or the toxins of fatigue may have set the nerves on edge, a sharp tone or a threatening look on the part of the parent may have proved the last straw that broke down poise and control. Whatever the explanation, we may be sure that the line taken by the behavior was determined by a preponderance of motivating causes.

More complicated still because involving a succession of situations and a wide range of responses, is the case of one boy in a family or community who makes a satisfactory social adjustment and becomes a useful member of society, while another boy in the same general setting develops a perverse character and becomes a social problem and menace. In these cases as in the simpler ones of our illustrations, however, the same general factors are involved. A succession of stimuli or influences from the environment play on the individual; these release and set into action certain energies or forces which we call motives; the motives cause behavior after their type, conduct and character are the result. Human nature expressed in its acts is quite as capable of explanation as is the behavior of atoms, once we are able to discover and relate the factors involved in its processes.

Stimulus and Response

"There is," says Professor Woodworth, "nothing mysterious about motives." Theoretically no; yet actually nothing connected with life and conduct is more difficult to appraise in concrete situations than the motives which lie back of acts. Perhaps the most satisfactory, at least the simplest approach to the problem of motives and motivation is by way of the familiar terms, *stimulus* and *response.*

Psychology, in common with other sciences, is obliged to postulate something it calls energy in order to account for its phenomena. Let energy (light, sound, heat) come in contact with organs adapted to its reception, and response follows, an act takes place, adjustment is under way. Thus a sudden sharp sound causes a start, touching a hot surface causes the hand to be snatched away, a bright light makes the eyelids close. This is stimulus and response at the level of reflex action.

With increasing complexity this principle operates at all levels of behavior, from the simple automatic response of the pupil to light, on to the most highly organized chain of social conduct. That is to say, impressions from the external environment impinge on the individual; these impressions set up adjustive reactions and behavior is modified. To illustrate:

A boy of eight is playing ball with the neighborhood team in a vacant lot. It is his turn to bat. He has just stepped up to the plate and the pitcher is winding up when a clock in a near-by tower chimes, *one—two—three—four.* Suddenly on the stroke of four the boy drops his bat, and without pause or explanation dashes away toward home. The accumulating sensory stimuli had set in action a train of ideas that recalled an imperative appointment with his mother at four o'clock.

Another example of stimulus and response at a still more complicated level: Mr. Jones appears at breakfast in his home, placid and genial in mood. He takes up the paper by his plate and turns to the market page. Immediately his eye falls on Something 5's in the bond column, things begin to happen. First a tensing of his muscles, a flush followed by pallor spreads over his face, a moment of intense concentration of thought, then springing from his chair he hastens to the telephone, calls up his broker and in staccato tones savagely gives a selling order for a block of Something 5's. Here the innocent stimulus consisting of a line or two of print, touched off a train of ideas, emotions and habits which in turn galvanized Mr. Jones into overt action.

One further illustration involving a somewhat different factor: Jane is obviously unprepared today in her high-school classes. Not only that, she is indifferent and inattentive, barely courteous in her replies. Two teachers have spoken to her rather sharply. The third teacher studies Jane for a moment, makes a mental note and at the end of the period asks her to stop a moment at the desk. A sympathetic question brings out the fact that Jane's mother has been taken seriously ill and that Jane is greatly worried and distressed. Where two teachers read in Jane only lack of preparation and inattention, the third teacher detects the subtler signs of strain and unhappiness. Hence this teacher's response to an exasperating Jane is one of sympathy rather than of chiding.

The Nature of Motive

Every now and then in our discussion to this point we have mentioned motives as a determining factor in behavior. Let us now look a little more closely into the question of motives.

Response (behavior), as we have seen, is not a matter of stimulus alone. In order for the stimulus to do its part there must be something (motive) in the individual that matches or complements the stimulus. This something consists of some energy, drive or activity so adapted to the stimulus that the stimulus sets it (the motive) free in acts of adjustment. By no possibility can any stimulus, whether at the reflex or the social level, produce response unless the potential source of motive is ready to react to the stimulus. Without hunger the infant does not respond to the touch on the lips. Without the urge of sex the rats will not risk the shock. A child of eighteen months when reached by firemen in a burning building, was found laughing in delight at the pretty flames; he had not yet been conditioned to fear of fire so no escape motive answered to the stimulus. The boy of ten whose mother unwisely holds up for his emulation the neighborhood paragon of youthful perfection, is not motivated to similar standards for the reason that no desire (motive) is active in him to be like the paragon.

From such considerations it follows that to *motivate* a person to a certain act or line of conduct, is to bring into action by appropriate incentives the requisite energies or activities which are a part of his equipment, native or acquired.

A familiar law of physics is that a body at rest remains at rest unless acted upon by an external force. A corresponding law of psychology might be that no organism acts except when motivated by an interior source of energy. The kick given a sled at the top of a hill motivates it by putting it into the grip of gravity. The direction taken by the sled is determined by the track already made (habit) and by the guiding (intelligent control) given the sled by a directing hand. A fight between two boys is motivated when a chip on the shoulder of one stirs into activity the resentment, anger, self-esteem, hatred and similar energies ready in the other.

At this point we may conveniently substitute for the biological term stimulus its broader correlate, *incentive*. Incentives are external sources of motivation. Praise and blame are incentives to learning; desire for social recognition is the motive to which the incentive chiefly applies. A bonus paid salesmen is an incentive to greater activity; desire for wealth is the motive involved. In the most general sense all motives consist of punishment or rewards—experience we would escape or welcome.

Individuals differ greatly in the incentives which appeal to them. The sight of his neighbor's new car may be the incentive for one man to buy a car a notch higher in the price sale, while it leaves another man unmoved. Prizes, such as election to scholarship honor societies, act as incentives only to those who care for such recognition and who believe they have a chance in the competition. Urging on the young the value of certain virtues in the abstract, such as honesty, dependability, courtesy and the like, may provide little or no incentive, depending on the extent to which it arouses desire and purpose to possess the recommended trait.

The basis of difference in reaction to incentives is individual differences in motives. Growing out of native equipment, out of the course taken by social development, out of economic interests, and many other factors, no two persons act under identical motives.

When a man is knocked down in a busy street by a passing automobile, different responses come from observers according to their motives. Curiosity leads some to stop and look at the victim. One man runs to summon the police. Another telephones a hospital. Still another rushes to notify an "ambulance-chaser" lawyer of the accident. All these persons receive essentially the same sensory impressions. They react quite differently in the situation because of the motives that are set into action by what they observe.

Even when externally the act seems to be the same, the motives that lead to it may differ widely. One man may pay a debt from a sense of honor, another because he fears the collector, a third because he desires a new loan. This youth enlists in the army under a solemn inner urge to do his patriotic duty, that youth because of a desire for adventure. Kindness and good will may be behind one check received by a benevolent society, while behind another similar check may be contempt for the ineffectual individual which is overbalanced by fear of losing social prestige by refusal to contribute.

Motives can be judged only by the acts they induce, and even then few judgments are more hazardous than those that ascribe motives. The fallacious assumption that motives can be analyzed and described, often leads to impossible demands upon children by parents and teachers. "Why did you pull Jenny's hair?" "Why did you play truant from school?" "Why did you tell that lie?" And the child, unused to self-analysis, is expected to answer; but of course usually cannot answer truly and so has recourse to stolid silence or to invention. The question of motive is also of great concern in the courts. It is practically impossible to convict a person of murder unless a motive can be shown. Insistently the counsel for the prosecution brings out his interpretation of the motives that led to the crime; just as insistently counsel for the defense denies that such motives existed or played a part. To discover the motives involved in such a case is highly important, but it is doubtful whether the true motives are often revealed with any degree of accuracy.

In some situations, however, a single motive may assert itself with such compelling power that it must assume full responsibility for the behavior that results. Lust may crush out every other motive. Fear become panic has the field to itself. Love may prevail over every other force. Anger or hate may be strong enough to cancel pain and make one exult in suffering. Where any such dominating motive is plainly present the acts which follow are not hard to explain. It is in situations where no single motive stands out and where the motives are somewhat evenly balanced that analysis fails.

Motives are as impossible of full analysis and description with our present knowledge, as is human nature itself; for their complexity and range touch every aspect of experience.

Among the more elementary motives are the instinctive drives, the chemical effects of certain hormones in the blood, sensation, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion. Dewey tells us that habit is "a demand for action," and hence a motive. Included also among the strongest motives must be the visceral disturbances which are sensed as emotions. To these must be added the flow of ideas, thought, ideals and the emotionalized mind-sets loosely called attitudes, and finally whatever drives may come from the unconscious as postulated by Freud, Adler and their followers; and many other forms of motivating energy, some of which will receive attention in later chapters.

For the moment we will only repeat that when we discover the motive to any act we always find some organization of energy acting in ways prepared for it by previous experience of the race or the individual. McDougall would restrict the term motive to such energy "working upon the level of self-conscious reflective action."[1] We have chosen here to treat the term in its broader biological, as well as its psychological, meaning, not restricting it to the ideational processes alone.

Behavior in Social Situations

The term situation, which we have frequently used, requires further attention. For most of the problems of behavior arise in what we call situations. "How shall I meet this situation?" is a question often asked. "Can he rise to the situation?" "An embarrassing situation." "A delicate situation." These familiar expressions suggest something of the importance attaching to what we call situations in our everyday experience.

Even at the reflex level, stimuli seldom appear singly. We look while we listen; contacts, temperatures, tastes and smells are never wholly absent. Reports are constantly flowing in to the brain from every part, both peripheral and internal, of the organism. At higher levels the range of impressions is vastly increased, taking in as it does stimuli of social as well as physical origin.

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[1] W. McDougall, *The Energies of Men,* p. 135.

If we follow Woodworth's definition we will call "the whole mass of stimuli acting at once upon the organism,"[2] a situation. This definition, however, suffers from over-simplification in two directions: (1) neither in his definition nor its context does Professor Woodworth seem to take into account the social meanings that come to attach to physical stimuli; (2) he does not make the reactor a part of the situation.

(1) For human beings sensory stimuli, while fundamental to normal adjustment, are but a small part of the incentives to action coming from the environment. This is because every physical object comes to possess a social meaning, and *it is to the social meaning that we mainly react*. This fact is so obvious as scarcely to need discussion, yet we will pause for an illustration or two. Small boys sometimes take the proverbial "chip on the shoulder" quite literally. The writer saw one such situation. Two boys were quarreling. One elaborately stooped, picked up a bit of wood lying at his feet, ceremoniously balanced it on his shoulder and in icy tones said: "Now knock it off!" This the other at once proceeded to do and the fight was on.

Now, there is in a chip of wood *per se* nothing intrinsically offensive. The mere sensory stimulus is inadequate to explain the behavior that follows. The true stimulus comes from a socially provocative meaning which has been given to a chip in this position. The chip becomes a vehicle loaded with insult, and the stimulus resides in the insult. So also there is nothing particularly stirring about a piece of bunting that can be bought for a few cents or a dollar or two according to the size. But let the bunting be properly barred and starred with the colors red, white and blue, and it becomes a symbol of something full of meaning and infinitely precious, for which a nation will sacrifice and men will die. In the traditional freshman-sophomore combat, neither side cares whether the gigantic ball remains in this position or that, or whether the colors of one class or the other fly from the top of a pole. That is, neither side cares for these things as mere physical stimuli; but as symbols of triumph and pride they are esteemed as quite worth bruised heads and even broken bones.

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[2] R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 225.

The simple fact is that men do not live by bread alone, but by the comradeship and esteem of their fellow men. Every object to which we respond in our physical environment therefore becomes saturated with social values. Men will wear a rather ill designed gold key dangling in the way for years from their watch chain, not because they are attached to keys but because this key stands for the distinction of Phi Beta Kappa. Women will cripple their feet and injure their posture and carriage, not because they love strained muscles but because high heels confer satisfying distinction; their hygienic and practical value may be less than *nil*, but their social value is (at present) enormous. In some such way as this everything we habitually see or hear or taste or smell or touch, comes to convey a social meaning which is the principal part of its value as stimulus and incentive. From this it follows that our response to most of the situations we meet is governed not by physical stimuli alone, but by these plus the social meanings they convey. Woodworth's definition of situation, even to account for its stimulus aspect only, would need to be revised to say: "the whole mass of *physical and social* stimuli . . ."

(2) Even then, however, the definition is incomplete for the reason that it does not include response (that is, the reacting individual) as a part of the situation. In the situation

in which a chip on the shoulder of one boy caused another boy to attack, the situation did not consist of boy-with-chip-on-shoulder (stimulus) alone; but of boy-with-chip-on-shoulder plus boy-resenting-attacking (response). The total situation involved in the case of the boy who deserted the baseball game included not alone the four peals of the clock. It comprised also the answering flood of memory, the sense of apprehension or of obligation, and whatever else accounted for the resulting behavior; and finally included the running boy himself as he rushed homeward. Generalized, this means that *the reactor is intrinsically a part of every situation.*

The practical necessity for this inclusion is clear as soon as we turn to the factors at work in actual situations. The four strokes of the clock presented no situation to the other members of our ball players' team, for the reason that in them was no answering recollection of mothers' commands or wishes. They had no motive for response of any kind, so for them no situation existed. Look in upon a breakfast table where Mr. Smith in reading his morning paper lets his eye fall on the market quotation for Something 5's. The situation presented is quite different, for Mr. Smith responds to the quotation with inattention or only mild interest.

Every situation is therefore an affair of two distinct but related aspects: *on the one hand* is stimulus, incentive, urge to action; *on the other,* the reacting individual, with his own peculiar equipment of motives. If the motives are of one kind, a certain response will follow; if of another kind, a different reaction will occur. If the individual lacks the necessary equipment in sensory organ or in social experience for receiving and interpreting the stimuli, then for him no situation exists and no adaptive response will follow.

If we define situation from Woodworth's simplified point of view, it is obvious that experience consists of an unbroken continuance of situations. Our broader definition permits us, however, to think of situation in a somewhat more specific and restricted meaning. Taking human life as we find it, experience is not filled with a dead level of familiar stimuli to which we respond through habit. Experience is more like driving an automobile. Much of the time there is nothing to do but the familiar automatic things that do not require anything more than the ordinary adjustments to the highway. But sooner or later the smooth-flowing progression is broken in upon. A red light flashes, a car cuts in from a crossroad, a child dashes into the road to retrieve a ball. Now action is demanded, adjustment must be made to insistent elements. A true situation has now arisen in the flow of experience. That is, a segment of the experience-stream takes on special significance, is lifted out of the common routine by factors which require modified behavior.

Such segments of experience are frequent in every normal life. The head of the household arises one morning, goes as is his custom in leisurely fashion about his toilet. Suddenly in the midst of things the breakfast gong rings; his watch is ten minutes slow. Shall he delay breakfast, or call to the family to go on without him, or overlook his own slightly Airedale appearance and go down without shaving? One is passing normally along the sidewalk, automatically avoiding people and traffic, when there presents himself a man asking alms. One may hand out a dime, one may suggest the associated charities, or one may simply ignore the request and walk on. Whatever one does, this small segment of experience has had the spotlight of attention and decision thrown upon it. A situation has arisen; for a stimulus has presented itself and adjustive behavior has followed.

Situations are of all degrees of specificity and immediacy. This is at once clear if we think of the various relations sustained by the individual. Each person is a member of society in the broad sense, receiving impressions (stimuli) from it and responding to it. We belong to a particular nation, town, community and have a part in situations arising from this relationship. We are members of a school, a church, a club or other special group, which is responsible for situations of their own kind. We have personal relations with individuals and from these relations other situations occur. In some of these relationships the situations are so broadly general that we are hardly aware of them, and the adjustive reactions present no great problem. In other of the relationships the situations are very concrete and highly particularized.

To sum up in a word: What we ordinarily call situations consist of some conjunction of circumstances (stimuli plus motive-complexes) which require a definite act of adjustment (response). Put differently, from this broader viewpoint, a situation is any segment or set-up of experience which demands some adaptive change in behavior. A situation, in the everyday meaning of the term, places a distinct demand on the individual; he must *do something about it.* It is this compulsive factor that makes any segment of experience a situation in any significant sense. For example, a person riding in the rear seat of the automobile of our illustration might not find in the stop sign or an approaching car or the careless child a true situation, since he is required to make no adjustment (unless he belongs to the rear-seat-driver guild!).

Selective Response in Social Situations

A social situation is one in which the physical stimuli carry a social meaning or value. A knit brow, flushed face, tensed muscles, bared teeth mean anger, emotional excitement. The situations in which they occur are social situations.

Most social situations involve a very large number of elements (stimuli). Response in such situations is always selective. For that matter all response is selective, simply because attention by its very nature favors one object of its regard while it ignores another. But in an important practical sense the element in situations to which response is made is *consciously and purposively* selective. And this selection determines in large degree the individual's social adjustment, and serves as a measure of his character and personality. An illustration or two will serve to emphasize this point:

Andrew Smith, driving along the street in his car, turns to the left without troubling to signal. At this moment Alec Jones coming up behind decides to speed up and pass, omitting to sound his horn. The speed of neither is great and the damage is only two scratched fenders. The cars both pull up and the drivers get out and approach each other. An interesting situation is at hand. Alec speaks first with an ominous note in his voice: "Well, how about it?"

Andrew, calm, with a good-natured grin replies: "Neither of us signaled, so I suppose we were both out of order. What do you say to going on?"

A moment's pause while Alec's face and voice relax. "Suits me," he answers, "we're both dumb fools."

But think what a chance for a dog fight in this situation, had the response been to other elements than the peaceable ones that controlled. Suppose Andrew had bridled at Alec's set jaw and sharp tone, and with some violence had called attention to the danger of passing a car at the head of a street where a turn is likely, and especially without sounding the horn. And suppose Alec had responded to Andrew's friendly overture with sarcastic remarks about turning to the left across traffic without looking in one's mirror or signaling the turn. All that saved a quarrel was the response of each to the amicable elements of the situation rather than to its irritating elements.

A hundred illustrations involving the same principle will occur to every reader. A celebrated lecturer dreaded to have children in his audience because they laughed at the wrong point in a pathetic story. They responded to an element upon which he intended no stress and missed the point of his emphasis.

In Owen Wister's *The Virginian,* the Virginian drawls smoothly but with death in his tone, "Smile when you call me that." With the smile left out, the situation lacked the sole factor that saved it from insult.

A child comes to school seething with anger and rebellion induced by a deplorable scene in the home. His face is like a thundercloud and his manner barely respectful as he declines to recite. To what element in the situation thus presented will the teacher respond? Will she rise to the bait of the child's exasperating behavior, or will she with smile and pleasant word, or by simply overlooking the offensiveness of the rebel, make a bid for the better nature which is for the moment eclipsed?

No day, probably few hours, pass in any active life in which one is not called upon to select among the elements in some situation in which he makes response. And nothing is more revealing of the personality than the stimuli which one passes by and the ones which one makes the basis of one's response. Some persons are natural peacemakers, quietly ignoring the elements in situations which would lead to conflict; others seldom let pass without response the stimuli that make for disagreement and discord. Some bring out the best that is in us because they characteristically pick upon those elements in each situation which call for our best thought and most efficient skills, the expression of which brings us pleasure; other persons put us at our worst by seizing upon and emphasizing in each situation the elements which engender in us negative attitudes and acts. To be able to put people at their best through wise use of selective response, is an element of strength and leadership in character.

The difference in individuals in the elements to which they characteristically respond in situations, is like the difference in response to colors. One person notices and responds to the sharper primary colors. The fully saturated reds, blues, yellows and greens are what appeal. Another person may pass these by for the more subdued shades and tones of intermediate colors. There are those who in social situations respond only to the obvious and insistent elements, missing the more subtle factors. These are the persons whose comedy must be of the slap-stick variety, whose pathos must reveal itself in rending sobs and tears, whose humor must be inescapably obvious. For them heroism must prove itself in thrilling deeds of physical prowess and danger. They would be more impressed with the courage shown in the prize fight than that revealed in the sustained struggle of a brave spirit against great odds; as for example Helen Keller's fight for enlightenment and culture. Such persons are likely to be somewhat crude and obtuse socially. The finer shades and values in a social situation pass them by. Because of this they lack tact, miss the best of companionship, fail to understand other people, often act under stimuli that are far from the best in the situation.

In sharp contrast with persons whose selective response is of this type are those whose social sensitivity is keen and whose apprehension of the more subtle elements in situations is sure. They discover the richer meanings and values in the situations they meet. They get and give the most in friendship, because they have that fuller understanding which is the basis of sympathy. Their satisfactions in the marriage relation reach to the full enjoyment of the other's personality and comradeship. In school or college they are able to look beyond requirements and grades. In thinking of a career they consider other rewards as well as the financial. In their social development they are farther from the elemental and primitive than are the type we have set in contrast with them. In their personalities they embody more of the admirable graces.

Two broad factors are responsible in most social situations for the response made: *One* is the *stimulus-value or prepotency* of the various stimuli comprised in the situation; the *other* is the readiness and strength of the motives set in action by the situation.

The first of these may be illustrated in physiological terms by the effect of light waves on the eye. At four hundred and fifty billion waves per second the eye sees the color red, at seven hundred and ninety billions per second, violet; and all other colors of the spectrum at rates between. Although there are waves much below the red rate and much above the violet rate, for the human eye they have no stimulus value. So also light waves fail to stimulate the ear, sound waves do not affect the eye, and so on. Sex stimulus follows the same law, the appeal of each variety of animals being limited to its own kind.

Probably because of their survival value in the evolutionary process, certain types of stimuli are almost universally prepotent in nearly every situation where they occur: A *moving* object is observed more readily than a still one. The *new and strange* claim attention ahead of the old and familar. *Sex* characters have marked prepotency for the opposite sex. The *helplessness of infancy* attracts the regard and sympathy of normal adults. *Intense stimuli* of all kinds—loud noises, bright lights, strong tastes—are prepotent over milder stimuli. Acts of physical *daring and bravery* are at a premium among practically all peoples.

For most social situations the stimulus-value of the various elements depends on the experience, interests, intelligence and entire pattern of life of those participating in the situation. What challenges the attention of one person or group may pass unnoticed by another. Modernized young Chinese and Japanese women show great curiosity and interest in the costumes of women travelers from the Occident, evidently making mental notes for their own use later on. Balinese women, on the other hand, whose total garb consists only of a skirt, show no such curiosity, for they have no desire to emulate. In ancient Greece and Rome a sickly or deformed child attracted attention only to be exposed on some hillside; now all civilized nations provide hospitals and homes for the unfortunate. In the older day the feature of the situation that appealed was the trouble and hardship of feeding a useless member of the community; more recently the pathos of physical handicaps has forced itself on the realization of a more socialized people.

Whatever produces fun and laughter or has in it the element of humor, has for most people high stimulus-value in social situations. We pay fabulous salaries to those who are able by their quips and turns and antics to make us laugh. But, as we have already noted, we do not all laugh at the same things, nor all find humor in the same factors of a situation. To some the grimacing clown is less funny than to others. Children shriek with laughter at situations in the movie which leave the adult part of the audience unmoved; and in their turn children sit stolid while adults roar. Experience, insight, interest and attitude cause each group to see and respond to elements in the situation which lack stimulus-value for those of a different age.

Factors that have high stimulus-value in personalities also vary with time circumstance. In a group of Polynesian maidens it is the fat ones who possess prepotent charm for male suitors, while with our own swains slenderness appeals. A dimple or a curve, rather than good housewifery, may dominate the situation during courtship, but under the test of marriage, these values often exchange places. In certain circles a man may be sought after and welcomed because of his conviviality, repartee and general exuberance of spirits. To a business executive looking for a potential head of an important department, these qualities may be passed over for others more related to the service required. Illustrating the same principle, the qualities in a girl which will attract admiring escorts are not always the ones that will attract men to marry her.

Further illustrations are not required. The significance of such facts as these for our discussion is this: The natural prepotence of certain elements in social situations may give them undue importance in determining response, and in so doing throw adjustment out of balance. Other elements, often of greater meaning and value, do not force themselves equally on our attention and so are overlooked. Our perceptions for these more subtle elements may need to be sharpened. If, for example, we persistently fail to recognize beauty where highly intelligent and cultured people see it, we might well seek to cultivate our perception of beauty. One who ignores great literature, music and art, must acknowledge a lack of readiness to apprehend stimuli of great worth. One who has failed to sense an essential nobility practically always present in human nature, in spite of its many weaknesses, has missed something from his social environment which he can ill afford to lose. One who has not discovered that the more clamant, sensational and highly provocative factors in the social environment are seldom of greatest value as cues to interest and endeavor, still has much to learn. It is even possible that the chief use of intelligence and experience in the economy of our lives, is to *enable us to select from the stimuli of our environment those to which we will respond.*

In discussing the prepotency of stimuli in social situations, the second of the two factors which determine response, the *strength and readiness of motives* has frequently been mentioned. For stimulus and motive are but two inseparable aspects of a single fact.

Motives, the currents of energy acting in us, differ quite as much in their compulsive power as stimuli vary in their effectiveness. Drives that are irresistible in one person have less force in another, and the strength of a motive changes with circumstances in the individual. Lincoln the storekeeper is said to have walked fourteen miles to return over-change of a few cents to a customer; another clerk might wait until the customer returned to make restitution. Some compulsion was at work in young Abe which is less strong in the average person. Some boys and girls are quite literally *sent* to college; others, driven by some subjective urge, desire or conviction, *go* at the cost of effort and hardship. There are persons the tides of whose motivating energy run lazily and without great pressure toward action and achievement. There are others who in their motives are of the high potency type which causes them to respond vigorously to situations in which they participate.

Because motives are of such infinite variety and strength, and because they combine with and oppose each other in so many ways, they are usually quite unanalyzable in any complete sense, even in the simplest situation. Consider for example the motives that account for the act of appearing for a meal. These are but a few of the many that may be involved:

1. Hunger
2. Knowledge that it is necessary to eat regularly
3. Habit
4. To save concern on the part of others
5. To avoid having to answer questions
6. To enjoy the conversation
7. To meet some particular person
8. Desire to put on weight
9. Desire to preserve strength and endurance

Not only may all these and other motives be acting on any particular occasion, but they appear in many different combinations and proportions. Conceivably all the motives of our list might unite to bring one to a particular meal. They might even be acting at their optimum strength. In that case the motivation would manifestly be irresistible. More likely, however, there is no such harmonious concert. Hunger may be lacking and yet the other motives exist strong enough to compel the act. Or hunger plus habit may be strong enough to overcome the desire to *take off* weight, or to avoid conversation or to shirk the meeting of some particular person.

Scarcely ever in situations of importance do all the motives point in the same direction. Often the conflict of motives becomes so marked that a state of tension and indecision is created, only to be resolved when one set of motives or the other triumphs. To be or not to be was Hamlet's problem; the motives clashed. Shall the maiden say yes when the proposal comes which she sees to be imminent? There is the natural urge to marriage, the desire for a home, perhaps for children; love adds its persuasion. On the other hand this man is no tycoon, his occupation is a humble one, he is not the Prince Charming of the maiden's dreams. Her response to the fateful question will be determined by the preponderance of motives leading in one direction or the other. It is out of the conflict of motives that all problems of conduct arise in consciousness.

Purposed Improvement of Selective Response

The normative value of such considerations as we have been discussing, is not difficult to comprehend. At all levels of behavior above the reflex, the individual can take a hand in shaping his own response in the situations he meets. Except the extreme behaviorists, no school of psychology denies to human nature a form of energy that goes beyond that recognized in the physical sciences. For this energy that is not purely blind and mechanical, McDougall proposes three possible names from which to choose: *mental* energy; *psychophysical* energy; and *hormic energy*.[3] Whichever name is chosen, or whether some entirely different name, the distinguishing feature of this form of energy is that it is "peculiar to purposive activities."

Put in different words, this means that we can at least in a measure set up a goal and work to it. We can direct our attention to a fuller understanding of the situations in which we find ourselves. We can examine the school situation, the political situation, the marital situation, the economic situation of which we are a part, judging the value and validity of the different stimuli which they present. Elements in situations which our judgment and experience tell us possess a potency beyond their true value, we can scale down. Elements which are indistinct but give promise of true worth, we can seek out and give their rightful place. We can cultivate our perception for the subtle values in the situations of which we are a part, and refuse to be satisfied with the obvious and the usual.

Even in the marshaling or suppressing of motives we can bring intelligence and purpose to bear. When we are driven headlong by a desire we can pause for a look at the goal to which it is heading and so judge its validity. If we find ourselves in the grip of a strong mind-set leading to a particular act or line of conduct, we can examine the attitude for indefensible biases and prejudices. In short, we can in some measure choose among the motives we allow to rule in our behavior. So important is the matter of motives and their use, that much of the remainder of the book will deal, directly or indirectly, with the problem.

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[3] W. McDougall, *The Energies of Men*, p. 10.

PROBLEMS

1. Do you know individuals whose personalities differ from one type of situation to another? For example, the writer knows a child who is the pride of all her teachers, but who is most exasperating at home. With a particular individual in mind, can you explain such behavior in terms of selective response to social situations?
2. The group will find most interesting a debate concerning the worth of honor societies as incentives for learning.
3. Many persons insist that school marks are essential incentives for school work. You might consider quite carefully in your own thinking and in discussion, the question as to what extent all pupils are urged to more worth-while effort by marks.
4. Make an effort to observe the social behavior of children of different ages. Do you note differences according to age in the urge to compete or to excel? Does it seem to you that this urge is native? Or does it appear to result from learning?
5. Consult social psychology and sociology for discussion of the power of motives on a crowd, as compared with their power on individuals.
6. A college student who is the son of a minister tells the writer that his motives are very different at home from those when he is at school. He insists that he is completely sincere in both situations. Does it seem to you that your motives vary from one situation to another?
7. Prepare a list of handicaps of the school and home in promoting the establishment of desirable and dependable motives in children.

REFERENCES

Allport, F. H. *Social Psychology*, pp. 42-83. A well worked out theory of motivation not wholly in accord with the one here presented.

McDougall, W. *The Energies of Men.* Read Ch. I for the point of view of an important school of psychology. Ch. II, "Schools of Psychology," presents contrasting positions.

Murphy, G. *Experimental Social Psychology,* Ch. II, "The Biology of Motives." Presents an exhaustive summary of experimental findings on this phase of the problem.

Thomson, M. K. *The Springs of Human Action.* Presents a comprehensive view of motivation. Rather general.

Woodworth, R. S. *Psychology* (revised ed.). Ch. VI deals with "factors both within and without the individual that determine what he shall do at any moment." Read especially pp. 225-246.

Adjustment and Mastery, Ch. IX. Discusses desires and motives.

CHAPTER VII

BASIC MOTIVES IN CONDUCT

BY BASIC motives are meant motives of the type that Woodworth calls "dependable."[1] A motive is basic when it is (1) *primitive,* reaching far down in the evolutionary process; when it is (2) *universal,* being found in all normal individuals regardless of race, habitat or social conditions; when it is (3) *dependable,* in the sense that it can be counted upon to produce the same general type of behavior in different individuals; when it is (4) *simple,* not being compounded of several drives of different origin and nature; when it is (5) *unlearned,* though in the higher animals and especially in man learning quickly "conditions" the native drives. Such a motive, for example, is fear. Fear is found well down in the animal scale (primitive). It manifests itself under adequate stimuli in all individuals (universal). It characteristically produces behavior directed toward escape or self-preservation (dependable). It is relatively simple, depending physiologically for its drive on visceral activities, possibly on hormones (simple). In some of its forms it is, according to weight of scientific opinion, ready to respond without training (unlearned).

Source of the Basic Motives

If we could know the source of all the basic motives and how they may be modified, we should then be able to change human nature and direct social adjustment much better than at present.

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[1] R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (rev. ed.), pp. 246-266.

As these words are written a boy has just passed the open door of the writer's office, in charge of an assistant in the educational clinic. The boy has been brought for consultation by his distracted mother, who is unable to control him. In the clinic the boy has to be forcibly restrained to keep him from breaking apparatus. He refuses to respond to questions asked or to tests given him. He is rebellious, discourteous, insolent to the person in charge. This boy is headed toward serious incorrigibility unless something can be done for him. Yet ten years ago he was a baby, without any of these habits or maladjustments that now threaten his future and make his present a trial to those about him. In the expressive phrase of the day, how did he get that way?

It is quite certain that the motives operating in this boy's conduct were not all of the basic type. Some were learned, coming from experiences in home, community or school, which had left perverse tendencies. But underneath these learned reactions were nevertheless drives that were primitive, universal, dependable, simple, unlearned; for example, *anger* and *self-assertion.*

That the basic motives which we shall discuss in the present chapter come from heredity, most psychologists would agree. And as Professor Gardner Murphy remarks, "If we are to understand 'human nature' as we find it, we must do our best to understand the raw material of human nature, the behavior which rests on a hereditary basis."[2]

The older psychologists explained human behavior largely in terms of instincts; definite patterns of action coming to the individual from his racial past. William James, for example, believed that man possesses an almost countless number of such action patterns, some of which are ready to begin their function at birth, others ripening as need for their function arises. Later psychology has largely discarded the doctrine of instincts of this wide range and specificity. While recognizing the instinctive urge that comes from heredity, it rejects the hard-and-fast pattern idea, thereby leaving environment, experience, education a much larger part in determining behavior. This trend is shown in the fact that G. Stanley Hall listed scores of fears with corresponding action patterns, which come to the child through heredity; while J. B. Watson allows but three such native fears, and Sherman none.

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[2] *Experimental Social Psychology,* p. 42.

Illustrating the difference in viewpoint concerning the number of human behavior patterns possessed independently of training, are the lists of such patterns proposed by McDougall, Woodworth and Watson.

McDougall, who calls these native drives *propensities,* gives the following eighteen, cautioning that the list "is not put forward as final and correct in all respects."[3]

1. To seek (and perhaps to store) food (food-seeking propensity).
2. To reject and avoid certain noxious substances (disgust propensity).
3. To court and mate (sex propensity).
4. To flee to cover in response to violent impressions that inflict pain or injury (fear propensity).
5. To explore strange places and things (curiosity propensity).
6. To feed, protect and shelter the young (protective or parental propensity).
7. To remain in company with fellows and, if isolated, to seek that company (gregarious propensity).
8. To domineer, to lead, to assert oneself over, or display oneself before, one's fellows (self-assertive propensity).
9. To defer, to obey, to follow, to submit in the presence of others who display superior powers (submissive propensity).

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[3] W. McDougall, *The Energies of Men,* p. 97.

10. To resent and forcibly to break down any thwarting or resistance offered to the free exercise of any other tendency (anger propensity).
11. To cry aloud for assistance when our efforts are utterly baffled (appeal propensity).
12. To construct shelters and implements (constructive propensity).
13. To acquire, possess, and defend whatever is found useful or otherwise attractive (acquisitive propensity).
14. To laugh at the defects and failures of our fellow-creatures (laughter propensity).
15. To remove, or to remove oneself from, whatever produces discomfort, as by scratching or by change of position and location (comfort propensity).
16. To lie down, rest and sleep when tired (rest or sleep propensity).
17. To wander to new scenes (migratory propensity).
18. A group of very simple propensities subserving bodily needs, such as coughing, sneezing, breathing, evacuation.

Woodworth's list of "relatively primitive and universal human motives" which he refers to as "so-called instincts," is as follows:[4]

1. Hunger and food seeking
2. Thirst
3. Escape from pain and danger, fear
4. Resistance to constraint and interference, anger
5. Curiosity, exploring
6. Manipulating objects
7. Seeking company, herding together
8. Submitting, following a leader
9. Self-assertion, mastering
10. Mating, sex desire
11. Caring for the young, motherly love

Like McDougall, Woodworth claims no infallibility or completeness for his list, saying: "There are many other lists, longer and shorter, but none of them can claim scientific validity. We have made only a beginning in the study of motives."

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[4] R. S. Woodworth, *Adjustment and Mastery,* p. 98.

Watson reduces native behavior patterns to the low minimum of three:[5]

1. Fear, catching the breath, clutching with the hands, crying
2. Rage, crying, slashing movements with hands, holding the breath
3. Love, cooing, gurgling, cessation of crying in some cases

For the purposes of this chapter we shall not need to attempt an exhaustive list of the basic motives. We shall rather select for description those that are least to be questioned and that seem most important in determining social conduct.

Tissue Hungers

In the body's metabolism many chemical changes are constantly taking place. Analysis shows different chemical compositions for the blood and the tissues when the body is rested and when it is fatigued, when it is quiet or in a state of excitement, and under many other conditions. The glands, as we have seen, are in effect factories working constantly under strict chemical formulæ. Metabolism itself consists of chemical processes.

Now in all this activity there seems to exist a normal chemical balance necessary to a feeling of well-being and satisfaction. When the balance is disturbed by a change in the chemical reactions, the tissues give notice. This notice is in the form of a sense of disturbance, unrest, desire, or discomfort, which disappears when the normal balance is again restored. The drives thus set up by such chemical changes are known as "tissue hungers" or "tissue needs."

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[5] See his *Psychologies of 1925,* pp. 46-49.

In general the tissue hungers are rhythmic in their action, though the rhythm in some of them can be changed by training and habit. Besides breakfast, luncheon and dinner, the Englishman must have his mid-afternoon tea; the American demands three meals a day; the people of India are accustomed to but two. The established chemical rhythm changes also with changing organic conditions. The new-born child feeds every two hours, then changes to three, to four, and finally to the intervals set by social convention. Sex demands are more pressing between twenty and fifty than before or after these ages. But whatever the rhythm the process is the same: Chemical changes go on piling up in a certain tissue until a point is reached where a drive exists toward behavior that will satisfy the tissue's need.

Hunger is the call of the tissues for food. Every cell of the body lives as an individual organ, assimiliating its nourishment and excreting its waste. Hunger is first localized in the tissues of the stomach, whose pangs are a cry for food. In long continued starvation the nerves and the brain are affected and a general feeling of *malaise* ensues. Extreme famine reduces men to the level of beasts. Hungry populations are characteristically ready for violence and revolution.

Teachers in schools where there are chronically hungry children, find that this condition not only limits achievement but has its effect on conduct. One teacher relates this incident. John, who had seemed a promising boy, proved to be slack in his work and a troublemaker among the pupils. The teacher set herself to win John to better ways, giving him much personal help and attention. He seemed to respond, but he suffered marked relapses. One day the teacher asked John to stay when the children were dismissed. Half in exasperation, half in appeal she said, "John, what is the matter with you; why don't you behave and do your work?" After a moment's delay John, responding, said, "Miss Lane, I'll tell you. I'm just too darned hungry all the time to be good." Anyone who having missed a meal or two finds himself irritable, glum and depressed, has proof of the effect of this form of tissue need on the personality. Proverbial is the power of a satisfying meal to put one into good humor, soften the mood, give an optimistic outlook upon life. The threat of famine casts its shadow over many regions of the earth; it is estimated that a quarter or a third of the world's population go to sleep hungry every night. Mystics may "purify" themselves by fasting, but no one who has watched starving people in China or Russia, can think of hunger as an agent for the upbuilding of life in any civilization.

On the other hand, the hunger drive unchecked by proper inhibitions leads to self-indulgence, gluttony and many unlovely traits. Plain but abundant living is the ideal expression of the hunger motive.

Besides the healthy rhythmic hunger that regularly proclaims its demands, there is an abnormal hunger that comes from malnutrition. This kind of hunger may not be felt as the familiar demand of the stomach for food; in fact the stomach may rebel at the thought of eating. Nor does malnutrition always come from lack of food; it may arise from dysfunction in the digestive system, or from an ill-balanced diet. Carlyle blamed his tyrranical moods on indigestion, a jangled chemistry of nutrition. In many homes are dissension, sharp words, unkindness, distorted personalities, due to the unsatisfied craving of the tissues for proper nourishment. The child who chronically suffers from poor nutrition, whatever the cause, can but show the effects in his personality.

Thirst is much more insistent than hunger. Gandhi can fast for several weeks and survive, but he regularly must have water to drink. Thirst is first localized in the throat, whose protesting tissues serve notice that the supply of water, which constitutes some eighty per cent of the weight of the body, has become depleted. If the deprivation continues until the thirst becomes extreme, the entire organism seems to cry out in protest. Changes then quickly take place in the neural centers, delirium and hysteria follow. Probably few persons, especially if physically active in a high temperature, as on a desert, would be able to retain their sanity for more than a few days without water; four or five days would usually end life.

Because water is blessedly abundant almost everywhere, thirst is much less of a problem than hunger. Yet hygienists constantly urge upon us that we drink too little water. Every child's book on hygiene prescribes so many glasses a day, usually far more than the average person drinks. While scientific proof is so far lacking, there is good ground for believing that failure to satisfy the tissues' need for water, is with many persons a cause of physical and mental conditions which affect behavior and personality.

Fatigue is nature's demand for removal of toxins which are tormenting the tissues. Whether fatigue is solely responsible for the body's need for sleep is not known, but that the two are closely related is certain. Fatigue, until it passes a certain point, tends to bring on sleep. Sleep is an excellent cure for fatigue. If the fatigue is from mental rather than from physical activity, then muscular exercise of a kind that will hold the attention and give a pleasant exhilaration is a great restorer of the chemical balance. On the physiological side this is accomplished through the increased flow of the lymph and the blood, and the heightened activity of the various tissues.

Both observation and our own experience convince us that excessive fatigue, especially if it is long continued and cumulative, tends to produce undesirable patterns of behavior. The man whom care, worry and long hours in a business office have brought to the point where his nerves are on edge and his sleep uncertain, is practically sure to undergo a profound change in personality while this condition lasts. The mother who is constantly worn from household work, from the care of children and from the struggle to make ends meet on a meager budget, is rarely able to be her best self. Pupils in school who cut short their sleep for late hours, who worry because of studies they are not mastering, or who have to work their way through school, are in danger of developing harmful attitudes and traits. Especially should it be recognized that fatigue which comes from worry, anxiety, solicitude, unhappiness, is doubly injurious.

We are not to get the impression that all fatigue is harmful. There is a fatigue that is normal and pleasant and that prepares the organism to enjoy rest or sleep. Such fatigue has a relatively short rhythm; it accumulates and is removed daily. It comes from activities that on the whole yield satisfaction, or at least do not cause aversion or worry. Fatigue of this kind seems even to be necessary to normal living. A person who could never become tired or sleepy would lack a quality few would care to lose.

Asphyxia is the name given the tissues' protest when the supply of oxygen runs low, and the accumulated amount of carbon dioxide has become too great. No one has failed to notice the discomfort that comes in a crowded room with windows and doors tight shut. How quickly the suffocating and irritating sensation disappears when one goes into the open air or when windows are thrown open to the blast.

Undoubtedly much of the disorder and indifference found in some school rooms can be traced to incipient asphyxia, accompanied by fatigue. Fresh air has a high value in the building of a personality.

Sex is a drive that begins far down in the scale of life. Egg-cells and sperm-cells are found in the lowly protozoa. Bisexual fertilization Loeb calls a life-saving act, which puts into life new energy and keeps it young and flowing. Effects of the sex drive are seen in the swarming of bees, in the migration of salmon against swift streams and over barriers to their spawning grounds, in the assembling of seal herds at their breeding places. In the singing of birds, the roaring of lions, the prancing of stallions, and a hundred other forms of animal behavior, sex is the urge.

At the human level as we have already noted (Chapter V), sex plays a commanding part in almost every interest and activity. Its drive is directly responsible for courtship, mating and procreation. The many forms of sex irregularity which torment the individual and create problems for society, owe their existence to the insistent demands of sex tissues for satisfaction. Deprivation of this satisfaction leaves its mark on the personality quite as surely as do sexual excesses.

Romantic love, or love between the sexes, is a complex of tissue hunger and attraction of personality for personality. Either of these may exist without the other, but both are needed for a happy union. Perfect mating depends on mutual adaptability for satisfying the sex demand, and a lasting sympathy and attraction of each personality for the other. Satisfaction of sex alone may serve for a time as a sufficient bond, but if the personalities jar upon each other the sex bond itself weakens and the bond fails. Matings that rest only on the elementary attraction of sex without suitability between the two as persons, or without the capacity for the necessary adaptations and adjustments required of persons who are to live together, are not likely to remain happy when the original drive that brought them together weakens. Tragic proof of this is seen in the fact that one out of every six marriages in the United States ends in divorce, with many others so unhappy that the unions are failures. Successful marriage should have as its foundation elementary sex attraction, but it must include also a wide community of mutual interests and purposes. William Morris to the contrary notwithstanding, "love" is not enough; even though the denial of "love" too often results finally in various disturbances of personality which reveal themselves in neurotic tendencies.

Besides founding the home, playing a large part in economic development, and fostering many of the graces of social living, sex has its perversities. Its drive not infrequently leads to habits of self-excitation and indulgence, whose physical and mental effects are harmful. Out of the sex drive comes the "oldest profession," with its ghastly sequence of disease and loss of self-respect. Recently a conjunction of circumstances has greatly aggravated a problem never wholly absent between the young of the two sexes. The older moral standards have been greatly relaxed, women have been given greater freedom, sex as a topic of conversation and discussion is no longer taboo, the economic depression has greatly delayed or actually prevented many marriages, knowledge of contraceptives has become general among intelligent classes. While all this has been going on the sex motive has lost nothing of its urge. The result, according to students in this field, has been a great increase in illicit sex relationships among those who under happier economic conditions would marry. That this trend is a poor solution of the urge of sex, disappointing in the end to the individual and damaging to society, there can be no question. Just as the human personality lacks something of completeness without the normal experience of sex, so sex fails in its fulfillment under the casual relations that are not centered in a home and family.

The Fear Motive

Fear as a factor in maladjustment has already been discussed

(Chapter III). Our purpose here will be to look at fear beginning as one of the *primitive, universal, dependable, simple, unlearned* drives of human nature, and developing into a highly complex and important factor in the motivation of many persons.

One important measure of the extent to which any motive functions in experience is the influence of this motive on language—the number of words required to express its different shades of meaning. The following is the list under "Fear" in Maswon's edition of Roget's *Dictionary of Synonyms and Antonyms:*

> *Nouns.* Fear, timidity, diffidence, apprehensiveness, fearfulness, solicitude, anxiety, care, misgiving, mistrust, suspicion, qualm, hesitation; apprehension, dread, reverence, awe.
>
> Fright, alarm, dread, terror, horror, dismay, consternation, panic, scare, funk (colloq.), cold feet (slang), stampede; trepidation, flutter, fear and trembling, perturbation, tremor, quivering, shaking, trembling, quaking, palpitation, nervousness, restlessness, disquietude.
>
> Intimidation, daunting, bullying; terrorism, reign of terror; terrorist, bully.
>
> (Object of fear): Bugaboo, bugbear, scarecrow, bogy, hobgoblin, nightmare, specter, *bête noire.*
>
> *Verbs.* Fear, be afraid, apprehend, dread, distrust, hesitate, falter, funk, cower, crouch, skulk, take fright, take alarm; start, wince, flinch, shy, shrink, fly.
>
> Tremble, shake, shiver, shudder, flutter, quake, quaver, quiver, quail.
>
> Frighten, terrify, inspire fear, bulldoze (colloq.), dismay, astound; awe, strike terror, appall, unman, petrify, horrify; startle, scare, alarm, stampede.
>
> Intimidate, daunt, cow, overawe, abash, deter, discourage; browbeat, bully, threaten, terrorize, bullyrag, badger.
>
> Haunt, obsess, beset, besiege; prey on the mind.

To these fifty-eight nouns and sixty-two verbs may be added an almost equal number of adjectives and adverbs. Surely the fear motive acts in many different types of situation in our lives. We may not often feel stark fear or terror, but few escape situations in which diffidence, solicitude, anxiety, apprehension, dread or some other derivative of fear plays no part.

Psychologists are in the main agreed that fear has but few *native* forms; there are few situations that produce fear in the new-born child. Watson found that newly born children start sharply at loud sounds, and at the support being removed so as to allow the child to fall; he contends that all other kinds of fear are *learned.* The Joneses, experimenting with the reaction of persons of different ages to snakes, report that no infant showed any signs of fear in the presence of snakes; on the other hand, all manifested interest and a desire to handle them. Very different was the behavior of a class of college students, most of whom exhibited evidences of marked revulsion and distress when asked to touch a harmless snake.[6] The ease with which a fear may be conditioned is proved by a little girl who, frightened by her new patent leather shoes when first they were shown her, afterward manifested fright at her father's old slippers which had been placed beside her shoes, though previously she had enjoyed playing with the slippers.

Yet even though there may be but few native fear reactions, the universality of the fear motive and the wide range of experience to which it applies, suggest an important fact: *The human organism is so constituted and so tuned to its environment and the lessons of experience that fear is very easily aroused.* The specific fear patterns which exist may be few, but the readiness to respond with fear in some of its forms is tragically present.

The basic fear drive consists at birth largely of potentialities. Fears of furry things, of cold and clammy things, of the dark, of ghosts and goblins, of savage looks, of acid tones, of ridicule, of storms and floods, of disease and death, of losing precious things—these and a hundred other fears mercifully pass the child by at the beginning. As many of them as later enter his experience must wait on maturation, on growth of knowledge, on contact with broadening environment.

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[6] H. E. and M. C. Jones, "A Study of Fear," *Childhood Education,* Vol. 5, pp. 136-143.

Fears, which seem to increase rapidly through early childhood, are in a state of constant transformation due to changes in the situations which create them. No young child and probably few adolescents, even though they may suffer privations, have the fear of poverty which oppresses many adults who have had experience with a heartless economic order. Children who under a certain brand of theology have been taught to fear hell, may lose that fear as their critical judgment develops, and they may later be disquieted because all religious faith has gone. The boy who looks upon war as an adventure in glory and heroism may, when he sees warfare in a truer light, contemplate the necessity of bearing arms with shrinking and dread. Children in the kindergarten (but not always in the primary!) are spared the fear of being "failed" which will strike dread to their hearts a few years later. Some fears once potent no longer trouble intelligent men, for the situations that caused them have been mastered or proved without reality. Yellow fever and the plague do not cause serious alarm for we can control them; we no longer fear an eclipse, for knowledge tells us that sun or moon is not being devoured. Yet new fears are added by a changing civilization. Millions of men are today filled with apprehension because ever-increasing machines are taking their jobs away from them. Other millions who read war threats among the nations, suffer qualms of anxiety when they think of poison gas and of death that rains from the sky.

Caution has a basis of fear, but it consists mainly of intelligence, knowledge, judgment. In so far as caution is dependent on fear, fear renders a necessary service in our adjustment. The older function of fear, that of preparing for combat or for flight, has a decreasingly important place in organized society. A heavy debit factor, already mentioned, must also be taken into account in the appraisal of fear as a motive. Fear long continued has a demoralizing effect on personality. As a class the Untouchables of India cringe and cower before others of their race who are superior to them only in caste—the result of generations of fear. Slaves of any sort are never admirable persons. Children brought up under conditions of cruelty and abuse show the effects of fear either in lack of poise and confidence or in an attitude of protective arrogance, suspicion and rebellion. Fear interferes with the normal functioning of the organism. It destroys happiness as well as health. It kills love and respect. On many counts the value of fear as a motive in the control of conduct may be questioned.

Anger

Like fear, *anger* is a drive which man shares with lower forms of animal life. The organic accompaniments of anger also resemble those of fear. Hormones from the ductless glands give the blood changed chemical quality, vegetative functions are checked, breathing and the heart beat quicken, blood is rushed to the surface, muscles grow tense and ready for action. Characteristic reactions to the drive of anger are combat, fighting, attack. During anger reason is clouded, judgment is uncertain, normal inhibitions give way. Though the body may be at its best for attack, the mind is at a disadvantage while anger rules.

Again like fear, anger begins very early in the life of the individual. Hold in close restraint any normal child in such a way as to make free movement impossible, and at once flushed face, violent muscular effort, agitated cries proclaim the presence of anger. In general anger results from interference with the free flow of experience. The building blocks tumble, and the child hurls and hammers them. A playmate reaches for a toy, and a blow results. A door refuses to open, and receives violent kicks. This tendency carries over into adult life, though the expression of anger may have changed its form. Words are usually employed by grown-ups instead of blows, though muscular violence is sometimes employed, as witness an occasional fracas even in the august halls of the Congress.

Anger may easily lose its basic quality and be conditioned into habit. The baby, deprived of his bottle or toy, screams and struggles. If instead of diverting his attention to a new interest, the mother returns the bottle or toy to quiet the storm, anger is rewarded and thus the anger drive is selected as an instrument of redress against an offending world. Children may be thwarted and nagged and their activities interfered with until anger becomes a ready response, and its expression increasingly violent. Then the tantrum problem has been created, and emotional balance is thrown out of plumb.

Because anger is a part of native equipment, it must be expected now and then in the young child whose wishes have occasionally to be denied in the larger interest of himself or the group. If development and education go on normally, however, learning and the general process of social adjustment should result in the almost total elimination of anger in its cruder forms. Men of culture do not use their fists or employ coarse and violent speech to express their feeling. Women of refinement do not pull each other's hair or talk Billingsgate.

This does not mean that anger is all bad even in highly civilized society; but rather that it needs to be tempered and its expression suited to social conditions and needs. Blind rage and violent outbursts are more likely to complicate than to solve situations. Yet a person who could feel no stir of "righteous" indignation at the world's wrongs and injustices, or who could not be moved to resentment at the cruelties of arrogance and power, would lack something that is needed by those who would help shape an acceptable social order. And indignation and resentment, at least at their best, are but forms of anger mixed with knowledge, reason and purpose. The acts they inspire are directed toward a more rational end than are the acts of primitive anger. In general, resentment oftenest arises when the situation has a personal bearing, while indignation is more likely to occur when the situation involves the welfare of others.

If, as was implied above, the extent to which a particular concept is bound up with experience is to be measured by the degree to which its terms enter our vocabulary, then anger plays a large part in our lives. Here are a few of the well near two hundred words and phrases which the anger drive has given the English language: *animosity, irritation, displeasure, wrath, indignation, resentment, vexation, annoyance, irascibility, asperity, acrimony, spleen, bile, ascerbity, exasperation, umbrage, dudgeon, soreness, pet, tantrum, bitterness, pique, huff, sulks, angry mood, fury, rage, passion, vials of wrath, hot blood, high words, lose one's temper.*

The Dominance Drive

Deeply embedded in human nature is the urge to express or serve the self; to dominate and master things and other persons. The puzzle resists solution, so it must be solved. An opponent offers opposition, so he must be beaten in the game.

A chip on the shoulder invites trouble only because it challenges the dominance of those whom it offends. Let the circus come to town with its amazing acts of skill in tumbling, riding, trapeze performances, and the boy population works valiantly to attain distinction over the same thorny road. Children under a dozen years can seldom be welded into perfect teamwork in games, because they have not yet learned to subordinate self-assertion to group co-operation.

Nature has been subdued not alone because men require food, warmth and safety, but also because they are driven by an irresistible inner urge to master difficulties. Conquering the North and the South Pole has yielded so far no great practical value except the satisfaction that comes to the self from winning the game and from the recognition such achievement brings. There is nothing tangible at the top of Mount Everest that we need, yet many lives have been lost in the struggle to reach its summit. We travel through the air, not because the added speed is necessary to our welfare, but because intrepid men were driven to try their skill against the pull of gravity. The world would be much better off without submarines, but we feel a satisfaction in the fact that we have beaten the ocean at its own game. Many men who could live a more comfortable and perhaps a happier life if they demanded from business or industry no more than a generous competence, wear out body and mind in fighting for wealth which they cannot use and which others covet; the urge to conquer obstacles, to assert the self, compels them.

The dominance, or self-assertive, drive is a constant factor in making social adjustments at all age levels. Children bully and fight one another for no reason except the urge of dominance. Parents often oppose the child, not because the child's way is wrong, but because it conflicts with the adult desire to be obeyed. We resent a slight or a reprimand because it hurts our self-esteem. Many persons never learn to take orders gracefully, because the urge to mastery and power in the self has not been balanced by motives of social co-operation. The child who shows off, the braggart of any age, acts under a dominance drive which is not sufficiently conditioned or held in check by compensating motives.

Equally a shortage in the drive of self-assertion may result in grave mal-adjustments of personality, and be in the end even worse than an over-supply. Timidity and shyness, as noted earlier in the discussion, cause less trouble in the home or the school than too much self-assertion, but for the individual concerned they are a far greater handicap. Perhaps this explains at least in part why so many "bad" boys turn out highly successful men, while not a few "good" boys fail to make their way. The child who is constantly ill at ease with others, often embarrassed and ashamed, is likely to develop a personality that lacks positiveness and tone.

A self which lacks sufficient assertion and becomes diffident and shrinking, is seldom happy; the rough-and-tumble contacts with reality bring too many strings and bruises to self-esteem. Refuge against buffeting often take the form of a false and uncertain defiance, or an ineffectual peevishness. Sulkiness and sullenness seldom are found in a personality which has a strong sense of dominance.

So important for the individual has nature found the dominance drive, that it withstands much suppression. Much, perhaps most, of the control exercised over young children in the home and the schools, is based on submission. The child is compelled to give way to the adult. He must do this, not do that, learn to obey. He is punished for rebellion, he must not "talk back" or set his will against his mentor's. On the plane of the inanimate order the world also seems against the child. Chairs and boxes bump tender heads; toys refuse to work;

roller skates slide out from under; the pitched ball will not curve or the kite fly. Yet the child's spirit remains undaunted. The self returns to the attack of the non-self order and will not be subdued. The plucky fighter will not on the whole accept defeat at the hands of circumstance.

Nothing is more fatal to the development of personality than a constant sense of defeat. Pupils who come to take failure to master situations as a matter of course, and who listen with sullen acceptance to threats of unwise teachers that they will not "pass," are suffering irretrievable harm at the very foundations of their being. Discouraged students in high school or college who surrender faith in themselves while they lose all zest for study, have had violence done not only to their self-respect but to the forces that activate achievement. The "down-and-outer" in the economic system, deprived of self-confidence and ambition by his failure, has lost the drive which alone can make a man of him.

The Drive of Curiosity—Demand for New Experience

Consciousness, at the human level at least, seems to abhor monotony. The span of attention for a single item of experience is but a few seconds, and unchanging fixation quickly leads to cessation of awareness or a state of hypnosis. Well below the human, and even below the quadrupeds, animals show curiosity and actively explore the new and strange. Very early the young child manifests this urge. During most of its waking hours it is busy touching, handling, pounding, looking, listening, examining, experimenting, making the objects of its environment yield their full measure of new sensory experience. Response of attention to new stimuli, readiness of interest in novel situations, curiosity about things which possess an element of strangeness—these are sure tests of normality of intelligence.

In earlier childhood it would almost seem that the demand is sometimes not so much for new experience as for sheer activity, physical or mental. The baby will drop the toy and pick it up a score of times, or hammer the dish with the spoon unceasingly. Grown a little older, he demands the same story time after time, and corrects any deviation from the familiar form. It is likely, however, that experience is growing even when the reactions appear identical, and that situations which appear to the observer to be the same, possess elements of newness to the child. Perhaps we may say that all activity has for the young child a sufficient element of newness to satisfy, and that many repetitions are at first necessary in order to build up a fund of familiar experience to serve as a nucleus of personality and as an assimilation-center for further learning.

Be that as it may, it is at least certain that children in the early stages of school experience are interested in the *processes* of learning to an extent that does not obtain later. While even in primers and first readers interest in the story is a factor, yet the mere activity of learning words and sentences exerts a strong appeal. Arithmetic is quite generally a favorite study of the elementary school, though the activity required is largely formal. By the junior high-school age there has been a shift in emphasis, and interest demands that the activity shall have a closer tie-up with the accumulated body of experience or with the practical concerns of daily living. Failure to provide in the curriculum for this tie-up, is undoubtedly responsible for the slackening of interest and enthusiasm for school often observable in the later elementary grades and in the secondary school.

Demand for new experience remains a powerful drive until middle life and, though it perceptibly weakens as old age comes on, it never is entirely lost except in extreme senescence. Few men can stand solitary confinement in prison and retain their mental balance. Wives of frontier farmers living far from neighbors and seldom seeing persons other than those for whom they cook and wash, show far more than a normal proportion of insanity. Probably few persons, no matter how varied the routine of their lives, escape the feeling occasionally that they need a vaction with the change it brings. One young miss expressed this urge when she said, "I just *must* have a trip every now and then or I'd die." Beyond question many of the escapades of children in leaving home or doing forbidden things, occur without conscious purpose to violate accepted conventions or rebel against authority. They act only under a drive that is for the moment stronger than opposing habits and restraints. So also older persons may occasionally astonish themselves and their friends by lapses in conduct which but register the breaking point of repression.

The normal demand for new experience lies at the foundation of education. Its urge will insure effort, providing the experience offered has the appeal of interest and value. Failing in this, the incentive to effort must be external and the resulting effort becomes distasteful, interest in study falters, achievement suffers, school is a bore, creative activity lags.

Avoidance of Discomfort

Evidences of this drive are found alike in the simplest reflexes and in the most complex of purposed acts. The hand recoils from the contact that burns; the eyelid flies shut when a grit enters; the foot of a sleeping person pulls away when the sole is tickled. Under normal conditions, fear of punishment deters from intended acts unless overbalanced by some stronger motive. The mental suffering from suspense and apprehension may become so intolerable that even the falling of the dreaded blow brings a feeling of relief. Effort without interest is never accompanied by distinct satisfaction, but on the contrary usually brings discomfort which may become acute. It is this fact that makes study a bore to so many children and causes them to be indifferent or hostile to the school.

On the other hand it must be recognized that no life can be wholly free from discomfort and pain. One of the most important lessons for any individual to learn is to meet the disagreeable with courage and endurance. There are many persons who are cheerful and companionable and who will carry their end of the load as long as everything is pleasant and comfortable, but who become petulant and irritable and who turn "quitters" as soon as things go wrong. Proper adjustment requires a spirit of resistance that refuses to accept hardship which is unnecessary or which can be cured by attacking its source. But this attitude needs to be balanced by a fortitude that enables its possessor to endure without bitterness or cringing what cannot be cured.

It is probable that much of the difference in resistance among individuals is the result of early conditioning of the fundamental tendency to avoid discomfort. The young child who is pitied and petted when he whimpers over a hurt, has by this treatment had his attention fixed on the hurt and his desire for notice and comforting cultivated; he will therefore tend to whimper and cry and to pity himself when again he meets the disagreeable. On the other hand, if when a hurt comes or a trouble must be endured, the child's mind is diverted and his courage strengthened by cheerful comradeship without exaggerated pity or concern, he then learns to discount the disagreeable through an attitude of objectivity. Healthy nerves also are a large factor in ability to withstand the disagreeable.

Psychologists and physiologists agree that development and adjustment proceed best under the stimulus of abundant satisfactions and pervading happiness. Nothing is likely to be gained by chronic discomfort, either mental or physical. Yet it is possible so to react to reasonable pain and discomfort that satisfaction and happiness are not destroyed. To learn this art is one of the ends of education.

Motivation through the Unconscious

Though experimental evidence in the field of the unconscious is far from satisfactory, observation and analysis both support the hypothesis that there exists below the threshold of awareness, forces that are active and powerful in determining behavior. It is impossible to doubt, for example, that compensatory reactions originating in forgotten situations appear in every life. The cases, such as were mentioned in a previous chapter, in which a feeling of inferiority in one direction brought an excess of assertion of power in another direction, are too many and too clear to result from chance. Byron probably was not aware that his arrogance and his spirit of rebellion had its roots in the humiliation suffered because of his club foot, but it is almost certain that this was the case—certain because similar compensating behavior has been observed in countless other instances.

The blind are not conscious of the fact that their heightened hearing and sense of touch come, not from any effect which absence of visual stimulus may produce on other end organs, but from quickened motivation to compensate for the handicap of blindness. A woman who as a child had lived in a home of poverty that permitted only the bare necessities of existence, came into a reasonable competence in her middle age. Her first purchase after securing possession of her money was two yards of broad ribbon for a bright red sash. True, no one, not even small girls, wore sashes at that time; certainly plump women of forty-five were not wearing them. Laughingly and with a certain wistfulness she explained that when a young girl she had wanted with an intense and unfulfilled longing, a sash such as other girls of her age were wearing. Hidden all these years in her unconscious had been that thwarted desire which hastened to fulfill itself when fulfillment became possible.

The wishes and libidos of Freud may not account as fully as he originally believed for certain aspects of behavior. Yet probably few informed persons now doubt the existence of such motives as he describes. The feelings of inferiority experienced in childhood and youth as emphasized by Adler, do have repercussions in personality long after the humiliating situations themselves have been lost in the past. Nor is it necessary to assume that the particular few motives which these men stressed constitute all, or even a considerable part, of the drives from the unconscious. Psychiatrists in treating their patients find it necessary to get back into these hidden and forgotten experiences in order to understand their patients.

Complex Drives

In our analysis of certain basic drives responsible for behavior, we have not of course accounted for human conduct. For these relatively simple drives seldom or never act singly and alone as the prime movers to action. Human conduct, however simple the situation which gives it rise, involves an intricate complexity of motivation. The elementary drives combine into a great complex of urges and checks, one prompting to action while another restrains. Or if several act at once in the same general direction, the resultant behavior is a compromise product of the various forces operating together.

For example, the tissue cravings such as hunger and sex are not allowed by other motives to have their own way without interference. Not only do fear and caution intervene, but the ideation centers exert their control through judgment, reason, sense of obligation. Habit contrary to the proposed act also may bring its steadying influence to bear. Anger readily joins hands with the drive of self-assertion to induce anti-social behavior, which in turn may be checked by anticipation of consequences. Certain tissue cravings are reinforced in their demands by the urge to new experience and by insistent emotional tensions which seek relief through action. Unless opposed by powerful checks from other drives, or from the ideational centers, such a combination is likely to control in any situation favorable to its expression. Again, the innate tendency to avoid discomfort, while a constant factor in behavior, may be outweighed by drives of anger, fear, sex, self-assertion, or any others which are strong enough to remove the block that stands in the way of action.

Incidental reference has been made in preceding pages to the influence of ideas, habits and emotions in determining behavior. These powerful sources of motive are of course learned reactions, and do not properly come under our chapter heading. Nevertheless they are constantly intertwined with the elementary drives in causing or inhibiting action, and so may be mentioned in this connection. Habit always supports old and familiar lines of action as against new types of behavior. Ideas of the fitness or unfitness of anticipated acts exert their control. In fact, the whole pattern of one's past experience influences one's response in each new situation. With the elementary drives of human nature as the basis of motivation, and with the controls provided by emotion and the higher ideational centers, the motives that lead to action even in any ordinary situation defy anything like complete analysis, even by the person concerned. No person, therefore, no matter how wise or experienced, can account with anything like full accuracy for the motives back of any single course of conduct.

In spite of these difficulties, however, much can be known about the sources from which behavior springs. We can in some degree answer the question why we act as we do. We cannot only know and describe, at least in general terms, the conditions under which action takes place, but we can also shape and control to some extent the forces that govern behavior. For ourselves we can discern the motives back of our conduct sufficiently so that we can take an intelligent part in directing our own social adjustment. For those with whom we live and work, or for whose guidance we are responsible, we can understand in some degree at least the motives responsible for various types of conduct.

The possiblity of this appraisal of human-nature-in-action is in large measure due to the fact that motives *tend to group or organize in certain relatively stable complexes whose elements can be identified and described.* For example, a child brought up under certain conditions of environment and training is practically certain to be arrogant and snobbish toward other children of a supposedly inferior race. The drives that enter into the complex of motives leading to this behavior are in the main perfectly discernible and dependable; and by changing the environmental influences and instruction the complex can be codified and the behavior changed. The drives that are stimulated and organized into motives of certain types are well known to skillful propagandists, who use their knowledge in time of war to weld an entire nation under the flame of hatred into aggression toward an enemy; and to advertisers, who play upon the motives that lead to buying. Leaders of youth understand the elements in human nature which will respond to the call for service and self-sacrifice in a great cause, and so are able to organize the motives that control choice of vocation and the entire course of the life.

We shall better understand human nature and the forces that lie back of behavior, if we remember man's lowly origin and his long climb upward to his present status. In accounting for human behavior James Harvey Robinson strikingly compares the relative periods of time during which our environment has presented particular types of situations, and therefore acted to bring into play particular types of motives. He assumes that man has lived as man for some five hundred thousand years at the lowest estimate. For purposes of illustration he imagines that this long period is all crowded for a single generation into a life-span of fifty years. Each year of life for the individual would thus stand for ten thousand years of the race.

Of this fifty years, fully forty-nine would be required before we emerged from a nomadic life of hunting and made settled homes, tilling the soil, domesticating animals, weaving cloth for garments. Not until the middle of the fiftieth year, on this scale, did we invent writing. It was only three months ago that "ancient" Rome and Greece developed literature, art and philosophy to a high state. We have had Christianity for only the last two months, and the printing press for only the last two weeks. The steam engine is less than a week old, and for only a few days have we had railway trains and steam ships. Electricity came to our attention less than twenty-four hours ago. It is only a few hours since we began to fly, to make moving pictures, to drive automobiles. Only a week or two ago we were burning heretics and witches. In short, man has had what by courtesy he calls civilization, for only about six months of his fifty years, much of it only days or hours; so close are we to savagery with our motives.[7]

Psychology has not yet dealt thoroughly with the sources of motive which account for human conduct. Especially have the groupings of the elementary drives *into complexes* been neglected. More recently attention is turning to such important complexes of motive as *attitudes, ideals, beliefs, loyalties* and the like. To a consideration of some of the more important of these complex motives, we will turn in later chapters.

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[7] Cf. J. H. Robinson's, *The Mind in the Making*, p. 83.

PROBLEMS

1. A group of adults will find it most helpful to have each member write down a description of his most dependable and consistent emotional response. To what extent are the responses thus enumerated to be characterized as basic urges?
2. Can you think of any tissue hungers which are very powerful and yet are not native to the organism of the individual?
3. Someone has suggested that the most distressing mental state is a fear of fear, or a worry about worry. Can you illustrate this point in your own behavior, or in that of someone you know?
4. Analyze the recreational activities of yourself and your group. To what extent are they competitive in character?
5. Examine critically the emphasis which secondary schools and colleges place upon school spirit. Someone has characterized this spirit as collective egotism. Do you believe this to be a valid criticism?

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CHAPTER VIII

EARLY PATTERNS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

FROM the moment that two parent-cells unite to start a new life on to the end of that life, two sets of influences combine to shape the individual—heredity and environment. The hereditary factor accomplishes its function through *maturation,* the environmental factor forces on the individual the necessity and stimulus for *learning.*

The New-Born Child and His Task

The human individual at birth is by far the most helpless of creatures, and he has the farthest to travel in his development. At the beginning he can perform no act for which nature has not set the model in pre-organized reflexes. He has accumulated no experience to guide his responses, achieved no knowledge, ideas or memories from his environment and he conceives no future. The present sensory impressions which he is prepared to receive he cannot yet organize into percepts corresponding to the objective world. It is more than doubtful whether he even apprehends this world as the "big, blooming, buzzing confusion" which William James accredited to him. Seemingly in no hurry to enter upon the job that awaits him, he at first sleeps more than twenty hours out of each twenty-four.

The task which this new individual confronts would appear to be appalling in its magnitude except for the fact that so many of his fellow mortals do master it. Starting with an inarticulate cry, he must within a few years understand and be able to speak a different language. He must come to know and adapt himself to the ways of his social group, and finally of the broader group and the world at large. Within some three years after his formal training begins he must have mastered the mechanics of reading, and do this with greater skill than he is likely to attain in several years spent in college on a foreign language. Similarly he must acquire the fundamentals of number. He must achieve knowledge of the physical world about him, of vocations, of institutions, of many vastly technical machines, of innumerable social procedures, of moral codes, of religion, and of many other things which form a part of the environment, social and physical, to which he must adjust.

Between the helplessness and ignorance of the new-born child and the efficiency of the masterful citizen of the world, there lies only *development*. And development is accomplished fundamentally by means of the two instrumentalities, *maturation* and *learning*. Let these fail and the individual remains incompetent and classifies himself as socially unfit—abnormal, a monstrosity.

Maturation and Development

Maturation is not altogether a new concept in psychology, though application of the term to its present use is recent. When a generation ago the doctrine of specific instincts ruled, the various instincts were said to "ripen" by stages as the organism was ready for and needed the activities they set going. This manifestly is one aspect of maturation. At another level, we have long been taught, the understanding and use of the more difficult logical relations (as in mathematics or philosophy) must wait until neural development has made possible the synaptic connections necessary for their understanding. This is all to say that maturation prepares the way and sets the limits for the exercise of a function, whether the activity be on the instinctive or on the intellectual level. So important does Gesell consider maturation that he says its control of development makes "the infant as an individual reasonably secure against extreme conditioning, whether favorable or unfavorable."[1]

Maturation is, then, a process of physiological development within the organism which is *not dependent on exercise or learning*. It is rooted in the very constitution of the cells and tissues, and follows the law of its species in its direction, order, time and amount. It prescribes the broad outlines which development may take. To quote Woodworth: "Maturation prepares the raw materials for learning. It provides weak activities that are strengthened by use, and variable activities that are regularized by use. It provides smaller activities that are combined by learning into larger action patterns, and it provides broad diffuse movements that are broken up by learning into more minute and precise skilled movements."[2]

Gesell recognizes the importance of maturation as a condition of development in these words: "The very plasticity of growth requires that there be limiting and regulatory mechanisms. Growth is a process so intricate, and so sensitive, that there must be powerful stabilizing factors, intrinsic rather than extrinsic, which preserve the balance of the total pattern and the direction of the growth trend. Maturation is, in a sense, a name for this regulatory mechanism."[3] Gesell's formal definition of maturation is as follows: "Maturation is the intrinsic component of development which determines the primary morphogenesis and variabilities of the life-cycle."[4]

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[1] A. Gesell, *Psychological Review,* Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 318.

[2] R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (rev. ed.), p. 208.

[3] A. Gesell, *The Guidance of Mental Growth in Infant and Child,* p. 291.

[4] A. Gesell, "Maturation and the Patterning of Behavior," *Handbook of Child Psychology* (C. Murchison ed.), p. 210.

Supporting the same viewpoint, Jones finds that, while certain types of fear response are innate, other types must wait on maturation. Up to two years of age, children upon whom he experimented, manifested no fear of snakes. From three to three-and-a-half years they showed distinct caution; from four on, definite fear reactions. These changes were due, Jones believes, not to conditioning but to "a general maturation of behavior which leads to more discriminatory responses."[5] Both common observation and experiment show that children under two who are not afraid of strangers, usually begin to show shyness or fear at the age of three or four. Maturation has, by the time the later stage is reached, made it possible for perception to recognize the new and strange, while experience has not yet taught the child that strangers do not harm.

Because maturation provides the limits within which development can take place, we may believe that it is a constant factor in personality. The young child thinks, understands, acts as a child first of all because of his immaturity. Children fall short of being logicians, theologians, philosophers not primarily from lack of learning, but from want of the ripening in the neural mechanism necessary to such thinking. Their emotions are unstable not alone because they have not yet learned emotional control, but also because the physiological basis for emotion is still immature. And the mother who complained that "there must be something wrong with the high school because Jennie had no more than got well started in it when she began to show an unwonted interest in boys," did not understand the part played by maturation in sex interest and activity. Boys under ten or twelve years cannot be trained to good teamwork in baseball or football, not because they cannot learn the rules and strategy, but because maturation has not yet prepared the way for fully co-operative behavior.

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[5] M. C. Jones, *A Handbook of Child Psychology.*

The refusal of children of eight or ten to become interested in the finer skills of drawing and mechanical arts is not due to perversity or laziness but to immaturity of the neural structures involved in such skills.

Learning and Development

Learning and maturation are, then, the two inseparable elements in development. Maturation, as we have seen, follows the compulsion of inner characteristics provided by heredity; learning is the individual's response to the demands of external stimuli. Maturation represents the response of the individual to his racial past, learning his response to his environmental present.

In the broad sense learning stands for all *changes in behavior or in structure produced by exercise.* Hang the rattle or the ball before the baby, and he at first makes many random and unsuccessful movements to grasp it. Now and then he succeeds, and perhaps receives a thrill of satisfaction. Gradually with practice the unnecessary and unsuccessful movements are eliminated and the child reaches directly for what he wishes to grasp; learning has taken place. Exercise has changed behavior and has left its effects in modified structure (chiefly in the brain). This modification is the physical basis of habit.

By use of various experiments in mirror writing the adult can approximate (but not exactly reproduce) the problem of learning to write as it confronts the young child. For example, try to write your name while looking in the mirror, *making it read right in the mirror.* It is evident of course that the effect of the mirror is to erase the effects of learning in ordinary writing and compel one to learn wholly new reactions for which prepared neural structure does not exist.

Such an experiment, or indeed the learning of any act of skill, as the fingering of the typewriter keyboard or attaining an easy manner in social groups, fulfills our definition. The modified behavior produces changes in neural structure (sets up habits) which make the modified behavior easier on successive trials. Especially is this true when the process of learning (the changed behavior) brings the reward of satisfaction. A certain child of two years, upon entering the nursery school, at first found satisfaction in pushing and striking other children. The first ones he thus attacked gave way or tumbled over under his drive of assertive dominance. Thomas was in the way of learning to be a bully. But his assertive behavior soon received a check. He attacked a boy who not only returned his blows, but pushed him over and then kicked at him. This counter-learning acted as a check on the tendency induced by his first successes in dominance; the sprouting habit of bullying received a setback. Thomas was learning.

The point at which learning must begin in the new-born individual depends on the stage reached by maturation at birth. Guinea pigs for example, are well developed when they are born. They have a full coat of fur, are able to run, easily find their way to nursing, are eating green food within a few days. In sharp contrast with this advanced maturation, the rat is born without hair, cannot walk, is unable to right itself if placed on its back, has difficulty in achieving nursing, is in general "unripe." Chickens and some birds can pick at food and run almost as soon as they are hatched, other birds are helpless for days. The central fact in such wide diversities as these is that animals are born at different stages of maturation. The further advanced the maturation, the less relatively there is left for learning; the less the degree of maturation, the more the individual has to learn in order to make the required adjustments.

The human individual is born, as we have noted, with maturation relatively incomplete. Not only this, but the period of infancy (and therefore of maturation) is longer than in any other animal. This means that learning must begin far down in the adjustment scale, and that it must cover a wide range of activities. Conditioning therefore is a factor of great importance in determining the course taken by development. Learning plays a major part in the shaping of behavior patterns, though learning cannot precede or extend beyond the limits of maturation.

Though we rightly have our schools, curricula, courses of study, teachers, textbooks, classrooms and all the rest, by far the larger (and probably most valuable) part of what any individual learns comes from the general social environment rather than the school. The best way to learn a language is not to "study" it in the classroom, but actually to use it with people who speak it. The most effective way, in fact the only really effective way, to learn ease and graciousness of manner is by growing up in situations where these qualities prevail. The way to learn morality is not from textbooks, lectures or discussions, but by having right conduct so grounded in practice that it is built into the habit structure of personality. Children learn much of what comes to characterize them as individuals from the movies, the radio, the daily papers and the talk and conduct that go on around them. It is the business of formal education to make sure that the young learn the indispensable and the highly desirable things which may be lost out of their education if it is not definitely studied and taught. That the schools often fail to meet this high ideal must be admitted; on the other hand, much of what the child learns from his environment outside the school runs directly counter to the school's instruction and so tends to nullify its influence. Because the child learns his moral standards more from society at large than from the school, it is impossible for schools to educate the young much beyond the moral level of the situation in which they live.

Earlier Forms of Behavior

The purpose of this brief excursion into genetic psychology has been to introduce us to the central problem of the chapter, the early shaping of the patterns of social behavior. Psychologists are sharply aware of the importance of the early years as a factor in life's total outcome. Long before the child is able to criticize his own conduct or understand the value of social behavior, he is laying important foundations in habits, attitudes, emotional responses and other fundamentals of personality. Far from being wasted years while the child is waiting to grow up and get at the serious business of living, the first half-dozen years of his life probably play a larger part in the kind of person he is to become than does any other period of equal length in the lifetime. For it is now that maturation and learning are both at the height of their activity and that development is therefore most rapid. And, while the patterns of behavior blocked out during this early period will change greatly as development goes on, no person ever gets wholly away from the traits of his early childhood.

Young children are unable, if our understanding of their mental processes is correct, to project the self into the future and set up ideals to be achieved through purposed behavior. By the time they reach adolescence they will have formulated many such goals and devised plans for their attainment. But the younger child is more the creature of his immediate situation and his response to it. Long before he can understand the value of co-operation, he is forming habits and attitudes out of the situations in which he co-operates or refuses to co-operate. Long before he is able to comprehend the moral quality of truthfulness and lying, he is establishing the patterns for his veracity by the way he responds in the telling of the truth. If, for example, the treatment of a child leads him into evasion, sharp practice and trickery, he will have a handicap (behavior pattern) to overcome when later under the compulsion of an ideal he makes a fight for integrity of character. Young John, in the kindergarten, was met by a friend of his mother one day as he was coming home from school, the front of his suit smeared with milk.

"What happend to you, John?" asked the friend.

"Well, this morning I forgot to take straws to drink my milk. The bottle was too full and it ran down."

"Did you drink what was left?"

"No, but I thought Mother would feel better if she thought I had, so I threw it out and brought the bottle."

Here evidently was an incipient pattern of deception forming toward the mother who could not be told all that happened.

Something of the importance of the patterning which takes place in early childhood is suggested by Miss Andrus in her inventory of habits of children of two to four years. By habits are meant here responses sufficiently grounded to be observable as characteristics (behavior patterns) of the children studied. The habits noted are divided into four groups as follows:[6]

Emotional habits	112
Mental habits	113
Motor habits	112
Social-moral habits	73
Total	410

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[6] Ruth Andrus, *A Tentative Inventory of Habits of Children from Two to Four Years of Age*, pp. 8-15.

The habits under consideration include such undesirable responses as crying easily when one is hurt, spilling water when one is drinking it, merely handling playthings instead of playing with them, preferring to play alone instead of with other children. They also include such desirable responses as introducing games, drawing straight lines with crayon, putting on one's stockings alone, showing self-control when angry. More than four hundred habits (and of course others not observed and listed) were under way in the first few years.

Zaluzhni, by observing the group behavior of twenty-four nursery children one to four years of age, records some three thousand reactions, classifying them as follows:[7]

"(1) turning away in disgust, running away, protecting self; whimpering, crying and screaming, calling for help (grouped as defensive-negativistic behavior); (2) destroying, chasing, taking away, beating, threatening, demanding, teasing, scolding (grouped as aggressive behavior); (3) joining others, greeting (body behavior), offering, trying to get something, conversing, greeting (speech), asking, instructing (grouped as primitive social behavior); (4) caressing, pointing out, aiding, cooperating, correcting, taking the initiative, informing, advising, proposing, criticizing, calling for cooperation, laughing, singing (grouped as collective-social behavior)." By the time the child is four, Murphy concludes, "nearly every type of social relation or response has appeared."

Whatever their source, whether as Watson claims the first patterns of emotion are limited to fear, anger and love; whether there exist besides these other incipient emotional reactions not yet identified by the experimentalists; or whether such additional reactions appear only as maturation provides the mechanisms for them, it is at least certain that the child of two or three years has achieved a very wide range of emotional behavior. By the time he has reached school age his repertoire of emotions omits few if any of the basic forms known to adults.

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[7] Quoted by G. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology*, p. 282.

For example, the child of three to five or six has experienced many (though not all) of the forms of fear listed in Chapter VII. By this age most children are not strangers to timidity, diffidence, apprehension, solicitude, anxiety, care, misgiving, mistrust, hesitation, dread, dismay, alarm. Many have known the fear of bugbears, bogeys, hobgoblins, specters, nightmares. They understand what it is to tremble, shudder, quake, quail.

Equally have their experiences broadened in the various patterns of anger and resentment. Most pre-school children have had some experience of irritation, displeasure, wrath, indignation, vexation, annoyance, exasperation, dudgeon, tantrum, sulks, fury, rage and the like.

Likewise for the behavior patterns of love. Even young children express love, liking, interest, sympathy. By their behavior they show when they "take to" another person. They hold dear, prize, cling to, cherish, caress, fondle, pet what they love. They show themselves affectionate, tender, fond, devoted, motherly, sisterly.

So we might continue with our illustrations. As development goes on and the range of experience increases, these patterns of emotional behavior will change with changes in their objects. Nevertheless they leave their effects on the growing personality. And besides these basic emotions which most psychologists agree are present in their simpler forms at birth, the child soon reveals other emotions in his behavior. Among those that find expression in the earlier years are: *mirth* or *amusement, jealousy, grief, joy, curiosity, dislike, aversion* or *hatred*. But whatever the emotion and its pattern of expression, it is clear that emotional development takes place through the two instrumentalities already mentioned: *maturation* and *learning*. Six is unable to experience the sentiment of love toward the other sex which dominates sixteen, for the good reason that maturation has not made it possible. Similarly, children cannot fully comprehend the love and solicitude of parents for the child, since learning has not yet provided the basis for such understanding.

Normal Types of Social Behavior

One thing which modern scholarship has definitely shown is the futility of undertaking to classify large numbers of people into a few groups on the basis of any human trait. The normal curve of distribution seems to hold not only for intelligence, but for all other qualities of personality. Yet individual differences can sometimes most effectively be emphasized by selecting some point on the scale of the trait in question and treating it as if it stood for a type.

Following this principle, Charlotte Bühler describes three types of social behavior patterns in children from six to eighteen months of age.[8] These she describes as:

1. *Socially blind* behavior
2. *Socially dependent* behavior
3. *Socially independent* behavior

The *socially blind* child does not respond to the presence of other children. He acts as if the other child were not present or were an inanimate object. He may take a toy from the other child, but he does it in the same way that he would pick it up from the floor, with no social recognition or emotional response.

The *socially dependent* child responds very differently. First of all he seems keenly aware of another child's presence. Whether he is inhibited or stimulated by the other child's presence, depends on the behavior of the other child. If inhibited, he restricts his own movements, watches the other, perhaps copies his acts, accepts the other's leadership, submits to his demands. If, on the other hand, stimulation instead of inhibition results from the contact, he becomes very active, seeks to attract the other's attention. Whichever kind of reaction prevails, the socially dependent child remains sharply conscious of the presence of the other child, watching and reacting to him constantly.

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[8] In *Handbook of Child Psychology* (C. Murchison Ed.), p. 393.

Quite different is the *socially independent* child. He is keenly aware of the presence of another child but does not respond with either inhibited or stimulated behavior. His behavior is more self-sufficient than that of the socially dependent child. He does not play up to the other's presence in so definite a fashion. For example, after for a time noticing and responding to the other child, the socially independent child may turn away and interest himself in activities of his own devising.

Whether these types of behavior carry on into later experience and remain as definite characteristics in the individual we have as yet no experimental evidence to prove. That such differences have some permanent effect on later social adjustment, seems fairly certain.

Approaching the question of types from the nature of the *contacts made within the group* by somewhat older children, Miss Bühler reports the following:[9]

1. The *protective* type
2. The *beloved* or *popular* type
3. The *leader* type
4. The *despot* type
5. The *socially unsuccessful* type

The *protective* child assumes responsibility for others, particularly for a protégé, who may be timid and socially unsuccessful. The happiness, welfare and safety of those taken under the protective child's care are a matter of constant solicitude. This protective behavior may involve mothering, dominance, even despotism, but the purposes are not consciously selfish.

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[9] Charlotte Bühler, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

The *beloved* or popular child gains the devotion of the group less by overt action than by charm and graces of person. In him there seems to be integrated a happy combination of traits which win the response of love, admiration and allegiance from others. This child may not possess the qualities of a resourceful leader, but be the more or less passive recipient of the spontaneous homage of his companions.

Prominent in the *leader* type are initiative and dominance. These traits may be accompanied by personal charm, but such is not always the case. Winkler-Hermaden, studying German and Austrian youth, identified three leadership types:[10] (1) the *sovereign* type, (2) the *pedagogue* type and (3) the *apostle* type. The sovereign type owes his leadership to behavior which expresses the attractive or otherwise compelling qualities of his own personality; his is a leadership of person. The pedagogue type is less ego-centric in his behavior, his activities being centered in the care and welfare of the group. The apostle type finds his strength in devotion to an objective cause whose promotion he seeks to advance.

Winkler-Hermaden believes that children of twelve to fourteen years respond most readily to the sovereign type of leadership; that those of fourteen to sixteen years are most attracted by the pedagogue type; and that those of sixteen to eighteen years tend to follow the apostle type.

We need not at the present stage of scientific inquiry take such classification of types too seriously. If we should undertake to group humanity wholesale by types, we would require an endless number of types. Besides social types, of which we should have many, there would be countless *mental* types,

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[10] Reported by Charlotte Bühler, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

moral types, *physical* types, and various others, each with its subdivisions, and all with no fixed boundaries separating one from another within their respective categories. Yet if we will think of types as representing nothing more than *an arbitrary point on a continuous scale,* the concept can be a helpful one in understanding the patterning of behavior.

Agencies Which Shape Social Behavior

That the child's behavior reflects the quality of the social medium in which he develops is common knowledge. Several agencies or influences operating within that medium are of sufficient importance in the patterning of behavior to warrant brief consideration. These are:

1. The general regimen of family life acting on the child
2. Example, suggestion, standards set by parents, nurses, relatives or other children
3. Specific instruction, guidance, direction
4. The system of compulsions, restraints, permissions, rewards and punishments employed

The Regimen of the Home

What is commonly spoken of as the "atmosphere" of the home is a potent influence acting upon the child. The regimen to which he is constantly subjected supplies the situations out of which his traits as an individual emerge. The way the babe is handled, the amount of attention he receives, whether he is taken up and fondled at every sign of whimper or complaint, the prevailing emotional tone of those with whom he has contact, the consistency and propriety of the treatment he receives—these and many other such factors constantly furnish the stimuli which govern behavior.

A case by way of illustration. William was the first child of his parents, greatly beloved, looked upon as a paragon. His mother, vivacious, cultivated, devoted, believed in giving herself fully to her child. She was with him almost every waking moment of his day for his first three years. By her he was entertained, comforted, restrained, admonished, punished, stimulated, petted, helped in his play, shown off to company. He was left to himself almost not at all, and so developed little resourcefulness for his own amusement. He constantly was given assistance and oversight and almost inevitably came frequently into conflict with his mother's will and plans. Occasional clashes resulted. Naturally vigorous and headstrong, he became noisy and boisterous, getting on his mother's nerves and inducing sharpness and rebukes from her which failed to modify his behavior. Obstinacy grew and there were occasional scenes in which William kicked, screamed and displayed general bad temper. In short he is getting out of hand with his mother now that he is four. The father, away all day at his office, sees William but little and wonders where the child gets his bad temper and unruly ways. These troublesome behavior patterns come in the main from the general regimen of the child's home. And unless that regimen can be changed, or unless its unfortunate effects can be cured by corrective situations provided in the school and the community, William bids fair to become a rather trying person. Even now he is lacking in the finer graces and more lovable traits of personality which many children of his age possess.

One further case may be used to illustrate the effects of a phase of the home's regimen as it registered in the behavior of a child.

Miriam is the youngest of a large family of lively, healthy, rather boisterous children who developed the habit of teasing one another and resorting to violent outbursts and quarrels when patience gave way to exasperation. When she was less than a year old Tom, five, was accustomed to hold her arms tightly at her sides for the satisfaction of hearing her screams and watching her struggles. A little later her playthings were withheld from her for the enjoyment of her rage. As she grew to kindergarten and school age the teasing often took the form of tantalizing speech—jeers, jokes, quips at Miriam's expense, repartee in which because of her tender years she was worsted even though her speech was ready and her tongue sharp. Miriam was equipped with a high I. Q., a quick temper, voluble tongue, ready fists and fingernails that scratched. In sheer self-protection and in an unconscious struggle against intimidation and the subjection of her personality, she has developed some rather undesirable traits of personality. She is tempestuous. She is on the defensive among her associates and likely to take offense where none is intended. She lashes out with hot words which are often bitterly repented. She lacks in some degree the winsomeness and poise which her native endowment made possible for her. Here, as in the case of William, some of the finer graces have been lost in the defensive struggle she has been obliged to wage in order to maintain her individuality. The regimen of her home has been unfavorable in one important particular: it induced negative moods and interfered with happiness.

Barring some physical cause, most temper tantrums are quite certainly induced by the treatment accorded the child in the home. Rage is an instinctive reaction, but it must have a stimulus and it is easily conditioned into its various patterns. The habit of temper outbursts once started is hard to break. The first step in proper treatment is of course to remove the inciting cause. But with the habit well grounded it may run on of its own momentum even when the stimulating cause is removed. The corrective treatment may have to extend over a considerable period of time. In some cases a sudden shock may divert the habit.

Eddie was four. His father had died when Eddie was a small infant. The mother was weak physically, nervously irritable, uncertain in her moods, and far from calm or consistent in her handling of the child. Eddie developed the habit of flying into rages, in which he would roll on the floor and kick and scream, grow blue, lose his breath. Consultation with a psychologist brought the suggestion of a heroic remedy. The mother was to fill a tub with cold water and keep it standing in a room adjoining the living room. When Eddie next fell into one of his tantrums he was to be picked up bodily and plunged quickly, clothes and all, into and completely under the water. This was to be done as often as the tantrum occurred or until the treatment was considered ineffective. It worked. Just two duckings and the tantrums were cured.

Some children cry or sulk much more readily than others. This is probably due much more to the treatment the child receives than to native differences in emotional make-up. Any child will cry when severely hurt. Most children will cry over slight injuries. If the child is noticed when he cries, if he is comforted and pitied in such way as to keep fresh the realization of the hurt or to give satisfaction from the attention received, the tendency then is to condition behavior toward crying on all occasions. If, on the other hand, the hurt child is diverted from his hurt a double kindness is done him. The pain itself is much lessened, for it is taken out from the center of attention where all sensations are at their highest; the habit of crying over small things is not formed, much to the advantage of the child's personality and the comfort of all concerned.

Sulking may exist in all degrees from a simple mood easily dispersed to a chronic emotional attitude almost impossible to overcome. At its slightest, sulking is evidenced by inhibited behavior: an unwillingness or temporary refusal to respond to the wishes or demands of the parent. At its worst, sulking may become an attitude of almost continuous rebellion against one or the other parent or against the whole regimen of the home. This reaction may apply only to home situations, or it may carry over to the school as a somewhat generalized characteristic that expresses itself against all assumption of external authority. The clinician and the wise teacher always seek the cause for unexplained cases of school sullenness in conditions present or past in the home.

The sulker is always unhappy when in his negative moods. Older grown, he dwells on the hardness and injustice of his lot, fills his mind with dark and bitter things, rages against the person whom he blames. Settled dislike, vindictiveness and hate tend to follow. There is little doubt that many parents would be shocked and horrified if they could realize the hate borne them by their children, as the fruit of periods of sulking become chronic.

Asked why children lie an inspired wag answered, "In order to get along with adults." The child has no instinct that enables him to distinguish the right from the wrong. This is wholly a matter of learning, and the definition of right and wrong finally reached is practically altogether that of the group to which he belongs. Right is at the beginning simply what the child is allowed to do or approved for doing. Wrong is what he is not allowed to do or is punished for doing.

Children are not infrequently driven into deception and falsehood by the treatment they receive from their elders. To illustrate, a book has been torn or a dish broken: "Marjorie, did you do that?"—in a threatening voice. Marjorie, put on the defensive and having as yet no moral standards of her own, is quite likely to evade, invent, possibly lie. And if the subterfuge succeeds she will try it the next time and the next.

And even if the child is caught in the deception and punished, the immediacy and pressure of threat implied in the next cornering and quizzing, may momentarily supersede the effects of unpleasant experiences in the last attempt and lead to new evasions and lies.

"Now mind," warns the father to his small son, "if I hear of you being in a fight I will thrash you when you get home." Later there is a disturbance among the group of boys, hot words, blows, a tussle, a bleeding nose or two. Then the inquisition with father and son in leading rôles. The father questions, cross-questions, thunders. The boy, at bay, cornered, fearing the worst, evades, tells half-truths, colors his story, throws blame on others, and in general behaves in such fashion that, later in his life we should call him a cad for his acts. And who knows but that in such early situations he is laying down a cad-pattern which will govern other future acts?

Example and Suggestion

The example, suggestion and standards of the home are important factors in the situations out of which social behavior springs. By the time a child is one year old he is definitely beginning to copy the acts of other persons. True, the copying is not exact, the individuality of the child manifesting itself in his imitation. This copying is nevertheless shaping behavior on an observed model. Note, for example, the waving of bye-bye and other responses. Ten-months-old John carefully holds his hand back of his ear in imitation of his deaf grandmother. One-year-old Jeanette puckers up her face in imitation of her older sister. The tendency to model certain aspects of behavior on the acts of others is at its height by the age of three or four years. It continues strong for several years thereafter, and seems gradually to decrease with later childhood and adolescence, without, however, ever fully disappearing.

Closely related to imitation is suggestibility, the tendency to respond to ideas implanted in the mind from without, which appears during childhood and plays an important part in shaping conduct. For example, the older brother boasts to the family at dinner how he "busted that 'low-life, Fatty,' one in the ear when he tripped me in the game." Younger brother listens, thinks well of the performance, the idea sinks in, the suggestion is lodged. Next day he is able to report that he "busted Jimmy one in the nose" when they were playing.

Imitation and suggestion operate over the whole range of the child's behavior. It is well known in clinical history that children closely associated with a playmate who stammers, are in danger of contracting the habit. St. Vitus' dance has a tendency to spread through a group by the contagion of imitation and suggestion. The children of nervous and irritable mothers are likely to show nervousness and irritability, probably not so much from physical inheritance as from contagion of example. The effects of social contagion on the young child's manner and poise are perhaps even more marked than on the physical organism. Children who come from homes where loud, raucous speech is the rule, quite inevitably reveal this influence in their manner of speaking. Cruelty or unkindness on the part of the parents toward each other or the children can hardly escape being reflected in the behavior of the child. Criticism, fault finding, intolerance toward the school or the church, find expression in the attitude of the child toward these institutions.

Manners may be thought of as particularized aspects of manner. The easiest and most natural way for the child to learn social amenities is to absorb them from the atmosphere of his home. Suggestion and imitation are at work with relentless force, reproducing in the responses of the child the examples placed before him in his earlier years. The child who as a matter of course is presented to strangers who enter the home, who is expected to greet callers instead of ignore them in the interest of play, who is taken into the conversation at table or fireside, who is not interrupted when his turn comes in the conversation, who in short is treated with politeness and respect by those older than himself in the family or school circle, is being himself trained in an important trait of personality.

Apropos of this point, the writer observed a mother with her son of eleven or twelve years who entered a public dining room and passed to a near-by table. Very naturally and wholly as a matter of course the boy drew back his mother's chair and placed it for her. Not until she had taken her napkin did he claim his own. Soon after the meal was served a lady, passing the table, stopped to speak to mother and son. Instantly the boy was on his feet and took his seat only when the lady had passed on. All this was so natural, so much a matter of course, so easily and perfectly done, that one could easily see the many situations of similar kind in the home where these behavior patterns had been worked out.

Instruction in Behavior

Though children learn best, and probably most, through the natural contagion of social example, there remain some aspects of social behavior which may need to be taught more directly in the home or the school. What these particular forms of behavior are which require instruction, will depend on individual differences in children and their social environment.

For example, the child busy with his play when callers come and often quite excluded from the conversation after the greetings are over, may now and then need to be prompted by the mother or father to come forward and meet the callers, or say good-by to them as they leave. This instruction may be generalized and take the form of a conversation after the callers have gone or before they arrive, explaining to the child what good manners require. If this is coupled with the suggestion of making a good impression on others by proper courtesy, the motivation will be more successful than to set the response forth as a duty or requirement.

Instruction at some points needs to be made specific. It is not sufficient, for example, to urge upon a child that he should be neat; he should be taught by example and by precept what constitutes neatness in his home and school affairs. Children (and even adults!) require instruction in the detailed forms of social politeness and convention. An identical principle applies also to the general social code and the whole range of the child's conduct. What desirable forms of behavior he does not learn by contact with his social environment should be taught him by appropriate instruction.

A distinction important in giving the required instruction on such behavior forms is that between true instruction and reproof, actual or implied. The more closely the instruction can be linked with the situation requiring its expression in behavior, the better; but, on the other hand, if the child is under reproof for a wrong response so that his emotions are aroused or his attitude bad, this is a poor time to undertake to lodge suggestion or instruction. The guiding principle here is that the child must desire the behavior recommended and must welcome the instruction if it is to be most effective.

Permission and Compulsion

What the young child is permitted to do or restrained from doing is, as we have noted, a basic factor in determining his early sense of right and wrong. A young woman tells that as a child she had the queer idea that all adults were good and all children bad. She arrived at this distorted judgment from noticing that grown persons were never punished for this or that, while children were. True, as the child develops in experience and reason his notion of right and wrong becomes somewhat generalized; but the influence of earlier concepts arising from the permissions and restraints to which he was subjected is perhaps never wholly escaped.

Gradually the concept of right and wrong expands from a definition based solely on control by permission or compulsion in home or school, to a definition based on what the social group, large or small, approves. No one can ever escape the tyranny and the comfort of custom. What "they" do, what "everybody" thinks or does, never loses its hold on us. And likely this is, within certain limits, wholly desirable, for only in this way can sufficient like-mindedness exist to make social cohesion possible.

But even after the patterns of approved behavior are known they are not always followed. Knowledge of the moral and social code commonly outruns its performance. It is at this point that rewards and punishments find their application. In general, types of behavior that are to be continued and built into character and personality must be accompanied by satisfaction; and types of behavior that are to be discontinued must be accompanied by annoyance. Too often, we may believe, is the satisfaction-annoyance factor neglected or unwisely handled in the training of the child. Desirable behavior in home or school frequently passes unrecognized by approval and appreciation, which are capable of yielding strong satisfaction. The annoyance coming from undesirable behavior too often takes the form of physical punishment, of harsh words and tones, or of other penalties which convey to the child the impression that the chastening represents only the ill-temper of parent or teacher. Both rewards and punishments should be suited to the development of the child and should be recognized by him as a natural result of the situation resulting from his acts, and not as due to irrational whims of his superiors.

Range of Early Experience

The early responses of the child fall within a relatively narrow range of experience. If we can know how he characteristically reacts in a few typical situations, we shall have a line on the patterns of behavior which are forming. It is in these situations, mostly in the home, or directly within its control, that for the first half-dozen years personality chiefly is developing. For it is here that the child is happy or unhappy, that he maintains or loses his emotional poise, that he learns independence and initiative of action or comes to depend on others for guidance and help, that he develops habits of cooperation or of resistance, and so on throughout the whole range of traits which are emerging.

Corresponding to the basic needs of the child and the normal life in the home, the following are the situations in which the child is fairly sure to have a part:

1. Eating
2. Sleeping
3. Playing
4. Eliminating
5. Speaking and conversing
6. Caring for person
7. Responding to visitors in the home
8. Making contacts outside the home

With this list, or something approximating it, in mind the question for each type of situation becomes: Is the child forming desirable habits and are his skills increasing satisfactorily;

are his acts suitable in all essential features of the situation? Is the emotional tone right in connection with the activities performed; on the whole is the child happy, cheerful, satisfied? Are the acts properly motivated so that they are in large measure the child's own, external compulsion, suggestion and direction being at a low minimum? Is the child growing in self-direction, and therefore in control over his own responses? If such questions can in the main be answered affirmatively for each of the situations, then social adjustment is moving satisfactorily for the present stage and personality is laying a good foundation. If response in any one or more of the situations is of an undesirable type, the causes should be discovered and removed.

Behavior Patterns Related to Eating

Good habits of eating involve for children such forms of behavior as the following:

(1) Regularity and proper intervals of eating
(2) Liking of proper foods and drinks, including appropriate variety
(3) Satisfactory skills and neatness in eating
(4) Good manners at table, including promptness
(5) Cheerfulness, happy moods at table, enjoyment of eating

(1) Children whose stomachs are not trained in early infancy to regular rhythms of hunger are likely to demand food at irregular intervals, forming the undesirable habit of "piecing" and of nibbling at this and that.

(2) Liking for certain foods is native, and for other foods has to be learned. The ideal is to avoid finicky behavior which restricts the range of the child's dietary, makes the planning and preparing of his food a problem in the home, and causes the child to be sullen or disagreeable while eating.

(3) The marked differences in eating skills observed in chil-

dren of two or three years are usually due in part to the development of muscular control. They are also related to proper assistance given the child, without depriving him of the necessary practice and initiative on his own part. Children who are fed by fastidious parents, because they dislike to see their offspring messy, suffer a distinct handicap. No small part of the trouble young children have with their eating skills comes from the unsuitable implements given them. Young Cynthia Ann, just learning to handle a spoon, illustrated the point when a relative presented her with a small, specially shaped spoon having a short handle ending in a loop. She seized upon her new possession with interest, but after one or two attempts to carry food to her mouth with it, she tossed it over her shoulder and reached for a real spoon.

(4) Good manners at table are best learned from example and suggestion. Yet, as previously remarked, there is a place for direct instruction properly motivated. The large sale of Emily Post's books on table form indicates that even adults need precept for their guidance.

(5) Much experimental evidence exists to show that any high excitement or the presence of anger, fear or disquieting moods interferes with appetite and digestion. Of all times and places in the home, meal time should be free from fault findings, reprimands, sharp words and "third degrees" of every kind. The practice followed in some homes of taking advantage of the table hour for catechising and correcting children, cannot be too strongly condemned for its harmful effects.

Behavior Patterns Related to Sleep

Sleep is not only a basic organic necessity, it is also the center of many important patterns of behavior for the child Some desirable habits related to sleep are:

(1) Going to bed and getting up at regular times
(2) Sleeping without fear in the dark
(3) Going to sleep promptly, waking up definitely and clearly
(4) Going to bed when the time comes without making a scene or teasing to remain up longer
(5) Putting playthings and books away before retiring
(6) Putting the clothes in order
(7) Saying good night and good morning to members of the family

The following two situations are reported practically verbatim and are typical of the widely different behavior patterns which may develop in one aspect of sleep activities.

Case No. 1

Situation	*Response*
1. Home. Evening. Child playing with blocks. Clock strikes eight. Mother says, "Come, Joe, time for bed."	1. Joe: "Oh, no, Mother! Just a little while. I'm building a house." Joe continues his play.
2. Clock shows eight-five. Mother: "Joe, put your blocks up this minute and go to bed. Do you hear me?"	2. Joe: "Yes, Mother, in just a minute. Oh, why do I have to go to bed?" Scowls.
3. Eight-fifteen. Mother: "Joe Smith! Do you know what time it is? Now don't let me have to tell you again to go to bed."	3. Joe: Slam! Bang! Blocks scatter. Wow! Snarl! Sniff! "Why do I have to go to bed? I'm not sleepy."
4. Eight-twenty: Mother takes Joe by collar and marches him off upstairs. Blocks remain scattered over floor.	4. Joe kicking, crying, remonstrating.

Case No. 2

Situation	*Response*
1. Home. Evening. Child playing with blocks. Clock strikes eight. Mother says, "Jack, did I hear that clock say, 'Bed-bed-bed, time to go to bed'?"	1. Jack: "Oh, Mother——"
2. Clock still echoing last stroke. Mother, at Jack's side: "Shall I help you put away your blocks?—Here goes." A race in putting blocks in their box.	2. Jack: "I'm first! Now I'll beat you upstairs." Squeals and yells of delight at the race. Bed.

It is of course evident that back of each of these two situations had been much previous conditioning of behavior. The regimen of the home, suggestion, possibly direct instruction, have had their effect. Joe probably would not have responded to Jack's situation as Jack did, *without the earlier experiences of Jack* in similar situations; but unquestionably Joe's behavior could have been conditioned to match Jack's, if he had had proper situations provided from the start.

Behavior Patterns Growing Out of Play

Because so large a proportion of the child's time is spent in play, because the play interest and activity are intense, and because the social relations involved in play are close and vital, the patterns of behavior developed in these relations are of the highest importance. Among the desirable play responses are these:

(1) Much vigorous activity prompted by the initiative and invention of the child

(2) Activities for the earlier years which use the larger muscles while requiring few of the finer co-ordinations of eye and hand
(3) The finding of interest and satisfaction in few simple toys or playthings, some of which may be improvised from materials at hand
(4) Sharing happily and without undue friction in play with other children
(5) Being able to find entertainment and satisfaction in playing alone
(6) Conforming, in accordance with the stage of development, with the rules of the game
(7) Making play conduct accord with standards of good sportsmanship

The psychological reasons for these criteria of play activities are fairly obvious. (1) Play that is too much directed by adults, or that consists in watching highly mechanized toys perform, does not provide the development which play should give. (2) Activities which place great demands on the smaller muscles not only fail to provide necessary exercise but also cause over-strain on the neural organism. (3) The child who is overstocked with toys is likely to pass from one to another without bringing any into the sustained use necessary to full enjoyment. At the same time an attitude is likely to develop which demands multiplicity and complexity of stimulus and is dissatisfied with simplicity. (4) Though children of three to five are not interested in competitive games, they may nevertheless learn to play in groups and receive much development from such associations. True teamwork, the voluntary subordination of the individual to the interests of the group, seldom appears much before the dawn of adolescence. (5) While it is essential that children have playmates and learn from their play how to adjust to the group, it is also highly desirable that the child shall learn to enjoy himself when alone. The individual who is bored and ill at ease when he has no company but himself, lacks a valuable resource for happiness and development. (6) One of the most desirable results of good play is the growth of restraint, self-control, readiness to conform to the will of the group as expressed in rules governing games and play. (7) To speak of sportsmanship for the young child sounds rather large. Grant that the fuller expression of this trait must wait for competitive games for its fuller expression. Yet the child of three or four can learn to await his turn, to let another have a desired place or object, to show appreciation when another child has done well. And even in the earlier years play has its defeats and victories, the response to which outlines the patterns for later conduct.

Behavior Patterns Related to Eliminating

Although the acts of elimination are basically reflex they are subject to conditioning. Desirable habits which may be set up in normal children are:

1. Regularity of organic rhythm
2. Proper continence
3. Attention to demands whenever they occur
4. Habits of responsibility for attending the toilet

In the healthy organism little difficulty is experienced in establishing a reasonably dependable rhythm for elimination. Neglect through interesting activities or excitement often is the chief obstacle in the way of right habits. Enuresis usually has some nervous or other organic cause that requires the attention of a physician.

Behavior Patterns from Speaking and Conversation

Because the child learns his speech forms by listening to others converse and by conversing with them, he naturally adopts at the same time the patterns that govern in the conversations heard. If, for example, the older members of the family freely interrupt one another in defiance of the rules of courtesy, if their voices are loud and strident, if their responses are blunt or harsh, if glumness and silence rule in the family circle, then these forms of expression are almost certain to be grounded in the child. Among desirable speech-conversation patterns are the following:

(1) Enjoyment and responsiveness in speech, readiness to contribute one's proper share to conversation
(2) Recognition of the rights of others in conversation, with the restraint necessary to avoid improper interruption
(3) Development of vocabulary in accordance with experience and development
(4) Avoidance of "baby-talk," coarse or lewd speech, unsuitable slang or barbarisms
(5) Voice and articulation properly controlled, with freedom from impediments such as lisping and stammering
(6) Ease and freedom coupled with proper reticence in talking to persons outside the group of familiars

(1) Development of speech is known to be closely related to mental development, and social responsiveness is markedly dependent on freedom in conversation. (2) Conversation in which the child learns to wait, think and listen as well as talk, affords excellent training in control; and at the same time it cultivates consideration for others. (3) While vocabulary depends in no small degree on the speech heard in the home and therefore reflects social background, it also is recognized as an important measure of intelligence. (4) Because we "think in words," the wealth and fitness of the speech forms we use reveal something of the quality of the mind. Uncouth speech suggests poverty of thought and taste. (5) Personal charm depends quite as much on pleasant voice and good articulation as on attractive face or form. (6) The poise and assurance

that come from ease in speaking with strangers as well as friends, add much to the effectiveness of personality.

Behavior Patterns Connected with Caring for Person

Marked differences occur among children in learning to care for their bodies and clothes. Some at three years possess more skill and independence than others at six. Allowing for reasonable differences in motor skills and initiative, it is likely that the greater part of the difference in the practical skill shown is due to differences in training. The child who is not expected or allowed to do anything for himself has no way of learning. Patterns that should develop early out of the child's care of his person are:

(1) Cordial co-operation followed later by self-responsibility for washing hands, face, teeth, the taking of baths
(2) Proper pride in clothing and growth of responsibility for its cleanliness and care
(3) Learning to dress and undress with a minimum of assistance from older persons
(4) Increasing responsibility for personal hygiene, as changing from wet garments, wearing appropriate clothes, avoiding unsuitable foods, reporting illness, and similar acts

Responding to Visitors in the Home

By the time the child is from three to five years old his behavior may be patterned to show at least the beginnings of hospitality and the courtesy of host or hostess to guests. This response most naturally starts with visitors of the child's own age, but soon extends to older callers. By example, suggestion and direct instruction, the child of two or three years and up can be developing such desirable responses as these:

(1) Proper greetings and good-bys to guests
(2) Special attention to comfort and entertainment of visitors
(3) Sharing playthings, giving visiting child the best
(4) Allowing visiting playmates a large part in choosing games and making other decisions

It is on a foundation of such early patterns as these that later the graciousness and naturalness of perfect hospitality rest. For out of such responses will grow the attitudes and the complex of responses, sometimes called manner, necessary to such behavior.

Behavior in Situations Outside the Home

Few persons have failed to share the embarrassment of a parent whose child, in some public place or when taken calling, proves unmanageable and makes a scene. The seriousness of such a situation is not primarily in its effect on deprecating adults, but on the child the development of whose personality is taking such directions. The young child needs to learn what constitutes proper behavior as a guest quite as much as he needs learn it as a host. Early patterns may take such directions as the following:

(1) Proper receiving and returning of greetings and saying of good-bys
(2) Early learning to express appreciation upon closing a visit
(3) Responsiveness in play and conversation, with a growing recognition of the rights of others
(4) Increasingly adaptive behavior in situations that differ from those familiar in the home

In grounding these social patterns, as well as others, care should be used not to push training faster than maturation proceeds. Just how fast this is, we lack conclusive experimental evidence to prove. Mrs. Johnson contends that children in the nursery school have not yet arrived at an age when they naturally extend greetings and employ other such amenities.[11] She states that children at this stage upon meeting normally stand and look at each other, or touch each other, or simply begin playing, without feeling any necessity for more formal behavior. There is danger, she thinks, of creating artificiality of behavior if the social conventions are urged upon the child. On the other hand, children from two years on are highly imitative and can be learning by observation of other children and adults. Common observation shows that by the age of two the child spontaneously waves good-by and calls greetings to parents and others. It seems likely that the best solution lies in early but gradual training to the social conventions, not expecting the child to show the skills attained by adults, but remembering that habits and attitudes are forming even in the first years.

PROBLEMS

1. Try to recall an infant whom you knew ten or more years ago to be quite spoiled by an over-attentive mother. Recall another infant of similar age who was treated quite scientifically according to the dictates of the experts on child care and training. Compare the characteristics of those individuals now. This would make a most interesting study for a group of adults.
2. Most interesting are the movies which have been prepared by Arnold Gesell demonstrating the fact of the maturation of human behavior. Exhibitions of these movies would be profitable at this point in the study.
3. In school much more of perverse behavior is seen in slowly developing children, or in those commonly called dull, than in those who develop more rapidly. Does the maturation hypothesis offer an explanation for this fact? What changes in school practice are suggested?
4. Can you think of practices common in home and in school which encourage the child to indulge in falsehood and evasiveness?

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[11] H. M. Johnson, *Children in the Nursery School,* p. 31*ff.*

5. Many of us can recall our pre-adolescent years in which we were most shy in the presence of children of the opposite sex. Does this appear to be common among children now? Is this tendency simply a phase of maturation, or are older persons responsible for this feeling in children?
6. Through observation try to get the answer to this question: "Do parents who ask the most questions know most about their children?"
7. Through study and comparing your thinking with that of your friends, can you develop some principles for the psychological weaning of individuals from their parents?
8. Try to observe some pre-school children at play. What knowledge do you gain of their parents?
9. What explanation can you offer for the fact that commonly conflict between adults and children increases as children grow older?
10. Distinguish between rewards and bribes as incentives to behavior. Make specific application of this distinction with reference to the establishment of certain desirable habits in young children.
11. From physicians and other persons trained in the study of children seek explanations for the fact that a large number of children are feeding problems.

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CHAPTER IX

ATTITUDES AS MOTIVES

ATTITUDE is a new and not altogether satisfactory term employed in psychology. That it is not satisfactory is due to lack of precise definition, there being as yet no general agreement on what shall be included in its connotation. The necessity for such a term, however, is indicated by Dr. John Dewey when he says: "We need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready to overt manifestations; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity."[1] This is to say that we need a word to sum up the effects of previous experience in preparing us to meet new situations.

The Term Attitude

The part played by the past in enabling us to adjust to the present scarcely needs emphasis. Let some magic sponge erase from our experience all the effects of the past learning, and we might as well be the "man from Mars" for all we could understand of our environment. Language, the meaning of objects, the ways of persons in their relations with one another, the values which we prize, social institutions and their functions—all these and a thousand other things in our surroundings would be meaningless until we had again learned their implications.

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[1] *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 40.

Now it is of course impossible to set forth in the contents of any single term the *whole* of the contribution made by past experience to present adjustment. There is simply too much involved in our past activities and learning for any one word to carry it all. The good old term *habit* comes as near to this generalized meaning as any word we are likely to get. And indeed Doctor Dewey suggests that we might for his purpose employ the word habit, "twisted somewhat from its customary use."

But it is difficult to twist words from their customary use, and keep our thinking straight. Confronted by the necessity of expressing a new meaning, scientists usually either invent a wholly new term or else appropriate some old term, giving it a technically defined meaning so different from the original content of the word that confusion is not likely to result.[2] Following the latter of these methods, psychology has appropriated the word *attitude* to stand for certain aspects of past experience as it affects present behavior.

At this point, however, it is but fair to note that not all psychologists are in accord with the introduction of this new term. Professor Symonds, evidently taking his cue from Dewey, concludes that "attitude is subsumed by habit and has no existence as a separate reaction."[3] Similarly Thomson: "An attitude is the result of habitual modes of conduct and in turn becomes a determiner of future conduct in modifying and regulating the primary drives. . . . As motives and drives they [attitudes] have what force there is in habit; never more, never less."[4] Representing the tendency to adopt the new term, Allport in his various writings on social psychology, makes much of the concept of attitudes; Thurstone and Chave devote a book to *The Measurement of Attitude;* Gardner Murphy in his *Experimental Social Psychology* has a chapter of seventy-five pages on "Social Attitudes and Their Measurement"; many other psychologists have accepted the term.

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[2] An example of the latter practice is the use of the words *validity, reliability* and *objectivity* in statistics.

[3] P. M. Symonds, *The Nature of Conduct,* p. 230.

The Nature of Attitude

Just what is an attitude? How does attitude differ from habit, so that habit has to be "twisted from its customary use" in order to express what attitude means? As stated at the beginning, the term is not yet sufficiently standardized to give it an exact and authoritative definition that fits all the different meanings assigned to it.

First we may note two broad types of definition employed by psychologists: one looking upon attitude, (1) as a *verbal substitute for* overt behavior; the other, (2) as a *tendency to* overt behavior.

(1) It is somewhat difficult to understand those who would define attitudes as verbal substitutes for overt behavior. This point of view seems to have arisen from the fact, as Bain explains, that "most attempts to study attitudes have been by way of getting verbal responses through questionnaires, rating of verbal symbols in gradations of liking-disliking, and of asking people for preferences, desires or interests."[5] In short, tests of attitude have been principally those of verbalized reports of personal tendencies or predispositions in situations

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[4] M. K. Thomson, *The Springs of Human Action,* p. 166.

[5] R. Bain, "Theory and Measurement of Attitudes and Opinions," *Psychological Bulletin,* No. 27, p. 360.

described. Whether the person reporting had an actual tendency to the action he *claimed,* cannot of course be proved by any such test. Only the overt action itself would be conclusive evidence on the question. This does not mean, however, that the verbalized statement made by a person concerning his attitude is necessarily a substitute for overt action of the type claimed. He may act in the line of his statement. And if he does not, then it is more than doubtful whether his verbal reaction expresses attitude; quite on the contrary, it seems definitely to misrepresent attitude. An attitude *may* be expressed (or concealed) by words; also it may be expressed (or concealed) by a tone of voice, by a look, by a gesture, by an act. To say that a verbal substitute for an overt act constitutes an attitude overlooks too many of the factors involved.

Thurstone in discussing the theory of attitude measurement makes the following clear distinction: "The term 'opinion' will here mean a verbal expression of attitude. If a man said we made a mistake in entering the war against Germany, that statement would be called his opinion. The term 'opinion' will be restricted to verbal expression. But it is an expression of what? It expresses an attitude, supposedly. There should be no difficulty in understanding this use of the two terms. The verbal expression is the *opinion.* Our interpretation of such an expressed opinion would be that the man's *attitude* is pro-German. An opinion symbolizes an attitude."[6] It is the opinion therefore and not the attitude that is a substitute for action, if there is a substitute in the case at issue; for, strictly speaking, opinions are in general *precursors of,* rather than *substitutes for* overt action.

(2) The definition that treats attitude as a *tendency to* overt action meets the case as far as it goes, *providing* that in overt action we include *inhibition.* For an attitude may quite as

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[6] L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chane, *The Measurement of Attitude,* p. 7.

readily prevent action as cause it. An attitude which includes dislike, aversion, contempt, hatred toward people of another race, quite certainly will block the way to acts of friendship, appreciation, co-operative enterprise. Equally certain will liking, admiration, good-will lead to acts of friendly intercourse. To use an illustration which most students can verify: A negative attitude toward a teacher or a subject in school invariably hinders the study and effort necessary to mastery, while a positive attitude acts as a stimulus to study and effort. Whatever the attitude, so that it is a true attitude and not *mere* verbalization, it prepares us for overt action in the situation to which it applies. In Lockhart's words, an attitude is "a potential act, but it may never be carried over into overt behavior because of inhibiting factors."[7]

Having accepted the point of view that attitude is a tendency to overt action, there still remains the question whether attitudes exist as innumerable tendencies to *particularized* behavior, or whether they constitute clusters or groups of tendencies to *types* of behavior in related situations. For example, can one have an attitude of racial tolerance which tends to apply to all races with which one has contacts, or are his racial attitudes quite unrelated to one another; tolerant perhaps to Chinese, intolerant to Japanese, and so on? Or, does a pro-Japanese or pro-Chinese attitude in one situation indicate a "pro" attitude in other situations involving these races? In short, can attitudes be in any degree generalized so that their behavior patterns follow broad types, or are they so highly specialized that no group patterns exist?

Answering this question Lickert says, "Investigators have proceeded almost without question on the assumption that social attitudes are grouped in patterns or clusters"; and himself concludes that, "speaking generally, attitudes may be conceived as clustered, or linked together."[8] Bain, however, insists that "attitudes cluster together only when they constitute alternative verbalization of the same conative tendency in relation to a specifically defined social situation."[9] G. W. Allport, in discussing the traits that make for radicalism in social situations, takes the position that attitudes tend to go in clusters.[10] On the basis of present evidence, both theoretical and experimental, it seems safe to say that attitudes do tend to generalize or spread from a given situation to related situations that contain similar social elements. For example, the public attitude of hostility toward certain organizations of American veterans who bring political pressure to bear toward securing pensions and similar financial advantages, is quite certain to spread to other veterans' organizations not concerned in such activities. Indeed, the hostile attitude may extend to the entire military establishment. A "pro" or "anti" attitude toward the leader of a political party, practically always carries over to votes for or against minor candidates of the party. Many instances are known from pioneer days of men who declared implacable hostility to all Indians because of acts of cruelty inflicted on their family or friends by some one or few Indians. In short, the principle seems to hold for attitudes as for other aspects of learning, that "spread" will occur wherever *identical elements* are involved. By this process clusters or related groups of attitudes develop.

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[7] E. G. Lockhart, "The Attitudes of Children Toward Law," *University of Iowa Studies in Character Education,* No. 1, p. 8.

To what extent certain basic attitudes represent innate factors of temperament, it is impossible now to say. Whether, for example, there is a biological influence at work tending to produce racial antagonisms, is not certainly known. That in accordance with the popular concept some men are "women haters" by nature, we may well doubt; yet attitudes toward the opposite sex are known to depend in part on organic tensions, which in turn go back to a foundation of inherited dispositions. It seems probable also that the liking or disliking of many persons for certain foods may be contingent on hereditary physiological reactions to such foods. In general, it is probably safe to say that some of the more basic attitudes, such as those just mentioned, have their roots in native tendencies. The "gestalt" psychology would postulate a broadly general but individualized life-pattern for each person, which in some degree predetermines his attitudes in common with other aspects of personality. Most psychologists agree that all attitudes are largely the product of learning.

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[8] R. Lickert, "A Technique for Measurement of Attitudes," *Archives of Psychology*, No. 140, p. 9.

[9] R. Bain, "Theory and Measurement of Attitudes and Opinions," *Psychological Bulletin*, No. 27.

[10] The Composition of Political Attitudes," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 35, pp. 220-238.

Elements that Enter into Attitude

We have not yet answered the question as to just what elements enter into an attitude to account for its motivating effect on conduct. And at this point, as at the beginning of the chapter, we must admit that it is impossible to list and enumerate all the elements that may enter into an attitude. Attitude is commonly referred to as a *"mind-set," predisposition* or *tendency* toward a certain act or line of action. Murphy defines attitude as "verbalized or verbalizable tendencies, dispositions, adjustments toward certain acts."[11] Miss Schwesinger speaks of "mind-set, including attitude, opinions, prejudices, interest"[12]—rather a loose and unsatisfactory conglomeration. Thurstone defines attitude thus: "The sum-total of a man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats and convictions about any specified topic."[13] Allport gives this analysis: "An attitude is a disposition to act which is built up by integration of numerous specific response of a similar type, but which exists as a general neural 'set,' and when activated by a specific stimulus results in behavior that is more obviously a function of the disposition than of the activating stimulus."[14]

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[11] G. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology,* p. 615.

[12] G. C. Schwesinger, *Heredity and Environment,* p. 123.

The essence of these various definitions may be illustrated by a concrete example. John Stark lived on the Pacific Coast. His home was in a section which the hard-working Japanese farmers had not yet entered, but John had heard his parents and neighbors say many bitter and derogatory things about the Japanese. When it was rumored that several Japanese families were planning to move into the neighborhood, rent land and do market gardening, there was vehement opposition and even talk of violence against the intruders. In the midst of this excitement the Stark family moved to another part of the state. Imagine John's indignation when on going to school in the new community he found several Japanese children among the pupils. John at first avoided them and refused to speak to them or play with them. His mind-set was so strongly anti-Japanese that he had difficulty in adjusting to any situation of which the Japanese children were a part.

Now what elements entered into the attitude of this boy?

1. First there were various ideas, concepts, opinions, beliefs about the Japanese which came from hearing discussions at home and elsewhere about them. This cognitive element consisting of supposed facts and various impressions, supplied the basis for John's attitude.

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[13] L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude,* p. 6.

[14] G. W. Allport, "Composition of Political Attitudes," *American Journal of Sociology,* No. 35, p. 221.

2. These "facts" and impressions had come to him accompanied by a strong emotional element of disapproval, dislike, scorn, hatred for everything Japanese. To the affective atmosphere of the home and the community, as well as to the ideas, opinions and beliefs which he himself held, John's emotions made ready response.

3. Coming in part from his emotional reactions and such basic drives as dominance and self-preservation, and in part from learned habits of behavior toward persons held in dislike and contempt, there existed in John certain habits of reaction when the sources of motivation were like those presented by the Japanese.

Putting these several factors together we have an attitude, the proof of whose existence lay in the boy's overt behavior in situations which involved Japanese.

Generalizing these various factors, we have at least in broad outline the elements that enter into attitude. Structurally an attitude consists: (1) of a cognitive basis, something known or believed about the person, object, activity or situation toward which the attitude is directed; (2) of basic drives and emotions which accompany the ideas, impressions or opinions formed; (3) of certain habits or tendencies to overt action which result from the cognitive and emotional elements, and their characteristic forms of expression.

It must also be taken into account that in order properly to be called an attitude, a mind-set must possess some degree of permanence and stability. The center of motivation provided must be sufficiently organized so that it actually produces a tendency to overt action typical for the situation to which it applies. Whatever tendency to overt action exists must not, if it is to be called an attitude, be so temporary and so little tied up with accepted ideas and their accompanying emotions that no consistent pattern of behavior results. For example, just as the solicitor for the community relief fund calls for your subscription you learn that an official of this fund has been caught grafting. Your knowledge of this fact arouses your indignation and resentment, and a tendency to withhold support. Quickly, however, you remember that this official is only one among many, that the remainder are probably honest, and that the needy should not be made to suffer for the guilt of one man. So the temporary negative tendency toward the fund is swept away.

In thus reducing an attitude to its simplest elements we must not forget, however, the highly individualized matrix out of which attitude springs. Impressions and emotions coming from the same objective stimulus (situation) result in very different attitudes in different persons; even in the same person at different stages of his development. The receiving of a dole is abhorrent to some persons but is taken as a matter of course and a right by others. Seeing the violent end of a gangster villain on the screen, or reading a similar description in a book, may make one boy respect the straight and narrow way while it incites another boy to emulate the daring hero, the latter one believing at the same time that he can avoid the slips that led to downfall.

To understand the difference in these attitudes one would have to know the entire life-pattern of each individual—both the patterns that are innate and those that have been learned prior to the dole situation or the gangster situation. This would probably reveal fundamental differences in the basic drives. It certainly would involve differences in the conceptual and the emotional processes of the persons concerned. Not only the total "gestalt" of the individual but the facts he knows, the opinions he holds, his beliefs, biases, hopes, purposes, desires and a host of similar factors, help to determine the quality of the attitudes that arise from a particular social situation.

It is evident of course that the number of individual attitudes, and in fact of clusters or groups of attitudes, which may exist, is limitless. Attitudes may and do arise in every connection in which we come to possess ideas and impressions to which emotion may attach, and from which behavior may spring. This is to say that we develop innumerable mind-sets or emotional habits of action in all kinds of situations which enter our experience. These mind-sets or emotionalized habits and ideas represent, in the words of Doctor Dewey, "the effects of previous experience in preparing us to meet new situations." They are a highly important part of personality.

Attitudes as Sources of Motive

Attention has already been called in our discussion to the motivating effects of attitude. It is evident that in the large, the whole of previous experience functions in our present behavior. In a special sense, however, the complex of motives which comprise an attitude, tends strongly to overt action in situations to which the attitude relates. So true is this that statesmen, politicians, public relations counsel, expert advertisers and all others who are wise in the ways of human nature, work first on attitude when they seek to move people in new directions.

At the end of Woodrow Wilson's first term as president he was re-elected on the slogan: "He kept us out of war." Then in a few months the tide of events changed. Propaganda was begun in the press, from platform and pulpit and the cinema screen and from many other sources. German "atrocities," already familiar, were pictured with renewed vividness, the Germans were no longer a nation of cultured people, but ruthless "Huns" who mutilated women and bayoneted children. Their treaties were "scraps of paper." Our national pride and dignity were being dragged in the dust by the restrictions placed on the freedom of the seas. This was a "war to end war," and to "make the world safe for democracy"—and so on. Our people were given such "facts" and ideas as would prepare them to engage in war. Their pride, their patriotism, their pity for the oppressed, their anger, their hatred, their combativeness were all appealed to by skillful writers and speakers led by the President, who was himself a master of appeal and whose words were backed by the prestige of a great office. The result was a rapid change in public attitude, and the people who had a few months before voted for Wilson because "he kept us out of war" now demanded that war be declared. Furthermore, they supported the war with great vigor and no small sacrifice, to its conclusion. Their attitude led to overt behavior.

So also in other lines. Two decades ago when the World War began a very large section of public opinion was against the use of cigarettes, even by men. They were "coffin nails," harmful both to body and character. No girl who cared for her reputation would be seen smoking one. Then our soldiers went "across." Nothing was too good for them, and we shipped them candies, chocolates, dried fruits and other dainties. In this mood of public generosity the tobacco interests saw an opportunity. They themselves sent large consignments free of charge to the soldiers. Subscriptions were organized to buy cigarettes for the "men in France," and thousands of cartons were shipped. Cigarettes became associated with patriotism, generosity, bravery. Attitude was changing. Advertising posters showed beautiful girls lighting cigarettes for dashing young men. Finally, venturesome advertisers began to picture girls smoking; girls timidly began to appear with cigarettes in public places; soon all restrictions were off and millions were smoking who a generation before would have looked upon the practice with horror. Attitude had changed on a large scale, and with it behavior also.

The old Roman emperors, finding their people growing dissatisfied and hostile in their poverty, transformed their attitude and saved revolution by providing circuses, feasts and other lavish entertainments. Leading industrialists and financiers in our own land pay lavish salaries to men skilled in the psychology of public attitude, for their services in allaying antagonism and creating attitudes of friendliness toward the industries and their enterprises. Boss Tweed's "The public be damned" has no place in modern business, which has become aware that attitude, "mind-set," finally finds expression in overt behavior.

Let us consider briefly the motivating rôle of each of the elements which usually enter into attitude. In our previous analysis we found attitude to consist of: (1) a nucleus of ideas (something known or believed), (2) a mass of accompanying feeling and emotions, (3) habits of action characteristic of such drives. The motivating effect of each of these three elements is widely variable in different attitudes, now one, now another playing the chief rôle.

(1) What is the rôle of ideas in attitude? Feeling and emotion are undoubtedly the fundamental driving forces in human behavior—fundamental in the sense that they come from farthest down in the evolutionary cycle, and also in the sense that they are the earliest drives in the life of the individual. Yet feeling and emotion fall far short of accounting for all of conduct. Man, with his highly developed cortex for the mediation of ideas, is able through their agency to apply intelligence to the shaping of his behavior. Says Professor Freeman, "Human behavior and the structure of the nervous system both testify to the important rôle of ideas in guiding human conduct. . . . The first condition underlying behavior is the understanding of the world. . . . Man works out his adjustment to the larger universe by working out a comprehensive theory or point of view by which to explain the world and to under-

stand his relationship to it."[15] Ideas are the crucial factors in social attitudes, the means by which intelligence takes control over emotion and the primitive drives.

It is first to the ideational factor in attitude that the politician appeals in the platform offered by his party for the consideration of the voters. The purpose is to shape their understanding and political philosophy to accord with the policies proposed, and thereby create favorable attitudes toward party and candidates. To the same end the public relations counsel presents carefully selected facts from the life or activities of his client, hoping thereby to influence the understanding and opinions of the public so that their attitude may be shaped to favor, instead of oppose, the man the counsel represents. Public opinion is recognized as one of the most powerful social forces known to compel action on the part of individuals; hence the doctrine of "pitiless publicity" as a corrective of evil practices in business or politics. Let the ideas, concepts, understandings of a man or a society be sound, and attitude and action will be reasonably safe. Let these be twisted, false, mixed with error, and attitude and action suffer in their validity.

(2) So many attitudes are strongly tinged with emotion that some, as we have noted, have defined attitude as an "emotionalized mind-set" or "emotionalized habit." And the very essence of an emotion is to produce action of its type. Indeed, the motivating effect of ideas depends in many cases, perhaps in most cases, on the emotions which the ideas evoke. The stern attitude toward kidnaping which insists on the apprehension and severe punishment of the kidnaper, undoubtedly springs from emotions of fear, revenge, pity, anger which the act creates. The punishment accorded heretics and reformers through

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[15] F. N. Freeman, "Sources of Motivation," *Religion and Conduct* (G. H. Betts, F. K. Eiselen, G. A. Coe, ed.), pp. 30, 32, 33.

the ages is not motivated primarily by the fact of differences in ideas of philosophies, but by the feelings of resentment and intolerance produced by these differences. People know in a general way all the time that vice, graft and crime exist in their cities, but they take action only when their anger has been stirred by some flagrant instance of imposition.

The extent to which the basic and derived emotions comprise the content of experience has already been suggested (Chapter VII). Not only the scores of emotional shadings which go back to fear, anger, love, but similar shadings of our likings and dislikings, our attractions and aversions, our appreciations, jealousies, hates, admirations, disgusts, and all the rest, form in the aggregate the emotional background of our attitudes. And it is in the main these emotions that supply the live steam for the drives back of conduct.

(3) All habit, according to Dewey, is a "demand for action"; that is, a source of motive. At least habit, which is so large an element in attitude, tends to stabilize action and give direction to conduct. John Stark of our illustration "high-hatted" the Japanese children because this kind of behavior was to him characteristic of the ideas he held and the emotions that attached to these ideas. His previous experience (conserved by habit) had prepared him to meet new situations of this type in that manner. With certain facts of political chicanery before them and with adequate indignation surging within them, people characteristically "turn the rascals out" by their votes; habit leads to this obvious response, though far deeper remedies may be needed to correct the situation. It required centuries to show man that there are better ways of settling "affairs of honor" than by duels, and of dealing with heretics than by burning them. All of which means that if attitude is a "tendency to overt action," it is a tendency to a particular kind of action as determined by habit.

Attitudes Functioning in Personality and Social Adjustment

Everyone in the course of his development and education comes normally to have attitudes toward many more or less generalized types of situations. Thus we have attitudes toward war, religion, education, marriage, government, wealth, philanthropy, prize fighting, the liquor question and a hundred others. Not every person could analyze and describe his attitude on these questions, but none fails to have mind-sets which influence behavior toward them.

In so far as one's attitude is generalized toward these very inclusive situations, it is likely that this attitude is a complex consisting of many related attitudes toward particular aspects of the larger situation. For example, one's attitude toward war is made up of one's attitude toward the use of force, toward poison gas, bayonets, bombs, submarines, long-distance guns, blockades, and other instruments of destruction. One's attitude toward religion is a composite of one's attitudes toward the church, the Bible, creeds, religious persons and many other factors. It often happens that attitudes toward different factors within a larger field are inconsistent, as when one favors conscription of fighters in war but opposes conscription of labor and wealth; or when one accepts the basic principles of Christianity without squaring one's attitudes toward the way of life required to make them effective. Such conflicts in attitudes mean some degree of failure of integration in the personality.

Attitude, the way a person faces the situation of which he is a part, is one of the surest measures of adjustment. Certain types of attitude are socially favored, while others bring social disapproval. The person whose characteristic attitudes in his relations with others are those of responsiveness and co-operation, will have more friends and followers, other things being equal, than will one who is always holding back, making objections, refusing to "go along." One whose habitual attitude toward humanity is one of good will, fits better into the social group than a person who is characteristically anti-social. Critical attitudes do not lead to warm friendship and helpful cooperation. The cynic is seldom sought as a chum. The "knocker" and the fault finder is seldom a favorite in his group. It is probably on the whole better for the personality to live with one's likes rather than one's dislikes, and to dwell on one's admirations more than on one's disgusts. One whose attitude constantly questions whether life is worth living can hardly get much satisfaction out of life.

Nowhere are the effects of attitude more clearly seen than in the home. The close relationships that exist there are almost certain to result in highly developed attitudes in both children and parents, which may be either positive or negative. In many homes there is little of strain between parents and children, the prevailing attitude on both sides being one of friendliness and good will. In such homes love and affection are likely to be freely expressed, and happiness is the prevailing mood. In other homes quite the opposite is the rule. Parents are censorious and fault finding, the children are corrected, nagged, threatened, obstructed, punished. The latter respond in kind, the relations become strained, affection diminishes and may even be replaced on the part of the children by positive dislike and hatred. Under these conditions children's attitudes almost certainly become negative, they grow rebellious and oppose even reasonable requests of their parents. This opposition creates antagonistic attitudes in the parents, which still further add to the strain. The children come to feel that they are not understood and that restraints are put upon them without reason simply to satisfy the perversity of the parent.

Fortunately this extreme condition does not exist in a majority of homes. Yet the prevalence of attitudes of opposition and unrest on the part of children toward the home is surprisingly frequent. Inquiries in the writer's college classes, with opportunity for unsigned reports, indicated that more than half of the members had at one time or another during their early adolescence, considered the question of leaving home because of tensions and restraints. We may believe that few things in the home are more important than its prevailing attitudes, of parents as well as children.

The same principle holds with reference to the school. The child whose attitude is antagonistic toward the school, toward the subject he is studying or toward the teacher, of necessity fails to secure from the total situation all that the school should give him. In the better schools of the present, attitudes of true good will, respect, common interest and co-operation prevail. Yet this is far from applying to our entire educational system. In some schools the pupils look upon teachers as their taskmasters, perhaps even as their natural enemies. Instead of being a privilege and an opportunity, school is an imposition. Instead of studying to satisfy a hunger for mental activity and mastery, the pupil often exerts himself only enough to "get by." Wherever such attitudes exist, development is lagging, personality suffers in its growth. What Kilpatrick calls "attendant learnings," the habits, attitudes and associations which accompany the *intended* learning, may be altogether the more important of the two.

The Conditioning of Attitudes

If our analysis of attitudes and their functions is correct, there can be nothing of more concern in one's development than the kind of attitudes one forms—the predispositions or tendencies to particular types of behavior left in the personality from the daily processes of living. In fact it is doubtful whether education has a more important function than the shaping of attitudes. To particularize this statement: For a year or more Betty had been looking forward to entering the class in Domestic Science. The class started out with much anticipation. But the teacher proved to be of the taskmaster type. She ran to exact records, fixed penalties, stereotyped procedures. The second week she announced an elaborate system of demerits for errors made by the pupils. In the midst of activities in cooking, sewing or cleaning she would call out, "Mary, that mistake is ten off your grade for today. Elizabeth, that is five off for you." Under the rather disagreeable personality of this teacher and her mechanical methods of instruction, the attitude of the class quickly changed to one of boredom and resentment. Betty remarked to her mother, "My grade is all right I guess, but if I live to finish this course I never want to hear of Domestic Science again." The "attendant learning" of this course was highly unfortunate.

Most persons will agree that whatever may have been the facts learned or the skills achieved by this class, the girls paid too high a price in the negative attitudes toward the subject, toward study and effort, toward the school which the experience of the course provided, and possibly toward the homemaking skills taught. It is possible for pupils in literature to show wholly satisfactory grades in a few prescribed "classics," yet pass from the course with their tastes for reading so undeveloped that they devote their leisure reading to movie stories, "true story" magazines, "confession" serials and such like. That this actually happens is shown both by careful inquiries and by the sales of such materials. A history course that leaves an indifferent attitude toward history, that results in a narrow nationalism rather than world-wide interest and appreciation, can scarcely be called a success no matter what the grade records show. The student of the social sciences who comes from his courses tolerant of graft and special privilege, complacent in the presence of political trickery or incompetence, indifferent to his obligations as a citizen, lacks the chief thing which his study should give him—a proper attitude toward these things. The college graduate who achieves his twenty-second year and his degree, perhaps even his Phi Beta Kappa, with his attitudes unformed or badly askew toward important social situations, or toward life itself, has no reason to be proud of his education.

Only for purposes of analysis and description can the various sources of attitudes be thought of separately. Actually our mind-sets originate in a vast complex of innate constitution and of experiences which no experimental skill can ever wholly untangle. With this caution in mind we may turn briefly to several sources of attitude which are sufficiently distinguishable to warrant examination: Attitudes may be created or changed by:

1. Absorption through cumulative experience
2. Single (or few) striking or dramatic experiences
3. The use of "stereotypes"; that is, of slogans or other symbols which convey accepted meanings or arouse emotion
4. Organized instruction
5. Critical judgment, reason, examination of validities and values
6. Conversion (religious)

It is of course as impossible as it is unnecessary to try to describe or list all the sources from which attitudes spring in the ordinary run of *cumulative experience*. Lasker presents much evidence to show that hostile race attitudes commonly have their origins in childhood experiences, and depend in large measure on the attitudes of parents in the home.[16] Child companions and neighborhood contacts also play a significant part. G. B. Watson found that approximately three-fourths of the attitudes held by one hundred students toward war, were traced by these students to pre-adolescent experiences.[17] This would seem to mean that absorption played a larger part than other factors. A more general and perhaps more convincing type of evidence is the fact already mentioned (Chapter IV) of the excess of delinquency which comes from congested and slum districts of our cities, where the community attitude is known often to be less law-abiding than in more favored communities.

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[16] B. Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children,* especially Chapter VI.

Taking all the evidence into account, it would seem safe to say that the basic principles to be recognized in the training of attitudes is that desirable attitudes are not as a rule formed in undesirable situations. This is implied, of course, in the very definition of attitude, which conceives it as summing together into centers of motive the results of previous experience. If this point of view holds, it is impossible for attitudes to be markedly better than, or different from, the total social situation in which they originate. Radicals will naturally come from an environment where radicalism is talked, felt, practiced, and where the conditions of life favor revolutionary points of view. Conservatives will be bred where the *milieu* is comfortable and where the existing philosophy sanctions the *status quo*.

A college girl from the South recently furnished a good example of the principle of absorption. In the writer's class of which she was a member was a negro youth, of good appearance, markedly able, socially cultured. After the second meeting of the class the girl stopped at the instructor's desk as the class went out and said: "I understand the northern custom of racially mixed classes, but just out of respect to my upbringing and convictions I want to register my objection to sitting in a class with a negro."

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[17] *Religious Education*, 1926, Vol. 21, pp. 188-194.

Here was a strong mind-set which had developed from some twenty years in an environment from which its absorption was inevitable. Out of this environment had come the cognitive element which was the basis of her attitude—the ideas, impressions, facts, beliefs, understandings of the negro and his relation to the whites. All her life this girl had seen negroes treated as inferiors, heard them spoken of as inferiors, accepted them as inferiors. All her life too she had sensed a strong emotional reaction to the thought of social equality, and had herself come to feel strongly in situations which assumed equality. Her habits of action likewise took their direction from these ideas and feelings. From early childhood she had treated negroes as inferiors, keeping them rigidly "in their place." It would have required strong counteracting influences indeed to have made the girl's attitude other than what it was.

How attitude may develop out of the presence of home environment is thus described by a college girl:

"My upbringing seems to have been largely regulated by the clock. Rising and retiring, meals and lessons, all took place according to an inflexible schedule. To be tardy for school was unheard of, and promptness for social engagements was considered equally important. I can remember vividly attending a party greatly embarrassed by the lack of a hair ribbon because I had loitered while dressing and my father insisted on my leaving the house on time.

"Punctuality was impressed upon me as one of the cardinal virtues. Constant emphasis placed it in the realm of the habitual. The displeasure of my parents, incurred upon occasions of unpunctuality, gave the situation a decided emotional tinge. Needless to say, I have developed a very decided attitude toward this trait. Failure of others to be punctual annoys me considerably, but it is my reaction to my own failure which causes me the more acute distress. Whether it is important that I be on time or whether it is entirely unimportant, I find myself actively unhappy if it appears that I shall be late. When I drive a car, I am always hurrying to 'get there.' I am usually the first to arrive and have spent countless hours (which might have been more profitably employed) waiting for others. Even though I know that the person with whom I have an engagement is notoriously unpunctual, I am miserable if I do not arrive on time. If I am unavoidably detained, I actually suffer mentally."

Yet we are not to think that the same home and the same general treatment would necessarily have produced exactly the same results in another child. There is still the matter of the individual life-pattern of the child to be taken into account. This girl evidently possessed an emotional poise and a capacity for habit forming which made possible a positive instead of a negative response to what appears to have been an exaggerated emphasis on punctuality. Such treatment might produce tensions resulting in contrary response in a child differently constituted.

Mind-sets sufficiently stabilized to be called attitudes are sometimes created by *single (or few) striking or dramatic experiences*. Thus happy lovers are usually well disposed toward the place where they first met or where they plighted troth. A college girl tells of her persistent dislike for church bells, and explains her attitude on the ground that the first time she remembers hearing a church bell, at the age of ten, it was tolling for the death of a dear friend and playmate. Physicians find that young wives whose first sex experiences shock and annoy them, are often inhibited for some time in their normal responses.

Not only does the striking and dramatic in experience possess great pre-potency, but initial experiences have greater weight in forming attitudes than do later experiences in the same general situation. The person who makes a bad impression when he is introduced to a stranger has a distinct handicap to overcome in their later relations. A favorable presentation of a speaker to his audience, and his own opening sentences, have much to do with the success of the occasion. Architects wisely plan for a pleasing entrance to a house or a public building, so that the initial impression is propitious. The first chapter of a book counts for more toward its success than does the eighth or the fifteenth chapter. With this principle in mind one sometimes regrets that the view from railway trains, and often the stations themselves, present so unprepossessing sights to travelers as they enter our towns and cities. Teachers also might well take advantage of the effect of initial impression in preparing for the first sessions of their classes in new subjects.

Unless the emotional tension which forms a part of the attitude-forming experience is extreme, attitudes which rest on but a single experience, or upon but few experiences, are probably more easily modified than are those that develop gradually out of repeated experiences. In reconditioning such attitudes the desideratum is of course to provide experiences of high emotional value whose effects run counter to those of the earlier experience.

"The whole machinery of propaganda and education," says Murphy, "can be better understood in the light of the theory of 'stereotypes.' Our attitudes toward races, flags, national anthems, and toward the words which crystallize generally accepted values, such as freedom, honor, and democracy, tend in general to be imprinted upon us in a more or less *standardized* form. . . . When we hear of patriots or bolsheviks we can scarcely stop to consider the individual attributes of all the persons thus designated."[18]

Stereotypes are a shorthand method of classifying individuals or acts under broad categories which tend to carry with them attitudes of a characteristic type toward the individuals or acts.

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[18] G. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology*, p. 679.

To be classed as a heretic two hundred years ago involved danger of persecution, if not of the rack and the stake; now "heretic" is in many circles a high compliment which implies originality of thought or attitude. To call a person a radical today is sufficient to set the attitude of many persons against him without their taking the trouble to understand his positions or acquaint themselves with his character. The attitudes of a considerable proportion of college students toward one of their number can be influenced markedly by hearing him called a "grind." During the period of the Eighteenth Amendment the term prohibitionist attached to a man was enough to poison the attitude of many against him.

The simple fact is that many persons depend on stereotypes instead of ideas and facts for the foundation of important attitudes. Words and symbols stir their emotions and govern their motives. The flag, the cross, democracy, liberty, Americanism, Lincoln, are among the words that possess high positive stereotyped value for most Americans. Words that for many have negative stereotype values are: bootlegger, racketeer, dictator, Red, nigger, wop, dago, moron, hoodlum, Wall Street, bathing beauty. Following the financial crash of 1929-1930 the word "banker" was for a time in danger of becoming a stereotype of unpleasant connotation. Other words now on probation, so to speak, are Hollywood, brain trust, labor leader, capitalist.

Obviously any classification of stereotypes on the basis of the attitudes they induce, is biased and undependable for the reason that different persons react quite differently to many such symbols. The man who believes in dictatorships is likely to scoff at democracy; members of the D. A. R. and other super-patriotic organizations see red when pacificism is mentioned. People of pacifistic tendencies are equally offended by the meaning they give militarism. There are those who look with longing if not respect on Hollywood; and even beauty queens have their admirers. Nevertheless the principle holds. Every person's attitudes are influenced more or less by stereotypes; some persons allow stereotypes to govern many of their attitudes very completely.

Closely related to stereotypes in their influence on attitude is the prestige of position, power, wealth, dress or other attributes that set their possessor out from the crowd. Let a man be elected president of the United States and he becomes a seer, an oracle, a demigod whom people will travel miles to see and hear. When a man is made bishop of his church his theological views at once become important. Any person who has amassed a hundred million dollars will be heard by many with respect on any problem whatever of human destiny. Let a foreigner visiting our shores carry the title of prince or queen, and all doors are open; the newspapers, the radio, the lecture platform, the moving pictures extend generous hands, banquets and receptions tread on one another's heels.

Attitude is strongly influenced also by dress. Only the person of assured prestige can afford to be negligent of his personal appearance. This point was illustrated by a large class in psychology, many of whom had expressed confidence in their ability to judge character and personality even from photographs. Without knowing the types represented, they were given a dozen photographs, half of long-term prisoners in a penitentiary, half of men of distinction in business and the professions. Care was taken to have one prisoner shown in correct form from wing collar and cutaway to spats, and to have a statesman of recognized integrity dressed roughly as he appeared on his farm. As might be expected, the total classification made by the class failed to identify types of character and personality of the individuals judged. The striking thing was that approximately eighty per cent listed the statesman as a roustabout, a nobody or a criminal; and the same proportion had the prisoner (who had actually been killed in an attempt to escape) classified as a "senator," a "bishop" or a "man of large affairs." Lockhart found that "as a result of one lesson unit of study on the need and value of laws, the class made a score on the test which brought the mean up seven and one-tenth per cent nearer the standard set by the lawyers."[19]

Attitudes may be taught by *organized instruction.* It was this fact that led von Humboldt to say, "What you would have in the life of a nation you must first put into its schools." For a generation prior to the World War, Germany through her schools shaped the attitude of her people toward militarism. Russia is today using her schools for the making of communists, as we have already noted. The older history texts used in our schools (and it is to be feared some of those used today) unblushingly presented the England of Revolutionary War days as an unmitigated tyrant and the colonists as unselfish patriots. Similarly our texts have in the main taught that all our wars have originated in humanitarian motives, and that all our acquisitions of territory have been characterized by loftiness of purpose and with full return of value to the other parties concerned. The texts (though decreasingly) have presented war in such a light that its "glory," instead of its cruelty and stupidity, was made the foundation of the attitude toward it.

Generalizing these illustrations, instruction, if it is well planned and skillfully carried out, can be made to create almost any type of attitudes to order, providing there are no counteracting influences which negate the effects of the teaching. We can by instruction create an attitude of narrow and bigoted nationalism, or one of broad internationalism. We can make the young tolerant of class privilege and injustice, or intolerant of these practices. We can prepare the mind-set for a

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[19] E. G. Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

"planned economy" or for "rugged individualism" as a national policy,—and so on throughout practically the whole range of human affairs.

To make instruction take hold of attitudes, the ideas, facts, impressions conveyed must be vital and they must be received with conviction of their truth and significance. If instead of ideas and facts the instruction deals with stereotypes, the same principle obtains; a conviction of their validity and their value must hold. And to the ideas or the stereotypes must attach an emotional warmth that gives them motivating force. If the way can be opened to overt action in the line of the developing attitude, its effectiveness and permanence are doubly assured.

In actual practice the setting up of desired attitudes through organized instruction is not so simple as it sounds. This is due not only to possible innate tendencies which cause the pupil to refuse to respond to the instruction, but also, and probably much more, to the opposing influences which come from agencies outside the organized educational process. For example, the schools are required by law in many states to teach the ill effects of the use of tobacco. Yet billboards, advertising pages in magazines and newspapers, the radio, all use every wile of suggestion and assertion to encourage its use. The courses in social science seek to establish the attitude that public office is a public trust, but while this instruction is going on the young citizen observes that the official convicted in the courts for chicanery is frequently "vindicated" by a re-election at the hands of an indifferent or corrupt constituency. Smart crookedness often wins highly coveted rewards. We try in the schools to teach the sordidness of crime, but a considerable section of the press and the movies makes crime heroic and attractive. So we have the anomaly of society taxing itself to educate the young to one set of attitudes in the school, while outside there are powerful agencies constantly at work contradicting the school's instruction.

The method of modifying attitudes by *critical judgment* presupposes a mind sufficiently developed to be aware of personality and criticize the self and its behavior. This ability, at least as supplied to estimates or behavior, probably exists earlier than has been commonly supposed. Young Richard, past four, in a fit of anger threw a cup at his older sister, cutting a gash in her head. While the blood was being staunched Richard contritely remarked, "That was a terrible thing to do." The strongly objective (extravert) type of individual is little given to self-analysis, the personality in its attitudes and acts being taken for granted. The subjective type (introvert) is more likely to pass his acts and traits in review and judge their fitness.

It may safely be granted that a characteristically objective state of mind is healthier and more desirable than a prevailingly introspective state. This does not mean, however, that one should never give certain of his traits the "once over"—not to dwell upon his faults, but that recognizing them he may cure them. Many parents, for example, could profit by an honest facing of the attitudes they maintain toward their children. Teachers' attitudes toward the school conduct of children, as Wickman[20] well showed, often need modification if the psychologists are right. Every person has mind-sets, few or many, that are based on prejudice, bias, intolerance, predilection, partial knowledge, twisted facts, false premises or other insecure foundations.

In correcting undesirable attitudes, the first point of attack should be their ideational foundation. Our wrong attitudes come mainly from mistaken understandings, unwarranted opinions, erroneous concepts. "To know all is to forgive all," seems a difficult statement, yet it contains a large truth. How often after a full explanation, in some situation that had caused us offense, have we felt displeasure fading away as understanding became clear. If it happens that the attitude in question, though undesirable, is still a normal reaction to a faulty situation, then obviously it is the situation that needs remedy. Resentment, to illustrate, is an undesirable attitude to harbor. But its cure when directed toward a politically controlled court is to free the court of such control, rather than to attack the attitude.

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[20] E. K. Wickman, *Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes.*

The emotional element in an attitude is also subject to reconditioning. There is such a thing as enjoying an emotional outburst. Some persons unquestionably find pleasure in their animosities, revel in their exasperations, take satisfaction from their enmities, dudgeons, huffs, hatreds and piques. In such cases the emotions assume undue importance in the total flow of experience, and need to be brought under control. One who finds himself frequently feeling hurt, exasperated, excited, stirred up in situations where others remain calm, has reason to suspect some failure in internal poise which requires correction.

Nor in the conditioning of attitudes is the overt behavior factor to be overlooked. If one is to modify an attitude one must make sure to change the acts which express it. To rid oneself of feelings of antagonism while continuing antagonistic behavior. is impossible. For student groups to meet and pass resolutions of race friendship and equality. and then as individuals to treat negroes and foreigners as inferiors, works no change in attitude. Attitudes live and thrive through their expression in social situations; unexpressed they tend to weaken and die.

Conversion stands for an experience in the realm of the religious which possesses such psychological importance as to warrant a place in our list of factors producing changes in attitudes. The apostle Paul furnishes us with a concrete example. Paul had been highly scornful and antagonistic toward the new sect called Christians, this attitude being proved by his active opposition, which extended even to persecution of members of the sect. Then one day as he was on his way to Damascus a radical upheaval occurred in Paul's life which he referred to as seeing a blinding light. He emerged from this experience changed in his attitudes and acts. He had been converted. From this time on he gave himself energetically to the promotion of Christianity, finally being beheaded for his activities.

Millions of persons have claimed the mystical experience of conversion—a sense of guilt accompanied by tension or strain; repentance and desire to "get right with God"; consciousness of forgiveness and "acceptance"; feelings of release and freedom. Any examination of the reality of the mystical back of this experience is outside our purpose here. Of the psychological processes involved and their effect there can be no reasonable question. People do have the experience of conversion. This does in many cases produce marked changes in attitudes and in behavior. Paul testified (and his later life bore him out) that the things he had once hated he now loved, and the things he had loved he now hated. Countless numbers have had analogous experiences.

The effects of conversion are shown in some instances by such changes in life outlook that character undergoes radical transformation, behavior is modified, old lines of conduct are dropped, new ambitions and enterprises are taken up. That many "conversions" consist of only temporary emotional upsets without any permanent effects on attitudes and behavior, will be freely granted. That whatever good results can come from conversion can better be obtained by development in desired directions, is believed by most religious educators. Yet in spite of these concessions, the phenomenon called conversion is a psychological reality, and in at least an appreciable proportion of cases it is a potent factor in the shaping of attitudes and character.

PROBLEMS

1. Professor Symonds, in discussing *What is an attitude?* says that seven different meanings for the term attitude may be found in the writings of educators and psychologists, as follows: "(1) Attitude refers to the great organic drives more familiarly known as purposes and motives. (2) Attitude refers to muscular set or adjustment. (3) Attitude refers to generalized conduct. (4) Attitude refers to neural set or readiness to make certain reactions. (5) Attitude refers to the emotional concomitant of action. (6) Attitude refers to the feeling comitant of action. (7) Attitude refers to certain verbal responses indicating liking or disliking, acceptance or rejection."[21] *Criticize each of these statements in the light of your own understanding of attitude.*
2. A college girl thus accounts for her attitude of antipathy toward the Chinese: "One morning when I was about six a telegram came to my parents telling that my grandmother in California had just been killed by an automobile. Later details explained that when she and my aunt were returning from a movie they were accosted on a dark street by a disreputable-looking Chinese. My grandmother, who was very nervous and excitable, ran in fright into the street where she was struck by an automobile and instantly killed. We all blamed the Chinaman and felt very bitter, and talked a great deal about it. From that time on I found myself disliking the Chinese as a bad lot. For years I could not be induced to enter a chop-suey restaurant. As a child I avoided passing the Chinese laundry, or fled past it with averted eyes. Only after I entered college, had a course on Oriental civilization, and met some lovely Chinese girls did my hostility relax." *Classify this girl's negative attitude toward the Chinese as to its source (see p. 214). Also classify the source of the later changed attitude.*
3. Consider your own attitudes and describe one attitude and the course of its development which came, so far as they apply, from the sources of attitudes listed on page 214. Have you any attitudes which came from sources other than those mentioned? In the attitudes you describe, identify as far as possible each of the three elements referred to on page 210 as entering into attitude.

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[21] P. M. Symonds, "What Is an Attitude?" *Psychological Bulletin,* No. 24 (1927), p. 200.

4. Note Thurstone's statement that "an opinion symbolizes an attitude." Does an attitude include any other elements than those subsumed under the word opinion? If so, explain.
5. Describe one or more situations known to you in which a change in attitude was followed by a change in behavior (overt action).
6. To what extent can a person who recognizes in himself an attitude that he wishes to change, modify this attitude by his own choice, decision, purpose, effort? Can you cite concrete instances?

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CHAPTER X

IDEALS AS MOTIVES

IDEAL is another term which has long been left to popular usage and which psychology now proposes to adopt and give a more exact meaning. Like *attitude,* the word ideal has not yet acquired an exact definition universally accepted and used. Nevertheless the term is coming to be increasingly employed to stand for a complex of motives important in social behavior.

The Nature of an Ideal

The word ideal has a long history and has been used to convey many different meanings. At its broadest it has supplied the name for an important system of philosophy—the philosophy of idealism. In common speech "the ideal" has meant the flawless but the unattainable—what is "ideal" being in current usage often thought of as impractical, abstract, visionary. In this sense anything that is ideal is opposed to what is real; the ideal may be beautiful and greatly to be desired, but it is impossibly elusive. The term is so closely associated with the idea of perfection that the *beau ideal* is a paragon, an exemplar, a pattern, an archtype to be admired and emulated, even if not fully possessed. Growing out of such concepts, whatever is ideal is in this usage largely if not wholly a creation of the fancy or imagination, not something actual in fact and truth. The realistic is commonly represented as "true to life," while the idealistic is thought of as a splendid fiction. It is with this implication in mind that Roback speaks of an ideal as a "pious wish seldom fulfilled." Similarly, sober *Britannica* (14th ed.) refers to ideal as standing for "the attitude of mind which is prone to represent things in an imaginative light and lay emphasis exclusively or primarily on abstract perfection."

Recent usage is taking the word ideal out of its nebulous and more or less futile connotations and setting it at work with definite and practical meanings. The first step in this direction is to make ideals stand for *objectives which are practicable and attainable*. Charters has contributed much to this change of definition in his book, *The Teaching of Ideals*. With his customary brevity and directness he defines ideal as "a trait which has become an object of desire," adding that a trait must become "a matter of purpose before it can be achieved as an ideal."[1] Nothing is said here, it is to be noted, about the social quality of the trait to which desire attaches. In this sense a trait becomes an ideal because it is made the object of desire and purpose, not because it is good or bad.

Accepting in general this point of view we propose the following working definition: *An ideal is any generalized pattern of behavior which becomes the objective of desire and purpose*. Thus an ideal is not an idle, fanciful picture in the mind, a plaything of unfocused aspiration. On the contrary, it is a proposed achievement, a purposed goal, a motive to effort and activity leading to a definite end.

From this functional point of view ideals are therefore always concrete objectives. But not every objective is an ideal, for not every objective is desired as a personal possession in the form of modified behavior. To illustrate: A schoolboy is told that as soon as his penmanship advances to a certain standard of legibility, appearance and speed, he will be excused from further writing drill. Here is a definite objective, a goal worth reaching, for the boy dislikes writing and can use the time saved in reading stories, which he greatly enjoys. So he works faithfully until he has reached the degree of excellence set as the price of his exemption.

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[1] W. W. Charters, *The Teaching of Ideals*, p. 33.

But in accomplishing his objective the boy may have been acting under the compulsion of an external incentive rather than an ideal. For in addition to being a goal an ideal is a subjective, intimately personal thing. It is a skill, power, ability or quality *of the self* which is to be possessed because of the appeal of its worth. Let the schoolboy desire the skill of good penmanship because he wishes to add it to his attainments, rather than because of this skill he secures exemption from a task, and the skill then becomes an ideal. In the case of the college youth who asserted, "I don't know yet how I am going to do it but by the time I am forty I am going to be worth a million," he was expressing an ideal, providing that his ambition centered in the quality of millionaireness in himself: the personal power and importance, the possibility of feeling and acting on the millionaire level. Again, the distinction is emphasized in the difference between aiming at a college *degree* and at a college *education*. The degree is but an objective because it is external to the self; the education is an ideal because it stands for changes in the personality. Only when the activity or achievement is desired for the patterns of behavior it represents, does the objective become an ideal.

Objectives which have become ideals also take on a quality of continuing motivation which the non-ideal objective does not possess. For an objective when it has been achieved, offers no further drive to action. But an ideal, which affects the personality itself, once attained, leads on to new desires and purposes and so to further effort.

This principle appears also in the teaching of *standards* to children in the home or school before they are able to formulate and pursue ideals. The child is taught to pick up his playthings, hang up his garments, observe the requirements of cleanliness, practice good manners, co-operate with others, refrain from disapproved acts. In this way certain basic habits are set up, standards are established. Thus a wide range of desirable social acts may be stabilized without the traits involved ever being consciously desired or purposed by the child. Yet the whole range of social behavior cannot be so easily provided for. Some necessary standards are irksome and therefore not made fully into habits. Conflicts arise, lapses occur, and the standards of conduct favored in the home or the school are neglected or rejected. And in any case many attainments must wait for maturation and the accumulation of experience before they can be possessed. No individual therefore reaches the age when ideals become practically possible, with all desirable traits already achieved. There is always a place for ideals in any developing personality. Fortunate is the person who in childhood responds to standards of social conduct such as later furnish a sound foundation for ideals.

Standards represent forces that compel from outside and behind (*vis a tergo*); ideals stand for forces that lure from ahead and pull from within. Professor Bower, after referring to the *vis a tergo* which acts upon the individual, speaks of "the incentive which operates as a pull from in front, as the grip of ends that in themselves are felt to be worthful. It (the incentive or ideal) arises from envisioning ends that are felt to be capable of bringing satisfaction as compared with other ends. It consists of the identification of the self with these ends and a forthreaching toward their realization. It springs from a sense of values. It is outreaching, active, affirmative, dynamic, releasing. In this type of incentive attention and purpose are fixed upon the as yet unrealized possibilities of life. It operates at the point where experience is cutting into new reality. It is creative."[2]

In the pursuit of an ideal the self finds its greatest freedom and fullest expression, because effort is then motivated by inner assent and affirmation rather than by outer compulsion. Toward that which has become an ideal one feels the pull of inclination, propensity, aspiration, ambition, wish. True, if the goal set is difficult and if the road to its realization is long, there may be lapses in performance, even backslidings; yet the flame of desire and the drive of purpose never wholly fail, else the ideal perishes.

Ideals the Product of Generalization

Ideals arise from a process of generalization. The trait desired is not limited in its application to a particular situation. For example, the school girl who would make the manner, speech or dress of an admired teacher her ideal, does not think primarily of imitating single acts of her model in particular situations. On the contrary, she observes many acts of the esteemed person, noting her teacher's manner, her speech or her dress on many occasions and in varying situations, until out of the whole a total generalized pattern takes form. The girl covets the poise and charm which are *characteristic* of prototype. These forms of behavior she must be able to hold before herself universalized as accepted standards, if they are to serve as ideals.

To use one further illustration: The boy who reads the life of Lincoln or Edison, or who follows the unfoldment of an admirable character in fiction, constructing out of these models ideals for himself, must universalize out of many individual acts of the valued character the traits he would acquire. He must see the relation of these forms of behavior to situations which he himself meets. If, for example, Lincoln's rugged honesty enters into the ideal, this honesty must be generalized from the various instances in which honest conduct was reflected. And the boy must desire and purpose this trait of honest behavior for himself in the situations of his own life.

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[2] W. C. Bower, *Creative Experience*, p. 216.

Thus, structurally, an ideal consists of three elements: (1) a generalized pattern of the trait or characteristic coveted; (2) a felt desire for the possession of this trait or characteristic; (3) a purpose to pursue and possess the desired trait or characteristic. Lacking a clear definition or idea of the pattern proposed, the ideal is too hazy to be effective. Lacking the urge of desire, the motive necessary to effort fails. Lacking purpose, practical effort, the ideal is incomplete and futile and ends in profitless sentimentalizing.

The Quality of an Ideal

It is at this point that the word ideal will have its greatest difficulty in changing from popular to scientific usage. In ordinary speech when we speak of a person's ideals we mean something good. The term "American ideals" is supposed to cause a thrill of pride in all true Americans. In short, ideals are commonly supposed to be elevated, worthy, noble, exalted.

Yet if the word is to serve its purpose in psychology this one-sided definition cannot be allowed. Just as we need a word, in Doctor Dewey's phrase, "to stand for the effects of past experience in preparing us to meet new situations," so we need a word to stand for effects of *desired and purposed future experience*. And, just as the word attitude may stand for mind-sets which measured by their effects on social behavior are either good or bad, so ideal may stand for proposed behavior goals that are either good or bad. However contrary to popular usage, the word ideal in its psychological meaning strictly carries no moral implication. *Any* trait which becomes the object of desire and purpose is an ideal to the one who sets such a goal.

Practical applications of ideals to undesirable behavior are not hard to find. A boy of six was overheard confiding to his chum his ambition and purpose to be able to swear like the iceman. Psychologically this boy was motivated by an ideal. Let children from day to day pour over comic strips where in a play of wits, juvenile smartness and trickery always triumphs over the stupidity of adults, and this type of behavior may readily become a working ideal to the young reader. To young adolescents the perfervid lovemaking of the screen may become the criterion and ideal for carrying on their own "affairs." The industrialist or financier who moves ruthlessly toward his own economic mastery and greatness without caring for the broken fortunes and wrecked lives he leaves behind him, is following an ideal—such as it is. Operating under the same principle, the ranks of the gangsters which are so rapidly depleted by violent ends are kept filled by youths whose ideals are to be bigger, better and bolder bad men than those who have yet made the front page. The typical ward politician also has his ideals, but most of them are not in line with public interest.

Both badness and goodness, anti-social as well as social forms of behavior, may be desired and pursued as goals.

The Functioning of Ideals in Conduct

Attitudes and ideals, though widely different in their constitution, are co-operating factors in a common process of motivation. Attitudes precede ideals in the child's development, for mind-sets are forming from the first days of life; while ideals, as we have noted, must wait until development and experience prepare the individual to conceive desired future goals, and follow conscious purpose for their achievement. By creating predispositions to certain types of behavior and by emphasizing certain values, attitudes prepare the way for ideals. Attitudes sum up the yesterdays of experience; ideals anticipate its tomorrows.

Ideals differ greatly in their force and potency as motives, some having but little effect on behavior, others dominating the whole course of ambition and effort. Among the several factors which operate to determine the compulsive power and hence the behavior outcome of an ideal, are the following:

(1) The clearness and definiteness of the objective
(2) The possibility of actually attaining the objective
(3) The urgency of the desire
(4) The strength and stability of purpose
(5) The presence or absence of conflicting objectives

It is an accepted principle in education that clear comprehension of the goals to be reached is an important factor in learning. To be effective as a motive in behavior, an ideal must supply a goal of sufficient *clearness and definiteness* so that desire and purpose can attach. In the field of action we must see distinctly what we would aim at. We do not devote effort and enthusiasm to objectives concerning which we feel confusion or uncertainty. Nor are goals made out of abstractions. One does not admire *patriotism,* but patriotic acts. One is not moved by the abstraction, honesty, courage or kindness, but by deeds in which people act honestly, courageously, kindly. No boy can make "Lincoln" his ideal. The total synthesis "Lincoln" is too indefinite and abstruse to serve as a nucleus of desire and a pattern of action. What the boy must do is to select from Lincoln's character—that is, from his characteristic behavior in actual situations—the traits which he values, and make these the objectives of his desire and purpose;

Lincoln's clearness in thinking, his thorough doing of his work, his simplicity in speaking, his control of emotion when under stress, his sense of humor in trying situations. These forms of behavior generalized from concrete situations, are definite enough to serve as practical objectives.

It is this principle that casts doubt on the attempt to teach character by stressing in the abstract the value of certain "virtues," such as courtesy, dependability, thrift and the like. Except as these goals are made concrete in clearly defined types of behavior, they can be expected to exert but little control over conduct. Only as the abstraction "scholarship" is broken up into being interested in particular fields of information, mastering essential facts, freeing the mind from abstracting biases, thinking hard and straight, and so on, will the ideal take hold upon study and learning. But let the broad synthesis "scholarship" be thus broken up into definite activities and standards whose values are understood, and effective motivation results.

Undoubtedly the truth back of Roback's quip that ideals are "pious wishes seldom fulfilled," comes in no small degree from the tendency of well-disposed persons to react to goals so imperfectly conceived that they cannot serve as patterns of action. Such persons vaguely aspire to excellence in this line or that, but never sharply define the steps or stages necessary to its attainment. They would be leaders in their group, but fail to discover the concrete procedures involved in leadership. They would like to be interesting and facile in conversation, but do not recognize and seek the essential traits upon which good conversation depends. Religiously inclined persons may feel a thrill of impulsion toward heroic deeds when they sing *Onward, Christian Soldiers*, but with nothing concrete proposed and no plan of action in their minds to utilize the emotion, the experience is likely to end with the thrill, no effect being registered in behavior. So also one may form the good New Year resolution to "be a better man," but no results are likely to follow unless "being a better man" is made specific in definite types of action: being more companionable at home, contributing more generously to worthy causes, breaking off from this or that bad habit, cultivating particular worthy interests and the like.

Put into a single statement, the only way successfully to teach the "virtues" to the young, or to secure them for ourselves, we may believe, is to be sure that each virtue is made attractively concrete and specific as forms of behavior in typical situations.

Ideals, if they are to function as motives, must be *attainable* in a satisfying degree. Experiment has abundantly shown that achievement is improved by allowing the subject to know the progress he is making toward a goal which he comprehends. Many years ago John Dewey emphasized the principle that goals which are too high or distant fail to act as ideals. The average college student may daydream about matching Einstein or Jeans or Eddington with their mysterious mathematical formulæ and their concepts of fourth, fifth, sixth or *nth* dimensions, but such dreams are hardly likely to improve the student's mathematics grades. The gap is so wide between what he envisions and what he can really perform that purpose falters and the dream has no effect on achievement.

Prizes and exemptions offered in school with the hope of stimulating ideals of scholarship, often fail because the objective proposed is felt to be unattainable. For example, in order to be eligible to certain scholastic honor societies, one must be in the upper fifth of his class in scholarship. From the start, probably at least half of the students know they have no chance for such distinction. Other students soon discover that they also are being distanced by their competitors. The result is that the honor dangled before them has no appeal to a large proportion of the students. Scholarly ideals are not quickened because those concerned have no hope of reaching the objective. Also it may be noted that the coveted honor is itself *only* an objective. It is not an ideal unless, and until, the honor sought becomes identified with personal scholarly attainments.

In similar manner, incentives placed before children often fail because the rewards offered are too distant in time. To urge upon the boy of a dozen years that he must be industrious and learn his arithmetic because he will need to be accurate and quick in his accounts when he becomes a banker or a merchant twenty years hence, inevitably leaves most boys cold. The contingency is too far ahead to exert any great compulsion. True, normal development of the personality requires that the individual shall learn to work for delayed satisfactions. Yet there is a proper balance which should be maintained between incentives whose rewards are immediate, or at least soon to be realized, and those that lie inconceivably (to the individual) far ahead. Human nature is mercifully not poignantly concerned over the pain, the sorrow or the trouble that lies in the distant future. No more can it be expected to react strongly to desires whose fulfillment is remote.

The motivating force of an ideal is directly proportionate to the *strength of desire* toward its objective. The goal may be ever so clear and definite, its value may be conceded in intellectual terms and even acclaimed in verbal protestations, but if desire, yearning, eagerness, ambition, aspiration fail to add their compulsion, the proposed objective does not take hold upon behavior. One may admire and acclaim a philosopher, an athlete or a saint without desiring to be one, oneself.

Desire arises only out of a conviction of value (merit, worth, excellence) and *a wish to possess that value*. We value what we prize and appreciate and want for ourselves. It is not essential that one's estimate of the worth of an objective shall be a true or valid one in order to arouse desire. Every person on occasions values objectives which, once possessed, prove undesirable. Many persons have philosophies so warped that they characteristically pursue ends they would be better without. But, true or false, the ascribing of value to a goal makes it the center of desire whose force is proportionate to the value assigned.

In the end this means that we value those things which bring, or are expected to bring, *satisfaction.* Desire reaches out therefore toward what satisfies some demand of the self. Toward what yields or promises no satisfaction, desire is indifferent. Toward what destroys or threatens to destroy satisfaction, desire gives way to aversion.

One's satisfaction, and therefore one's desires, change with development and may be modified by education. The satisfactions of the young child differ vastly both in scope and type from those of an adult. To some adults satisfactions on the sensory plane retain their dominance. To this group belong the *gourmets,* who make much of their eating and drinking. Here also are to be found those persons who revel in physical comforts and luxuries, not for their esthetic value but for their sensory satisfactions. Some are strongly dominated by the satisfactions associated with sex. To others beauty yields the supremest satisfactions. Still others turn for their highest satisfactions to personal achievement and power; to social recognition; to the rendering of service to others; to the mystical experiences of religion.

Examples of satisfactions that go beyond the sensory and the physical are plentiful. Men and women suffer physical exposure, cold, hunger, fatigue and climb a mountain peak in order to find at the top—satisfaction: it may come in a sense of victory, in a sunset, in an exhilaration of spirit. The artist who starves in his garret would no doubt enjoy a beefsteak; but his greater satisfaction is in the pursuit of another objective, else he would choose the beefsteak. The captain of industry who has amassed a fortune far greater than he can spend on satisfactions, still finds his ruling satisfaction in further winnings, so he goes on and dies in the harness. The prodigal son and the elder brother were alike in seeking satisfactions, but their satisfactions belonged to different categories of experience. Nothing, it would seem, is more fundamental in personality, certainly nothing is more determinative of ideals, than the character of what satisfies or annoys.

The first requisite in educating the satisfactions is breadth and richness of experience. In the main, "desire grows by what it feeds upon." One desires most keenly those things of which one has had a satisfying taste. Many are satisfied with a narrow, meager existence because they have known no other possibilities. The "divine discontent" that demands a fuller and more abundant life, comes from glimpses of that life. Richly endowed persons, whose development has kept pace with their capacities, have experienced many different satisfactions from the lowest and simplest to the highest and most subtle. And out of these come the desires that give dynamics to ideals.

Among the principles serviceable in educating the satisfactions and therefore the desires are the following:

1. Development of personality proceeds from response to satisfactions whose source is sensory and physical, to response to those whose source is intellectual and æsthetic.
2. Development of personality proceeds from response to satisfactions that are immediate, to response to those that are deferred in their realization.
3. Development of personality proceeds from strictly self-centered satisfactions, to those that are predominantly social in their source.

If these principles are sound, one of the truest measures of the quality and the development of a personality is the range and character of its satisfactions and desires; that is, of its *values*.

Wish, desire, purpose are three steps in the attainment of an objective. We are interested in the *strength and stability of purpose*. We *wish* for many things without any strong impulsion toward the course of action or the effort required for their attainment. We wish we could have a trip around the world, that we could run a hundred yards in less than ten seconds, speak French, sway audiences. But the wish falls short of being a true desire because it lacks the compelling force that leads to purpose. Wishful thinking is characteristically empty of results.

What we *desire* we not only wish for but *seek*, are bent after, set our mind upon, covet, crave, long for, feel the lack of, pine for. Desire may even grow so strong that it becomes frenzy, mania, passion. Its natural outcome is *purpose*.

Purpose stands for wish and desire striving to achieve their end. It connotes intention, design, undertaking, working toward. Without purpose, wish and desire are idle, effort fails, ideals come to naught. No ideal is more than a dream until purpose takes hold. Daydreams are not ideals because, however much the object of the dream may be desired, there is no intent of pursuing it; purpose lacking, no motivation takes place. Practically everyone would like to be rich, learned, eloquent, skilled, socially irresistible. Many dream about and wish for these things, feel the stirrings of desire for them, picture themselves in situations where such attainments are given expression—yet without serious purpose to pay the price in effort necessary for their possession. It is easy to sentimentalize over greatness or goodness or strength of character in others without being affected in our own conduct.

The modern world, for example, sincerely *admires* Jesus. It places Him on a pedestal, puts Him in stained-glass windows, sets a halo about His head, sings hymns about Him, acclaims Him as the great Exemplar. But follow Him, make His way of life into ideals actively to be pursued, square behavior by His teachings and practice? Nothing is farther from the thought of most of the admiring, worshiping throng. Admiration, praise, acclaim, yes. Desire and purpose to live the values they extol, no. It is one thing to exalt a quality or type of personality, but quite another thing to purpose and pursue the lines which would achieve that quality or type for ourselves.

The effectiveness of the purpose brought to bear on the carrying out of ideals depends in large degree on its stability and persistence. There are persons who characteristically show traits of vacillation and uncertainty. They make decisions, form resolutions, start out valiantly, perhaps for a time make appreciable progress toward their goal. But they do not stick. The freshness wears off of the new endeavor, the thrill of achievement dies away, progress reaches the plateau characteristic of most learning. Old habits assert themselves, effort grows more difficult, resolution weakens, purpose fails, the spurt is over, the ideal is discarded.

Contrasted with individuals of this faltering type are those of typical steadfastness and tenacity. They may or may not be brilliant performers, but such as they are they are steady. Having put their hand to the plow they do not turn back. They have resolution and firmness in the face of difficulties. Whether they slowly plod or whether they run on winged feet, they do not lose sight of their goal. Their purpose holds firm, they keep steadily on.

Individuals differ also in the extent to which desire is linked up to action. Unquestionably there are men of thought and men of action. Similarly, there are those who dream their ideals, sentimentalize over them, bask in their glow, but do not actively pursue them. They recognize the value of the goal they have pictured, feel honestly enough the pull of desire, but they do not translate their dreams and desires into performance. Persons in whom such traits are dominant are likely to become dissatisfied and unhappy from the fact that their achievements fall so far below their aspirations. Discouraged and disillusioned, they are in danger of foregoing effort and of turning in compensation to dreams and phantasies.

To be set over against these are the persons whose greatest strength is in performance. They may (and do) even deny that they have ideals. They speak of seeing a thing that needs doing, and doing it. They spend little or no time dreaming. Yet they do set goals, make plans, carry out purposes that have to do with their own personalities. The truth probably is that the distinction between these two types is only one of emphasis or degree.

Just what the proper balance is between dwelling on desirable patterns of action and the practical putting of these patterns into effect, no one can say with authority. It seems safe to conclude, however, that one who tends to run to dreams instead of action should look seriously to his overt performance of the desired patterns of action; and that one who reflects but little on the patterns of his own behavior and the qualities of his own personality, could afford to turn his thought now and then to ideal goals.

Paul was not the only one who has found that "the good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do." *Conflicting ojectives* abound in every person's experience. Nor are they always between good and evil. The opposition may be between two goods; the merely "good" is often the worst enemy of the "best." Students are quite likely to find the laudable ambition to make the varsity very much at odds with the equally creditable ambition to attain good scholarship. One has an inclination to be saving and economical, but also one would like to be a generous spender and of course be well dressed. The desire to be a hale-fellow-well-met with the crowd does not always jibe with ideals of personal independence and self-determination. One prefers to be honest in one's examination, but others are not strict, and there is the question of grades. The housewife would like to be known as a model housekeeper, but also has an ambition to be the best bridge player in her set.

This all comes to the point that the average person's life not only offers far more opportunities for pursuing desirable goals than can be utilized successfully; but also presents many situations where choice has to be made between the mediocre and the good, and even between the good and the bad.

No person will succeed all the time in pursuing the "best" goals or in rejecting "bad" and following the "good" objective. Nevertheless an important part of one's education is to develop criteria of values and a habit of conscious reflection concerning the objectives which are to govern desire and purpose. The thoughtless, unintelligent, uninformed person is too much at the mercy of inclination and impulse, of chance stimuli from environment, of temporary whims and fruitless enthusiasms. Every person needs to build a philosophy of values, to form working standards of what is more worth while, in order that they may serve as a guide to purpose and effort.

More Immediate Sources of Ideals

Though in the large ideals take their type and tone from the general social medium, yet the ideals of any individual respond very directly to the standards and values provided by the immediate environment. Where comradeship and sympathy are close between parents and children, the ideals of the home are fairly sure to be reflected in the ideals of the children unless very strong influences are at work in opposite directions. If instead of comradeship and sympathy a condition of antagonism and misunderstanding prevails, the young are likely through sheer negativism to reject such ideals of the home as run counter to their own inclinations. Homes which provide no ideals leave the young at the mercy of outside influences.

A girl of sixteen writing from a state penal institution, illustrates the effects of the immediate on character:

> "I was born in Chicago. The first thing I can remember is taking care of the baby. I had two sisters but they were always out with their gangs. I had a brother but he never helped any. We lived in a two-room apartment in a basement in the back. The yard was used by a junk man. People in the elevated trains could look down into the yard and I guess they said my God, what kind of people they are to live that way. My mother did scrubbing in the buildings. If somebody nosey would tell her I had been sitting on the curb instead of watching the baby she would beat me, but she never beat me Saturday nights. Then she would hold me. When I smell gin I sometimes think of Mother holding me and crying. When my father worked for the junk man he slept at home. He beat my brother sometimes but not me.
>
> "The first time I remember I used my head was one day I went and stood by a railroad station and cried. A man asked me what was the matter. I said I was hungry and he gave me fifty cents. Was I happy! I went and got a sundae and some gum and then went to a movie show. When I went home I had fifteen cents left and gave it to Mother. I told her I had found it. Father was away somewhere and we hadn't anything since the day before except part of a loaf of bread. I worked the railroad station pretty hard and always got enough for a movie and a soda and a dime to bring home. One day a cop caught me and made me tell where I lived. The next day the truant officer came to see my mother and she laid into me. After that I worked other stations and you bet your life I never again gave the correct address of our apartment."[3]

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[3] Anonymous. "Girl Delinquent, Age Sixteen," *Harper's Magazine*, No. 983 (April, 1932), p. 551.

Small wonder that out of such situations come ideals that lead to the reform school.

Important among the sources of ideals are influences of the friendships, chumships and "crushes" which play an important part in later childhood and adolescence. First by uncritical imitation of an admired model, later through more or less critical analysis and selective acceptance of approved traits of the favored friend, the young individual sets up goals for his own attainment. With the falling away of the friendly relationship the ideals may lose their force, but while they last they are important factors in conduct.

Not to be overlooked among the potent sources of present-day ideals, are the movies. The standards of speech, dress, deportment, spending of money, courtship, marriage, and a wide range of morals for many people are set by the heroes and heroines of the films. It is likely that the educative influence of the screen upon the ideals of the young in America is second to that of no other agency. Added to the spell of the pictures is the hold which the movie magazines, circulated by the tens of thousands, have upon impressionable youth. Hollywood has a great social responsibility of which it seems little aware.

Of first importance also as a source of ideals, is the omnipresent radio with its great variety of programs. And sharply it is being criticized by students of social affairs for the quality of many of its broadcasts, one series of programs being dubbed the "children's hour of crime." One who spends a few diligent evenings tuning in upon the nearly six hundred broadcasting stations with their crooners, their tinny jazz, their cheap humor, their sloppy speech, their maudlin advertising, their political and theological rantings, is struck with amazement at the social futility, if not the moral threat, of this latest miracle of modern science. That some good music, some good amusement and some good instruction come over the radio may be granted as the exception that proves the rule.

Ours is pre-eminently a land of printing presses, libraries and books. We are a nation of readers. The stories, books of fiction, biographies, histories, poetry and all the rest are unquestionably important factors in the shaping of ideals. With this in mind it is a matter of some educational concern that magazines which feature "confessions" and "true stories" have many times over, the circulation of "standard" journals; and that the books that run into many reprintings are frequently those that deal in unhealthy sentiment or cheap sensation. It may well be questioned whether the ideals likely to come from the most widely circulated reading matter of the day are on the whole likely to be elevating.

The school and the church are both highly specialized institutions, one of whose foremost functions is the cultivation of character. Until comparatively recent years the school assumed that attitudes and ideals emerge naturally and inevitably out of the general learning process; and that character is best attained as a by-product of education. Chief stress was therefore placed on training the intellect, storing the mind with information and developing various ancillary skills such as those in language and number. Within the last decade or two, however, this point of view has been sharply modified in educational theory and, to a less degree, in school practice. Education is coming to think in terms of the *whole individual,* and promises to be at least as much concerned over the *kind of person* the school turns out as over the intellectual equipment provided. The developing of attitudes, the cultivation of ideals, the helping of the child to a proper social adjustment, is increasingly recognized as a primary function of education.

Comparable changes have been taking place in the treatment of the young by the more progressive sections of the church. Religion is no longer taught in the better church schools as systems of doctrines or as sets of observances. Increasingly it is being presented as a pattern of life, a set of ideals, a quality of character and personality.

Changing Ideals

"Every important satisfaction of an old want creates a new one." Only those ideals that are continuously evolving and so keeping step with experience, act as a stimulus to the development of personality. The concept of an ideal as an achievement, finished and complete, to be held unchanged in future experience, is not only false but vicious. Growing personalities do not seek attainments that are done once for all and therefore final. Goals that when reached fail to lead on to new objectives next ahead, are in no true sense goals, but gravestones of dead ambitions. Social evolution does not point toward a definite end with a stable condition after that end is reached. On the contrary, it represents an eternal process of *becoming,* both for society and for the individual.

There was a day, for example, when the "chief end of man"—his highest ideal—was "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever." This definition of the religious ideal would satisfy few even of the most devout of modern Christians. In Herbert Spencer's time the ruling ideal of education was "to train an English gentleman." Now the point of view sets the goal in quite a different direction. Successively has education been dominated by the ideal of discipline, of "culture," of knowledge—of power of practical utility. Probably at no former time was the ideal for education undergoing more rapid change than it is today. The same thing holds in other areas of experience, as the economic, the political, the religious.

So also the ideals of the individual pass through changes paralleling the expansion of his knowledge, the ripening of his reason, the development of his emotion, the growth of his attitudes, the enrichment of his interests, the disillusioning that comes to him from the discipline of experience.

This principle is easily verified by anyone who cares to look back upon various stages—a year, five years, ten years apart—in his own life, and compare the dominant ambitions and purposes at each stage. Objectives that were once highly desired have lost their pull—we no longer care for them. Standards which we set for ourselves in the dim past have become accepted as habit, or have been given up and forgotten. Things supremely worth while then seem now of little value. And on the other hand, objectives which in an earlier period of our development had not yet entered our thought or experience, have since become strong influences in our lives. New values appear, new ambitions arise, new desires emerge. Thus personality changes and the self takes on new forms. The test of whether these changes are moving in good directions is whether the successive goals set by our evolving ambitions and desires lead *to the deepest, truest and most lasting satisfactions for ourselves and for those whom our lives touch.*

The Teaching of Ideals

Many organizations for the young are built and supported on the proposition that character can be taught. Prominent among such groups are the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Campfire Girls, Four-H Clubs, Pioneers, Junior Red Cross and various religious organizations. In all these organizations the teaching of ideals is made an important factor.

Although, as has been pointed out, many ideals come from the social environment of the individual, yet few will question that ideals can fruitfully be made a definite objective in education; they can be taught and learned. That is to say, assuming satisfactory procedures in the instruction, worthy behavior patterns can be defined and their value shown, situations can be provided for the practice of the desired traits, satisfactions can be assured for successful performance of the behavior involved. To these procedures of instruction, learning, the acceptance of the objective and its pursuit with desire and purpose can be expected to at least a reasonable degree.

In the teaching of ideals several definite steps or procedures are to be recognized. These are:

1. Selection of the traits which are to be made the objectives of instruction and learning
2. Making clear and attractive to the learner the values (desirability) of the traits sought, so that he may want to possess them
3. Breaking the generalized trait up into particular forms of behavior representative of the trait
4. Provision to insure satisfaction to the learner from the practice of the trait behavior
5. Making available or utilizing situations in which the desired trait may find normal expression

In the *selection of traits* we realize that the number of traits possessed or possible for any individual is of course without limit. Also, measured by their importance in social adjustment, traits are of quite different value. For these and other reasons any successful teaching of ideals requires careful selection of the behavior objectives to be sought.

One need not concede that the Boy Scout oath and law present the best possible list of traits, in order to agree that the following stand for important objectives in conduct:

THE SCOUT OATH

On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and my country and to obey the scout law; to help other people at all times; to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.

THE SCOUT LAW

1. *A scout is trustworthy.* A scout's honor is to be trusted. If he were to violate his honor by telling a lie, or by cheating, or by not doing exactly a given task, when trusted on his honor, he may be directed to hand over his scout badge.

2. *A scout is loyal.* He is loyal to all to whom loyalty is due; his scout leader, his home and parents, and country.

3. *A scout is helpful.* He must be prepared at any time to save life, help injured persons, and share the home duties. He must do at least one good turn for somebody every day.

4. *A scout is friendly.* He is a friend to all and a brother to every other scout.

5. *A scout is courteous.* He is polite to all, especially to women, children, old people, and the weak and helpless. He must not take pay for being helpful or courteous.

6. *A scout is kind.* He is a friend to animals. He will not kill nor hurt any living creature needlessly, but will strive to save and protect all harmless life.

7. *A scout is obedient.* He obeys his parents, scoutmaster, patrol leader, and all other duly constituted authorities.

8. *A scout is cheerful.* He smiles whenever he can. His obedience to orders is prompt and cheery. He never shirks nor grumbles at hardships.

9. *A scout is thrifty.* He does not wantonly destroy property. He works faithfully, wastes nothing, and makes the best use of his opportunities. He saves his money so that he may pay his own way, be generous to those in need, and helpful to worthy objects. He may work for pay but must not receive tips for courtesies or good turns.

10. *A scout is brave.* He has the courage to face danger in spite of fear and to stand up for the right against the coaxings of friends or the jeers or threats of enemies, and defeat does not down him.

11. *A scout is clean.* He keeps clean in body and thought, stands for clean speech, clean sport, clean habits, and travels with a clean crowd.

12. *A scout is reverent.* He is reverent toward God. He is faithful in his religious duties, and respects the convictions of others in matters of custom and religion.

Denver high-school students and their teachers jointly selected the following traits for emphasis in the curriculum of their schools:

1. Appreciation (beauty, people, humor)
2. Adaptability
3. Courtesy
4. Co-operation
5. Courage
6. Desire for improvement
7. Foresight
8. Generosity
9. Health and cleanliness
10. Gratitude
11. Honesty
12. Happiness
13. Industry
14. Initiative
15. Judgment
16. Morality
17. Neatness and orderliness
18. Open-mindedness
19. Punctuality
20. Responsibility
21. Reverence, respect
22. Self-judgment
23. Self-control
24. Sympathy
25. Sociability
26. Service to society
27. Tact
28. Thoroughness
29. Thrift
30. Unselfishness

In *making values stand out* we note that different values appeal to different individuals, and to the same individual at different stages of his development. One person may convert the qualities that enable him to command, dominate, drive others. Another person may respond most easily to the appeal of traits that win admiration, friendships, followers. A third may find chief satisfaction in abilities that enable him unselfishly to serve others. Most boys, it would seem, pass through a stage when their dominant ambition is to "show off" and win applause for their own prowess. Many a thoughtless youth, desirous of being known as a generous spender, becomes thrifty and saving when his choice has settled on a mate, and a home is in prospect.

In the teaching of ideals the guiding principle would seem to be to bring into sharper focus values that are being neglected.

to balance over-emphasized values with counter-checks; as, for example, generosity and openhandedness with foresight and thrift; initiative and resourcefulness with co-operation and proper obedience.

Too great emphasis cannot be placed on teaching ideals, on translating mere ideas or concepts of desirable *traits into concrete acts of behavior*. In presenting a tenative list of desirable traits for high-school teachers, Charters makes this analysis of the trait of "businesslikeness":[4]

Businesslikeness (punctuality, promptness, dispatch, accuracy, definiteness, effectiveness, ability to teach, clearness, fluency, alertness)

a. Sees that he has all of the necessary materials at hand
b. Gets down to business quickly
c. Keeps to the subject in conversation
d. Pays bills promptly
e. Gets out required reports in good form
f. Meets appointments punctually
g. Makes clear to each pupil exactly what is to be done
h. Criticizes pupils' work explicitly
i. Adapts teaching to pupils' needs and abilities
j. Makes economical use of time
k. Relates class work to other school subjects and to life situations

Another method of making the concept of the trait concrete and practical is by using descriptive definition or analysis such as that found in the Scout law. Better still in teaching is the use of many actual examples of acts involving the trait. It should be thoroughly understood by the learner that a trait has no meaning except as it expresses itself characteristically in behavior.

Fundamentally, *satisfaction from any activity* may come from two sources: from the activity itself, with the sense of achievement which accompanies it; from the social recognition and approval which results from the activity. The first of these is distinctively subjective, though it is doubtful whether satisfaction coming from the sheer experience of activity and achievement would of itself alone, without the stimulus of social notice and indorsement, constitute a dependable source of motivation. In the main it is the notice, the opinion, the approval or the disapproval of the group, that exerts greatest compulsion over our behavior.

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[4] W. W. Charters, *The Teaching of Ideals,* p. 68.

The country which expects loyalty from its citizens must recognize and reward that loyalty with appreciation, justice and opportunity. Acts of co-operation, courtesy and unselfishness in the home or the school must meet the reward of approbation and of reciprocal behavior from the child's mentors and associates, if habit patterns are to result. The Scout who is trying to carry out in his conduct the ideals of Scout law, needs the assurance of respect and sanction from his fellows and of the wider public outside in order to strengthen desire and purpose.

No fact is more certain in psychology than that character takes form and ideals are realized only in normal activity in real situations. Instruction that ends in abstract theorizing or in stressing goals with no provision assured for testing the theories in practice or realizing the goals in actual behavior, leaves much to be desired. Recognition must be given then to the problem of *providing and using situations for expression*. It is true of course that normal living in home, school and the wider social community, affords plentiful situations for the cultivation of most of the desirable traits. Yet favorable situations are not always available for traits which are being taught. For example, the standards and rewards which would encourage courtesy, tact or kindness are not always present in the home. In such cases the school should give particular attention to situations in which such traits find expression. Also, there is a type of school in which initiative and originality are subordinated to conventionalized learning. Here the situation is unfavorable for the development of originality and initiative, and must be rectified if these traits are to be taught.

PROBLEMS

1. Organize a study of currently popular radio programs for children. Evaluate these programs in terms of the ideals emphasized.
2. In discussion consider the proposition that the making and breaking of pledges and resolutions is actually relaxing upon character.
3. Teachers and parents commonly insist that the experiences of childhood should involve a considerable amount of arduous and difficut tasks, in order that the child may be prepared for the difficulties and disappointments of adult life. Can you discern essential differences in the nature of situations which cause adults to perform many unpleasant tasks, and those imposed upon children in school?
4. What appears to you to be the net social effect of the common insistence of the elders in home and school that any person who will work hard and live well can attain great distinction?
5. William James once said that of all groups of individuals, drunkards have the highest ideals. Criticize this statement in the light of the present chapter.

REFERENCES

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Coe, G. A. *Educating for Citizenship,* pp. 62-78. Deals with partisan propaganda clothed as ideals.

*Dewey, J. *Human Nature and Conduct,* pp. 259-264 and pp. 282-288. The first of these references deals with the relations of desire and thought in the making effective of an ideal; the second with the futility of goals of perfection without activity to realize the goal.

*Jones, V. *Handbook of Child Psychology* (C. Murchison Ed.), "Children's Morals," pp. 524-528. Shows how ideals originate.

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CHAPTER XI

BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE AS MOTIVES

MOST of our decisions are based on probabilities rather than certainties, and most of our acts are governed by what we assume, believe or hope, rather than what we positively know. Man's whole history is the story of his effort to escape from the hazards of chance and arrive at the safe ground of certainty in his affairs. One of the surest marks of subnormality and incompetence in the individual is failure of curiosity, absence of desire to know the facts and meanings of environment.

Not only is the normal individual driven by an innate curiosity that cannot be appeased, his practical intelligence also tells him that he must master facts, truth, reality if he would be comfortably at home in his universe. In working out the common adjustments daily and hourly required of him, he must make decisions and perform acts which should not be leaps in the dark, but he should be guided, as far as may be, by knowledge whose evidence is sound. So also when the mind reaches out into problems farther afield and asks questions concerning the nature of man, the meaning of life, the goals of existence, the destiny toward which all is moving. Concerning both matters that are near at hand and those whose answers are less immediate, the call is for information, fact, truth, certainty. And it is out of these urges, the urge of practical necessity on the one hand and the urge of wide-ranging curiosity on the other, that have come man's considerable structure of what he calls *knowledge*, and the even larger fabric of his hypotheses and *beliefs*.

The Quest for Certainty

It is a good thing that man is not easily discouraged. For in his long search for certainties as a weapon against chance, he has achieved very little that he can call positive and secure against subsequent change and revision. We have arrived at many *probabilities*, but at few *certainties*. We *believe* much more than we *know*. What is accepted today as fact and truth is often proved tomorrow to be error. At one time men were certain that the earth was the center of the universe, and that stars and planets circled around it as their lode-stone. On this assumption they founded their philosophy and their religion. Then they discovered that, far from being the controlling pivot of the universe, the earth was but as a chance grain of sand cast up on celestial shores by gigantic forces outside their comprehension. So also for a time we were sure that man sprang ready in form and function from a creator's hand. Fuller evidence revealed him to be but a link in a great chain of life whose beginning or end we do not know. Once we believed that sickness and disease were caused by evil spirits and were to be warded off by prayers, ceremonials and sacrifices. Later evidence forced us to discard this belief and rely for protection on efforts of our own whose success depended on new knowledge and skills.

Even what we call scientific knowledge, the product of the best of modern minds and methods, has a trick of vanishing. The *atom*, which science long accepted as the smallest division and ultimate unit of matter, has given way to *ions* and *electrons* which for today are taken as promising probabilities of fact and truth. Fever was long thought by physicians to be harmful to the organism, and therefore as far as possible to be banished in cases of sickness. Now this certainty has been shaken and fever is artificially induced as a curative agent in certain diseases. And so on endlessly in every contact we have with the material universe.

In the realm of human relations our certainties are even less secure than they are in the physical world. After experimenting with many different kinds of government, civilized men finally turned with hope to democracy as offering the best plan for civic organization. Now, while still defending the theory, many leaders are questioning whether society is at present best served by democracy in government. In education the certainties seem no more assured. In one age we are told that the purpose of education is to discipline the mind. In another age this objective is discarded, and practical skills made the ruling aim. One set of theorists tell us to study the humanities, while another set would direct us to the sciences. In the economic realm we are even more at sea. Shall we build our system on "rugged individualism" and the survival of the fittest? Or shall we have a "managed economy" meant to smooth out the curve of wealth by protecting the weak while restraining the strong? Who knows what is best; where does certainty lie?

The point to all this is that we must constantly accept and act on *probabilities*. For most of what we call knowledge is nothing more than probability. If the probability is supported by a sufficient amount of unconflicting evidence, it advances toward certainty. But in the meantime we cannot wait for absolute certainty. Decisions must be made, chances must be taken, life must go on. That the man and the maid, absorbed in each other and contemplating matrimony, are suitably matched none can be certain, perhaps least of all themselves; but they must mate, for that is the law of nature. Will stocks and bonds go up or down? Who knows? After we have brought to bear on the question all the evidence to be had, there still remains a large element of chance; we must invest or not invest on grounds of probability. We wish to go from Chicago to New York. Time and safety are factors. Shall we take the airplane or the train? There are probabilities favoring the plane for time and the train for safety, but no *certainty in either case.* We shall have to weigh probabilities (that is, consider evidence) and let them rule, we cannot *know.* Is there a beyond-human power active for good in the universe? We can only answer in terms of *belief* based on probabilities. And the probabilities in all these cases must go back to *evidence.*

What then *is* evidence? How are we to estimate its weight, appraise its reliability and so judge of the credence that should be given it? Basically, evidence consists of two kinds: (1) that which comes *from observation or experience that can be shared with others;* (2) that which comes *from experiences that are personal and unique and therefore not sharable.*

(1) Evidence that comes from observation can usually (not always) be checked by having the observation repeated; the conditions under which the observation takes place can be controlled (scientific method) to exclude irrelevant factors; various tests of reliability or certainty can be applied which tend to rule out individual bias and error. Turning to illustrations, by applying these procedures, observation has given varying degrees of credibility to evidence: that pure water boils at a temperature of two hundred and twelve degrees Fahrenheit at sea level; that crime tends to increase with poverty in American cities; that alcohol is a habit-forming drug; that reform of young delinquents under conditions usually prevailing in their treatment is the exception rather than the rule; that democracy in government is on the wane.

Does the maintaining of strong military establishments tend to prevent war? Does capital punishment decrease crime? Is the country better off without than with prohibition? Is "progressive" education preferable for the general population to "standard" education? Evidence on most or all of these questions and a hundred others like them, can still hardly be called convincing. Sufficient observation under conditions that exclude individual error and bias has not been carried out and its results weighed. Therefore probability is doubtful, certainty is in question.

(2) Evidence that comes from personal, unique and unsharable experience is not subject to the tests that apply to sharable observation. The certainty resulting from a unique personal experience may be strong in the individual who has the experience, but it cannot be tested by others in the same way that anyone who has the apparatus and the skill can test whether a particle of water really consists of H_2O. For example, Mr. H. G. Wells makes this striking statement:

> "Then suddenly . . . God comes. This cardinal experience is an undoubting, immediate sense of God. It is the attainment of an absolute certainty that one is not alone in oneself. It is as if one were touched at every point by a being akin to oneself, sympathetic, beyond measure wiser, steadfast and pure in aim. It is completer and more intimate, but it is like standing side by side with and touching someone that we love very dearly and trust completely."[1]

One need not question the reality of Mr. Wells' experience in calling attention to the fact that the experience referred to was distinctly *his own,* and that he could not provide the conditions insuring that other persons should have the same experience.

So also with the thrill of love, the uplift from a sunrise viewed from a mountaintop, the exhilaration felt from an ideal. Such experiences, as we have said, are entirely valid and convincing for the individual who has them, but there is no way of proving them to persons who do not experience them. Only as the apprehension of fact, truth or value through unique personal experience *becomes common,* does the credibility of evidence become strong; and even then for most persons the certainty involved remains relatively low.

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[1] H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King,* p. 23. (1917)

The two types of evidence we have been discussing are often contrasted by calling evidence from sharable observation *objective,* and from unique personal experience *subjective.* These terms, however, are so inexact and they lead to so many unnecessary difficulties that their value may well be doubted. A more fruitful distinction is to say that in our world of reality are *facts* which can be *observed,* and there are *values* that can be *felt.* One can observe the fact of an eclipse of the sun or the division and multiplication of a cell; one can feel the value of the uplift from an oratorio, but one cannot prove this value by sharing it with another. *Observed fact* and *apprehended value* each has its place as evidence of fact or truth. Both function in determining probability, but they deal with different kinds of data.

The Scale of Certainty

The total amount of certainty possessed by mankind in the aggregate, the sum of all the assurance concerning fact, truth, reality achieved by his culture, may for purposes of graphic illustration be represented on a *certainty scale.* The high end of the scale will stand for absolute or complete certainty, hence for full and unconditioned affirmation; the low end will stand for no certainty, or for denial. All that purports or appears to be fact, truth or reality in human experience will find a place somewhere on this scale. Whatever is supported by sufficient and uncontradicted evidence will occupy a high position on the scale; whatever lacks acceptable evidence will have to take a correspondingly low place on the scale. The position of any purported fact will depend on the *amount of probability* that attaches to it.

Thus at or near the top of the scale will come such items as these: water on our sphere expands as it freezes; that $(x - y)^2 = x^2 - 2xy + y^2$, that death is an inevitable factor in organic evolution; that the earth is an offshoot of the sun.

At undetermined points farther down the scale might come such propositions as these: that government in American cities is less efficiently administered than are state and federal governments; that high in the chain of man's pre-human ancestors was the anthropoid ape; that the airplane will increasingly be employed as a means of transportation; that a "managed economy" will permanently displace "ruggest individualism" in the economic order; that for the next half-century Japan will dominate affairs in the Orient.

On the scale also, high or low, must be found a place for such predications as: that back of the universe and responsible for it is a guiding, creative intelligence; that life continues after death; that God exists as personal father and friend; that Jesus was uniquely the son of God; that Jesus was born of a virgin; that after His death Jesus arose in a physical resurrection; that the Bible is the uniquely inspired word of God; and so on throughout the realm of the religious aspects of experience.

Somewhere on the certainty scale, even if at its denial point, must come such statements of probability as have to do with fortune-telling, good-luck value of four-leaf clovers, seeing the new moon over the right shoulder, ill-luck threats in the number thirteen or in passing under a ladder, increasing the yield of crops by planting in certain phases of the moon, and a hundred other superstitions.

CERTAINTY SCALE



In thinking, in terms of such a scale, of the degree of probability or certainty which can be assigned to any purported fact or truth, one will consider the amount and character of *evidence* which supports it. As far as possible one will rule out both one's own bias and the unconsidered or unfounded opinions of others, as being without weight. Especially will one guard against the influence of emotion as an irrelevant and distorting factor—one's great desire to make a fortune is no guarantee of the soundness of an investment scheme.

It is not likely that any ten persons will agree exactly concerning the position on the scale that should be given the item, *Latin should be eliminated from the public high-school curriculum;* or the item, *Communications have come from those who have died;* or the item, *Certain charms and mascots have the power to ward off ill fortune;* or any one of a thousand other such items. Yet if each person had available the *same evidence,* and was able to give all evidence its *true weight,* and could exclude all *effects of bias and emotion,* the degree of probability assigned probably would differ but little.

Belief and Knowledge

So far we have spoken mainly of certainty as a condition influencing action, using knowledge and belief now and then as convenient terms, but always as representing some degree of certainty. In fact we *could* get along very well without the words knowledge and belief, if in their stead we invented terms to stand for given amounts of probability or certainty; for that is all these good old words stand for.

Nevertheless, knowledge and belief represent important meanings and are deeply embedded in our language, and it will be worth while to look a little more closely into their particular meanings. If we are to keep our thinking straight concerning their relations to each other and to certainty, we must first of all avoid a rather common error of thinking of knowledge and belief as in some way antagonistic to each other, or as if they indicated quite different processes and ends. No such dichotomy in fact exists. The two terms may well be compared.

Both knowledge and belief go back to *evidence* for their grounds. Where evidence is wholly lacking there can be no knowledge, nor can there be tenable belief. And where dependable evidence contradicts either knowledge or belief already accepted, it must be discarded if intelligence is to rule. Those who still maintain the claims of a six-day creation either do not know the evidence or have laid aside all critical judgment. No informed person can any longer believe that "night air" causes malaria. Referring to the close relation of knowledge and belief, Langdon-Davies says: "The really enlightened man is not the one who believes nothing, but the man who founds his belief on the firmest rock of reality [knowledge]. Such a man sees in the scientific picture of the universe which happens to be painted in his age the most perfect foundation for his belief."[2]

In whatever field both knowledge and belief operate, knowledge represents a higher degree of *certainty* than belief. At one stage in medical history only a few men believed that the blood circulates, none knew. Then came Harvey and others who secured positive evidence of the flow of blood, and since then we know. At the present time we know that the earth rotates on its axis; we can only believe (or disbelieve) that Mars is inhabited, the evidence not being sufficient to say we know. We know that we have recently been passing through a great economic depression; we believe that the remedy lies in this policy or that proposed recovery.

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[2] J. Langdon-Davies, *Man and His Universe*, p. 14.

Concerning many things we are obliged to say, I believe but I do not know. In Doctor Dewey's phrase, "We *believe* in the absence of complete assurance." We are always reaching out after knowledge as a guide in the world of action, and would much prefer it to belief because it stands for greater certainty. Man's reach far exceeds his grasp, he gets inklings of truth or of possibility which look promising. So he formulates tentatively a belief or hypothesis which he proceeds to test out, and thus increases his certainty or disproves his hypothesis. Many beliefs which men hold are therefore stages on the road to knowledge (full assurance or certainty); others turn out to be mistakes which with fuller evidence must be discarded.

Belief and knowledge may be compared with meaning as to the *fields occupied*. Besides joining hands with knowledge in ascribing certainty in the realm of observable phenomena, belief deals with *fields of value* from which sharable experience is excluded. For example, the old catechism assures us that, "The chief end of man [thing of highest value for him] is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever." Browning tells us that "Love is best." Philosophers talk learnedly about the *summum bonum,* the highest good or value. To the Christian and to the Mohammedan, belief assigns high value to a future life, and each has a heaven in his faith. To the Buddhist and to the Confucionist, on the contrary, a future life has no value, so annihilation is a dogma of their teachings.

The miser may believe that gold is worth more than friendships; the mystic, that inner experience has greater value than outer contacts; the politician, that power is more to be desired than honor; and the unselfish man, that it is more blessed to give than to receive. So also the musician may be convinced that the compositions of Brahms are superior to those of Mozart, and George Bernard Shaw that his writings outrank the works of Shakespeare. All these matters are questions of *felt values,* not of verifiable, demonstrable truth. To the individuals who make the assertions, the beliefs they express may represent truth *for their own experience,* but this truth (value) may not hold for others.

Belief also transcends knowledge in its freedom within the time order. Will monarchies be restored in Germany, Spain and China? There are those who believe they will be; no one knows. Will a cure be found for cancer? Will television be a practical success within the next decade? Will there be another great war within the lifetime of people now living? Will there come a time as pictured by Aldous Huxley[3] when human beings can be developed from fertilized ova in laboratory cultures? Belief can answer these questions with whatever assurance its evidence will warrant, knowledge has nothing to say until the event transpires. "Time will tell"; such problems are "on the lap of the gods."

Both knowledge and belief *lead to action,* both are *motives.* If we know from dependable information that the vein of ore has run out in the gold mine in which we have an investment, we hasten to unload our stock. Belief of much less certainty may lead us to do the same thing. The physician makes a positive diagnosis of his patient's case if he can, he wishes to *know* before he acts; but if the evidence is so baffling that he only *believes* that he has discovered the condition, he still must act. All of us constantly must act with but meager certainty of the facts with which we have to deal. We can at best but "know in part," belief fills the gap, faith (which is but willingness to accept the dare) takes hold, and we make the leap into decision and action. We *believe* far more than we

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[3] In *Brave New World.*

know, and we act from belief more frequently than from knowledge. Which is only to say that certainties to the degree that warrants calling them knowledge, are fewer than certainties to the degree that compels us to call them beliefs.

Because of such facts as the preceding, belief is so practically important in our behavior that it warrants further brief inquiry into its psychological make-up. What is *belief,* what are its processes?

The Emotional Element in Belief

The following is proposed as a tentative definition of belief: *Belief is the acceptance without conclusive verification of what purports or appears to be fact, truth or reality.*

The acceptance of the fact, truth or reality is not wholly, often not largely even, dictated by proof or logic. Preponderance of evidence supported by reason is less frequently than one might think the determining factor in belief. Many of our beliefs, especially those that lie closest to personal interest and concern, contain a large *emotional element* which influences their acceptability and also their motivating effects. In general we believe most easily and firmly what we wish, hope, long, desire to be true. William James in his remarkable essay, *The Will to Believe,* shows the close relationship between *willing* a thing and *believing* it. Both rest back upon inner assent or accord with the object of belief.

Emphasizing the same point John Dewey remarks: "If a man believes in ghosts, devils, miracles, fortune-tellers, the immutable certainty of the existing economic régime, and the supreme merit of his political party and its leaders . . . these are immediate goods to him."[4] They meet an emotional demand and satisfy a sense of value in him; so he believes. Conversely, it is difficult to believe what runs counter to our emotions. "I just cannot believe it," we say of some event which outrages our feelings and affronts our sense of fitness. There is a streak in most of us that makes us seek to escape unpleasant reality by denying its existence.

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[4] J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* p. 405.

Illustrations of the effect of emotion on belief and disbelief are too plentiful to require more than the barest suggestion. We give strong emotional assent to the idea of going on living after death, and to meeting those we love who have gone before; this makes belief in a future life easy and tenacious. Most authorities agree that religion arose out of early man's need and deep desire for help beyond the human in meeting the thrusts of chance and the dangers of a hard lot. Belief in a supernatural agency was natural and inevitable under this stress, and it is notorious that even today religious faith thrives best in times of stress when men most feel their insufficiency, and their emotions are keyed to a high pitch. This is not to say that what they then believe in is not a reality, but their mental condition does have a bearing upon its certainty. On the same principle we tend to discount certainty on matters which our emotions reject. Receiving a dreaded verdict of the physician, though we have no factual grounds for rejecting his judgment, we tend to respond, "I do not believe it."

It is this emotional element in belief that makes "decisions" easy in the high excitement of religious revivals, that gives the demagogue and the orator advantage over the high-wrought audience, and that places the crazed mob at the mercy of the leader who stirs their passion. Under the lash of unreasoning emotion Joan of Arc was adjudged guilty of heresy, blasphemy and other crimes, and burned at the stake on May 30, 1431; in calmer times, on April 11, 1909, she was officially beatified; and was canonized in 1920.

Belief in the emotionally *unacceptable* may be accounted for on at least two different grounds. *First,* the logic of facts may so far outweigh the emotion as to force acceptance of the belief. Emotional negation of the meaning of the earlier shocks of the economic earthquake of 1929 kept many from believing at first that the end of an era was at hand, but the full disaster left them no alternative to this certainty. Again, it was with great reluctance that, compelled by the findings of science, men surrendered their belief that the earth was the center of the universe and man a special creation placed by divine fiat and favor at the head of created things. Nevertheless, regardless of the shock to his dignity and self-importance, he was forced by facts to the certainty that his earlier belief was untenable.

The *second* ground on which belief in the emotionally unacceptable is to be accounted for, is that the incidence of the thing believed in rests upon others rather than upon those originally responsible for the belief. Once the belief is firmly established in tradition, authority and common indorsement are compulsions strong enough to force its acceptance even by those whom it hits. To illustrate, the doctrine of hell was not devised by men who expected to go there; hell was for the wicked and unsaved, while those who originated credence in its horrors were righteous and of the elect. Belief in witchcraft came not from potential victims of the ducking stool and the stake, but from their accusers and judges. Belief in the divine right of kings came from the kings and not from the commoners. It is far easier to believe in the emotionally unacceptable—ill fortune, pain and calamities—for others than for ourselves.

Representative also of the part played by emotion in belief is the influence of attitude and self-interest in deciding the credence we give to purported fact or truth. The acceptance by early Christianity of this life as a "vale of tears" where we "tarry but for a night" in preparation for a blessed existence beyond, came from a people weary to death from unrelieved toil, poverty, suffering and oppression. Their experience and attitude made heaven with its eternal rest and its streets of gold an attractive picture easily accepted. The doctrine of rugged individualism with full freedom to exploit nature and men to selfish advantage, is a creed easy of acceptance by the fortunate and the strong; and bitter to the soul of those who serve as victims. Those who sincerely pin their faith to socialism or communism do not come as a rule from the class whose wealth would be despoiled under these systems. In brief, personal bias is a factor constantly to be reckoned with in judging the soundness and certainty of beliefs.

Belief Functioning as Motive

Belief is among the most powerful of human motives. Says Dewey: "Beliefs about God, nature, society and man are precisely the things that men most cling to and most ardently fight for. It is easier to win a miser from his hoard than a man from his deeper opinions."[5]

It is an amazing thing that the objects for which men are willing to sacrifice, suffer, risk life itself, are not objects whose reality and certainty could be demonstrated as conclusive knowledge. We prize our beliefs and will defend them beyond almost any other possession. Joan of Arc with the flames burning before her would not deny her "voices." Savonarola, crushed and broken by the rack, denied his beliefs, but after resting a brief space from his torture he reaffirmed his convictions and went to death for his convictions. Not all the "holy wars" have been caused solely by differences in belief, but without these differences such wars would have been impossible. Conflicting beliefs today keep the Hindus and the Moslems of India ready to spring at each other's throats. The most revolt-ing cruelties which men have inflicted in cold blood upon each other have come from the passions and intolerance that go with treasured beliefs. Massacres, persecutions, imprisonments, hangings, burnings, tortures upon every fiendish form of rack, all have been used in defense of certainties so insecure that they belonged to the belief end rather than to the knowledge end of the certainty scale.

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[5] J. Dewey, *loc. cit.*, p. 406.

Not all beliefs, any more than all appetites, attitudes or ideals, have equal motivating power. The force of a belief to compel action comes largely from the emotion connected with it. And the most compelling beliefs are those that center upon matters of great emotional interest and concern. What more deeply concerns man than the question of his own being and future? Is he but an incident in a great impersoal scheme of creation, or are the very hairs of his head numbered by a creator who is also father and friend? Are we, in trying to build a social order and make the world a satisfactory place in which to live, working alone against forces of evil, or is there a power for good operating in the universe with which we can join hands? When the organic processes of the individual cease, when the last neural connection has been made and the last heart beat registered, is this the end, or does life go on? Is the planet upon which we live the result of cosmic chance and accident, or was it planned for the home of man? Does our lineage go back to the primeval slime for its origin, or did we come already human and specially favored from the hand of destiny? If there is a life after death, what are its conditions, does virtue there meet the reward it is so often denied here, and does wickedness receive its merited punishment?

Because such questions go deep into problems of reality that profoundly concern all intelligent persons, the beliefs that rise out of them are of great intensity. Correspondingly, the intolerances that accompany such beliefs are implacable. In religion, therefore, are some of the most powerful sources of human motive. Into its beliefs enter fear, love, hate, instinctive will to live and other basic drives.

Beliefs that center upon certain mundane interests of great importance are but a degree less moving than those that deal with what we assume to be the eternal verities. Indeed to many persons they are even more moving because more immediate in experience. Theories of social organization, for example, arouse ready concern because they vitally affect our lives. Shall we tie to democracy or turn to a managed economic order? Is war to be prevented by bristling preparedness or by extending the unarmed hand of brotherhood? Shall we cultivate the spirit of strong nationalism in our youth or shall we aim at erasing national lines and achieving world-mindedness? Ought we in America to maintain a policy of unemployment and old-age insurance, and what should be the procedures employed to finance the undertaking? Shall we admit into our schools propaganda and attempts at indoctrination of the young with the opinions of the ruling majority, or shall we teach as acceptable truth only those points of view long tested in social practice, presenting all sides of controversial questions as nearly as possible without bias?

These are samples of some of the deeper-lying problems with which belief has to deal and which have the power to stir the emotions. Answers to no such questions can at present be stated in terms of fully verified knowledge. Our certainties are only those that come from opinion and belief, founded in part, it is true, upon some acknowledged basis of fact and truth, but not yet sufficient to afford settled conclusions. And since such problems deal with matters upon which we must *act*, we are forced, whether we will or no, to formulate hypotheses (beliefs to be tested) concerning them and proceed as best we can.

Practical social effects of the belief motive are of course evident in a large scale on every hand. The very nature of our government with its sacrosanct Constitution is the product of a dominating belief (theory) on the part of its founders. A civil war was fought to settle which of two economic and social theories should prevail. The American nation provided the first system of free universal education supported by taxation imposed by the people themselves, which the world ever knew. So insistent has been American belief in education as the instrument of progress, that we have made education compulsory for every citizen. And to support public education we voted upon ourselves in taxes in 1930 well over two billions of dollars. Belief in the social inferiority and subordinate position of woman has for centuries kept her at a disadvantage as compared to men, in the eyes of the church and of the law. Misplaced confidence in the moral effects of restrictive legislation gave us the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution,—and a change in this conviction led to its repeal.

The practical effects of religious belief, whose tenets lie quite outside the range of objectively verifiable knowledge, are not less convincing. Organized religion, the church, has at various times in history possessed more authority than the state itself. Indeed, for considerable periods the church *was* the state. It made and administered laws, took over all judicial functions, exercised full powers of life and death over citizens—all with no sanction except that which came from belief in the dogmas for which it stood. And even today, when its power is much curtailed, organized religion is a highly potent factor in our civilization. This is obvious first of all on the material side. Prior to the beginning of the present decade the value of church property in the United States was listed at seven billion dollars, more by nearly one-half than the value of all public school property (four billion seven hundred million dollars) of the nation in the same year (1926). And at that time the annual budget of organized religion in this country was approximately an even billion dollars. Religious belief manifestly has a strong compulsive power over the pocketbook. Fully commensurate with this impressive showing of material importance is the influence of the church in political, economic and moral directions. Organized religion represents one of the strongest forces operating in society.

Illustrations of belief operating as motive on a more secular and personal plane are as plentiful. Why does one man choose a Ford and another a Chevrolet? Evidently on the basis of belief rather than proved fact of excellence, else one car or the other would claim the market. The student who chooses a classical instead of a scientific course in college must make his selection on the basis of believed rather than of proved values, for the answer to the old question of their relative worth no one positively knows. Shall you as a young voter align yourself with one of the old parties (and which one?) or shall you join a progressive or a radical group? If you do not merely drift into one or the other without guiding conviction, your action must be controlled by beliefs sufficient to govern your choice. Shall you study medicine, law or commerce in preparing for your vocation? You have certain facts available as to demand and supply in each of these fields, the rewards, and other considerations; you will use all these facts in making your decision, yet your *belief* in the desirability of one or the other will inevitably be a large factor in your choice. You cannot *know*.

Let us go back then to our earlier question: What is belief? Belief is a guess at certainty of fact or truth; an attempt to go beyond knowledge into the grasp of reality. Belief is assent both by emotion and cognition of a conceived possibility without full verification. Belief and knowledge are two related methods of approaching the same objective—truth. Knowledge represents the higher degree of certainty or reliability, resting, at its minimum, on proofs that satisfy scientific requirements and accord with reason. Belief, which may have a basis of proved fact, must depend on probabilities, and be satisfied with less demonstrable certainty. Belief often deals with matters concerning which scientifically acceptable proofs are for the present lacking, or by the very nature of things are impossible. Belief differs structurally from knowledge in that it contains a large emotional element, often quite sufficient to overshadow judgment and reason. Because of the presence of emotion, belief is capable of exerting great motivating force. Attitude and self-interest are highly important factors in belief. On the whole we tend to believe what we wish to believe, and to reject what conflicts with our desires.

Superstition as an Aspect of Belief

John Langdon-Davies asserts that religion is constituted of beliefs which the natural knowledge of its day cannot disprove; and that superstitions consist of beliefs which science can disprove.[6]

It would hardly seem safe to push this distinction too far, for religion has its Genesis account of creation, its floating ax heads, its dry path through the sea, its sun standing still in the sky, and other claims on whose certainty science would hesitate to put the stamp of its approval. If the writer means the distinction he has named as an *ideal* for religion, there can be little quarrel with his position. Religion would probably gain and not lose by excluding from its beliefs all that verified knowledge condemns, and that reason based on such knowledge rejects. For in so doing it would divorce itself from superstition.

A superstition, according to Lesser, is a "belief or practice which is isolated from a system of reference."[7] The belief or practice concerned in a superstition refuses to play the game; it evades all standards and criteria by which certainty is judged. Britannica defines superstition as "The acceptance of beliefs or practices groundless in themselves and inconsistent with the degree of enlightenment reached by the community to which one belongs." At least we may look upon superstitions as beliefs which tested knowledge disproves. The "practices" referred to in the foregoing definitions are but the overt expression which results from the superstitious belief.

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[6] *Man and His Universe,* p. 14.

Superstition implies belief in occult sources of truth hidden to the ordinary processes of knowledge and understanding—short-cuts to reality. The fortune-teller is supposed to possess clairvoyant powers denied to the ordinary individual. Why "burning ears" are proof that someone is talking about us, or why it portends good luck first to see the new moon over the right (in some communities the left) shoulder, may not be explainable on scientific grounds, but these beliefs are incontrovertible to the highly credulous person.

It is probable that few persons are wholly free from superstitious beliefs, nor do high intelligence and scientific training seem to insure immunity to their appeal. Some of the world's leading scientists have disregarded the rigid methods and careful conclusions used in their own fields and been easy victims for promoters of the occult. The amount annually paid in the United States to clairvoyants, foreseers of the future and similar exploiters of the desire for revelations of reality hidden to others, is a vast sum. In spite of our "scientific" age and the supposed sophistication of modern man the tribe of "palmists," "psychologists," "astrologers" and necromancers in general does not seem to decrease.

Much statistical evidence of the prevalence of superstitions has been assembled. Caldwell and Lundeen, who tested eight hundred and fifty-four junior high-school pupils for unfounded beliefs, found that the average of the group accepted approximately twenty-five per cent of two hundred widespread superstitions as true. The average of such belief dropped from thirty-five per cent in the seventh grade, to twenty-three per cent in the eighth grade, to twenty per cent in the ninth grade. As in the case of older students, girls were more superstitious than boys, intelligence and school achievement showed a small but positive correlation with freedom from superstition.[8]

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[7] A. Lesser, *Journal of Philosophy,* XXVIII (November, 1931), pp. 17-28.

Studying three hundred and seventy-seven college girls and seven college boys, Gould found among them an aggregate of nine hundred and sixty-seven different superstitions.[9] Conklin, using lists of superstitions similar to those found by Gould, discovered that forty per cent of college men and sixty-six per cent of college women admitted believing in or practicing various superstitions.[10] Wagner, also investigating college students, secured from one hundred and eighty-six freshmen a total of one thousand four hundred and twenty-three superstitious beliefs, an average of seven and six-tenths per person. Among Wagner's findings were: that high intelligence decreases the number of superstitions; that Catholic students reported the highest number, Jewish students the lowest number of such beliefs, with Protestant students in between; that women were more superstitious than men; that superstitions were fewer among those of older age.[11]

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[8] O. W. Caldwell and G. E. Lundeen, "Unfounded Beliefs among Junior High-School Pupils," *Teachers College Record,* XXXVI (October, 1934), pp. 35-52.

[9] R. L. Gould, "Superstitions among Scottish College Girls," *Pedagogic Seminary,* XXVIII (1921), pp. 203-248.

[10] E. S. Conklin, "Superstitious Beliefs and Practices among College Students," *American Journal of Psychology,* XXX (1919), pp. 83-102.

[11] M. E. Wagner, "Superstitions and Their Social and Psychological Correlations among College Students," *Journal of Educational Psychology,* II (1928), pp. 26-28.

Typical of common superstitions are such beliefs as the following:

When a snake is killed its tail does not die until the sun goes down.

When squirrels gather a large supply of nuts the winter will be severe.

A hair from a horse's tail put in water will turn into a snake.

Red-haired persons have violent tempers.

People with square jaws have strong wills.

Finding a horseshoe portends good luck.

Thirteen is an unlucky number.

Seven is a lucky number.

Enterprises begun on Friday turn out badly.

When you speak of your good luck, rapping on wood will keep your luck from changing.

Finding a four-leaf clover insures good luck.

Good-looking babies grow up ugly.

By staring at a person's back you can attract his attention.

If a child smiles in his sleep, angels are talking to him.

Make a wish while seeing a falling star and your wish will come true.

If you drop a dishrag, company is coming.

Certain lines in the palm of the hand foretell the future.

To walk under a standing ladder will bring you bad luck.

Carrying a rabbit's foot insures good luck.

If you cross your fingers when you tell a lie the lie will not count.

Some people are born under lucky, others under unlucky, stars.

Pounding a child on his back on his birthday will bring him good luck through the year.

Two persons passing on opposite sides of a post should say, "Bread and butter," to prevent bad luck.

Crops are influenced by the phase of the moon in which they are planted.

Specially endowed persons are able to read the future.

One may ask what difference it makes whether such beliefs as these are held or not. Most of them seem incidental and trivial. That some superstitions are not highly important is probably true. Pounding a child on his back on his birthday may be simply good fun. Hunting four-leaf clovers is in itself a harmless enough exercise. Yet superstitions should not be encouraged for several reasons, among which are these:

1. *The state of mind which superstition engenders tends to disintegration of personality.* In general we arrive at the facts and truths which govern our lives by perceptual and rational processes. We come to believe in a world of order and law. But in superstitions we contradict these processes, disregard law and reason, and turn to necromancy. Thus we live in two discordant worlds.

2. *Not all superstitions are harmless.* Many bereaved persons, pathetic in their sorrow, have had their wistful eagerness to believe in the possibility of communion with the departed, traded upon by charlatans who, after periods of deception, have left their victims humiliated and disillusioned. Many who have gone to fortune-tellers for advice in financial matters, love-affairs and other private problems, have been grossly misled and injured. Nor should the noisome race of charlatans itself be encouraged.

3. *To embrace superstitions is to revert to magic:* thereby slipping backward in the evolutionary process, and discrediting the progress man has made toward an intelligent understanding of a law-abiding universe. It is doubtful whether intelligent, educated persons are justified in even toying with superstitions.

Religious Beliefs

Reference has already been made to two realms, based on the types of its evidence, in which belief operates:

(1) There are beliefs, for example, in which whatever certainty they possess is upheld by sharable observational evidence. Such is the belief by most scientists that cancer is caused, not by a bacterial organism, but by an excessive and at present unaccounted-for growth of body cells; a considerable amount of verifiable evidence supports this belief. Such also is the belief held by some and rejected by others, that

capital punishment acts as a deterrent to the crimes to which it applies. Each side to the controversy can bring certain facts to the support of its belief. So we might go on until we had included all sorts of hypotheses and theories concerning both nature and society—guesses at truth which are supported by a reasonable amount of verifiable proof, but not enough for full certainty.

(2) In quite a different class fall all matters of religious belief. Religion by its history and nature rests upon intangible values. Whatever proofs it has are not subject to testing by the methods of science. Joan of Arc's "voices," the mystics' "presence," Mr. Wells' "undoubting, immediate sense of God," the "acceptance" testified to by the religious convert—these are matters concerning immediate personal experience, whose evidence is not sharable. We simply have to accept or reject claims made concerning such beliefs and let it go at that. They lie outside the field of scientific procedures. So also with the opening words of the Bible, "In the beginning God . . ." Here we have the expression of what to millions of persons is an absolute certainty. Without challenging this belief in any degree, we again observe that the proposition cannot be proved by evidence based on shared observation; it lies in another category.

Religion in its early stages is so closely related to magic that the origins of the two are inseparable. Superstitions clustered thick about religion at the beginning and are yet not dissociated from it. So widely do people differ in their religious beliefs and so intense are their emotions when these beliefs are touched that religion is, and always has been, one of the most divisive forces operating in society.

What then may one believe in matters of religion? Manifestly this question can be answered only in the most general terms, and even then many will not accept any answer but their own. The principles here suggested are these, and they are equally applicable to other areas of experience:

1. *What we believe should be in accord with accepted knowledge.* Religion should keep step with progress in human thought.
2. *What we believe should represent the weight of probabilities as approved by reason in the light of known facts and truth.*

If these limitations were adhered to, religion would be stripped of much that is still in its creeds, and faith would be more intelligent. Under the limitations imposed by these principles, there is no reason why the religious person should not believe what suitable evidence supports. But even these simple principles are not easily applied, for the reason that facts of knowledge are often interpreted differently by different people; and reason is not infreqently unsound because of bias, or from flaws in its processes. As an illustration of the difficulties involved in arriving at common certainties,—and not as an attempt to suggest a creed,—one may consider such beliefs as the following, each of which is accepted by many persons and denied by others:

1. *God exists as creator.* This belief is necessary to account for the universe.
2. *God is a being of intelligence and purpose.* Such an assumption is required to account for the orderly procedures found in both animate and inanimate creation.
3. *God is continuously creative.* This belief needed to explain the processes of evolution which are still going on.
4. *God is law-abiding.* Consistency and law operate in the processes of nature.
5. *God is beneficent.* The total trend of evolution is upward and toward higher forms of existence, personal and social as well as organic.
6. *God is a living personality.* If God is assumed to have created man, this belief is necessary to account for man's highest attribute,

personality. It is inconceivable that creator should not include the supreme qualities of his creatures.

Measured by the principles stated above, the test of these and other similar beliefs is: (1) Are they contradicted by accepted knowledge? (2) Based on this knowledge, are they justified by reason?

Sources of Belief

Except for rare individuals of unusual independence of mind, personal belief varies but little from the belief patterns of their group. This is due to the native tendency of the individual to social conformity, and also to the punishment almost invariably inflicted on the disbeliever. What Krutsch calls "the modern temper" stands for a fairly sharp distinction between present-day attitudes and beliefs and those of earlier times; we are creatures of the times in which we live.

Regardless of the social pattern, certainty should wherever possible start with the knowledge end of the scale, and stay as near to it as known fact and truth will permit. Beliefs justifiable enough at one stage of knowledge indicate unintelligence or bias at another stage. For example, before science discovered microbes it was not strange that men ascribed disease to the influence of evil spirits and other supernatural causes. Now we know better. Following the patterns of thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was easy to believe in witchcraft; today knowledge has made such a belief impossible.

Not only do beliefs follow general social trends of civilizations and times, but they also respond to the immediate influences of sub-groups and localities. Following both tradition and self-interest, the economic points of view of the East and the Mid-West in this country are markedly different. It is easier to believe in hell and eternal damnation in the conservative South than in modernist-minded sections of the North. The writer, impressed as he watched twenty-five thousand Mohammedan men and boys assemble for midday worship in the mosque at New Delhi, asked his Mohammedan guide why women were not admitted. "Women have no souls," was the assured answer—an answer understandable enough in that environment, but quite unacceptable in Western civilization. Students who have gone through Princeton are likely to have quite a different definition of education from those who study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In short, beliefs, like attitudes and customs (of which they are a phase), come in the main ready-made from the social *milieu,* rather than from reflective thinking and logical weighing of facts. There is danger at present, for example, that large sections of our population, accustomed to the dole, will come actually to believe that the world owes them a living.

Beliefs can of course be taught. That is, ideas can be planted, given the support of authority and public opinion, and charged strongly with emotion. Religion gathers up its central beliefs into creeds, which become authoritative and sacred, and so tend to resist change. These creeds are perpetuated by being taught to the young and made a condition of acceptance into the church. This tends to stagnation. Thus it comes about that the church usually lags a century or so behind the thought of its day.

The school offers the richest opportunity of all for the grounding of beliefs. The young mind, responsive and credulous, has no option but to believe what it is taught. Indoctrination skillfully carried out in a curriculum, can determine the social philosophy of a nation. Because of this fact propaganda, which is always dangerous, is doubly dangerous in the schools. Education should make clear without bias, fear or favor, distinctions in the *certainty* of what it teaches. Verified knowledge should be taught as truth, with the understanding that even what is accepted as truth is subject to correction. Beliefs should be presented for what they are—theories, opinions, hypotheses, guesses at truth which are to be tried out, and concerning which no one can say the final word. The beliefs of religion should be understood also for what they are—attempts to discover truth and value in a realm which objective knowledge does not reach. Superstitions should be treated as mental maladjustment to the world of reality, and excluded as far as possible from the mind.

Doubt and Action

Doubt is not a true opposite of belief. The one who doubts does not deny purported truth, but only withholds assent pending further evidence. Over-suspiciousness is not a desirable quality of personality, but neither is over-credulity. Too ready an assent to what claims or appears to be true, leads to gullibility. The nicely balanced mind will not be so negative and hesitant that it refuses to accept and act on reasonable probabilities, nor on the other hand will it be so suggestible that it too readily embraces claims and assertions without examining their grounds.

There is a species of doubt that is lethargic and stupefying, a skepticism that does not go beyond mental inertia and incurious stubbornness. Over against this negativism is a kind of doubt that is creative because it is restless, curious, inquiring, insistent for the truth. The healthily doubting mind is the questioning mind, the mind concerned with problems and their solution. The great innovators of history have been men who doubted accepted positions and practices, and sought new certainties. Charles Darwin's doubt concerning the Biblical account of creation led him into researches out of which has come our concept of organic evolution. Galileo's doubt of Aristotle's teaching that two similar bodies falling through the same medium will move with a speed proportionate to their weights, led him to climb the steps of the leaning tower of Pisa and drop stones and other objects to the ground to test a hypothesis of his own. Out of this doubt Aristotle was corrected, and the foundations for the science of dynamics were laid. Pasteur doubted that disease and putrefaction are caused by fermentation, and he made investigations that started the scientific world on its relentless search for micro-organisms. Jesus is quoted as saying frequently, "It hath been said by them of old time, *but* . . ." Jesus' doubt was as remarkable as his faith.

Certain broad types of personality, based on the relation of belief and doubt to action, are observable. (1) There is a type of person who is timid and hesitant about acting without full certainty. Action is paralyzed because he cannot be sure. He is willing to assume no risks, he avoids dares of circumstances. His is not the responsibility for trying out new hypotheses. When new movements appear he holds off, not because of convictions in the opposite direction, but because he cannot be certain of the outcome. If a business opportunity is offered, he wants one hundred per cent of assurance before he invests. Because airplanes fall now and then, he cannot bring himself to ride in one. No newfangled notions for him, he will stick to the tried and proved. Safety first is his motto.

(2) At the other extreme in types is the one who is captured by every new idea. He will act on the slightest of probabilities, or with no probability at all. He gets on all the sucker lists, joins the train of every harebrained crank and reformer, takes the word of the promoter and the propagandists, prides himself on his "advanced thought," chases every will-o'-the-wisp, hunts for gold at the end of every rainbow. Such a person is naïve and gullible.

(3) In between these two extremes is the better balanced individual who demands a reasonable degree of probability before he acts, but who does not require absolute certainty before he proceeds. The man of this type has a critical mind which asks for evidence and weighs probabilities before he acts. He is not too easily bemused and confused by glowing claims and assertions. He maintains a healthy skepticism that is not based on timidity or balkiness, he only wants to know that he is not being misled as to probabilities. Such a person is willing to try new ventures, but he demands evidence of their soundness. He discounts extravagant claims and looks askance at panaceas and proposals for millenniums. For his investments he does not expect ten per cent returns with full guarantee of the principle, but neither does he buy blue sky or non-existent gold mines. In his religion he sums up probabilities on the evidence as he conceives it, and then risks or refuses to risk the venture of faith.

A well adjusted personality is not too sure of its certainties, yet it is confident enough of the essential certainties to be willing to act upon them. Without, for example, being dogmatically certain that a particular program of economic relief or of educational procedure is the best that can be devised, he will join in wholehearted efforts to make the program succeed when no better proposal is at hand; he will not balk, sulk or refuse to pull his load, when he has no alternative to offer.

Especially is the well adjusted person *tolerant* of beliefs and opinions that differ from his own. Recognizing the relatively small proportion of "proved" knowledge which is final, and acknowledging the insecure grounds for many of his beliefs, he will respect the right of others to their convictions; and he will do this without surrendering the certainties necessary to his own integrity of mind and action.

PROBLEMS

1. With the technique of the certainty scale, as set forth in this chapter, examine the strength of the beliefs of a group of persons.
2. Considering past history, does it appear that men have fought wars for the validity of fact, or for the validity of belief?
3. What seems to be the most promising method for altering the beliefs of children? Should the school attempt to alter children's invalid beliefs learned from parents?
4. What superstitions flourish within your group? Check through and find out to what extent individuals really believe in these superstitions.

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CHAPTER XII

SOCIAL CODES AS STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR

FUNDAMENTAL to character and personality is the social code by which one gauges one's behavior.

Codes of conduct are as old as Hammurabi and the Ten Commandments. Also they are as new as the latest formulation in a school character education program, or the most recent set of rulings or laws governing commerce and industry, or the newest list of "virtues" drafted in the youngest club for children.

Social Origin of Codes

A code is a composite of standards, rules or laws meant to serve as a stimulus or guide to individual conduct. Codes are behavior norms evolved by society, patterns by which the acts of its members are judged by public opinion or more formal tribunals. They cover in the aggregate practically the whole range of human activity and relationship. For conduct which touches the relations of citizen with citizen, we have the broad civic or legal code. Governing action where questions of right and wrong are involved, is the moral code. To guide in our relations to religion and its observance we are given a religious code.

There is, then, not one social code, but many codes. Not only does each different civilization have its codes; institutions, groups of all kinds within a civilization have their codes. There are therefore codes within codes, sometimes agreeing with each other, often in conflict.

Besides these broader aspects of the general social code are more particularized codes made to serve the needs of various groups or interests. For example, as a measure aimed at helping recovery from the economic depression starting in 1929, hundreds of codes were devised under the authority of the federal government to regulate practices as to hours of labor, production, wages and prices in as many lines of business. Doctors, lawyers, teachers have their codes, which summarize the standards expected of them in their professional activities. There exists also what we call the code of honor, the code of a gentleman. Every person, in fact, comes to possess an individual code or set of standards which, consciously or unconsciously, plays a large part in his conduct; and also in his estimate of the conduct of others.

Nor are codes limited to the standardizing of socially acceptable behavior. Anti-social conduct, quite as much as social, is influenced by codes. In fact, gangsters and thieves operate under codes more severe in their exactions and penalties than most codes devised for better use. Not only are rival groups active in the same field of crime required to respect one another's geographic territory, but specialists in a particular line of crime must not trespass on another group's hobby. Pickpockets are expected to stick to picking pockets, and second-story men to burglary; neither is allowed to "muscle in" on bootlegging or highjacking. The underworld code extends also to the relations of its denizens to the law: never help the police; better, far, to "take the rap" than to "talk." Not only are the demands of the anti-social code rigid, they are enforced with an implacability that knows no mercy.

All codes, unless arbitrarily constructed to fit a particular situation (as in the case of the NRA business codes of 1933-

1935), originate as a residuum of social experience; they rise out of custom. Types of relationships and patterns of conduct that are satisfactory or socially necessary are approved, continued, welded into fixed social habit. Finally, through age and long acceptance, these practices come to take on the force of law, they grow inflexible, and even acquire a quality of sacredness. To violate well-grounded custom is to put oneself out of tune with one's social environment and to invite unpleasant retaliations. In spite of all our modern broad-mindedness, marriage *is* necessary if two persons are to live together and maintain their social standing in the average American community. In India girls cannot go about the streets unattended by a member of their family, no matter how decorous their behavior; it simply isn't done.

To draw an exact line between custom and code is difficult, perhaps impossible. Certainly not all customs are formulated into definite codes. It is the custom in most rural communities, for example, to serve dinner at noon. But if Farmer Brown's or Groceryman Smith's family chooses to have its dinner in the evening, no code is violated for none exists covering this practice. It is the custom to make a great to-do over a wedding, but if a young couple chooses to slip away quietly and be married without benefit of clergy, even, there is no code to say them nay; for they are legally married when any qualified officer of the law says the word. Codes represent social will and custom on matters which society considers important enough to reach joint agreement, formulate standards, establish rules or laws. Codes mark the high points in the demand of society on its numbers for conformity.

This principle is well illustrated in the legal code. In the aggregate, law stands for the collective judgment or will of the people acting through the state. Law is supposed to deal with the most fundamental and necessary situations of social living.

First comes a body of law called the *Constitution,* which embodies those basic rights, principles and procedures which are deemed most crucial and precious. This law can be changed only with much difficulty and after considerable delay. *Next* comes *statute* law, passed by legislatures and approved by the executive. This law is less stable than constitutional law, and is supposed to change as the situation demands. It must be in accord with the basic Constitution. *Finally* comes a great body of *common law,* which consists of custom—practice continued until it has all the force of statute or constitutional law. Whenever the people find that any law or body of laws no longer represents their will and purpose, this law can be repealed or nullified, whether it is found in the Constitution, in statutes, or in common law.

The moral code has been reduced to no such exact form as the legal code, although many moral requirements are included in the legal code. That the moral code lacks the exact formulation of the legal code, is true first of all because the values or standards with which the moral code deals are relatively undefined and fluctuating. *Right* and *wrong,* which underlie the moral code, are variable concepts, changing from generation to generation and from situation to situation. In 1905 the writer knew a young teacher in a Middle-West school who all but lost her job because she brought her high-school basketball girls out at a game in "bloomers" instead of skirts. (The suits were banished after one appearance.) Now girls play basketball in the scantiest of costumes. To illustrate further, no such unanimity of condemnation attaches to beating a man in a trade, for example, as attaches to depriving him of his property at the point of a gun or by burglarizing his house, though in both cases he loses. Again, it is wrong (and forbidden by law) to say explicitly in a deal that black is white, but this may be said indirectly in an advertisement, and is so said a thousand times daily in the newspapers and magazines. Thus do the standards of right and wrong vary.

Further accounting for the lack of exactness in the moral code, is the fact that this code has back of it and responsible for it no organization or accepted procedure for its systematization, such as codifies law. It is the business of legislatures to make laws embodying the will of their constituents, but in the moral realm no legislative organization exists. Another difference favoring the formality and completeness of the legal as against the moral code, is that while the legal code is buttressed by organized authority for its enforcement—courts, police, prisons and the whole machinery of law—the moral code is supported by no coercive authority beyond that of public opinion. Only to the degree to which moral values are included in the legal code is morality upheld by any other force than custom. It may, for example, be immoral, for one who is able, not to contribute his share to the community chest of his city; but there is no authority to compel such a contribution as the state compels his payment of taxes. For an incompetent driver to drive a car on a crowded thoroughfare seems indisputably immoral, yet there is no authoritative restriction on such an act where the legal code does not require drivers to be licensed.

What is sometimes referred to as a personal code is strictly not a code at all but a list of ideals. Codes differ from ideals in the fact that while the drive toward the objective of an ideal is individual and comes from within, the compulsion toward the objective set up by a code is social, coming from without. If a person fails to measure up to the requirements of an ideal he has only himself to settle with; if he neglects the requirements of a code he faces social reprisal. Illustrating the distinction between codes and ideals, Benjamin Franklin's famous thirteen "virtues," often spoken of as his code, were, strictly speaking, a list of ideals which he himself chose as goals. The list is as follows:

1. *Temperance.* Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation.
2. *Silence.* Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid trifling conversation.
3. *Order.* Let all your things have their places; let each part of your business have its time.
4. *Resolution.* Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what you resolve.
5. *Frugality.* Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself; that is, waste nothing.
6. *Industry.* Lose no time; be always employed in something useful; cut off all unnecessary actions.
7. *Sincerity.* Use no hurtful deceit, think innocently and justly; and, if you speak, speak accordingly.
8. *Justice.* Wrong none by doing injuries, or omitting the benefits that are your duty.
9. *Moderation.* Avoid extremes; forbear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.
10. *Cleanliness.* Tolerate no uncleanliness in clothes, body, or habitation.
11. *Tranquillity.* Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or unavoidable.
12. *Chastity.*
13. *Humility.* Imitate Jesus and Socrates.

True, these ideals (as is true of most ideals) represented the standards of the day and so came from the social code. But they *were* made objectives of desire and purpose by Franklin and so for him became ideals. The Ten Commandments were strictly a code, for they represented collective social demand; which was strengthened by the sanctions of religion. Many have made this code, or parts of it, over into personal ideals, but this is still far from universal.

A factor to be taken into account in understanding or directing social movements, is that the evolution of a code requires much longer than its devolution—it is much easier to break down the observance of a code than to build its practice into established forms of behavior.

A striking example of the breaking up of a well established and potent social code is to be found among the Chinese since the beginning of the Republic in 1911. For centuries the teachings of Confucius, combined with many social factors in Chinese civilization, had grounded the people in the family system of social control, with its subservience to parental rule and reverence, if not worship, of ancestors. As long as they lived, Chinese parents held absolute control over the conduct, if indeed not over the lives, of their offspring, even when their children had themselves become gray-haired. Then entered the factors which deposed the monarchy, and in a generation or two changed the entire focus and tempo of Chinese life. Old customs fell away, the family system disintegrated, the ancient Confucian code lost its power to control Chinese life. Freed from the old restraints and not yet having developed new ones, it is not strange that China, in certain levels of society, is today passing through a period of moral rebellion and laxness.

Following the close of the World War, American standards of morals underwent comparable changes. Within a decade, social criteria long established were rejected, requirements stabilized by generations of usage were relaxed. With this relaxing of the older forms of social control it is not strange that the new freedom of the individual was frequently misused and that something like moral anarchy resulted. Only as new codes emerge out of social experience to take the place of discarded standards, does society recover from any period of moral debauch into which it has fallen.

The principle involved applies to the individual as well as to social groups. Let one who has regulated his conduct by an accepted code, for any reason throw off or be released from that code, and the lack of its steadying influence is likely to show in his behavior before new standards can become organized and take hold as motives.

Formal and Informal Codes

Social codes may roughly be classified into two types, *formal* and *informal*. Formal codes consist of standards, rules or laws which have been cast in definite verbal form. Much care is taken in constitutions and statutes to secure exact statements whose meaning and application are unambiguous. President William J. Hutchins received a prize of five thousand dollars for the formulation of a "Morality Code" (see p. 316).

Informal codes consist of standards, rules or laws which are widely known and accepted, which are variously expressed, and which have not been reduced to any fixed verbal form. In the expression, "It is not cricket," there is, for example, no specific list of requirements representing "cricket"; yet the standards back of this code are probably more compelling in the conduct of English boys than any formal set of rules for sportsmanship would be. What constitutes the "code of a gentleman" has not been formulated into any generally accepted statement; nevertheless the urgent meaning in the phrase is not likely to escape anyone to whom such a code would apply. Common law which, as we have said, has no rigid form or phrasing, is no less authoritative on that account.

By far the greater part of the total social code consists of requirements which have not been verbalized in set form. Comparatively few of the social guide posts to approved conduct bear definitely phrased directions. And they may for that very reason be more serviceable. The thou-shalt-nots of the Ten Commandments quite certainly have less effect on behavior than the easily understood but unformulated philosophy of

Jesus. The French Foreign Legion and the United States Marines are noted for their codes of military honor and courage, yet neither has reduced to formal documents the demands which all Legionnaires and Marines fully comprehend. Every intelligent person, long before he reaches the adult state, comes to know and in large measure to be governed by, the social standards of his day. By absorption from a thousand sources the individual, as he works out his own adjustment, becomes aware of what the group expects of him, developing an unwritten but actively functioning code.

Certain advantages inhere both in the formal and in the informal code. The formal code is very specific and definite. Little is allowed to individual interpretation or application. It covers matters of deep social concern. It says what it means in unmistakable terms which leave no excuse for not understanding, and its provisions are without difficulty applied to conduct situations. The informal code, on the other hand, leaves more latitude to the individual. Its application to concrete situations, while less rigid and certain, is more flexible, allowing finer shades of adjustment. The demand of the unformulated Western code for chivalry toward women, for example, is a better protection for them than any set of legal enactments alone could provide. Informal codes demand the application of the *spirit* of a requirement, while formal codes stop with the *letter* of the law. The law of love operating in a society or an individual is a far more potent influence for good than a love of law.

The value or validity of a formal code depends on the wisdom, insight and skill used in its formulation. We do not need to accept the ancient Hebrew belief that the Ten Commandments were written by the finger of God, to see in them something very fundamental and lasting. Old as they are, these standards had long been tried out in social living before they took the form in which they come down to us. The various items deal with matters of fundamental concern as felt by succeeding generations. They require traits that have on the whole proved good for humanity. Whether the Boy Scout code, the Hutchins code, and the many codes being formulated in character-emphasis programs are sound and useful will depend on whether they seize upon and emphasize for conduct the great fundamentals of character and personality. And whether they do this can in the long run only be determined as the traits for which they stand are built into developing lives.

No matter how rigidly formulated, a code is not truly a code unless it has behind it the pressure of social demand. This is a truth that lawmakers and reformers need to learn. Over and over has it been proved that laws unsupported by public opinion cannot be enforced; nor on the whole ought they to be, for the broader social wisdom of large groups of unhurried experience is the only check upon ill-balanced visionaries and misled minorities. Our statute books are today littered with dead laws that ought never to have been enacted. And the principle that holds for the legal code holds also for the broader social code. Not until a custom or standard has been socially tested and given the approval of a commanding proportion of the group, should it be set up as a demand or made part of the social code of the young.

Conflicting Codes

Mention has already been made of the code-within-code social system in which we live. Upon certain forms of behavior we are in the main agreed: Murder is taboo; killing another person in defense of one's own life is acceptable; kidnaping for ransom is universally condemned; not giving out of one's abundance to relieve want and suffering, causes one to lose caste. In such matters there is no confusion, all is clear between right and wrong. But it is not equally so at all points of our social conduct. Many persons would have the social code denounce all sex experience except in the marital relation. On the other hand, in many circles failure to keep to this standard brings neither legal nor social punishment; the voice of society is not authoritative and certain here as it is in the illustrations above. To illustrate further, in general the code of the physician demands that he save and prolong life in every instance so far as lies within his power. Yet let us suppose a doctor is confronted with a badly deformed baby, whose life he can save by heroic measures but whose deformity he cannot cure. Shall he save the life or let it flicker out? Answers will not agree. Shall the social code require that habitual criminals and those of markedly deficient intelligence be sterilized? The goodly chorus of yeses we hear is balanced by a chorus of noes. Lotteries are under legal ban in the United States, but this does not keep various organizations, including many churches, from conducting "raffles" and selling "chances" for articles of value. The fact is that between fairly generally acknowledged *right* and equally acknowledged *wrong*, there lie wide areas of conduct upon which social opinion is either quite unformed or else divided.

So moral confusion reigns. While we execrate and condemn to death a man who in cold blood and upon his own initiative kills another, we laud and make a hero out of him for doing exactly the same thing in a state of war. This confusion also often leads us to place property rights above human rights. Another kind of moral confusion is revealed in the requirement in various states that the harmful effects of narcotics and stimulants shall be taught the young in all schools, while at the same time hundreds of billboards and other advertisements are permitted which subtly commend the use of what school instruction condemns. The schools are expected to teach patriotism, and that a public office is a public trust. But while this is going on youth is daily reading the stories of "successful" men who use office for selfish gain. In the political code we teach young citizens that the ballot is sacred to the cause of democracy; but in every election they hear and read of votes sold for favors or cash, of ballot boxes stuffed, of election officials corrupted. In the churches on Sunday we listen to the reading of the Sermon on the Mount and thrill to its moral vision. During the week we take part in, perhaps help to promote, a social and economic order as far from this standard as East is from West.

Thus it comes about that the actual code under which one lives is far from simple and plain. In it are a few great fundamentals which society has pretty definitely settled, at least for the present age. But involved in this code also are many problems in which the right and the wrong are far from clear. And above all is the fact that so often right is right and wrong is wrong *only in particular situations*. Let the situation change and right may have become wrong; and wrong, right. Not only are we compelled to live under conflicting codes, but no single code can ever be final and absolute for all situations to which it applies.

Codes Functioning in Behavior

It is obvious that the individuals of each new generation must learn the code of their day and group. One cannot, except by unlikely accident, act in accordance with standards, rules or laws which one does not know. If one is to do the right and abstain from the wrong, one must be aware of right and wrong as understood by one's society. To be *intelligent,* adjustment must be *informed.*

But knowledge of the dominant social code is not enough to insure conduct that conforms to its requirements. Misconduct and failure of adjustment are not primarily due to lack of knowledge of the approved code, but to failure to be governed by that code. This is well illustrated in a study made by George E. Hill of the reactions of two groups of boys to a form called, "What Is Your Code?" One group consisted of five hundred and seventeen inmates of the Pontiac (Illinois) Reformatory, the other of four hundred and sixteen juniors and seniors in a suburban high school near Chicago. The boys were asked to indicate for seventy specified acts, their opinion of the degree of wrongness on a five-point scale from "worst wrong possible" to "not at all wrong." The purpose was to find out whether the delinquent boys knew, as well as did the high-school boys, the social code whose violation had sent them to prison. Among the acts listed were the following:

1. Repeating unkind gossip
2. Killing a person in defense of one's own life
3. Skipping school to go to a ball game
4. Forging a check
5. Very often failing to keep promises
6. A doctor allowing a badly deformed baby to die when he could save its life but not cure its deformity
7. Betting on horse races
8. Breaking windows and destroying property just for the fun of it
9. Driving an automobile while drunk but without having an accident
10. Holding up and robbing a person
11. Not giving to charity when able
12. Not taking the trouble to vote at primaries and elections
13. Lying about a child's age in order to get reduced fare on the train
14. A student who is allowed to grade his own paper reporting a higher grade than the one he earned
15. Charging interest above a fair rate when lending
16. Using profane language
17. Refusing to bear arms in a war one believes to be unjust
18. Advertising a medicine to cure a disease when you know such a medicine will not cure that disease

19. Taking money for one's vote at an election
20. Misrepresenting an investment in order to get people to invest
21. A man deserting a girl he has got into trouble without himself taking any responsibility
22. Not believing in God
23. Shooting a man during a holdup because he resists
24. Squealing on a friend in order to keep out of trouble
25. Not going to church on Sunday when there is the chance to go

A comparison of the ratings shows that the delinquent group and the high-school group were strikingly similar in their judgments, the *average* degree of wrongness for the seventy items being practically the same for both groups. Some few differences of possible significance were revealed in connection with particular items. The delinquent group ranked violations of property rights, such as theft of automobiles, holding up an oil station, breaking into a store and taking money or goods, less wrong than did the high-school group. The same difference showed in judging bootlegging. On the whole, however, one is forced to the conclusion that these boys were not delinquent because they did not know what society expected of them. They knew the social code and chose to violate it. Other similar studies have shown like results.

Evidence from somewhat different sources was secured by use of a code form adapted to junior-high-school pupils. Five hundred pupils registered their judgment on the code items, which had also been submitted to ninety-nine college teachers and advanced graduate students. The similarity of ratings by the pupils and the selected adults was striking, no marked differences appearing.

From such evidence and from the experience of social workers dealing with delinquents, it seems clear that few if any persons of normal intelligence are anti-social in their behavior, from ignorance of the social code. The problem is one of ideals and motivation. The perverse individual has inclinations and desires which run counter to the code, and for which no counter-checks exist in his experience or environment. Added to this is the fact that often the code of the family, the gang or the community, is in opposition to the wider code of society. Many children grow up in an environment where the following would constitute a fair sample of the prevailing code of their group:

Steal, but don't get caught
Beat the cops and the law whenever you can
Lie if you can get away with it
Everyone has his price, so get yours
The world owes you a living, so be sure to collect
When you sell, *caveat emptor* (let the buyer beware)
Graft on your employer, for he is probably grafting on someone else
Sell your vote, but be sure to get what it is worth to the other fellow

In teaching the young it is therefore not enough that they shall be *informed* concerning the basic code approved by society; this is essential to intelligent conduct, but for a large proportion of those showing anti-social tendencies such information is not lacking. What is required is better motivation of behavior to meet standards perfectly well known.

This can come, at least in part, by selecting highly essential features of the broader social code and making them the object of special emphasis. The Boy Scout code, for example, teaches few boys any standard which they do not already know in general. What this code does is, (1) to make the requirements of the narrower code stand out sharply, (2) to render these requirements concrete by explanation and illustration, and by affording opportunity in Scout activities for putting the desired behavior into effect. Essentially, this is what is done in all special codes. The Hutchins Morality Code presents no new and unfamiliar virtues. But by its form and by its analysis and examples, and above all by its *teachableness*, it makes old virtues easier of application.

The mere presentation of these carefully devised codes does not, however, solve the motivation question. Such a code may stand for no more to the child who recites it than so many abstractions which he is expected to repeat. Boy Scouts are required to know verbatim the twelve items of their code. Conceivably a Scout *might* be able to repeat the code and still not practice it. A class in school *might* memorize the basic statements in the Hutchins code:

> Good Americans control themselves,
> Good Americans play fair, etc.,

without cultivating in their own behavior, self-control and fair play. The point is to get hold of effective sources of motive and bring them to bear on the *practice* of the code so that its standards become personal habit.

Some such sources are the following:

(1) Loyalty to groups that stand for the code
(2) Cultivation of a sense of social values, leading to the shaping of right attitudes and the setting up of desirable ideals
(3) Satisfactions that come from behavior that represents the standards of the code

(1) Children, as well as adults, have a great capacity for loyalty to whatever they can call their own. It is altogether likely that the loyalty of Scouts, members of Four-H Clubs and similar organizations is a stronger motive in securing behavior responsive to their codes than is any other factor. School "councils" and other pupil organizations prove a strong force in gaining support for regulations and standards adopted by the group. The boy's allegiance to his neighborhood club or gang is likely to take precedence for a time over almost any other

influence that can be brought to bear on his conduct. When a boy has been adopted and received into an elect group, its interests become his interests and its ways his ways. The force of loyalty to group standards was observed at a convention hall where a Boy Scout acted, as the custom often is, as guide for a stranger from his hotel to the meeting place. When the boy had led his charge in at the door and shown him the proper elevator, the man in thanking him offered him a twenty-five-cent tip. The Scout gave him a cordial smile of refusal as he saluted good-by, with the words, "Scouts don't do that, sir."

Loyalty goes back to the basic drives for its motivating force. In it is a large measure of affection, love, good-will; a sense of possession or ownership; the urge to dominance and self-appreciation expressed, if in no other way, by exclusiveness in belonging to and possessing something that not everyone can have. The effect of these instinctive tendencies is to cloud value judgments in situations where loyalty is involved. People are loyal to all sorts of institutions, causes and individuals who are not worthy of the devotion they receive. This is perhaps not altogether to be deprecated, for there is something of worth in loyalty just as loyalty. It is this fact that excuses (if it is to be excused) the chant of certain super-nationalists, "My country, right or wrong." A youth may rage with incipient rebellion at untoward conditions in his home, but let an outsider cast slurs upon the home and the youth becomes its violent champion—and is admired for his loyalty. A college girl may question in her own mind certain standards or practices in her sorority, but let anyone outside the chosen circle raise such questions and at once her loyalty flames and she becomes an uncompromising defender.

Because of the beauty of loyalty as an element in personality, and because of its tendency to uncritical blindness, it is highly essential that the objects of our loyalty shall be well chosen. Almost nothing, it would seem, could be more disintegrating to the personality than to have loyalty at war with one's judgment of values. What could be more humiliating and unsettling than to have to admit to oneself that the object of one's loyalty—the organization, cause or person to whom one has given devotion and defense—is unworthy? What could more undermine the foundations of integrity in one's character than to feel obliged in the name of loyalty to defend persons, causes or institutions which private judgment questions or condemns?

(2) Whatever its admirable qualities *per se*, loyalty, which, if full and complete, involves acceptance of the code of its object, should be intelligent. The basic drives which figure so largely in loyalty should not be left to rule behavior unaccompanied by critical judgment. Before rendering to any individual, movement or institution the high compliment of loyalty, we should apply whatever tests of value we can command. True, we find ourselves in some situations where loyalty is demanded, without power of choice on our own part. We are born into a family which we had no part in choosing, find ourselves members of a home which we did not select. Most of us are citizens of our country by birth, and not by our own election. And we cannot live happily either in family or state without a degree of loyalty to them and their codes. If, therefore, our critical judgment condemns certain elements in the home or the country to which we belong, we can still be loyal to what our sense of values approves, while at the same time we seek to correct what we believe to be flaws.

In the case of organizations, causes or persons where allegiance and loyalty depend on choice, value judgment should be brought to bear. We are not obliged to join the Ku Klux Klan, a particular political party, a given church, a certain college fraternity or any other such group. We are not coerced into adopting the code of the anarchist or the super-patriot. The chief disideratum is that we shall approach the question of all such relations with proper social attitudes, with well considered ideals, and with a cultivated sense of social values. We must be ready to practice the code we profess if it is to show in conduct.

(3) Mention was made also of the place of *satisfactions* in the translating of verbal codes into behavior. The old dictum that "the only way to learn a thing (functionally) is to live it" holds especially for social codes. Any special code, no matter how fine, as long as it is only memorized, repeated, praised and discussed, has not been *learned* until it has been built into behavior and made habit. And it is at this point that the "law of effect" comes into play. Only if satisfaction accompanies behavior which expresses the standards of the desired code, will the code be made effective in conduct. Good sportsmanship must have its reward in self-approval and social recognition, if it is to be grounded in the young. "Good Americans are self-reliant," but self-reliance would hardly thrive in situations that brought no satisfactions.

Not until the standards of a code have become the ideals of the individual, does the code take hold upon conduct in the most fruitful way. Therefore one of the first considerations in the teaching of any particular code to the young, is to make desire and purpose spring from its proposals. In doing this, good psychology would dictate that even the appearance of *imposing* the code on the individual should be avoided. The value of the types of conduct proposed may be shown by discussion, concrete example from biography and history, character representation in literature and the drama. But the learner himself must respond by approving and assenting to the forms of behavior he will make his own if the code is to function as norm and incentive.

Favoring this principle, many schools use a method in the formulating of special codes by methods which make the pupils participate in their construction. In Pittsburgh, for example, where pupil organizations function in the management of the school, much is made of the qualities of personality required of good presidents, secretaries, committeemen, treasurers, councilors, and the like in the school organizations. The problem is studied, discussion takes place, examples are adduced, every device is employed to engage serious thought upon the characteristics that make for dependable leadership. Individuals and rooms submit lists of necessary traits. A central group of pupils and teachers make the final selection of a list of ten outstanding traits *on the basis of which officers are to be chosen.* The ten traits placed on one ballot were as follows:

Trait	*Name*
1. Plays fair	
2. Is cheerful—always in good spirits	
3. Is honest	
4. Is industrious—a hard worker	
5. Accepts responsibility	
6. Is an honor student—gets good marks	
7. Stands up for his class or club when they are criticized	
8. Has self-control	
9. Co-operates with others	
10. Has initiative—starts things	

Opposite each item or trait the pupils of a room, when voting for an officer, write the name of the classmate who in their opinion represents that trait to the highest degree. The pupil whose name appears most frequently on the ballots is declared elected.

Junior high schools in Kenosha, Wisconsin, employed a similar method, using ballots carrying the following traits:

The boy or girl who would make a good club president—

Is dependable ....
Is loyal ....
Is honest ....
Is polite and courteous..
Is prompt ....
Always plays fair..
Exercises self-control ....
Accepts responsibility..
Is self-confident ....
Is reliable ....

Several desirable outcomes would seem to be inherent in this approach to the use of the franchise: character and personality are stressed as the basis of leadership; good officers admittedly are chosen under the system; perhaps most important, the entire school membership have placed before them a code of conduct chosen and approved by themselves. It needs no pointing of the moral for children to understand that if the possession of the traits specified leads to popular choice for positions of honor, then the code implied is of value to all who would stand well with their fellows. The officer trait list becomes informally the code of the school.

Differing from co-operative and self-imposed codes such as we have noted, are codes prepared by authorities outside the group which is to use the code. If skillfully presented, and especially if supported by loyalty to an organization, such codes can be made effective as a stimulus to right behavior.

Surely no one who has watched or had a part in the programs carried out under the codes of the Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, Four-H Clubs, and similar organizations, can doubt that they influence conduct. On the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that the standards these codes represent are in some degree *handed down* to the young and therefore likely to fail of the effects they might have if they could be co-operatively chosen and self-imposed by the group.

Illustrating a combination of the two methods is an unpublished code adopted for Stephens College:

> Stephens College girls will strive to be:
> Tireless and *forceful* in doing
> Everything they set their minds to do;
> Proud of their natural endowment of
> *Health* and determined to guard it.
> Ever willing to *discipline* themselves;
> Never failing in *cheerfulness* and poise;
> Sincere and *honest* in word and deed;
> *Courteous* in speech, and action,
> Overlooking all false social barriers;
> Lovers of careful and exact *scholarship,*
> *Lovers, too, of beauty,* wherever found;
> Ever reverent toward *the spiritual;*
> Generous in womanly *service,* whether
> Enlisted for home, friend, or community.

In the preparation of this code the faculty of the school, by an elaborate method, which involved classifying two hundred and twenty-two characteristics into thirty-one families and then reducing the list to ten traits, first formulated what they thought a desirable code. This was then submitted to the students and after discussion modified somewhat and adopted by them.

The Children's Code, A Code of Morals for Boys and Girls, formulated by Dr. William J. Hutchins, President of Berea College, won the first prize of five thousand dollars in a competition. This ready-made code has been introduced into many schools and made the basis of instruction. The code consists of ten basic laws, each followed by a brief explanatory statement, and also by a fairly full analysis in terms of trait actions. Following are the ten basic laws and their explanations:

I

THE LAW OF HEALTH

The Good American Tries to Gain and to Keep Perfect Health

The welfare of our country depends upon those who try to be physically fit for their daily work. Therefore:

1. I will keep my clothes, my body and my mind clean.
2. I will avoid those habits which would harm me, and will make and never break those habits which will help me.
3. I will try to take such food, sleep and exercise as will keep me in perfect health.

II

THE LAW OF SELF-CONTROL

The Good American Controls Himself

Those who best control themselves can best serve their country.

1. I will control my *tongue*, and will not allow it to speak mean, vulgar or profane words.
2. I will control my *temper*, and will not get angry when people or things displease me.
3. I will control my *thoughts*, and will not allow a foolish wish to spoil a wise purpose.

III

THE LAW OF SELF-RELIANCE

The Good American Is Self-Reliant

Self-conceit is silly, but self-reliance is necessary to boys and girls who would be strong and useful.

1. I will gladly listen to the advice of older and wiser people, but I will learn to think for myself, choose for myself, act for myself.
2. I will not be afraid of being laughed at.
3. I will not be afraid of doing right when the crowd does wrong.

IV

THE LAW OF RELIABILITY

The Good American Is Reliable

Our country grows great and good as her citizens are able more fully to trust each other. Therefore:

1. I will be honest, in word and in act. I will not lie, sneak, or pretend, nor will I keep the truth from those who have a right to it.
2. I will not do wrong in the hope of not being found out. I cannot hide the truth from myself and cannot often hide it from others.
3. I will not take without permission what does not belong to me.
4. I will do promptly what I have promised to do. If I have made a foolish promise, I will at once confess my mistake, and I will try to make good any harm which my mistake may have caused. I will so speak and act that people will find it easier to trust each other.

V

THE LAW OF CLEAN PLAY

The Good American Plays Fair

Clean play increases and trains one's strength, and helps one to be more useful to one's country. Therefore:

1. I will not cheat, nor will I play for keeps or for money. If I should not play fair, the loser would lose the fun of the game, the winner would lose his self-respect, and the game itself would become a mean and often cruel business.
2. I will treat my opponent with politeness.
3. If I play in a group game, I will play, not for my own glory, but for the success of my team and the fun of the game.
4. I will be a good loser or a generous winner.

VI

THE LAW OF DUTY

The Good American Does His Duty

The shirker or the willing idler lives upon the labor of others, burdens others with the work which he ought to do himself. He harms his fellow citizens, and so harms his country.

I will try to find out what my duty is, *what I ought to do,* and my duty I will do, whether it is easy or hard. What I ought to do I can do.

VII

THE LAW OF GOOD WORKMANSHIP

The Good American Tries to Do the Right Thing in the Right Way

The welfare of our country depends upon those who have learned to do in the right way the things that ought to be done. Therefore:

1. I will get the best possible education, and learn all that I can from those who have learned to do the right thing in the right way.
2. I will take an interest in my work, and will not be satisfied with slip-shod and merely passable work. A wheel or a rail or a nail carelessly made may cause the death of hundreds.
3. I will try to do the right thing in the right way, even when no one else sees or praises me. But when I have done my best, I will not envy those who have done better, or have received larger reward. Envy spoils the work and the worker.

VIII

THE LAW OF TEAM-WORK

The Good American Works in Friendly Co-operation with His Fellow Workers

One man alone could not build a city or a great railroad. One man alone would find it hard to build a house or a bridge. That I may have bread, men have sowed and reaped, men have made plows and threshers, men have built mills and mined coal, men have made stoves and kept stores. As we learn better how to work together, the welfare of our country is advanced.

1. In whatever work I do with others, I will do my part and will help others do their part.
2. I will keep in order the things which I use in my work. When things are out of place, they are often in the way, and sometimes they are hard to find. Disorder means confusion, and the waste of time and patience.
3. In all my work with others, I will be cheerful. Cheerlessness depresses all the workers and injures all the work.
4. When I have received money for my work, I will be neither a miser nor a spendthrift. I will save or spend as one of the friendly workers of America.

IX

THE LAW OF KINDNESS

The Good American Is Kind

In America those who are of different races, colors and conditions must live together. We are of many different sorts, but we are one great people. Every unkindness hurts the common life, every kindness helps the common life. Therefore:

1. I will be kind in all my *thoughts*. I will bear no spites or grudges. I will not think myself above any other girl or boy just because I am of a different race or color or condition. I will never despise anybody.
2. I will be kind in all my *speech*. I will not gossip nor will I speak unkindly of anyone. Words may wound or heal.
3. I will be kind in all my *acts*. I will not selfishly insist on having my own way. I will always be polite. Rude people are not good Americans. I will not trouble unnecessarily those who do work for me. I will do my best to prevent cruelty, and will give my best help to those who need it most.

X

The Law of Loyalty

The Good American Is Loyal

If our America is to become ever greater and better, her citizens must be loyal, devotedly faithful, in every relation of life.

1. I will be loyal to my family. In loyalty I will gladly obey my parents or those who are in their place. I will do my best to help each member of my family to strength and usefulness.
2. I will be loyal to my school. In loyalty I will obey and help other pupils to obey those rules which further the good of all.
3. I will be loyal to my town, my state, my country. In loyalty I will respect and help others to respect their laws and their courts of justice.
4. I will be loyal to humanity. In loyalty I will do my best to help the friendly relations of our country with every other country, and to give to everyone in every land the best possible chance.

If I try simply to be loyal to my family, I may be disloyal to my school. If I try simply to be loyal to my school, I may be disloyal to my town, my state and my country. If I try simply to be loyal to my town, state and country, I may be disloyal to humanity. I will try above all things else to be loyal to humanity; then I shall surely be loyal to my country, my state and my town, to my school and to my family.

And he who obeys the law of loyalty obeys all of the other nine laws of The Good American

Making and Using Co-operative Codes

Wherever verbalized codes are employed in the guidance of conduct, good psychology would seem to favor the co-operatively made rather than the ready-made code—with this proviso: that the co-operatively made code represents fundamental patterns of behavior widely applicable in typical situations; and that the basic trait concepts be worked out concretely in illustrative trait actions. If these two conditions cannot be met with care and skill, it is doubtful whether co-operative code making should be undertaken.

In a group project of code building, the enterprise should not be hurried. It is entirely possible that the greatest good from such a code comes during the time of its making, rather than in its later application. For if the making of the code is a true co-operative process, the interest and the experience of each learner are called upon. The lessons of history and biography are utilized, the characters of fiction passed in review, the results of observation of other people turned to account, other codes studied. In such ways impressions are being made of the success value of the qualities represented in the code, and motives being organized for their practice. The great thing of course is to insure that the *standards* of the code shall become the *ideals* of the learner, and the entire code enterprise should be shaped to this end.

In the making and using of codes, a temptation exists to attempt too many things at once, thereby scattering attention and weakening emphasis until they cease to be effective. The

Denver list of traits (see p. 20) is undoubtedly too long for successful use if undertaken at one time. Doctor Charters recognizes the danger of over-multiplication when he says: "The outstanding problems of the curriculum maker are to select the *most important* traits, to determine the *crucial* life situations, and to decide upon the *right* actions to perform."[1] Current usage seems to favor the inclusion of not more than ten or twelve basic items in a working code, each of these to be so elaborated as to show its application in concrete situations. Care is required to select for the basic items "family" terms which include as many narrower traits as possible. For example, *dependability* is satisfactory as a basic, or "family," item for under it fit such traits as trustworthiness, responsibility, conscientiousness, industry, carefulness, consistency, thoroughness, patience, perseverance. *Co-operation* connotes such qualities as helpfulness, trustfulness, willingness, appreciativeness, unselfishness, loyalty.

The tendency of children to differ in their reactions to particular types of instruction at varying age levels, suggests caution in methods of using a code. Pupils of upper elementary grades and junior high-school as a rule do not respond well to direct emphasis on standards proposed for their personal acceptance. Experience seems to show that this age is negatively sensitive to all attempts at moralizing or "preaching" which has individual implications. Therefore the approach here is the indirect one: illustrations from literature, history, biography, current life, which reveal the desired characteristic as a factor in success. The motivation at this stage comes more from loyalty to the group—clubs, gangs, etc.—than from personal consideration. *Scouts* do this or do not do that, rather than *I* do or do not do this or that.

With adolescence well under way and the high-school level reached, the attitude changes. The youth or maiden has become acutely conscious of a self, with its possibilities of being liked or disliked, of winning recognition or failing to win it in the world of social relationships. Success has now become personal, and in a new sense motivation comes to include a distinctively subjective awareness. Because of this novel interest in self the approach to the matter of traits cannot be too direct at this age, provided it is skillfully linked up with the idea of self-improvement, achievement and social success.

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[1] W. W. Charters, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

PROBLEMS

1. Examine the codes expressed in various religions of the world. To what extent may they be characterized as the fundamental rules of social life in the regions in which the religions flourish?
2. Recount the codes which have been altered during your memory.
3. James Truslow Adams insists that for the great mass of humanity the moral code must have a supernatural sanction in order to be effective. In terms of your contact with the great mass of humanity, evaluate this position.
4. What advantages do you see in allowing school children to formulate their own code of school conduct? Are there disadvantages which make this practice dangerous?
5. By illustration distinguish between ideals and codes of conduct.

REFERENCES

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CHAPTER XIII

SELF-CRITICISM AND MORAL COMPULSION

THE old-time moralist had an easy task. For him there was no puzzle about *right* and *wrong*. Both were absolute qualities, fixed and immutable in their essence—dicta from a supreme source of wisdom and righteousness. They did not change from age to age nor from situation to situation. What was right was right and what was wrong was wrong, world without end; unalterable parts of truth and reality. From this point of view it followed that there could be no *degrees* of rightness or of wrongness, each act was right or it was wrong.

The Older Concept of Conscience

With this question settled the moralist next postulated for each individual an inner guide or monitor, called *conscience,* capable of pointing out infallibly to its possessor the right from the wrong in all problems of behavior. This sense of right and wrong was intuitive, native, unlearned, as fundamental as hunger or desire, a gift from the Creator to the highest of his creatures.

So dependable was this inner monitor that any person who would listen to an unspoiled conscience never need go astray. Though the ancient Hebrews did not have the word conscience, it was this inner mentor that the psalmist had in mind when he cried out, "Create within me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right Spirit within me." When "the heart of David smote him," he had offended against the still small voice. To the Greeks conscience was both law-giver and accuser. Polybius feelingly testifies, "There is no more terrible witness or more formidable accuser than the conscience that dwells in each man's soul." Conscience "deals more cruel blows than the lash." One need "never expect to hide a sin," for if it escapes the detection of others it is sure to rear its ugly head to our own gaze.

Cicero called conscience divine, and proclaimed it a safer guide than social standards. Voicing the point of view of the Christians, Paul finds a law of God written deep in the hearts of men. This law is revealed to every person by his conscience, the silent whisperer within each human heart. Because of the high source of this law, conscience is to the Christian the final court of appeal on all moral questions.

Conscience as conceived by the older school played fair in its rewards and penalties. Although it cruelly chastised and tormented those who disobeyed its commands, it equally rewarded all who complied with its requirements. The man who faithfully obeyed when conscience spoke was repaid with a warm glow of approval and self-appreciation for his act; and few experiences are more richly satisfying than inner approval of one's own conduct after moral conflict. Lady Macbeth, Eugene Aram, Jean Val Jean are classical literary examples of conscience punishing its victims. "Conscience does make cowards of us all," because we fear its lashings. When King Richard proved recreant to the inner monitor he was forced to pay the penalty:

> "My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
> And every tongue brings in a several tale,
> And every tale condemns me for a villain."

One of the graver difficulties met by the older moralists was the fact that conscience sometimes failed to function. The inner voice now and then became dumb. The retribution of remorse and suffering which were supposed naturally to follow from violation of conscience, did not always make its appearance. There were rogues and villains whose behavior shamed the moral law and who yet seemed to suffer no pangs and feel no remorse. There were sinners who seemed to thrive upon their sins. There were robbers and cutthroats and cheaters and libertines who to all appearances remained at peace with themselves in spite of their evil deeds. Such seeming failures of the processes of conscience did not, however, daunt the moralists. Where conscience failed to haunt the guilty, conscience itself had been spurned and abused until its voice had grown faint; its clear call had been ignored and its urging denied until the moral ear had become deaf to its entreaties; its urge had been neglected until its thrust was no longer felt. The fault lay in the use made of conscience, and not in conscience itself.

The Newer Point of View

Simple and attractive as this theory of behavior was, it has been rejected by the modern scientific mind because it does not fit the facts. Right and wrong are not fixed values given to man by divine fiat. They are purely relative terms whose meanings have been wrought out of collective human experience. All that human beings know of what is right and what is wrong, they have discovered in the heat and conflict of daily living. Nothing has come to them ready-made out of some storehouse of cosmic light and truth. They have fought for and won all the moral insight they possess.

Nor, so far as practical affairs are concerned, is there anything final and determinate about right and wrong—no acts which in their very essence are always and under all circumstances right, and other acts which are always and without exception wrong. What is right in this situation may be wrong in that, and what was wrong yesterday may be right today. There was a time when the highest virtue required that every man be a *producer* to the limit of his ability. Each acre of soil, each hour of labor must yield its utmost of the food, clothing, shelter, machines and other goods which a waiting world required. Every person's duty was to save, accumulate, lay by for a rainy day. Now such procedures are wrong. Virtue demands that we produce but sparingly. So we limit our hours of work, allow farm lands and oil wells to lie fallow, plow crops under, apply the principle of birth control to food animals, slaughter young pigs that they may not ripen into hams and shoulders and bacon. Instead of being advised to save our money we are now being urged to spend it, and are condemned if we hoard. Wrong has become right and right wrong because new situations have arisen which make them so.

The simple fact is that the right act is only the act that is *best for all concerned*—best in the sense of the richest and deepest and most lasting *satisfactions*. The wrong act is the act that runs counter to the interests of those concerned—that limits or destroys worthy satisfactions. And what types of behavior, individual and social, will best serve those interests and satisfactions is a problem that must be studied and solved anew by each people and generation as long as life and its conditions change. Undoubtedly there have existed social situations under which each of the system of sex relations known as polyandry, polygamy, monogamy have been "right" and other systems "wrong." There are situations in which the right of the indivdual to accumulate and own property should be upheld at all costs, but there are other situations in which the property of the individual is rightly taken from him and used for the group. And so also may be found similar illustrations for every area of human experience. It is life that must be served, not any abstraction known as right or wrong.

Just as the modern mind fails to find fixed rights and wrongs, so it fails to find in the individual any native power or faculty which stands guard as an inner censor over behavior. Man has not been provided by his original nature with a moral guide which enables him intuitively to know right from wrong. He does not come into life equipped to feel an urge toward, or away from, any line of behavior because an entity called conscience approves or disapproves. There is no monitor separate and detached from the lessons of experience. Whatever of inner guide one may possess is laboriously built up out of the processes of his own social living, not handed over in his creation ready to use.

Nevertheless, the ancients were not wholly wrong, nor can psychology disregard certain basic truths that lie back of the mistaken concept of conscience. There does exist in human affairs the distinction known as right and wrong. Some acts are right in the sense of being suitable in the situations concerned, *best* when measured by their outcomes; other acts are wrong because they are unsuitable, not best, as their ends reveal. And one of the chief tests which life puts upon the individual is to discover and adjust to these "rights" and "wrongs"—not to the labels they may bear, often mistakenly, but to their inner essence and truth.

Also, as the ancients believed, normal individuals do develop something important within them which answers in part at least to what the ancients called conscience. Everyone, for example, has the experience of feeling that a particular act contemplated or performed is fitting, apt, suitable, right; and that other acts are unfitting, discordant, wrong. Connected with acts of the first kind is a sense of self-approval and satisfaction;

connected with acts of the second kind is a sense of self-condemnation, dissatisfaction, annoyance. Furthermore, once the rightness of a proposed act has been accepted, there is felt an impulsion toward that act and of inhibition toward its opposite. Some urge exists which says *you ought* in the one case and that you *ought not* in the other case.

John Dewey raises the question, *why* we should act for the wise, or good, or better; why we should not follow our own immediate inclinations and devices. At once he replies: "There is only one answer—we have a moral nature, a conscience, call it what you will. And this nature responds directly in acknowledgment of the supreme authority of the Right over all claims of inclination and habit."[1]

The points at which psychology parts company with the old idea of conscience are (1) in the *source of the feeling* of right and wrong, and (2) in the *infallibility of the moral authority* of this feeling.

(1) Every normal person begins fairly early in the course of his development to arrive at certain patterns of behavior. These patterns are compounded partly out of his own innate tendencies and partly out of the models set him by his social environment and training. Many of the patterns come to exist as habit resulting from repeated practice. Some are in the form of standards set by other people, as in home, school and community relations. Still others take the form of ideals projected by the individual himself for his own attainment. But whatever their source, these patterns are self-accepted forms of action. They are sanctioned not only by social approval but also by our own inner assent. They represent attitude, habit, custom, accepted practice, *right*. To act in accordance with these accepted or self-imposed patterns is therefore fitting, suitable, normal, comfortable, satisfying. "Conscience" ap-

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[1] ***Human Nature and Conduct,*** p. 325.

proves such behavior, for no dissonance has been produced, no friction caused, by acts that break out of the pattern. To act contrary to accepted patterns causes a sense of friction, of unfitness, discord, dissatisfaction, annoyance, because the harmony of the pattern is broken. In such case "conscience" voices its disapproval of unfit behavior—unfit because it clashes with the pattern set consciously or unconsciously by the individual for himself. Especially does this sense of self-approval and disapproval arise in connection with situations which are deemed *important*—that is, in connection with moral behavior.

From this point of view "conscience," if we were to keep the older term, might be defined as: *The activity by which the fitness or unfitness of an act is recognized, when measured, by the way it accords with a general pattern of behavior accepted by the individual.*

Yet there are rare occasions, it must be noted, when the individual in order to maintain his moral integrity rises above the immediate social pattern provided for him and acts on his own responsibility. In such a case he follows his own ideas and convictions even though they come in conflict with custom and prevailing point of view. Tragic (but morally heroic!) examples are the honest pacifists in a time when war elation grips a people and the pacifist for devotion to a principle becomes an object of social scorn and contempt. As William James warns us:

> "Rightness is not *mere* usualness, wrongness is not *mere* oddity, however numerous the facts which might be invoked to prove such identity. Nor are the moral judgments those most invariably and emphatically impressed on us by public opinion. The most characteristically and peculiarly moral judgments that a man is ever called on to make are in unprecedented cases and lonely emergencies, where no popular rhetorical maxims can avail, and the hidden oracle alone can speak; and it speaks often in favor of conduct quite unusual, and suicidal as far as gaining popular approbation goes. The forces which

conspire to this resultant are subtle harmonies and discords between the elementary ideas which form the data in the case."[2]

Leaving aside for the moment the question of the source of these general patterns, we may note that all children, especially, are busy developing them, and that all adults have such patterns in large numbers and in relatively stable (though not static) form. To illustrate a few of these: The average socially minded person has a generalized pattern in mind of honesty in business relations, of helpfulness toward the unfortunate, of good sportsmanship in various situations, of acceptable bearing in the home, of political responsibility, of treatment of employee by employer and of employer by employee, and so on for a hundred other areas of experience. These patterns constitute his code of social behavior. In each of these cases he uses the pattern he has set up, as the measure by which to judge his own acts. If the act he proposes or performs fits in with his accepted pattern, there is, as we have said, a satisfying sense of inner harmony or approval. If the act does not fit in with the pattern a feeling of disharmony and dissent accompanied by self-censure, blame and disapprobation follows. It is out of this sense of fitness or unfitness of the act as related to patterns of behavior already accepted and approved, that the "voice of conscience" comes.

Hall-Quest, dealing with this problem, makes the following statement: "Conscience is the sum total of habits of living or thinking, and any departure therefrom results in unrest, a sense of disturbance, that is felt to be wrong."[3] The law of habit operating in the individual makes it inevitable that if the discordant behavior is repeated often enough, it will establish a pattern of its own, and all sense of friction and unrest coming from the act will cease. Thus conscience becomes "blunted," its "voice" stilled.

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[2] *Psychology,* Vol. II, p. 672.

[3] A. L. Hall-Quest, *It's Not Our Fault,* p. 83.

(2) It is of course evident that the dictates of conscience, that is, the feeling of impulsion or restraint arising in connection with any act, can never be any more authentic morally than the pattern out of which the feeling springs, is sound socially. No doubt many of those zealots who in the past helped break and burn men's bodies in the hope of saving their heretical souls, felt in themselves a warm glow of approval over their acts; they were the chosen instruments for fulfilling a divine purpose. Just the same, we may well doubt the social desirability of such patterns of behavior. Reformers generally seem to look upon themselves with the highest satisfaction and approval, even though often they appear to others to be more nuisance than help.

When is one's conscience, then, a safe guide? Asking the question more psychologically, when is it safe to square our behavior by an existing pattern accepted as model or criterion? The answer has already been given in the definition of a "right" act. An act is right when it yields the highest and most lasting satisfaction, not only for the actor but for all whom the consequences of the act may touch. A pattern which is to serve as a standard of reference for behavior, is sound if that pattern springs from acts which help and do not hinder the satisfactions of all concerned. The "voice of conscience" is a safe mentor only if it speaks truly for the interests of both the actor and the group in the situation under consideration.

Because no two situations are ever exactly alike, and because any given situation is itself constantly changing, patterns which are to serve fruitfully as standards can be only general in their outlines. To have a general truth-telling pattern is without doubt commendable; but, on the other hand, few things are more disruptive and socially undesirable in many situations than a literal telling of the truth. There are situations in which doctors are not justified in telling the truth; there are occasions when guests, hostesses, friends and casual strangers best serve the satisfactions of all concerned by speaking out of line with exact truth. The situation and not an abstract principle must decide. Conscience may set up a barrier (establish a pattern) against taking what is not one's own, but in practical living there must always be left a certain latitude to be determined by the situation. Was Jean Val Jean's pattern wrong which led him to take bread from the baker's window to feed starving children? Is our pattern violated when in a friend's house we make free with needed pins, buttons, postage stamps, gasoline for the car? Shall the student whose lucky guess enabled him to answer a question he did not know, refuse the credit? Here, and again as often as we turn to practical questions of social behavior, we are forced to the conclusion that the intelligently moral person must learn to meet concrete situations with the guidance of very general patterns rather than by fixed rules.

This is equivalent to saying that one's conscience is a safe mentor only so far as it is *intelligent,* to know the quality of satisfactions coming from the acts involved; *informed,* to know the meaning of the situation in which the act takes place; *unbiased,* so that intelligence and information concerning values and situation may be free to make their decision. The conduct patterns formulated by the stupid, the ignorant and uninformed, the prejudiced, are hazardous guides. One of the most devastating things that can be said about a conscientious blunderer is that he *meant well.*

Self-Compulsion

It is a strange anomaly in human affairs that so many persons who are vastly courageous and successful in meeting objective difficulties, encounter defeat when it comes to conflict with the self. Men will fight to the death with obstacles outside themselves, only to be defeated by their own impulses and desires which defy control. Roback finds the most distinctive quality in human nature to be its power to inhibit instinctive tendencies—*to stop acting*. In fact he definies character as *"an enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive impulses in accordance with a regulative principle."*[4]

And what is this regulative principle? Some, as we have seen, call it conscience; others forbear giving it a name, while recognizing its existence. In any case, the regulative principle or norm is something within the individual, and it is rather complex. It involves, as we have noted, personal habits, attitudes, standards, ideas, ideals, loyalties of various kinds. These shape up into what we have called a master-pattern, fairly stable though modifiable, for the personality. This master-pattern grows in one with one's social development until it touches all phases of one's activities and becomes the standard by which individual behavior is judged.

For example, the high-school boy out with his "gang" is offered a cigarette. His master-pattern excludes cigarettes for the present at least on two grounds: it is against training rules on the football team, and he has given his promise at home not to smoke until he finishes high school. So the boy inhibits a very natural tendency to go along with the group and at the same time satisfy the urge to new experience. The same principle operating in quite a different field is seen in the case of the business man who has accepted for himself a certain pattern of ethics for his business. A situation arises in which he finds himself at a disadvantage among competitors who hold no such pattern for themselves. Shall he change and violate his master-pattern, or hold to it and take his loss? Which he will do is a question of character.

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[4] A. A. Roback, *The Psychology of Character*, p. 450.

Will the young man entering politics sell out to the "interests"? Will the boy who has been handed a dollar over-change for his purchase, keep the dollar? Will the woman who realizes that she is neglecting her home for bridge, cut down on the bridge? Will magnates who see a safe way to fleece the public, resist the temptation and be honest? Will man or woman anywhere choose the hard road of self-denial and forego the easy way of self-indulgence? The answer to all such questions depends on two factors: *first,* the existence in the individuals of a master-pattern of conduct whose form excludes the proposed undesirable behavior; *second,* power to inhibit the tendency to the attractive act which violates the master-pattern.

Valuable as is Roback's emphasis on inhibition as a measure of character, it tells only half the story. Unquestionably, proper social adjustment often requires that we *stop action,* that we check undesirable impulses. Equally is it true however that what we need in many situations is not to check but to *compel* action. We see the task awaiting us, but rest is sweet and the task can wait. The student discovers in his lesson a problem worthy of time and energy for a full solution and understanding; but time presses, energy lags, and a "bluff" is substituted for mastery. The young couple in their new home find the social and economic pace set by their crowd too swift for them and quite out of accord with the master-pattern they have conceived for their home. Shall they resist the false standards of their environment and muster strength to block out their own (to them) better way?

Coming closer home, any one of us, once he stops to consider for a moment his own attitudes and habits in his home, business, school or office, will identify many points at which change would be desirable for the good of his own soul and for the happiness of those about him. Will we make those changes, breaking out of the patterns that hamper us, and follow a better way? Whether we will or not depends, as before, on the two basic factors: We must *see the better way* and we must be able to *compel ourselves to act in the face of inertia and opposition.* We must be able to say, I *ought,* and I *will.*

Perhaps today we have discovered a twinge in a tooth that indicates a bad time with the dentist; have we the command over self that puts us promptly under the drill? Possibly it has just dawned upon us that certain associations we have formed contain danger and promise no good; have we the grit to break off? Or it may be that we have now seen that in some past situation of conflict and strain we were in the wrong and the other person whom we scorned was in the right; have we the courage to go to this person with that admission and an apology? In short, how do we measure up when we face the disagreeable? Can we stand the gaff, take punishment, endure hardship, come through if need be with "head bloody but unbowed"?

Generalized, all these questions and illustrations go back to the one simple matter of the amount of *self-compulsion* of which we are capable. This self-compulsion at times will manifest itself as inhibition of tendencies to act out of harmony with an accepted master-pattern. At other times it will manifest itself in the demand for action against obstacles, or in the face of pain and defeat.

Growth of Moral Standards

Young children lack both the generalized standards and the skill necessary to self-criticism of behavior. They do not yet understand the "moral quality" of their acts. The child of two or three may conform to the standards imposed upon him in sleeping, eating, playing and other activities—or he may rebel against such standards, evading them if he can. But there is no evidence that he is troubled over whether his conduct is *right* or *wrong*. So far as one may judge he is not concerned with any sense of *ought* in his behavior, nor does conscience trouble him after acts of dereliction. He has at this time, we may believe, no criteria against which he can place an act and so judge its quality—even if his mind were capable of so complex a process.

To the child at first the good (right) act is the act that is permitted or approved by those with whom he has contact. The bad (wrong) act is the act that is disapproved or that brings punishment. This fact was illustrated in a reminiscence study made by a college class in which a girl told of her quaint childhood idea that all adults were good and all children bad. She accounted for her aberration on the ground that as a child she had noticed that adults were never punished, while children who were naughty in her home were constantly being switched or sent to bed without their supper. Ergo——

Nor was this childish logic so far astray. For "good" all through the ages has been what the group approves, and "bad" has been what it condemns. The *mores* of the group are not only right, they are compulsory. Let these mores grow reflective, let them receive the sanctions of authority, and they become *morals*—generalized standards of conduct. These the child learns, partly by absorption, partly by instruction, with modifications here and there according to the sub-group to which he belongs, and with occasional lapses due to his own perverse inclinations or faulty adjustments. These standards, with their individual divergences, become the child's social code, the master-pattern by which details of personal behavior are to be judged in situations where moral choice is involved.

A perennial question among students of childhood has been the age at which the "moral sense" begins to function; which is equivalent to asking the age at which his own conduct is criticized by the child in accordance with more or less generalized standards. Kotz's study of two children of four and five through conversation of the children with their parents, showed that ideals of right and wrong were beginning at this age to form around acts that would bring hurt or harm; as injury to others or to themselves, injury to things in their environment.[5] "Jimmie bad, took Tom-Tom's wagon," complained young Thomas in the nursery school. That Thomas had first taken the wagon from Jimmie did not at this stage enter into his values. Gradually, however, the child comes to judge his own conduct.

In studying German children, Schaefer[6] found that at the age of twelve, ideas as to wrongness of stealing went back in nearly half the cases to religious sanctions. At seventeen religious sanction had dropped to ten per cent, and broader social values such as that of justice, of harm done others, of injury to society, of law, were coming into the moral focus. Other studies have similarly shown that with increasing age the patterns by which conduct is judged move over from the socially immediate, concrete and particular to the more generalized. Right and wrong gradually come to have instrinsic meaning as concepts, broad patterns, labels.

The same trend was found by Macaulay and Watkins, who investigated the effects of environment and age on the child's ideas of moral values.[7] Up to about nine years the child's standards of morals rested quite completely on his own personal relations, and were immediate and specific. Wickedness was hurting the cat, disobeying father or mother, violating regulations in the school, biting or kicking playmates. Increasingly after this age, however, stealing and fighting *in general* were mentioned. By the time later adolescence was reached, such faults as *selfishness* and *hypocrisy* were freely built into the pattern of wickedness presented. As might be expected, children from the slums used adult moral concepts earlier than did those of more favored environment.

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[5] D. and R. Kotz, *Conversations with Children: Researches in Social Psychology and Pedagogy.* (Quoted by G. Murphy—*Experimental Social Psychology,* p. 436.)

[6] Quoted by G. Murphy. *Experimental Social Psychology,* p. 379.

[7] E. Macaulay and S. Watkins. "An Investigation into the Moral Conceptions of Children, *Forum Education* (1926) Vol. 4, pp. 13-33 and 92-108.

Reference has already been made (Chapter IV) to the influence of a particular interest or emphasis in the shaping of moral judgments. The teachers in Wickman's study, for example, considered as serious those forms of misbehavior which interfered with the running of the school; the psychologists looked past this interest to the effects of particular acts on personality. The same principle emerged when junior-high-school children in a suburban city where asked *how wrong* (not at all wrong, slightly wrong, considerably wrong, very wrong, worst wrong possible) certain acts were. Almost at the head of the *worst wrong possible* list of acts, was "stepping on the flag" which had fallen on the floor. Running this item a close race was, "making fun of religion." The first of these seemingly represented the effects of a recent drive for patriotism in the school; the second reflected the effects of strong religious teaching in the community. Miss McGrath, in studying the moral development of children asked,[8] *"Is it a sin to stay away from church on Sunday?"* Three groups of public-school children ten to sixteen years of age answered *Yes* in proportions of fifty-six per cent, sixty-one per cent and sixty-seven per cent respectively, while ninety-seven per cent of parochial school children said *Yes*.

The question asked by Muth of one hundred and sixty-seven children eleven to fourteen, *"What makes a thing good or bad?"*, might well stump others than the "dull normal" group, who could not answer.[9] Replies from the remainder fell into these categories:

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[8] M. C. McGrath. "A Study of the Moral Development of Children, *Psychological Monogamy* (1923), Vol. 32, No. 149.

1. *The law of God*—"Things done by the will of God are good."
2. *Public opinion*—"If many people like a thing that makes it good."
3. *Civic law*—"A thing is good if it is within the law."
4. *Parental law*—"If you mind your parents it makes you a good boy."
5. *The greatest good of the greatest number*—"If it is pleasant and enjoyable to others it is good; if not it is bad."
6. *The spirit of the deed*—"The thought that makes you do a thing makes it good or bad."

Out of all such studies and out of contacts with children and adults themselves, comes the inevitable conclusion reached on other grounds earlier in the chapter: The moral criterion, the definition by the individual of good and bad, the master-pattern by which conduct is judged, springs out of the social *milieu.* Conscience is built up gradually, day by day, out of the social experiences in which it has its roots. One's judgments of right and wrong are no more sound than are the insights which one applies to the multiform situations out of which one's ideas of right and wrong emerge. The generalized pattern by which each person criticizes his own acts (his conscience) is no more dependable than are social facts, concepts and judgments upon which the pattern rests. Given certain biases and prejudices, one may be "sure he is right" on moral questions without reflecting any great amount of truth or value. As witness: At one time or another conscience has warmly approved the burning of witches, the persecution of heretics, the offering of human sacrifices, the institution of slavery, the death penalty for poachers, and a thousand other atrocities imposed upon the weak by the strong.

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[9] L. C. Muth. *Children's Opinions on What Makes a Thing Good or Bad.* Unpublished. Quoted by G. Murphy. *Experimental Social Psychology,* p. 381.

Elements Concerned in Moral Initiative and Control

The most revealing measure of an individual as a *person* is his ability to *judge his own behavior* by an accepted pattern, and on the basis of this judgment to *compel the self to act or refrain from acting*. The pattern taken will quite certainly not always be right, yet responsible beings must develop and use such patterns. Action governed by such patterns may not infrequently prove harmful to the individual and to others concerned, nevertheless this self-compulsion must be exerted and the judgment be carried over into action if the personality is to maintain its moral integrity. Better to make mistakes than to fail to act from inner conviction. One cannot be man or woman without inner standards, nor can one be man or woman on any high plane if these standards are not reasonably obeyed under compulsion exerted by the self.

Stated in social terms, organized society would be impossible if its individual members refused in large numbers to accept for their own guidance the general patterns provided by custom and morals; equally would social organization be impossible if individuals generally refused or failed to compel their behavior to follow the patterns they have accepted in principle. Moral irresponsibility on a large scale must in the end defeat any society or nation. People without conscience, that is without *rights* and *wrongs* which they respect and obey, can never build or maintain a worthy civilization.

In the power of self-compulsion therefore lies the highest test of character and personality. The strong person is the one who can say, I *ought* and therefore I *will*. Or who, conversely, can refuse to act when his judgment of values tells him he ought not. Lacking this power of self-compulsion, one finds oneself too largely controlled by the varous situations in which inevitably one is forced to act. With such a one, an appetite or a desire thrusts its way into consciousness and, unopposed by habits of control or inner voice of authority, unsuitable action follows. Or an emotion, as anger, spite, ill-will, presses for unsocial behavior and wins the day. Or the demand for some immediate satisfaction regardless of later consequences, becomes insistent and the greater good is sacrified to the lesser. In a hundred ways opportunities for choice present themselves, the value of the choice depending on the ability of the individual to apply restraints or compulsions to conduct in accordance with worthy standards.

What then are the elements that enter into normal self-compulsion? What are the processes by which the individual becomes progressively self-directive? Or, as the older moralists would have put it, what are the elements which combined make an efficient conscience?

Binet made the power to criticize one's own acts a chief test of *intelligence*. By far the most difficult thinking to be done in human affairs is that which is required in discovering the right and wrong of various social relations. What one *ought to do* in this moral situation or that, puts a more difficult strain on his intelligence than is likely to occur in any other area of experience. Morons and others of low intelligence lack the first requisite for socially safe self-direction. Intelligence, properly trained and experienced, makes possible worthy self control.

Another element is *practical discrimination, judgment*. If good were always good, and bad were always bad, it would be relatively easy for the well-intentioned person to do right in most situations. For example, how many of the first ten of the following acts are *always* wrong, and how many of the second ten are *always* right?

(1) Lying
(2) Stealing
(3) Taking human life
(4) Disobeying parental commands
(5) Cheating in school examinations
(6) Having illicit sex relations
(7) Evading the paying of taxes
(8) Deserting one's wife
(9) Indulging habits believed to be injurious
(10) Wounding another by harsh words

(1) Giving to charity
(2) Supporting and serving the state
(3) Promoting religion
(4) Giving freely of service to others
(5) Rendering obedience to parents
(6) Turning the other cheek
(7) Conforming to the *mores* of the group
(8) Keeping control of one's temper
(9) Standing up for one's convictions
(10) Disciplining one's appetites and desires

One may agree that the general pattern of behavior should stand against the items of the first list, and should favor those of the second list. Yet few will say that all of the first list are to be condemned in advance without knowing the situation in which they occur; or that all of the second list are similarly to be approved regardless of the circumstances of which they are a part. And it is precisely at these moot points, the points which are legitimately to be decided as possible exceptions to an accepted general rule, that self-direction meets its severest test. To decide moral questions *where the values are divided* requires intelligence to understand the situation clearly, judgment practiced in the weighing of values, intellectual honesty that accepts and abides by the conclusions reached. Closely related to this factor and necessary to its operation in self-direction is ——

Knowledge of human nature, and of social customs and institutions is one item. This point has already been brought out in connection with the discussion of social codes (Chapter XII). One must know the patterns of behavior approved by the group of which one is a part, if one is to direct one's behavior to conform to its standards; or, equally, if one is to refuse to conform and so for oneself set different standards.

Nor must one who is to be morally intelligent limit this knowledge to one particular group and time. For fashions in morals change and are likely to take on local colors, while the great basic values of life remain relatively constant, regardless of chance fluctuations. Just as there are few vices practiced today that were not common in the times of Moses, Socrates or Jesus, so there are few virtues known to moderns which the ancients did not in their better moments embrace.

Within sight of the writer's window stands a church of a denomination which two decades ago officially forbade dancing to its members; today this particular local church is soliciting funds to maintain dancing for its young members in the parish house. Manifestly the patterns proposed then and now lack harmony, and one needs a wider knowledge of values than this situation provides to formulate one's own pattern. Colleges which in 1920 would dismiss girls for smoking cigarettes, now maintain smoking rooms for that sex; yet whatever basic reasons there are for or against the use of tobacco have not changed. So also one needs social and historical perspective to evaluate the "glory" of war, the significance of nationalistic "patriotism," the "sanctity" of property rights as against human rights, the obligations of a child to "honor" parents whose ignorance or selfishness has put a permanent handicap on the child's personality,—and so on among other traditional virtues whose foundations have always rested on some specialized interest rather than on universal values.

Illustrating further the need of perspective in arriving at a sound definition of social values, a great nation which in the time of war drove one of its leaders into shamed retirement because of his pacifism, later made him the honored head of its government. The practices of ancient military leaders in slaughtering and enslaving their prisoners, would make any modern nation which would countenance such acts an outcast among civilized peoples. Yet we moderns drop bombs and strew poison gases over combatants and noncombatants alike. We of the present are kinder than were peoples of old in our treatment of the weak, the helpless, the unfortunate, yet we permit both individuals and corporations to exploit the less fortunate, using their labor and strength to enhance their own aggrandizement and power. But the principle is clear. None but the informed conscience is safe as a guide. No person but the sophisticated person has reached the level of safe moral initiative. Innocence is a poor foundation for self-direction of social behavior. The moral training of the young requires a knowledge of human nature as it finds expression in social processes and institutions.

Still another item is *practice in judging social values and in making decisions*. There is in a true sense no way of *conferring* freedom. Freedom, whether of the will in making moral choices, or freedom of any other kind, must be won if it is to function. For only as freedom thus grows in the individual through use, is its possessor able to employ it in practical situations.

No child, the key word of whose training is subservience rather than responsibility, can be expected to develop proper moral initiative. The old doctrine of "breaking the will" and making the child submissive to external authority, was calculated to produce slaves instead of self-directive personalities. It is reported that Bismarck once said of the German schools of his day, that one-third of the students in the universities were incapacitated for successful work by their bad habits, that another third failed of success later because of habits contracted while at the university, but that the other third ruled Germany.

In so far as this estimate is true, one can but wonder to what extent responsibility for the unfortunate two-thirds lay with the system of control exercised at that time in the German school system. Through the *Gymnasium* (secondary school) German boys were subjected to a discipline of almost military strictness in all items of their conduct, being told what to do, and when, and how, at almost every moment of their school lives, with a rigidity quite unknown in American education. Then upon entrance to the university all this was changed. The youth, unused to freedom and self-direction, was now thrown wholly on his own moral resources. No one looked after his behavior in the least, no one was responsible for his conduct but himself; and he was unaccustomed to responsibility. Though forced in the new situation to make his own decisions on all matters of conduct, the youth had had no practice in choosing his lines of conduct and holding himself responsible for them. The mistake was in trying to confer freedom rather than giving it opportunity for growth.

It is a safe rule in any home or school or club or group, to allow the individual the largest degree of freedom over his own conduct which he is capable of using. In fact it is safe to go farther than that and deliberately to plan situations such that the young, as a part of their education, must assume large responsibility for making decisions and for carrying social choices over into action. In this principle lies the very essence of the character emphasis programs now developing widely throughout the country. Only out of experience in self-direction can moral judgment and responsibility grow.

Moral initiative, power of self-direction, imply certain hardness of fiber that cannot be had except through *discipline imposed by the self*. Happiness should be the keynote of childhood, yet children must learn something of restraint and self-denial. Help should be given the young child in accepting small hurts and disappointments without too much self-pity and lament. Cynthia Ann, six, showed the right spirit when, taken to the doctor for innoculation against whooping cough, she set her teeth and insisted on watching the needle go into her arm.

Many persons are moral weaklings, lacking normal power of self-compulsion, because they allow their emotions and their biases to rule. Intelligence and judgment tell them that this act is right, or that that act is wrong, but emotion unaccustomed to control takes command, and proper response fails. William James once advocated that those who desire to secure command over themselves, should practice daily some heroic act of self-denial or compulsion.

PROBLEMS

1. Is it true that young people find it much more difficult to resist a suggestion that some social code be broken, than a suggestion to participate in some generally commendable activity? What explanation can you offer for this?
2. Compare group pictures, such as of sororities, of the present with those of twenty or thirty years ago. In which is a greater amount of individuality expressed in personal appearance?
3. At what age does the crowd seem to be the normal social group? At what age did you find it most difficult to resist the suggestions of your associates?
4. Mary Carolyn, age four, is readily corrected by the suggestion that she has done something bad. She becomes extremely angry at the statement, "Mary Carolyn is a bad girl." Is her behavior quite unusual?
5. August, a college freshman, tells the writer that he is unalterably opposed to the profit system of economic life. He is being trained for the advertising business. Is it possible that he can be sincere in both attitudes?
6. Ask children of different ages why it is wrong to lie. Do you see any trend in the development of this concept?

7. Examine the practices in the schools you know. To what extent is self-compulsion encouraged?
8. It appears that many young people regard "to be good" as "to be bored." Is this attitude inherent in youth, or must we who would influence them alter our procedures and expectations? Consider this problem in specific detail.

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CHAPTER XIV

INTEGRATION OF CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

PERSONALITY and character have been defined in terms of the development of habitual or consistent modes of conduct, character differing from personality in that it includes only those conduct patterns which involve questions of right and wrong. "Right" and "wrong" have been differentiated in terms of the consequences of conduct for others, its social implications, immediate or delayed. This method of definition seems to accord with available psychological fact and principle.

Attention has been called to the various motive forces, within and without the individual, which, through their interaction in the flow of life situations, gradually mold and establish the conduct patterns of the individual until they become sufficiently consistent and predictable for him to be described as possessing certain "character" and "personality." The individual, in turn, becomes conscious enough of the nature of his habitualized conduct patterns to feel a certain satisfaction in behaving in a fashion consistent with them. This consciousness of consistency has been called "conscience." It should be noted, of course, that one man does not behave morally and another immorally because one has a conscience and the other lacks it; but, rather because each has developed different standards of conduct with which he is being consistent.

The Meaning of Integration

This tendency for human beings to develop a certain consistency of conduct is often referred to in the definitions of character and personality. We may note, for example, such statements as these:

> "In other words, self and personality describe the fact that a long-time view of a person, will show certain persistent trends of behavior."[1]
>
> "From a psychological point of view personality can be observed in the typical or characteristic forms of expression of an individual—his behavior."[2]
>
> "There seems to be two essential features of conduct that go to make up the highest character. One is *uniformity of response.* . . . The other essential feature of character is the *universality of response.* . . . This generalization of conduct seems to be the essence of character."[3]

Is this consistency of conduct what we have in mind when we say that a person has a "well-integrated" personality? Hartshorne and May, after testing children in many different ways, define integration as consistency.

> "We have illustrated from our honesty data our conception of integration as consistency of behavior, but the basic idea and the method of measuring this consistency is quite general. It might be applied to our tests of cooperation, or persistence, or self-control, or moral knowledge, or even our measures of reputation. A combined measure of the individual's consistency upon all these tests might approach an adequate measure of the integration of character."[4]

While this quotation may not be taken as representing the point of view of all psychologists, it does seem that among students of human nature there is rather general agreement on this point. In spite of our frequent inconsistencies, our "slips," and our inability at times to withstand disintegrating forces, most people develop a substantial core of consistent conduct patterns, and this tendency toward consistency is the key to the uniqueness, the individuality, the integration of the individual.

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[1] C. R. Griffith, *An Introduction to Applied Psychology,* p. 578.

[2] J. J. B. Morgan, *The Psychology of Abnormal People,* p. 352.

[3] P. M. Symonds, *The Nature of Conduct,* p. 291.

[4] H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, *Studies in the Organization of Character,* p. 292.

Is Consistency Enough?

Two questions immediately arise. First, can we be satisfied with merely consistent behavior? Second, will not the achievement of consistency tend to hamper the individual in making adjustments to new situations? These two questions demand careful consideration.

Integration and the Quality of Conduct Patterns

The confirmed drunkard, the habitual thief, the chronic liar—all are consistent in those forms of conduct which most clearly characterize them. Are we to say that they have achieved well-integrated characters and personalities? Yes, if consistency is the key to integration. It is quite obvious, however, that the standards of conduct with which the drunkard, the thief, and the liar are being consistent are scarcely those to which people of "good" characters or "desirable" personalities adhere. Society has discredited such conduct as inimical to its best interests. The *quality* of our standards of conduct must bear up under the test of social and individual usefulness before we can accept the standards as "good" or "desirable."

Recognizing, then, the need for a qualitative test for our consistent conduct, what values are there in consistency? Consistency of conduct in accordance with a standard that has become an ideal is of itself a source of real satisfaction to the individual. Some of us hold to an ideal of conduct exemplified by "moderation in all things." To conquer the powerful urge to immoderate anger or outbursts of temper gives us a real "thrill" and an added motive under trying conditions in the future. To the boy who has idealized the conduct of his athlete-hero, the achievement of physical prowess provides satisfactions of lasting and wholesome nature. A college girl who has determined to be friendly and a real friend in spite of a seemingly "natural" inclination to withdraw from social intercourse, is finding real joy in overcoming her shyness and in integrating her conduct about this idealized standard. In brief, the achievement of consistency may at its best bring about those deep satisfactions attendant upon the partial achievement of a compelling ideal.

Consistency is also satisfying to our immediate associates if it stands the test of quality. All of us like the "dependable" person, the one whose conduct can be predicted. We feel safe in relying on such an individual; we are not beset by fears of what he is going to do next. Not that we ever expect our friends always to do just what we think they may. Such consistency is rare and surely would prove dull. But we do like to find in a friend consistency of conduct in those areas that "make a difference"—in the fundamental of social living.

Consistency of conduct on the part of large groups is a fundamental of social stability. During the depression of 1929 this country was unusually free from serious riots and disorders. Was this because Americans were not faced with conditions similar to those that produced revolutionary political changes in other countries? Scarcely. Was it because the American is characteristically docile? Our history would not so indicate. The cause probably is to be found in the fact that Americans have got into the habit of settling their problems by processes that are more orderly in character. In spite of our occasional inconsistencies, as a nation we seem to have learned the value of consistency.

One important fact must not be overlooked in our discussion of consistency and the quality of conduct; that is the tendency for the consistent individual to display conduct of a qualitatively desirable sort. Symonds summarizes a phase of the studies of Hartshorne and May by saying: "The more desirable the qualites a person has in general, the more consistent he is; and the more undesirable the qualities a person has in general, the more inconsistent he is. . . . The man with good character seems to be organized from within; at least, he acts uniformly and consistently with regard to commendable things. But the man with low character is more a creature of chance impulses and is blown about by every change of circumstance."[5]

No one would hold that the relationship suggested to Symonds by Hartshorne and May's findings is perfect or inevitable. But it is high enough in degree to suggest the importance of the integration of conduct about qualitatively acceptable standards.

Integration and Adaptability

Is the person of well-integrated personality and character in danger of being handicapped in new situations demanding immediate adjustments? Will training for consistency produce a race of inflexible automatons incapable of progress through readjustment? These questions are answered partly in the previous section. In every society and in every age there are certain conduct patterns, certain standards that have proved their continuing values. To these adherence may well be demanded. Consistency with reference to them will never be out of date or reactionary. We commonly regard these standards as the fundamental traits of good character—honesty, fairness, dependability, and a host of others. Every generation must learn to value them if it is to preserve good character.

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[5] P. M. Symonds. *Diagnosing Personality and Conduct*, p. 564.

Beyond this core there is a wide circle of conduct patterns that are much more flexible in nature. As suggested earlier (see Chapter II), it is both impossible and undesirable for all people to conform to all group standards; impossible because of wide individual differences in temperament and environmental stimuli, and undesirable because of the contribution of the nonconformist to progress in social relationships.

In a sense, an attitude of inquiring open-mindedness, a willingness to readjust one's conduct to new situations and changing demands, can become a phase of integration on a very high level. The reactionary may find it hard to recognize this but is it not true that the person whose character is best integrated may be consistent to a conduct pattern which can be called a "pattern of adjustment"? If we look about among our friends it is quite possible that some whose characters we most admire are the ones who have developed habits of intelligent nonconformity, ready willingness to adjust to progress. Jesus, the quality of whose character few would question, exemplified this high type of integration. His adherence to a central core of basic virtues, while breaking with outworn traditional standards, is nowhere better illustrated than in His treatment of the Magdalene and her accusers.

That children at an early age should be taught to be deliberate non-conformists, is undesirable. The child, born with no conception of social values, must first learn the value of adherence to authority. That this idea can be carried too far is obvious; witness the educational revolt against repressive classroom discipline. But freedom and adaptability in children need to be fostered by permitting freedom of choice in those matters in which the child may reasonably be expected to exercise good judgment. For example, if provided with even meager facilities, the average child will devise methods of entertaining himself that are wholesome. Yet some parents feel obliged constantly to supervise and dominate the child's every waking moment. The same parents not infrequently worry little if by such practice they are teaching their child to be selfish and demanding, traits too fundamentally undesirable to allow their permanent habituation. The same sort of thing may happen in the classroom. The teacher may demand conformity in theme titles and thus destroy interest and inhibit creativeness.

The child who is permitted throughout his development to have freedom of choice in areas significant to him at the time and within the range of his powers of judgment, while at the same time being held to conformity to the basic social demands, stands a good chance of developing into a well integrated adult. Not only that, he is most apt to become the kind of adult who will distinguish clearly between necessary and unintelligent conformity.

Factors Contributing to Integration

To list briefly the factors contributing to the integration of character and personality, is to review the various motivating forces of human conduct already discussed in earlier chapters. By way of summary let us re-examine these forces.

(1) We must note the factor of *a reasonable conformity to social demands, the ability to select the most significant elements in each life situation, and to respond to them in ways that contribute to the best interests of our fellowmen.* This involves the development of a certain degree of self-restraint. The individual constantly chafing under the demands for conformity cannot achieve integration. He is too often torn between self-interest and group-interest. One psychologist has said that the child who, by the age of three years, has not learned the meaning of the word *No* has had three years preliminary training in crime. While extreme, this statement illustrates the need for developing, early in

childhood, a reasonable willingness to accept authority and to bow to social standards.

That conformity to social demands necessitates an adequate knowledge of these demands goes almost without saying. This knowledge seems to be acquired rather early, being largely the accumulation of about the first fifteen years of life. Doctor Freeman[5] has stated that we need an increased emphasis in our programs of character education, upon training children to acquire an adequate knowledge of the social code. Knowledge, of course, will not of itself insure right conduct; but it is a source of motivation basic to all good character and not to be overlooked, especially in the education of children. We need a greater emphasis upon training children to know and respect proved social values.

(2) Another major contributing factor is *absence of excessive fear, anger, uncertainty, sudden changes of environment, continued failure, and all other forces which produce unnecessary emotional disturbances.* The disintegrating effect of fear, as well as of anger, has already been noted. Uncertainty, in turn, is essentially a cause of fear of unknown consequences. The child who is the victim of parental discipline that fluctuates between excessive cruelty and sentimentality, the schoolboy whose teacher rules by dire threats, the man whose job is constantly at stake—no one of these can achieve that degree of emotional stability so necessary to integration. In no area of the child's experience is it more important that he should have this freedom from uncertainty, than in the home. Uncertainty and confusion may also be caused by sudden changes of environment. For example, teachers know how frequently the child who has just transferred from another school, experiences real problems of adjustment.

Continued failure destroys respect for oneself and leads on the one hand to rebellion, or on the other to a submissive "wishy-washyness," worse even than revolt. The school and vocational histories of delinquents and criminals are too replete with failure to warrant any other conclusion than that much criminality is the "price" of continued failure. The director of education in one state reformatory once told the writer, "Most of the boys in the shops of this institution never felt the thrill of success until they came to work in reformatory shops." The writer has seen a husky twenty-two-year-old reformatory inmate beg in tears to be permitted to continue the laborious translation of books into Braille, the chance to achieve something worth while meant so much to him.

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[5] F. N. Freeman. "Character Is Rooted in Codes," *Character,* Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 4-8, April-May, 1935.

On the positive side success experiences contribute mightily to the maintenance of self-respect. Such experiences can be had, however, only when there is a proper balance between the demands of the tasks in which one is engaged and the abilities which one possesses. One rarely finds a school pupil who dislikes a school subject in which it is possible for him to make good grades. It behooves parents and teachers to recognize and reward even the meagerest of successful endeavors of children. No youngster who makes his first amusing attempts at poetry need be heralded as a future Walt Whitman. But neither should his first efforts be laughed into scorn by thoughtless adults, thus spoiling his chance for self-expression, and for some thrill of success in what, to him, is a new field, and may be a field in which he has real talent.

Success not only contributes to the happiness of the individual, but his willingness to recognize the successes of others makes the individual well-liked by them. We like the people who realize our worth, who compliment our efforts. This trait is an essential in those who would be good friends.

(3) It is almost axiomatic to say that mental well-being is dependent upon *physical well-being*. The least ill-health can do

is to spoil our dispositions temporarily. The most it can do, if we live, is to make permanent changes in our personality. That this is especially true of young children has been noted in a previous chapter.

It is well to emphasize that by "good physical health" is meant more than just the absence of physical defect or disease. That is not enough. It means a feeling of buoyant physical well-being, a sense of fitness that gives force to personality.

(4) *Willingness to face facts* involves a degree of objectivity toward oneself. The individual unable to see himself clearly and to evaluate his own conduct is handicapped in his character development. If personal selfishness induces him to feign sickness in order to gain immediate favor or advantage, he may soon so deceive himself as to suffer the ill-effects upon personality that real illness might bring. Or if he cannot see how uninteresting his interminable stories are, he develops into the unbearable bore. This objectivity of outlook toward oneself should not be confused with excessive self-criticism or morbid introspection. In its best sense the former means a reasonable sensitiveness to the effects of one's conduct upon others. If my neighbor insists on playing his radio loudly at all hours of the night, he is failing to recognize the undesirable social effects of such conduct. If a youth in school refuses to conform to reasonable rules of conduct in the classroom, it may be because he lacks the motive or the knowledge necessary to foresee the effect of that conduct on others. Without carrying it to the extreme of over self-consciousness, every child should learn by experience and instruction to evaluate his conduct in the light of its social consequences.

In another sense willingness to face facts involves a disposition to meet unpleasant and even exasperating situations squarely. The danger in attempts to escape from reality lies in the disintegrating effects bound to result when eventually the individual is *forced* to face reality. For example, the child who runs away from home to escape punishment for a serious breach of the home code of conduct, must eventually return to a situation which he has made far worse than the original was.

This willingness to face realities—both as regards the consequences of conduct and the unpleasant experiences of life—is not an ability to be developed simply by moral persuasion. From early childhood every individual needs to be treated as a responsible agent. The home in which no effort is made to foster personal responsibility through a fair distribution of home tasks among children and parents, and in which socially undesirable conduct is condoned on the grounds that "boys will be boys," is fostering a spirit of irresponsibility that must ultimately lead to serious conflict between the child and social demands. This conflict in turn may encourage such flights from reality as only to compound the child's difficulties in attempting to make proper social adjustments.

(5) The factor of *a favorable social environment* deserves marked consideration. While we ordinarily like to think of man as a self-determining creature, able by the force of superior will to choose his standards, sociology and psychology tell us that this is true only in part. The sob-sister's plea that the young criminal "never had a chance" is all too true in many cases. All of us are to a degree the products of the social settings which form the stages of our lives. If the setting is such as to encourage desirable conduct, to make it the natural thing, our inclination is to choose the best. If the setting is vicious and unwholesome, it is hard for us to live above it. No one, of course, would hold that we are entirely at the mercy of environmental forces. Our court records are too full of substantiating evidence, however, to deny the validity of the general principle expressed in this paragraph.

The significance of this principle for those interested in fostering consistent adherence to desirable patterns of conduct, is at once evident. Integration is difficult if the home environment is disintegrating, though the school may set up the most wholesome of social environments. In fact, the child forced to live in two or three qualitatively different settings at once, is being subjected to a definitely disintegrating force. Teachers need to be concerned lest in the school they create situations that tend to tear down rather than integrate good conduct. It is to be regretted that such is all too often the case, as for example the disintegrating effect of most examination procedures. In brief, it is easiest to be good when the situation makes goodness easy.

(6) *Good character* must be an ideal around which all our efforts to achieve it become integrated. With many people good character is idealized through its embodiment in some individual. With others the ideal of character is more abstract. In either case, character is an ideal, pulling the individual on. It is evident that good character is an achievement, and that it is not acquired by those who see no worth in it.

We are not to think of this recognition of the value of character solely as a matter of formal acceptance of an intellectual proposition. There must be real satisfaction attendant upon conduct which is recognized as "good," and satisfaction is largely a matter of emotion. Much of this satisfaction comes through the approval of the group which is expressed, directly or indirectly, whenever the individual conforms to group standards that have proved their social value. It is the history of civilization that these group standards gradually rise in quality. Thus succeeding generations will achieve greater and more lasting satisfactions from higher and higher standards of conduct. Until men in general have developed a more nearly universal recognition of the value of human personality, they will continue to place stumbling blocks in the way of those whose characters and personalities are in the process of integration. As long as men permit the desire for profit to blind them to their social responsibility, certain disintegrating forces will thrive, such as the salacious book and magazine, the sex-ridden movie, the hair-raising radio crime school, the thousand and one conditions that make the achievement of character difficult.

The whole force of education, through home, church and school, must constantly, at all individual age levels, be pitted against the disintegrating forces of selfish greed and blind ignorance. Without this force the future outlook for character development is not optimistic. On the other hand, reasonable conformity to social demands, freedom from persistent emotional disturbances, health, a willingness to face facts, a favorable social environment, and a recognition of the value of character,—with these six conditions met to a reasonable degree, the integration of desirable personality and good character is possible and reasonably probable.

PROBLEMS

1. Select some person whom you know very well, perhaps your best friend. In one column write down the outstanding consistent traits of this person. In a second column write down this person's inconsistencies. Which of these two sets of characteristics seems to you the more important? Which column contains the more characteristics that attract you to this person?
2. Keep a careful account of your activities for one day, listing them in serial order. Check all those activities that are determined chiefly by custom or habit. What does this suggest to you as to the importance of custom and habit in your life?
3. Would your experience and observation lead you to agree with Hartshorne and May that consistency of conduct and high quality of conduct usually go together?
4. What practical suggestions can you formulate that look toward educating children for adaptability and flexibility in the realm of conduct? List several specific areas in which you would permit a child to make his own choices.

5. What characteristics of our modern schools tend to stress conformity? Adaptability?
6. Is obedience a desirable habit? Always?
7. What are the recreational pursuits you like best? In which of these do you feel you are reasonably successful or skillful? Do you tend to like the things you do well?
8. Do you think everyone can succeed at something? If so, how do you account for the many "failures" to be found in most communities?
9. Give illustrations from your experience of the kinds of facts persons fail to face squarely.
10. Have you ever had a definite ambition to better social conditions? What steps have you taken to realize this purpose?
11. In your own words formulate a list of criteria by which you would judge whether or not a person had achieved a high level of integration of character and personality.

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